



The Early Services of
Field Marshal The Duke of
Wellington in India.

Vol. - 2


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THE EARLY SERVICES
OF
FIELD MARSHAL THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON,
IN
INDIA.

WITH THE OFFICIAL AND OTHER DISPATCHES.

To Colonel Murray.

SIR,

Camp, 12th June, 1803*.

‘I am sorry to hear so bad an account of the pontoons. I suspected that the roads would not be very good when the rains commenced; and for that reason, as well as because I expect that the rivers will fill between the 14th and 20th, I wished that the pontoons should leave Panwell on the 8th, at latest.

‘You have done every thing you could do; and I dare say that when Lieut. Goodfellow shall arrive at Panwell, many of the difficulties of which Captain Young complains will be removed.

‘When we quitted Poonah, Captain Graham was advancing rapidly with the soucars; and I make no doubt but that in a short time he will have been able to procure from them a sufficient supply for this body of troops; and I hoped that your paymaster would be able to make equal progress.

‘You should not confine your dealings to one soucar. Open a communication with every soucar in Poonah, and take money from any man who will give it to you for bills upon Calcutta, Benares, Lucknow, or Madras; I can send them to you.

* *Memorial addressed to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah by Lieut. Colonel Collins, Chikley, 12th June, 1803.*

‘When Colonel Collins had the honor of an audience with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 6th of Saffter (28th May), the Colonel, by order of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, urged many cogent reasons and persuasions to induce the Maharajah to declare, without delay or reserve, whether the late negotiations carried on between his court, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswant Rao Holkar, had been entered into for the purpose of obstructing the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassein between his Highness the Peshwah and the British Government.

‘If you find that you cannot get on with the shroffs, you must write to Mr. Duncan, and press him to send you money. He will be able to do so, as I know that lately the state of the finances at Bombay has considerably mended; but if you want cash immediately for the purchase of the bullocks I mentioned to you in my letter, there is money of mine in the hands of Lieut. Colonel Close, for which you may call for this purpose, in proportion as you may want it.

‘I have bought twenty-seven camels to carry the camp equipage of the 78th regiment, which I propose should be paid for by the government of Bombay. The people from whom I bought them have paid the money into my treasury, and have desired to have a bill upon Poonah for it; I have complied with their request, and have given them a bill for 4700 Chandory rupees upon Captain Matheson. If it will distress Captain Matheson to pay this bill, you may also

‘But although Colonel Collins was extremely urgent with the Maharajah to give him instant information on this important point, and although the Colonel particularly pointed out the line of conduct which the British Government would be compelled to pursue, should the required explanation be withheld, yet the ministers of this durbar repeatedly declared that Colonel Collins must not expect any satisfactory answer to this question until a meeting had taken place between the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar. Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah also said, that he could not, without a violation of his faith, give Colonel Collins the satisfaction he demanded, until he (the Maharajah) had conversed with Ragojee Bhoonslah; but that after his interview with that Rajah, the Colonel should be informed whether there would be peace or war.

‘The proposed conference between Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having taken place, Colonel Collins now expects that the Maharajah will, conformably to his promise, explicitly declare whether it is his design to obstruct the completion of the treaty of Bassein, either by means of his own power, or in conjunction with Ragojee Bhoonslah and Jeswant Rao Holkar; and Colonel Collins further requires that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will state, without reserve, whether it be his present wish and intention to maintain and preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between his sirdar and the British Government.

‘Finally, in performance of his duty, Colonel Collins apprizes the Maharajah, that should he now refuse or delay to give explicit answers to the foregoing questions, and continue with his army south of the Nerbudda, such refusal or delay will be regarded by his Excellency as an avowal of hostile designs on the part of this court against the British Government; Colonel Collins therefore hopes that motives of moderation and justice, as well as a proper sense of his own interests, will induce Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to act on the present occasion conformably with the relations of amity which have so long subsisted between the two states, and which have never been violated on the part of the English, and consistently with the declaration that he (the Maharajah) made to the Colonel on the 29th of Zeeadeh (24th March): but should the Maharajah decline giving Colonel Collins the satisfaction which he now demands, in this case the Colonel requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will furnish him with a party of horse to escort him as far as Aurungabad, together with supplies of grain sufficient for the subsistence of his sepoys and followers, until their arrival at that city.

‘J. COLLINS.’

take that sum from Colonel Close. But the expense of these camels will appear hereafter in Captain Matheson's accounts, and if he has that money he may as well pay it at present.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Maxwell.

'DEAR COLONEL,

'13th June, 1803.

'I do not clearly comprehend the object of the papers which you showed me last night, and I wish to have it explained to me.

'In consequence of a representation from the officers of the cavalry, made by Colonel Dallas, I obtained the permission of the Commander-in-Chief, that a limited expense should be incurred for forage for their horses, when the corps should be placed in situations where it might be impossible for the grass cutters to supply the necessary quantity; and I issued orders upon the subject on the 3rd of June, in which, in obedience to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, I limited the period that the public should pay to those days I thought the grass cutters might have found it difficult to procure the necessary supply of forage.

'It appears, however, that notwithstanding the people attached to the gun bullocks procured forage for them, and that two hundred pioneers employed to cut grass for the carriage bullocks procured forage for these animals, the officers commanding troops continued to purchase forage for the horses during the time the troops were encamped near Chinchore.

'It is my opinion that the grass cutters ought also to have procured forage for the horses in the same situation; an opinion in which I am happy to find that you most fully agree; and that being the case, I cannot allow additional expense to be incurred by the public on account of forage during that period, without disobeying the orders of the Commander-in-Chief.

'The object of the papers which you showed me last night was, I understood, to convince me that additional expense had been incurred during the period above alluded to, by the officers commanding troops, of which I have no doubt; and to apprise me that as the expense was not to be paid for the period during which you and I are of opinion the grass cutters could and ought to have supplied the forage, as well during that which they could not, the officers commanding troops

were desirous not to receive any of it. It is unlucky that they did not fully explain, when they made their representation, that they wanted an additional permanent allowance to purchase forage, and not one merely to make good an expense incurred in consequence of extraordinary circumstances: but at all events I wish to know whether I now comprehend what was intended to be shown by those papers, as I propose to recall the order which I issued on the 3rd of June.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Maxwell.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 13th June, 1803.

‘ I return Mr. Duncan’s letter, and the copy of a paper received this day from Colonel Stevenson. The latter appears to be a fiction. The demand of the contribution from Mulcapoor could not have been made. Gopal Rao Bhow could not have entered the Nizam’s territories; and Ingolia could not have marched without Colonel Collins’s knowledge, and he says nothing of these events in his letter of the 6th to Malcolm.

‘ I doubt Holkar’s invasion of Guzerat, because the rains have set in, and he cannot remain in that country with his cavalry.

‘ It is very improbable that Scindiah’s man would have yielded possession of Bulsaur quietly, on the very day that Holkar came into the country. It is more likely that the officer’s cavalry was Scindiah’s.

‘ The patel of Nimgaum, however, told me this day, that he had heard that Holkar marched from Chandore, five days ago, for the Condabarry ghaut.

‘ I learn from Mr. Duncan that he has not got for me one carriage bullock, and not all the draught wanted even for the bridge; and yet he requires me to march off at once to the Attavesy!!!

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

‘ I received last night your letters of the 7th. I rather doubt the intelligence enclosed therein, from Rajah Mohiput Ram. I have letters from Colonel Collins, of a date as late

as the 6th, in which he does not mention either of these events, with which he certainly would have been acquainted, and would have noticed if they had been true.

‘Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, however, have certainly met; and a few days will, I think, bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

‘I am at present encamped about twenty miles to the southward of Ahmednuggur, and I intend to seize that place immediately, if there should be a war. I shall afterwards cross the Godavery, and act in co-operation with the troops under your command.

‘I wish you to move towards Aurungabad, with a view to be prepared to make the arrangements at that place which I informed you that the Nizam’s government had in contemplation, as soon as you shall receive a communication of their wishes upon the subject. These arrangements will, it is to be hoped, secure that place, which is a very great object gained. In the mean time, if Baba Ingliia, or Gopal Rao Bhow, or any other Marhatta chief should enter the Nizam’s territories, he must be beaten out, and cut up, if possible. If such a one should come within a forced march or two of your cavalry, I recommend to you to dash at him, taking with you the Company’s and the Nizam’s cavalry.

‘I do not wish you to move your main body from Aurungabad, till that post shall have been secured: but even if the chiefs you have mentioned, or any other Marhatta chiefs, not having a greater number of troops than those stated, should presume to enter the Nizam’s territories, at too great a distance for you to march with your Company’s cavalry, I think that the fiery Nabobs ought to be slipped against them without loss of time.

‘Indeed, in my opinion, it would be best if you were to keep the Nabobs in motion at some distance from you, at all events; and thus prevent these wandering small parties of Marhattas, who, I suspect, will be disavowed by all the great chiefs, from entering the Nizam’s territories. If these small parties, or even the great chiefs, can be terrified into tranquillity, for a short time, the game will be won; they will become tired and will immediately disperse to seek for plunder elsewhere.

‘If the question of peace or war should remain undecided for any length of time, I must still remain to the southward of the Godavery, till I can seize Ahmednuggur. In that case, I shall be either on the road to Puttun, or on that from Poonah to Aurungabad; and your hircarrahs will find me on

one or the other. I shall let you know which, as soon as I shall have found out on which there is most forage.

'If, by the slowness and indecision of all transactions in which the Marhattas are concerned, I should be detained on this side of the Godavery till that river shall have filled, which I think probable, I must get you to speak to Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor to collect boats for me at Toka, at which place I propose to cross, if possible. Toka is, I believe, within the Nizam's territories, and is the place at which the last of the rivers that fill the Godavery falls into it. It is on the road from Poonah to Aurungabad.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I have just received your letters of the 8th and 9th, which make no alterations necessary in the above.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp, at Angah, 14th June, 1803.

'Nothing particular has occurred since I last wrote to you.

'The Marhatta sirdars are still at Poonah, waiting, as I understood from Colonel Close, to take leave of the Peshwah. But they all say that they will come forward, as soon as they shall have performed that ceremony.

'The Peshwah has promised to write to Scindiah to desire him not to advance to Poonah, but he had not yesterday written his letter.

'Matters remained nearly in the same state in Scindiah's camp; but the Rajah of Berar acknowledged on the 5th, that he had received the letter written to him by the Governor General, with the treaty of Bassein.

'I enclose a report which I received yesterday, written by a gentleman employed to take possession of the districts ceded to the Company to the northward of Surat. These districts had been occupied by an officer of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, under a sunnud from Ballojee Koonger, Scindiah's vakeel, and the Peshwah's former minister. The possession was refused to the British Government by Scindiah's officer, and Mr. Inglis had that day obtained it partly by threats, and by showing a detachment under Captain Horton going to take possession of the fort of Parneira.

'Along with this report there came another, written by a native, on the 5th of June, from the ghaut, stating that Holkar had gone towards Dhar, in Malwa. I know also that

Holkar had not marched from the neighborhood of Chandore on the 2nd.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I do not believe that Holkar is gone into Guzerat. It is my opinion that if he had been so near as is supposed, Scindiah’s officer, who must have known it, would not have given up the districts on that same day to Mr. Inglis. Even if Scindiah and Holkar had not made peace, the officer would have known that the consequence of his entry must have been confusion, during which he could hold the district with impunity. It is much more probable that the party of horse seen by the officer of the 86th belonged to Scindiah, and that they were posted on the road to prevent Mr. Inglis from communicating with Surat; and indeed if they really had belonged to Holkar, they would either have cut up the officer of the 86th, or if they did not do that they would not have said that they were his troops.

‘There is a letter also of the 7th, from Mr. Inglis to Mr. Duncan, in which not a word is said of the supposed irruption of Holkar, and no account of it has been received from Surat.

‘I have desired Colonel Stevenson to move up to Aurungabad, in order to be prepared to secure that place from the present soubahdar, as soon as the Nizam shall express a wish to that effect.

‘I am now about twenty miles to the southward of Ahmednuggur. The country has suffered much, but I contrive to get a little forage.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 15th June, 1803*.

‘Amrut Rao’s vakeel has just been with me, and has expressed a most anxious wish to have an answer to his letter.

* *Memorandum transmitted by Lieut. Colonel Close, Resident at Poonah, to the Governor General.*

‘His Highness the Peshwah, having been made acquainted with the substance of the correspondence between Amrut Rao and Major General Wellesley, is satisfied that his brother is disposed to return to his family, and to abandon the rebellious. The Peshwah, therefore, is inclined, from motives of mercy, to forget what has passed, and it is his intention to allow Amrut Rao (on his returning to the path of his duty) country to the amount of four lacs per annum, as long as he continues to obey the Peshwah’s orders, and resides wherever he may be directed. This offer will be made to Amrut Rao by Major General Wellesley, who will inform him, at the same time, that he must come up to camp in ten days after the receipt of this offer, or else it will not be considered valid, and he will be then treated as a rebel, and an enemy to the state.’

He says that Amrut Rao has seen a letter from Anund Rao Holkar to Jeswunt Rao, in which the former states that the Peshwah had informed him that Amrut Rao was in treaty with the English, and his Highness recommended that Jeswunt Rao Holkar should seize him. Amrut Rao, therefore, pretends to apprehend that he is in some danger in his present situation at Nassuck, and he has desired to have a letter from me, authorizing him to come to Sungum-nair, or even to this camp, for protection; or that I should consent to his increasing his forces so as to provide for his own safety.

In answer I told him, that I saw clearly that Amrut Rao's situation was delicate, but that I could do no more than urge the Peshwah to state what answer should be given to this letter; that if I advised him to go to Sungum-nair, he might be disturbed by the Peshwah's troops; that if I advised him to come here, I might be obliged to reduce him to the alternative of staying without a provision from the Peshwah, or of going off again, if his Highness should not consent to pardon him; and that, besides, his Highness might have some reason to complain if I was to receive into my camp, as a friend, a person whom he should consider as an enemy.

In respect to his proposal, that I would consent to his increasing his forces, I could not recommend that measure, as I knew that he must provide for them by the plunder of the country, which would only bring him into fresh difficulties.

The vakeel then remonstrated respecting the plunder of Amrut Rao's servants at Poonah, and other places within the Peshwah's reach, in which they resided. In answer to this I observed, that this misfortune was the consequence of the state of enmity in which the brothers were, and that their reconciliation would be the only remedy for it. In answer to his request, that we should interfere in their favor, I observed, that would produce no good, and might probably draw from the Peshwah an observation, that we made friends of his enemies. The vakeel then said, we can retaliate, and have people in our power on whom we can be revenged. I answered, I could not recommend this, because it would be a breach of Amrut Rao's engagements with me, in consequence of which I had undertaken to make his peace with the Peshwah; that the principle of that measure was a desire on his part to be forgiven by his sovereign, which desire would be but ill manifested by an attack on his servants and adherents. It is very desirable, on many accounts, that this man should have an answer soon; and I shall be obliged to you,



if you will urge the Peshwah to come to a decision on the subject.

‘The vakeel informed me that Holkar was about ten coss from Chandore, and that he had built sheds to cover in his horses for the monsoon.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, at Angah, 16th June, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 14th. I sincerely hope that you may succeed in getting us some bullocks, and in bringing forward the brinjaries. I have got a few bullocks from the Nizam’s country; but so few, that they do not replace the casualties even amongst the Bombay carriage bullocks.

‘We have had rain, which has done much mischief to our weak cattle. In short, nothing but the required assistance from Poonah can keep us in the field.

‘I hear good accounts of Ahmednuggur; it is full of every thing we want. The property of this country is lodged there. The capture of that place will relieve our immediate distresses, and will give every body spirits. But the resources of Poonah must keep us in the field during the rainy season.

‘My people got there 3000 bullocks in one month, besides the cattle purchased by individuals and bazaar people.

‘Have you got any description of Ahmednuggur?

‘I received accounts of Holkar this morning. He was, with all his army, Meer Khan, &c., at Abhoona, on the 10th; this place is fifteen coss to the northward of Doorup. The fall of rain had been very violent in that part of the country, and his army was in the greatest distress. It was still reported that he was going towards Guzerat. He had heard of my march from Poonah, and arrival upon the Goor river.

‘I had a letter yesterday from Colonel Stevenson, of the 10th: he had received accounts from Scindiah’s camp, stating it was reported there that it was intended to attempt to seize Holkar, if he should come to the proposed meeting.

‘Colonel Stevenson’s man also writes him that the Nizam, the Rajah of Berar, and Scindiah are on good terms; and

the Colonel appears to think that there was something in this report, as the Nizam's sirdars had not accompanied him on his march that day, on the ground of their cattle being out foraging. He therefore thinks of having recourse to the measure he proposed before, in order, as he calls it, to pledge the Nizam to his cause.

'Another reason for delaying to attempt to take possession of Savanore, till we are relieved from all apprehension to the northward, is the necessity of keeping my rear quiet. I may get orders from Goklah and Appah Sahib to their troops, but these will not obey them. A contest will follow to a certainty, unless we should be very strong, which we shall not be without General Stuart breaks up his army.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp at Angah, 17th June, 1803

'I have received your letter of the 15th, and I return the enclosure.

'I hear this morning, from Amrut Rao's vakeel, that Holkar has crossed the Taptée, with an intention of invading Guzerat. This intention may be carried into execution hereafter, but cannot at present, I should imagine. It would be well, however, if Mr. Duncan were apprized of this movement of Holkar's army, in order that some troops may be placed between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, where, I believe, there are none at present.

'The best mode of settling with the ferrymen upon the Beemah and Goor, will be to give them a monthly payment for every body belonging to us, who, in consequence thereof, must be allowed to pass without paying toll. Will you be so kind as to have that matter settled? I am very anxious for some description of Ahmednuggur

'I suspect that the chiefs are coming forward; but they have spun out the time in order to allow the rivers to fill, and that they may be late in showing themselves with this army. If the rivers should fill before they march from Poonah, they ought still to be forced to march, and to cross the Beemah at different fords. One party as low down as Gardoon. The party that passes there will be clear of the Goor.

'The weather is still very bad, and distresses us much. I hope that the durbar will not deceive us respecting the brinjarries.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 18th June, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 16th. I apprized you yesterday of the intelligence I had received of Holkar's movements, which I believe to be authentic. A man came in from his camp this morning, who says that he left him on the 11th on his march to the northward; that he appeared to be in a hurry; that he was making long marches, leaving behind every body that could not keep up with him; and that it was reported in his camp, not only that he intended to cross the Taptee, but likewise the Nerbudda, and to go into the Holkar territory to the northward of that river. I think his crossing the Taptee at all, if he afterwards should cross the Nerbudda, looks very like a break up of the confederacy. I do not think it probable that Holkar would trust the defence of Chandore to Scindiah, if he is to be involved in hostilities with us. It appears by the map that Chickly is north of the Taptee: if that is the case, the confederates are all now north of that river; and we have nothing to apprehend at present for the safety of the Nizam's territories.

'We are much distressed by the rain, and lose many cattle. If you find that you cannot depend upon the Poopah brinjarries, and if Collins still hangs on at Scindiah's durbar, and I cannot take a decided step regarding Ahmednuggur; and if I learn from Colonel Stevenson that he can give me no assistance in cattle or provisions, I must recross the Beemah, in order to subsist. I do not think Colonel Stevenson can give me any assistance, as I learn that rice sells in his camp at the rate of four seers for a rupee; and I have not got a grain of rice from the country since the 6th. Indeed I am now shut out of the rice countries by the rivers.

'You see, therefore, that all depends upon your success at Poonah, unless we should have a war; in which case I expect that the capture of Ahmednuggur will set me up again

'It is very extraordinary that the Peshwah's government should have sent nobody to settle his country, which runs

from Poonah up to this place ; the people are in the villages, but there appears no government, nor indeed any thing except thieving.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

SIR,

‘ Camp near Angah, 18th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 15th.

‘ I conclude that you continue to issue half a seer of rice per diem, gratis, to the native troops ; and if you do that, I think it very immaterial what the price of rice may be in the Poonah bazaar.

‘ If you should not have done so hitherto, you may as well now issue the rice to the troops at that rate.

‘ We have been much distressed by the rain, and I am very anxious indeed for the cattle.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

‘ Camp at Angah, 18th June, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant and its enclosures. I had already directed Colonel Stevenson to march upon Aurungabad, and I now enclose a copy of the instructions which I have given to that officer with a view to the future security of that place.

‘ I understand that Meer Khan has withdrawn to the northward, and it is probable that he has heard of the disinclination of the Nizam’s government to hire all his troops.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

SIR,

‘ Camp at Angah, 18th June. 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose an extract of a letter, and a copy of its enclosure, which I have received from Major Kirkpatrick, from which it appears that it is the intention of the Nizam’s government, that the person who has hitherto been in charge of the fort of Aurungabad should be deprived of his charge ; that it should be delivered to the person who may appear to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and the British officers.

to be most fit for the trust; and that such measures and arrangements should be adopted as will tend to the security of that fort, in case the course of operations should draw the troops in the field to a distance from it.

‘I observe that Rajah Mohiput Ram is referred to me upon all these points; but as some time must elapse before I can reach Aurungabad; and as it is a matter of the utmost importance that that place should be as secure as it can be made at the earliest possible period of time; and as you know as well as I do, what measures ought to be adopted upon this occasion, I must beg you to consult with Rajah Mohiput Ram, and to make such arrangements for the security of Aurungabad as you may think best.

‘I think it probable that the garrison at present in Aurungabad will refuse to give up the fort, unless an engagement is made to pay them their arrears. Rajah Mohiput Ram must determine whether the arrears are to be paid or not; but, at all events, I request that the intention to make a new arrangement for the defence of the fort may be kept secret, till all your measures shall have been prepared to take possession of it by force, if the garrison should refuse to give it up.

‘If Rajah Mohiput Ram should consent to pay the arrears, and the troops should desire that you would engage that they should be paid, you may make such an engagement, first taking care to have from Rajah Mohiput Ram a paper, by which he will engage that the Nizam’s government shall pay the sum required within a month.

‘When you have settled the point with Rajah Mohiput Ram, you will call upon the commanding officer of the fort of Aurungabad to give it up, and you will give him two hours to consider of your demand.

‘If the garrison should refuse to give up the fort on any grounds, you must attack it, and get possession of it by force; but I request you to give strict orders that the place may not be plundered, and that no disorder may be committed by our troops who may be employed on this service. The officers must recollect that many females of the Nizam’s family are in Aurungabad, and that his Highness would be more sensible of any injuries that they may suffer from the licentiousness of the troops, than he will be of the benefit which his government might derive from their valor and discipline.

‘You will strongly urge Rajah Mohiput Ram to satisfy the present garrison of Aurungabad regarding their arrears;

and will point out to him, as a motive for attending to your recommendation, the possibility that disorders may be committed by the troops on taking possession of the place, if they should be obliged to take it by force.

‘After obtaining possession of the place, you will examine it, and see what number of men, ordnance, stores, &c. are necessary for its defence; you will call upon Rajah Mohiput Ram to supply those men, &c., if possible without weakening the force which is with you in the field; and you will make an arrangement with him for the quantity of provisions that may be required, which he also must take measures to lodge in the fort.

‘It is reasonable to suppose that Rajah Mohiput Ram must know best to whom the Nizam is desirous of giving charge of this fort in future, and you will place there as killadar whomever he may point out.

‘You will observe, by the enclosed paper, that the present killadar of Aurungabad is to be sent to Hyderabad: of course care must be taken to secure his person at the time that you will summon the fort to surrender, if he should be still in your camp. The troops in the fort may be suffered to depart whenever they please, or may be disposed of in such manner as Rajah Mohiput Ram may think proper.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 19th June, 1803.

‘I was so anxious that you should get my letter of yesterday in good time, that I did not detain your hircarrahs longer than the time necessary to fold it up.

‘I have suffered a great loss in carriage bullocks, and I find it difficult to replace them in this country, which is so exhausted. I shall therefore be much obliged to you if you will endeavour to get me some. Let them be purchased on account of the Company, and send them off to me in charge of any careful people you may have to spare. Even one or two hundred at a time would be of use, although I want as many thousands.

‘I hope to hear from you soon respecting rice, particularly whether any of that grain is to be procured in the Kurmilla or Perinda district.

‘The accounts of my hircarrahs, from Holkar’s camp, agree with those you have sent; excepting that mine say

it is reported that he intends to cross the Taptee and the Nerbudda, and to go into his own (or rather the Holkar) territories.

'Amrut Rao's vakeel in this camp says that Holkar has crossed the Taptee, and is going to plunder Guzerat. I think it probable that when he made those long marches, it was with a view to cross the Taptee before that river should fill, of which there was a great probability from the rains which fell to the northward on the 7th, 8th, and 9th.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 19th June, 1803.

'Our distresses increase upon us for want of cattle. I was obliged to leave behind this morning 500 loads of stores, and 100 of provisions. You will be a judge of the mortality of cattle from the following statement. There was a muster on the 15th, and there were 500 good carriage bullocks, in the grain and provision department, more than were required for the loads, and a sufficiency in the stores. The consumption between the 15th and 18th was 250 loads of provisions; and yet on the 18th the deficiency of carriage is found to be 100, making the loss of cattle in the provision department, in three days, 850 bullocks. In the store department it has been, in the same period of time, about 600. The gun cattle keep up well, notwithstanding the bad weather; but it is by force of exertion.

'Yesterday the drivers were out till nine at night in quest of forage. We moved a short distance in the morning, and they must have been in motion at three o'clock, so that these people were on foot for eighteen hours yesterday. I have been in difficulties of this kind before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount these, if I can get any assistance from Poonah, or if the Peshwah or his people will show any sign of our being here upon his business, or even with his knowledge or consent: or if he will not do that, if he will send any thing like an amildar to the country, or any body to take charge of the government, with whom I might communicate. But, under present circumstances, I am in a worse situation by far than I should be in an enemy's country: in such, I should act for myself, and should establish a government as I go on. There is forage in the country and grain also, but it is all hidden under ground:

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and we are forced to dig for every thing we get, notwithstanding that we give a large price for it. I have written to Colonel Stevenson for cattle. I have people employed in the Nizam's country to purchase, and in the neighborhood of camp also. But our best chance is Poonah.

'I have just received your letter of the 17th. I have not got the copy of the dispatch of the 30th of May; but I fancy I may get it, as I had yesterday a letter from Colonel Stevenson, dated the 15th. However, as attempts were made to stop the hircarrah, it would be as well if you were to send me a copy of the dispatch.

'I am very confident you will mention Amrut Rao's affairs, as soon as you may have a fair opportunity. The vakeel was with me again yesterday, and said, among other things, that as the Peshwah would not do any thing for Amrut Rao, he and his adherents intended to throw themselves upon the mercy of the English Government; and he asked whether, in that case, any thing would be done for him? I told him it was time enough to turn our thoughts to that subject, when we should find that the Peshwah would not pardon him. He told me that they were all in the very greatest distress, that they really had not subsistence.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I think it is very clear that Amrut Rao is not one of the confederates.'

To Lieut. General Stuart

'SIR.

'Camp at Rony, 19th June, 1803.

'I received accounts yesterday that Holkar has moved to the northward: it is reported in his camp, that he intends to cross the Taptee and the Nerbudda, and to take up his quarters for the rains in the Holkar territories. It is also reported that his march to the northward was made with a view to approach Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Amrut Rao's vakeel, who is in this camp, informed me this day, that Holkar had crossed the Taptee, and that it was his intention to enter that part of Guzerat lying between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda. He certainly moved off from the neighborhood of Chandore very suddenly, and made long and forced marches, leaving behind every body and every thing that could not keep up.

'I know that the rains began to the northward on the 7th, and that it rained violently on the 8th, 9th, and 10th; and

I concluded that his object in making these forced marches, at that very time, was to get across the Taptee before that river should fill, of which there must have been a great probability.

‘I think that if Holkar has crossed the Taptee there will be no confederacy. There has been no further account of the irruption into Guzerat south of the Taptee, since that which I sent you on the 14th, and I conclude that my conjectures upon that subject are correct.

‘We have had much rain in this quarter, and I am sorry to say, that I was obliged this day to leave behind 500 loads of stores, and 100 of provisions; notwithstanding that at a muster, taken on the 15th, both departments were complete, and the provision department had 500 bullocks more than there were loads. Since that day, that department has lost 850 bullocks, and the stores about 600.* Individuals, brinjaries, bazaar-people, &c., have suffered in proportion, and the distress is very great. The gun cattle, however, are still in style, but it is the consequence of great exertion.

‘I have experienced these difficulties before, and have surmounted them; and I shall surmount those which we at present feel, if I can get any assistance from Poonah; or if the Peshwah will only send a man to take charge of the government of the country; or will give the smallest sign of our being friends, and here upon his business and with his knowledge and consent. Under existing arrangements, there is no government in the country; the heads of villages do as they please: I can find nobody to communicate with, and, of course, cannot command its resources.

‘I do not know how the Peshwah manages his concerns; but we have not yet had the smallest assistance from Poonah of any kind. Notwithstanding my repeated requisitions to Colonel Close, and his request to the government, none of the sirdars have joined us, and as late as the 16th, had not quitted Poonah.

‘The Peshwah’s servants are very profuse in promises, but very sparing in performance; and we have enjoyed so little of the resources of the country, which it is so obviously the advantage of the inhabitants to supply to us, that I am almost induced to suspect counteraction on the part of the government. I shall be convinced of it, if the Peshwah omits much longer to write to Scindiah, of which I apprized you of the intention, but he has not yet written. If there

* In the heavy rains in India the brinjarry and draught bullocks always suffer by exposure. They stick in the mud, hog their backs, droop their heads, and die.

are not now counteractions on the part of the Peshwah, certainly his government must be the weakest, and his people the most extraordinary existing in India. It is his interest that this force should be enabled to keep the field; and that of his people to sell those of the resources of the country which are to enable us to do it. Yet we cannot get them; and I think it very probable that I shall be obliged to cross the Beemah to be able to subsist upon the stores which I have collected at Poonah.

'I have written to all quarters for assistance in cattle, and I am doing every thing I can in this country. I have also inquired of Colonel Stevenson, whether he can afford to share with me his supplies of rice. I shall struggle hard to avoid this movement; but I think it proper to apprise you of the possibility of it, and of the circumstances which may occasion it.

'The troops are healthy, notwithstanding the rain to which they have been exposed, and the cavalry horses are in good order; but our great difficulty at the present moment is, to find grain for them: there is plenty in the country, but it is all hid in holes; and, notwithstanding the price we pay, we get none that we do not dig up; in short, we should be better off in an enemy's country, and so I have told Colonel Close.

'I have the honor to be, &c

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'SIR,

'Camp 20th June, 1803

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 14th instant, in which you enclose one of the 13th, from the Military Board, upon the subject of packs for bullocks. I was not aware that there was any difference between those intended to carry ammunition, and those intended to carry grain; but I conceive that the orders which have been given on that subject to the Commissary of Stores, will provide for the wants of carriage for either article.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Sec. of Gov. Bombay.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Malcolm.

'MY DEAR MALCOLM,

'Camp, 20th June, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 18th, with the memorandum enclosed, and I agree almost entirely in the opinions which you have given.

‘Till the question with the confederacy is decided, we must stick to our ground in this country, otherwise the Nizam, and we, eventually, must suffer; and even supposing that by withdrawing now, we could stop the hostilities, which I doubt, we should only defer them to a period at which, probably, we should be less prepared than we are at the present moment. But as soon as there shall be no threats of the confederacy, either by the withdrawing of Scindiah, or from the success of the war, it is my opinion that we ought either entirely to new model the alliance, or to withdraw from it. You are well acquainted with my opinions on this subject.

‘The greater experience I gain of Marhatta affairs, the more convinced I am that we have been mistaken entirely regarding the constitution of the Marhatta empire. In fact, the Peshwah never has had exclusive power in the state: it is true, that all treaties have been negotiated under his authority, and have been concluded in his name; but the chiefs of the empire have consented to them; and the want of this consent in any one of them, or of power in the head of the empire, independent of these chiefs, is the difficulty of this case at the present moment. I put out of the question the conduct of the Putwurduns, Goklah, &c., because I have always considered, and it must appear to every body to be one which proceeds from causes entirely independent of the treaty, and of the circumstances which occasioned it, and of the Peshwah himself. These chiefs act under the treaty, because they had a previous acquaintance with us; and because they saw some prospect of being relieved from their difficulties by our interference, and of becoming in some degree independent under our protection. Had it not been for this hope, not one of them would have been with us, and we should have had a treaty with a cipher, bearing the name of Peshwah, without a particle of power.

‘Whatever may be the result of the present crisis, we shall gain nothing by the treaty. Scindiah, Holkar, the Rajah of Berar, and possibly others, will be separate and independent powers in India, very probably leagued for the present in a defensive alliance. We must look to that, and must not reduce our military establishments.

‘Is the peace of India secured? I doubt it, as far as we are concerned. Supposing there should be no war with the confederates, the first consequence of the alliance must be, to re-establish the government of the Peshwah in the northern countries, then to settle the Kolapoor question, &c.;

and supposing that we have another war with the French, there is no doubt but that we shall have a war with the Marhattas.

‘One bad consequence of these subsidiary treaties is, that they entirely annihilate the military power of the governments with which we contract them; and their reliance for their defence is exclusively upon us.

‘This treaty with the Peshwah has certainly given us a good military position; but the question is whether, in case the nation should be involved in a war with the French, which, in my opinion, is the hypothesis upon which all Indian politics should turn, the military position is so good, that it cannot be forced; and whether we do not lose more by the risk of having all the powerful Marhattas against us, at such a time, than we should gain by having the Peshwah certainly on our side, and by the goodness of our military position.

‘Upon this point, I have to observe, that the more I see of the Marhattas, the more convinced I am that they never could have any alliance with the French. The French, on their arrival, would want equipments, which would cost money, or money to procure them; and there is not a Marhatta in the whole country, from the Peshwah down to the lowest horseman, who has a shilling, or who would not require assistance from them.

‘In what manner then ought the alliance to be modelled? In my opinion, we ought to withdraw from Poonah, and leave some chance that the principal chiefs may have the power of the state in their hands; we ought to keep up our connexion with the Peshwah, so as that he might not be trampled upon; at the same time, we ought to increase our influence over the chiefs of the empire, in order that it may preponderate in all possible cases in which the state should be called upon to decide.

‘In short, I would preserve the existence of the state; and guide its actions by the weight of British influence, rather than annihilate it, and establish new powers in India by the subsidiary treaty.

‘In this consideration of the subject, I have not touched upon the disinclination of the Peshwah to the alliance, of which I have scarcely a doubt, and at all events, upon his inability to perform the conditions to which he has bound himself. But he has not even performed those conditions which must be in his power. Has he not now daily communications with Scindiah’s durbar, and even with Holkar, of

which the British Resident has no knowledge whatever? His very letter to Scindiah, which has been extorted from him, almost by force, contains a breach of treaty. In it, he desires that chief to remain where he is, pointedly; whereas, he knows that the requisition of the Governor General, and the only event which can ensure peace, is Scindiah's recrossing the Nerbudda.

'You may depend upon it, that if Collins had not pushed the negotiation as he has done; and if Scindiah had any option besides moving into the Nizam's territories, or returning to his own to procure subsistence;—in short, if he could procure subsistence where he is, he would remain there, in consequence of this paragraph in the Peshwah's letter. Besides, I see in the ackbar, that he is going to send another vakeel to Scindiah. For what purpose? and let it be stated for what reason the Peshwah did not give his letter to the British minister to be forwarded to Scindiah, knowing that that chief says the last did not reach him, instead of sending it through his own vakeel, whom he must mistrust.'

'Upon the whole, I see no prospect under the present treaty, and I should decidedly alter it, when a fair opportunity may offer.

'Collins is just in the right state. The fellow will explain himself, and will ask him to stay, and will pretend that he cannot move off on account of the rain, the swelling of the rivers, or because my troops are in this country; and thus the matter may hang on for some time longer.

'I think that if the war had not been still doubtful, Collins would have got an answer inimical to his memorial. The truth is, they are all shaking, and if the allies had come out of Poonah with me, there would be no war.

'I wish you would take up money wherever you can get it, and not from me. The Company may be losers, but my treasury will be richer.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Malcolm.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

*To Lieut. Colonel Close.**

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 20th June, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 18th, and return Colonel Collins's dispatch, the copy of which I have not yet

* *The Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors of the East India Company. (Extracts.)*

'HONORABLE SIRS,

'Fort William, 20th June, 1803.

'3. The intelligence of the important event of his Highness the Peshwah's restoration to the exercise of his just authority in the Marhatta state under the protection of the British power, must have afforded great satisfaction to your

received. I shall be very anxious to receive the next he may write.

‘I hope that you will be able to send us the brinjarries and the bullocks. We positively cannot stay without this assist-Honorable Committee. Every circumstance connected with that prosperous event justifies a confident expectation of the complete and pacific accomplishment of the beneficial objects of the late alliance with the Peshwah.

‘4. It is my duty, on this occasion, to express to your Honorable Committee the high sense which I entertain of the distinguished ability manifested by the Hon. Major General Wellesley, in conducting the British detachment under his command from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah.

‘5. The documents forming the enclosures to this dispatch will afford to your Honorable Committee a full view of the considerable military skill with which Major General Wellesley surmounted the difficulties of his long and arduous march, and combined the various arrangements requisite to secure the supply and movement of his army, and the co-operation and junction of the troops from Hyderabad and Bombay. Your Honorable Committee will also observe with pleasure the prudence, address, and temper, with which Major Gen. Wellesley conciliated the Marhatta states occupying the countries through which he passed; and you will approve the signal success with which he composed the various animosities and dissensions of the several Marhatta chiefs, and united that discordant and turbulent race in the common cause of the Peshwah and of the British Government.

‘6. The particular attention of your Honorable Committee will be directed to the judgment, humanity, and activity, manifested by Major General Wellesley in saving the city of Poonah from destruction, by the rapid march and seasonable arrival of the British troops. This happy event impressed the inhabitants of that city with the most favorable opinion of the British power. It is a circumstance equally honorable to our character, and propitious to our interests in that quarter of India, that the first effects of the British influence in the Marhatta dominions should have been displayed in rescuing the capital of the empire from impending ruin, and its inhabitants from violence and rapine.

‘7. It will be satisfactory to your Honorable Committee to be informed, that his Highness the Peshwah has expressed the utmost degree of admiration in observing the promptitude, energy, and success of those exertions to which his Highness is indebted for his restoration to his government and dominions; and that the conduct of Major General Wellesley and of Lieut Colonel Close, on this occasion, has apparently established in his Highness’s mind, the most implicit confidence in the good faith, justice, and power of the British government, and in the valor, skill, and integrity of its officers, with a high sense of the benefits which his Highness must derive from the operation of the late alliance on every branch of his interests and affairs.

‘13. Your Honorable Committee was informed, by Lieut. Colonel Close, of the exactions levied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar upon his Highness the Nizam’s city of Aurungabad. No reason exists to countenance an apprehension that these depredations on the Nizam’s territory are connected with the supposed confederacy between Holkar and Scindiah. Destitute of any permanent resources, Holkar is compelled to supply his exigencies by indiscri-

ance, and it really becomes more necessary every day. Send off the bullocks as they receive their loads. You can have no idea of our losses, or of the distress of every body.

‘If the head hircarrah, who knows Ahmednuggur, should be sent to you, I hope that you will examine him before you send him off, and get an account of the place, lest he should never come to me, or should be late. I have received an account of the place, which appears to be pretty strong,

minate plunder. It is probable that Holkar has been induced to levy contributions from Aurungabad by the treacherous suggestions of the Nizam’s officer commanding at that station, who is believed to have participated in the booty.

‘14. Major General Wellesley, however, deemed it to be proper to direct Colonel Stevenson to advance with the whole of the Nizam’s subsidiary force towards Aurungabad, for the eventual protection of his Highness’s dominions. I have lately received information that Holkar has retired with his army from the Nizam’s frontier towards the northward.

‘15. The judicious arrangement which Major General Wellesley has effected for the disposition of the troops under his command is calculated to meet every exigency of affairs. Even under the improbable supposition that Scindian, the Rajah of Berar, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, have really entertained designs of an hostile nature against the British Government or its allies, our early state of preparation, and the formidable force which Major General Wellesley has opposed to every possible operation on the part of any or all of those chieftains, must effectually deter them from the prosecution of the war. In the same spirit of seasonable precaution, Lieut. General Stuart has judged it to be expedient to advance the army under his immediate command to a position which may enable him to co-operate with the troops under Major General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson.

‘22. Your Honorable Committee will be enabled to form a competent judgment of the danger to which the tranquillity of Mysore and of the Deccan would have been exposed by the uninterrupted progress of disorder and confusion in the Marhatta empire; and you will estimate the advantages which have been derived from the success of the measures adopted by the British Government for removing the scene of war from our frontier, and for restoring the foundation of peace and good order.

‘26. Reviewing the general state of affairs, your Honorable Committee will concur in the sentiments of confidence and satisfaction with which I reflect, that the final accomplishment of the arrangements happily commenced at Poonah is entrusted, to the approved abilities of Major General Wellesley and of Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘27. In closing this dispatch, it will be satisfactory to your Honorable Committee that I should add my expectation, that the necessary expense of the late military operations in the Peninsula is not likely to occasion any derangement in the general prosperity of the finances of the Company in India, or in the accounts or services of the current year.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘WELLESLEY.’

‘To the Hon. the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.’

with a wet ditch and glacis, but no covered way. It would be desirable to know whether there are any passages over the ditch, and where, and the general height of the wall from the berm.

I have perused the letter from the killadar at Loghur, and I think it would be advisable for Colonel Murray to have the place examined which he recommends as a station for the cattle. If it answers, it would be proper to remove them thither.

'If you send off any rice from Poonah, the store at that place must of course be increased from below; and probably the gentlemen there could contrive to fix upon fair moments to send off the rice from Panwell.

'I am very anxious about my money: the 15th was the day on which you ought to have received it all. I shall be obliged to you if you will give the gentry a hint upon this subject. We are approaching to pay day again, and have not money enough for more than half our disbursement.

'I expect that Captain Buchan, with a lac of pagodas, will be at Poonah by the 24th; which sum I intend to order forward, but still we require the rupees in this country. I think that it would be advisable to have four baskets upon the Goor, particularly as there is no wooden boat there.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I enclose you the account I have got of Ahmednuggur. You will observe that the ditch is not broad, nor the wall high, nor the shape of the fort scientific. I shall be glad to know whether your man agrees in this story.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'SIR,

'Camp, 21st June, 1803.

'A man has arrived here from Holkar's camp this day: he left that chief on the other side of the Taptee, with his treasure, and 7000 or 8000 people, whom he calls maunkaries; one campoo was gone further to the northward, two other campoos were on this side of the Taptee with the Tope kannah, unable to move on account of the rain, and for want of cattle; and Meer Khan and Shahamut Khan were to the southward of those campoos: the distress in Holkar's camp was great, the loss of cattle had been immense, and grain as dear as two seers for a rupee; the people were deserting fast, and Holkar had been obliged to bury many cannon.

‘The reports of the camp are, that he is going to Guzerat, and that he is going to winter and recruit in the Holkar territories north of the Nerbudda: he has much treasure with him on elephants: the Taptee was filling.

‘I trust you will be able to send us forward some supplies. If I can only remain on this side of the Beemah, the confederates will not be able to hold out during the monsoon.

‘It would be very desirable that we should make some arrangement with the people at the ferries to pass the Company’s followers without fee. They might have a pass from you or from me, and would thus be immediately known. Our bullock drivers have never any money; and the very exaction of the fee at the ferry will be sufficient to prevent the bazaar people from attempting to cross it. Besides I have not much faith in our own people, and I believe it will be found out that, if some of the boats at the ferry are allowed to take a fee, the whole will do the same; and even if they are more honest than I suppose them to be, the consequence of having some boats in which the duty is free, and others for the use of which a fee is to be paid, will be, that the former only will be used by our people, and there will be great delays at the ferries.

‘The account of the pontoons is just like every other account I receive of a Bombay concern. Only think of these stupid creatures sending off these carriages in the midst of that heavy rain. It is very clear from those accounts of Colonel Murray that the equipment will not answer; you see that the carriages have broken before they have gone one stage.

‘Colonel Murray writes that he fears the brinjarry naig, with whom the durbar are negotiating, will never come forward in the service. He says he is the same man who deceived every body before at Bassein; and he believes he is the cause of the desertion of the brinjarries from the corps under his command: if this be the case, our chance is but small.

‘In my opinion it would be advisable to get land in Bundelcund in preference to Savanore, particularly as the Governor General prefers that district. At all events it would be most convenient to us not to pass the Werdah, even supposing we do take part of our jaedad to the southward of that river.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

· *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 21st June, 1803.

‘I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th. I rather believe that of the 19th ought to have been dated the 17th, as you mention in it that Mohiput Ram had sent for Captain Johnson; and in that of the 18th, that you had sent that officer to him.

‘The march of Mohiput Ram to Aurungabad has secured all the objects I had in view in ordering your corps there; and, as there is a scarcity of forage in that neighborhood, I by no means wish that you should now take your troops there: but I think it advisable that, as the Nizam has referred the consideration of the future security of that city to the British officers, some of us should look at it, and form a determination respecting the garrison, stores, &c., which ought to be in it. I shall accordingly be obliged to you if you will take a ride over there.

‘If they do not think proper afterwards to place in Aurungabad a garrison, such as you are of opinion ought to be in the fort, it is their own affair, and they must stand by the loss. But it is proper that in the mean time we should give them an opinion, stating what we think necessary for the defence of the place.

‘It may appear strange, but I acknowledge that I still doubt whether there will be a war. Colonel Collins had demanded his dismissal from Scindiah’s camp on the 12th instant, and an escort of cavalry, and grain for his sepoys, to take him to Aurungabad; but he had not got this assistance on the 13th; and the ground of the Colonel’s demand was rather a delay to give him satisfaction on certain points of inquiry regarding the existence of the confederacy, than a refusal of satisfaction. On the contrary, Scindiah said that he would satisfy him in three days, and the Colonel had opened a communication with the Rajah of Berar. Holkar himself has certainly crossed the Taptee; his army being in the greatest distress for want of provisions; there is, therefore, an end to all hopes of his junction with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar in this season. The reports are that he is going into Guzerat, and that he is going to refresh in the Holkar territory. Amrut Rao says that he is going into Guzerat: he has a large treasure with him.

‘Scindiah’s camp is in the very greatest distress for every thing; but that, in my opinion, is the strongest motive for war.

‘ I have no objection to your march to Roshungaum. From the account I have given you above of the state of affairs, you see that there is no chance of your being opposed or attacked by the whole confederacy ; and I look upon you to be fully equal to any part, particularly considering the superior state of your cattle and equipments compared with theirs. You must, however, confine yourself to the defensive till I can come to your support. By defensive I do not mean that you should wait in any particular place till you shall be attacked, but that you should attack any party that may come within the Nizam’s territories and your reach. I mean only that you should not commence an operation which may take you to a great distance from Aurungabad, or from me, before I can cross the Godavery and give you support.

‘ Till we have really a war, you must be cautious also regarding the places said to belong to the Nizam. His territories, and those of the Marhattas, are much intermixed ; nay, some districts are the joint property of both powers. That very place Badowly belongs partly to the Nizam, and partly to a Marhatta. Oomrawutty and Mulcapoor are in the same state. But, notwithstanding that this state of these countries is acknowledged by the Nizam’s durbar, his officers would willingly seize them, and probably occasion in this manner a war which it may yet be possible to avoid.

‘ Your hircarrahs have been detained in Scindiah’s camp, most probably by the rain, which has been very heavy in all parts of the country. The tappall still runs from thence.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Murray.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 21st June, 1803.*

‘ The account of the pontoons is indeed very bad. It is unlucky that, when the rain came on, the gentlemen below the ghauts did not stop them till it ceased a little, which by all accounts it appears to have done now very generally. It is probable that in fair weather they would have found a smaller number of bullocks fully equal to move them.

‘ Lieut. Goodfellow, instead of making a trial at Bombay, as he was desired to do by Lieut. Colonel Dallas, of the number of bullocks required, made a calculation upon very erroneous foundations, and then referred to the Madras regulations, which have nothing to do with the subject.

‘ In my opinion it will be best to desire Captain Young to desist from sending the pontoons till the weather shall have settled a little, and then to send them forward. From the breaking of carriages, however, before they have come one stage, and the deficiency and badness of the bullocks, I suspect that we shall derive but little benefit from this equipment, even if it should be able to get up the ghauts. If it had been ready to leave Panwell on the 8th of June, which was the day I fixed for it, it might have had some chance ; but time, which is every thing, is not equally prized every where.

‘ Captain Young must be directed to take advantage of the fair moments during the monsoon, to keep your magazine at Poonah full to the quantity I pointed out. From your account of the disposition of the brinjaries, I imagine that he will have no great difficulty in effecting this object.

‘ It is extraordinary that your gentlemen should be so unsuccessful in the purchase of cattle, and that the government should be so likewise ; my departments purchased 3000 there in one month. Individuals got as many more ; and if there had not been a stop put to the sale of bullocks in Poonah, by a government or a police regulation, the 78th regiment would have completed themselves in one night : but I assure you I do not attribute this failure to want of exertion on your part ; on the contrary, I am convinced that you do every thing in your power.

‘ Two mucedums and one hundred drivers of the carriage bullocks have deserted, notwithstanding that their pay is so much higher than that of any other description of followers in this camp. Indeed there is great desertion among the Bombay followers in general. I wish that you would send me one hundred more drivers as soon as you can, and let a small guard come with them. I have a party of horse looking out for the deserters, and I may pick up some, but that is doubtful. I am obliged to you for the supply of arrack.

‘ One would imagine that boats might be had at Bombay without much difficulty, and it is not impossible to transport them fifteen or sixteen miles to the rivers in the Konkan. I wrote to Mr. Duncan upon that subject long ago, but it appears that the boats are not yet forthcoming ; but they will come, and the communications with Panwell may be kept up during the monsoon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Colonel Murray.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th. There appears certainly to have been a mistake or misunderstanding between Colonel Stevenson and Rajah Mohiput Ram, in respect to the share of the expense of hiring the troops under Meer Khan, which it was supposed the British government would defray. In consequence of my orders, however, upon that subject, Colonel Stevenson has set Meer Khan right, in regard to the British government being bound by his letter to that chief, by a second letter, written with the knowledge of the sirdars in the Nizam’s service. It appears also that Meer Khan is not inclined to enter the Nizam’s service, even with the number of troops which Colonel Stevenson proposes to entertain. Upon the whole, therefore, I do not conceive that any inconvenience will result from these letters, or from the misunderstanding between Rajah Mohiput Ram and Colonel Stevenson,

‘It would certainly be desirable to discover whether Rajah Mohiput Ram really misunderstood Colonel Stevenson’s intention, or wilfully deceived his employers. But, considering all the circumstances of the present moment, I believe that it would be best to defer the inquiry to a future period.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 22nd June, 1803.

‘My brinjaries have been playing tricks as usual; and the consequence is, that I have not got one-third of the quantity of rice I ought to have

‘I have accounts from Scindiah’s camp of a date as late as the 14th. The negotiations are still in a state of uncertainty. Scindiah had written to Colonel Collins to desire him to stay; and he promised an explanation after the meeting with the Rajah of Berar, which actually took place on the 13th. We may therefore expect something definitive immediately. Either peace or war will relieve my distresses; peace, as it will enable me to approach my supplies, at Poonah: war, as it will give me an opportunity of attacking Ahmednuggur, in which place I shall find plenty.

‘There is another state, however, for which I must provide, viz., that of a continuance of these negotiations at

Scindiah's camp : this I can do only by your assistance. I cannot depend upon the supplies promised and expected from Poonah. The characteristic of the Peshwah's government is deceit, and he has not yet made me one promise that he has not broken ; I must therefore depend upon you.

' Upon receipt of this letter, I request that you will send off 2000 bags of rice, with a guard, to meet me at Puttun ; and let 1000 bags be from your grain departments, and 1000 from your brinjarries. You might replace the former from the rice at Aurungabad, and hire fresh bullocks to carry it.

' I point out Puttun because it is the place nearest to you, known to your people, and likewise nearest to me. It will likewise be as convenient a station for me to move to as any other, in case of this delay in the negotiations ; and I can easily order the boats to be brought down again from Toka, in order that there may be no delay in our communications.

' I regret much the necessity which exists for calling upon you for assistance in supplies, but it is entirely owing to the disappointments I have experienced from this government.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Colonel Stevenson.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

' I should wish the boats still to go to Toka, as I before pointed out.'

To Lieut Colonel Close.

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 23rd June. 1803.

' I return Colonel Collins's dispatch of the 16th. It is rather less pacific than the last, but I think it probable that the confederates have not yet arranged their matters, that Holkar has not yet come into their views, and that for that reason they wish to delay the decision for some time longer. Holkar's object would appear to be to get hold of the Holkar territory, and his game to effect it by a war between Scindiah and us. If there should be no war between Scindiah and us, he will get hold of that territory, but not so certainly, either by a peace mediated by Ragojee Bhoonslah, and guaranteed by him, or by the continuation of the contest with Scindiah. Holkar's object must be obviously to keep himself out of the contest with us, and to urge the others into it. But it is probable that Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah perceive that inclination, and want to urge him to go hand in hand with them.

‘They have now a fair opportunity of doing this, by apprizing him that he is to be attacked by the English; and upon this ground it is unfortunate that Colonel Collins’s moonshee should have said, and that the Peshwah should have written, that we intended to attack Holkar. In addition to the impolicy of such a declaration at the present moment, it is any thing but true, and ought, in my opinion, under the instructions of the Governor General, to be firmly contradicted. If you should be of that opinion, it would be well if you were to make a suggestion upon the subject to Colonel Collins.

‘I apprized you in my letter of yesterday of my want of grain. I started from Poonah with 5900 bags of rice, which, upon a moderate calculation, would have lasted me fifty-nine days, and I might have spun it out to ninety days. The losses in cattle obliged me to leave some behind in the neighborhood of Poonah, and to consume much larger quantities than were necessary in camp; but even with these drawbacks I ought to have had now a sufficiency to last me for a month, but the brinjarries have contrived to make away with two-thirds of it.

‘The critical circumstances of our situation are much increased by what I have above stated. I shall issue wheat flour to the troops, and the followers must live upon that likewise: but we depend for our existence upon the produce of the country in which we may be situated; and the necessity of being in or passing through a barren or exhausted country, or the increase of our numbers, will destroy us.

‘In this view of the question I do not consider the probability of hostilities, which must of course render it more difficult to draw subsistence from the countries in which we may happen to be. The question is, what is to be done? In considering this question, I believe I must take it for granted that I shall get no assistance whatever from Poonah or Bombay.

‘If it is decided immediately that there is to be a war, the attack of Ahmednuggur is still feasible; and if I should succeed in getting possession of that place, I hope to find some relief there for my distresses. The question rests entirely upon a consideration of the circumstances attending the state of doubt in which I think it probable that we shall be kept for some time longer. While this state of doubt exists, am I to go into the Nizam’s country, south of the Godavery, and subsist there as well as I can? am I to cross the Godavery with my whole force? or am I to return across the Beemah, approach the supplies at Poonah, and endeavor to

fit out again in case there should be a war? or am I to divide this body of troops, and send part of it to join Colonel Stevenson, and part back to Poonah?

‘If I go into the Nizam’s country, south of the Godavery, I am not certain that I shall be able to find subsistence, or, at all events, that I shall be able to re-establish myself in such manner as to take the field with a sufficient stock of provisions in store to feed the troops for any length of time. I may be reduced at last to the necessity of approaching the supplies at Poonah, and may suffer distress in doing so. Colonel Stevenson tells me that there are provisions in Dharore and Kurdlah; but he has his reports from the Nizam’s officers, who told him at the same time that none could be issued without his Highness’s orders: it is therefore probable that there are no provisions in these places.

‘If I cross the Godavery with my whole force, I must live upon Colonel Stevenson’s supplies: the Colonel is in no want; the Nizam’s government have supplied him well; but I know he has not more than he wants; and it is very probable that, when I come to double his consumption, I shall soon reduce him to the same state in which I am myself. In the mean time the contest may commence, and neither of the detachments will be in a condition to act. If I return across the Beemah, I shall subsist; and if I can keep alive my cattle, I have no doubt but that I should fit myself out again, and soon be in a situation to act with vigor.

‘But a retrograde movement is always bad in this country; and it may be attended by the worst consequences in the present situation of our affairs. It is obvious now that there will be no war if Holkar will not join it; but if Holkar joins in it and repasses the Taptee, Colonel Stevenson is no match for all the confederates put together, although he is fully equal to any two of them. I should be too distant to give him any assistance, having my corps on the other side of the Beemah, particularly in the crippled state in which it must be expected to be for some time to come.

‘The next point to be considered is, whether I shall divide, and send part to join Colonel Stevenson, and part to the neighborhood of Poonah. By this division I certainly strengthen Colonel Stevenson, and provide for the subsistence of the whole; but shall we then be strong enough for the confederates? In this choice of difficulties we must do the best we can; and I think that, upon the whole, that will be the measure attended with the most advantage and least probable evil.

‘If the answer of Scindiah to Collins should be at all

peaceable and friendly, in my opinion we ought to accept it ; and I ought to inform him that I intend to recross the Bee-mah, and to break up the army, as soon as I find that he commences to recross the Nerbudda.

‘What has happened already, and the situation of this body of troops, are sufficient proofs that we cannot carry on a war in this country, after having been four months from Seringapatam, and having marched nearly seven hundred miles, without having the assistance of the resources of Bombay and Poonah. The government of Bombay is unable (and always will be so with its present instruments) to afford us any assistance, and the Peshwah is both unable and unwilling. With half the means in their power, and without the assistance of the store collected at Poonah, it is pleasing to see how the Nizam’s government have supported the army under Colonel Stevenson ; but, although the provision is at their door at Poonah, and brought there without the smallest aid from them, they will not give us a bullock to remove it.

‘I can have but one opinion upon this subject, and that is, that, supposing the Peshwah’s inability to be of the lowest kind, there must be besides an unwillingness on his part, which has contributed to prevent us from enjoying any of the resources of Poonah. It is not to be believed that there are no cattle in that city. Let a house or a shop be produced in which there is not a bullock, and I will agree that I am mistaken ; and the police can command every bullock in the place, particularly when it is known that we are willing to pay highly for all that we receive.

‘But it is useless to search for proofs of the Peshwah’s dissimulation to us, or of his unwillingness to come forward to our assistance in a contest in which we are likely to be involved from our interference in his favor. We must look for a remedy for these evils ; and I acknowledge that I see none that are not of a nature more violent than are likely to be adopted.

‘The difficulties, however, in which this corps is likely to be involved, will be an useful lesson to governments and to us all : first, to avoid entering into a treaty with a prince, the only principle of whose character that is known is insincerity ; and next, to avoid, if possible, to enter upon a campaign at the distance of seven hundred miles from our own resources ; not only not having the government of the country on our side, but, in the shape of a friend, our worst enemy.

‘I hope that you have seen the Ahmednuggur hircarrah whom they promised to produce. ‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘By a letter of the 20th, just come in from Colonel Stevenson, I find that the grain in Dowlutabad (and probably that in Dharore and Kurdlah) is dry. There is no rice to be got in Aurungabad.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 24th June, 1803.

‘I have received from Sir William Clarke a copy of his letter to you of the 15th. I have no observation to make upon it, excepting in respect to the position which he recommends upon the Tenim ghaut. It might answer from the month of November to the month of May; but during the other months of the year, I imagine, indeed I know, that the rain is more violent in those ghauts than it is in the lower countries; and it is doubtful whether one European would survive being in camp there during the rainy season. The position upon the Tenim ghaut may be a good one hereafter, but it must be after the rains, and advantage must be taken of the ensuing fair season to build barracks, at least for the European troops.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close tells me that he sends you copies of the dispatches received from Colonel Collins, so that I do not copy for you those that he transmits me for perusal. As far as the 18th, matters were still in an undecided state in that quarter. Holkar had certainly crossed the Taptée. A man of mine saw him cross that river, and after that he had made one march from it on the 15th, so that the confederacy had not then been formed. I am sorry to observe, however, from the report of a conference between Colonel Collins’s moonshee and the Rajah of Berar, that the former said that I was to attack Holkar; and I see that the Peshwah has written the same to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. These assertions are not founded in fact, and, as it is probable that Holkar holds off from the confederacy, they may be very impolitic at the present moment, as the belief of them may oblige that chief to throw himself upon the others, as the only resource for his safety.

‘It is obvious, from all the proceedings at Scindiah’s camp, that there is some consideration which operates upon that chief and the Rajah of Berar, to induce them to delay the decision, whether there shall be a war or not. It cannot be a sense of the risk which they must incur in the contest;

because they must be well aware that, although the treaty of Bassein interferes with their projects of ambition, it provides effectually for the security of each against the force of the Peshwah; I conclude, therefore, that the cause of the wished-for delay is, that Holkar has not yet consented to their plans. It is not improbable but that he insists upon certain cessions from Scindiah as the price of his becoming a member of the confederacy. If I am correct in this conjecture, the assertion that I was to attack Holkar may have very bad consequences.

‘I think that it cannot be sufficiently lamented that we have not a communication with Holkar, or that the Governor General is not nearer the scene of operations and negotiations, or has not empowered some person to conclude with those chiefs at once. Our negotiators are able men certainly; but in apparently trifling points I have observed that they have more than once deviated from the general plan of the negotiation; and when a fault has occurred, it has not been possible to apply a remedy without a reference to Bengal, which takes two months. That which I have above mentioned is one of those errors; and the pains which Colonel Collins took for some time to persuade Scindiah to march towards Poonah is another.

‘I am sorry to tell you that my losses of cattle have been so great, and such the conduct of my brinjarries, that I am likely to be reduced to some distress. I marched from Poonah with 4400 brinjarry bullocks, loaded with rice, and 1550 loads of rice in the grain, and 100 loads, or five days’ provisions, in the provision department. Besides this, the sepoys had eight days’ rice with them. By issuing a reasonable quantity daily to the bazaar, this rice would have lasted about sixty days; and if the supplies which I expected by means of the Poonah brinjarries did not come up, it was my intention to stop entirely the issue to the bazaar at the end of a month, and to depend upon the country for the consumption, and to give rice only to the troops.

‘The great loss of cattle, however, which we have had since the day we marched from Poonah obliged me to begin by leaving behind 500 loads, and to encourage, rather than discourage, the consumption of rice. Besides, the brinjarries have been obliged to leave behind some, and to dispose of other rice in the villages, for the relief of their cattle; and the result of every thing is, that I have not at this moment more rice in camp than will last the troops, at half a seer per diem, eighteen days. We are, however, in a plentiful coun-

try, from which we get large supplies of wheat flour, and the bazaar is well supplied with that food. I propose also to issue that food to the sepoys alternately with rice.

‘Under all these circumstances it is difficult to decide what steps are to be taken. In all views of the question I am afraid that I have no hopes of a supply from Poonah, although the means of that city are immense; and although I have a depôt formed there, amounting to 8000 bags of rice, Colonel Close has not yet been able either to purchase or hire one bullock to carry off a load of it, nor has one bazaar man or trader from Poonah attended this camp with supplies. It is not possible to believe this fact and that the Peshwah is true to the cause: in fact, it must require more than mere apathy to prevent the traders of Poonah from following a course which must be so advantageous to them.

‘But if I can expect nothing from Poonah, what must be my plan to save the troops from the distress which is hanging over them? We may be immediately involved in hostility, or the state of doubt may continue. If we are involved in hostility, I must attack and get possession of Scindiah’s fort of Ahmednuggur, which will secure the resources of this country, and probably enable me to carry on war. From the account I have received of the state of that fort, I have no fear of the success of this project.

‘If this state of uncertainty is to continue, it appears absolutely necessary that I should keep my position north of the Beemah; but I have no resources to enable me to do it. I have written to Colonel Stevenson to know exactly what his resources are, and I have desired him positively to send me a supply of rice to the Godavery. But it is obvious that, if I cross that river, I shall soon reduce him to the same level with myself; and it is possible that both detachments may be unable to carry on active operations at the moment at which their services may be required, unless Colonel Stevenson’s resources are much more ample than I suspect them to be.

‘I have also thought of moving into the Nizam’s country, to recruit the cattle during the time of this state of doubt; but there is no rice in the Nizam’s country, and I may at last be obliged to return towards Poonah, in greater distress than I should be if I were to go back at present.

‘Another measure of which I have considered has been to divide this detachment, and send part to reinforce Colonel Stevenson, and part back towards Poonah. This appears to

be attended with most advantage, and liable to least inconvenience; but then the services of that part of the corps which will be sent back to Poonah would be lost for the campaign. Their junction again, even if it should be possible to recruit them with fresh supplies and means of moving them, would be very difficult, if not impossible.

‘It is obvious that, in my determination upon this occasion, I must be guided in a great degree by what I hear from Colonel Collins. To withdraw the whole corps across the Beemah may be most advisable under certain circumstances; whereas, under others, it would be most advisable to separate and reinforce Colonel Stevenson with a part.

‘You may easily conceive how unpleasant it is to me to write you these circumstances. Matters have turned out in the most unfortunate manner, and I have been disappointed in all the hopes of assistance which I had formed from Bombay, Poonah, &c. We have not got one bullock from Mr. Duncan. I formed a large depôt at Poonah, with the hope that I should be able to get some assistance from the Peshwah’s government to carry it on, or that my own cattle would have been able to return for it. But I have above informed you of the degree of assistance which I have received from the Peshwah’s government; and the forage of Poonah was so expensive, particularly after the Peshwah’s arrival, that the cattle got but little; it was of a bad kind, gave them little sustenance, and when they began to march they died immediately; so far therefore from being able to return for fresh loads, they are not able to carry on those they have got. In short, we have discovered once more, that, without assistance from the government of the country in which we are acting, we cannot carry on military operations at the distance of seven hundred miles from our supplies.

‘I shall write to you again in a day or two.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 25th June, 1803.

‘I enclose the extract of a letter which I have received from Colonel Close: this, in addition to my letter of yesterday, will give you a tolerable idea of the state of affairs at Poonah.

‘I have just received your letter of the 15th. My former letters will have given answers to all the points contained therein

‘In my opinion it would be best that all the money, whe-

ther for Colonel Stevenson or me, should come to Poonah. It might come by the Beejapoor road, which it would open for our communication with you. From Poonah it might be forwarded in safety either to Colonel Stevenson or me.

‘I informed you, in my letter of the 9th, that the sum I should want was one lac of pagodas per mensem.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 25th June, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 23rd, and I am sorry to find that our prospects are so very bad : we must, however, do the best we can.

‘In respect to your suggestion, that I should urge Colonel Collins to quit Scindiah’s camp, I have to observe, that I have already written to urge him to accelerate his negotiation. I have no direct communication with him ; indeed I never received from you the account of his dawd stages. The mutaseddee at Aurungabad occasionally sends me letters, but they are longer on the road than those which come by Poonah. Besides, I think it much to be doubted whether the negotiation with Scindiah, on the present footing, ought to be accelerated under present circumstances. It is true that we must go to war under any difficulties rather than lose our honor ; but we must keep out of the war if it is practicable.

‘In my opinion, the state of affairs is much altered since the Governor General wrote the instructions under which Collins is acting at this moment. It was then supposed that we had the Peshwah with us. I think that is at least doubtful at the present moment ; and the question is, whether, instead of urging forward Collins’s negotiation, on the footing established under that notion, we ought not rather to procrastinate it ; to report the state of the case at the present moment at the Peshwah’s darbar to the Governor General, and ask for further orders.

‘This opinion of mine, that the Peshwah is not with us, may, it is true, be erroneous. But it is founded upon the fact that his Highness has not yet taken any steps, recommended to him by the Company’s government, or which a sense of his own interests would have suggested, either to prevent the combination of the northern chiefs, or to assist us, or to enable us to carry on the contest against them, if it should be formed : and his acts, as far as they have come to our knowledge, have tended rather to our prejudice. And,

if we may believe Colonel Collins and the assertion of Scindiah and his ministers, the Peshwah has a correspondence with Ballojee Koonger and Scindiah's durbar, of the nature of which we are entirely ignorant.

'I cannot but feel that if we are to have a war under these circumstances, it will be one much more complicated than that expected to be the result of the course of action pointed out by the Governor General's instructions ; but one to which our resources are, I trust, fully equal. It is a duty, however, that we owe to our country to avoid it, if we can, with honor ; and I should hope that, if timely measures are taken, it might be avoided.

'Upon the ground of the Peshwah's duplicity the question is, what line we ought to suggest to the Governor General? The first thing he ought to do should be to come to Bombay. As for the settlement of the Marhatta question, that appears to be beyond a possibility ; in that case the best thing we can do is to restore matters nearly to the state in which they were when we entered the country, and allow them to fight out their own quarrels. The very hint of our taking this step would dissolve the confederacy at once. We should then have to defend the Nizam's country and our own territories, which probably they would never attack.

'I send you a letter, which I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Colonel Collins.

'Although I am much distressed for carriage, and my bullocks can but ill afford to take a trip to Poonah, I think it proper to send five hundred of them to receive a corresponding number of loads of rice, in order to enable me, if possible, to stay a little longer, or to draw off with safety : they will leave this to-morrow morning, and will arrive at Coraygaum on the 29th.

'It would be very desirable if they could find their loads at Coraygaum : first, because it would save them four marches ; secondly, because it would save them the passage of the Beemah. This river is, I am told, full ; and Lieut. MacArthur, who has crossed it, says that there are four boats there, but only two sepoys to work them. It is astonishing that, for their own interest, the owners of the ferry boat will not put that in motion.

'Two modes of sending in the rice to Coraygaum have suggested themselves to me : one, that coolies should be employed for the purpose ; the other, that some of Colonel Murray's rotten bullocks should attempt this service. But it will answer no purpose to employ upon carrying the rice

to Coraygaum the coolies whom you may have hired to carry it on to camp. It will be best that they should come on.

'If the rice can be sent to Coraygaum, it will be desirable that measuring men and packers should be sent with it; in order that there may be no loss of time in the delivery.

'Will you be so kind as to arrange all this matter with Colonel Murray? and tell him that I wish that if the rice should be sent to Coraygaum, it should be in sufficient quantities to give seventy-two pucca seers for each load, instead of sixty pucca seers, according to the mode in which Captain Moor has packed up the rice.

'Whether the rice be sent to Coraygaum or not, it is very desirable that about one hundred bundles of forage should be sent there to feed the cattle, otherwise they will not be able to come back. If it should not be possible to send the rice to Coraygaum, I request you to have Lieut. Walker, the officer in charge of the party with the bullocks, apprized thereof, in order that he may go on to Poonah.

'Colonel Agnew writes to me that they have some difficulty in posting their tappall from the Kistna and Beejapoor, and has requested that our runners should go on as far as the river, in the direction of Moodgul, to meet theirs. Will you be so kind as to mention this matter to Mr. Frissell?

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close'

'ARTHUR WELLSLEY'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 25th June, 1803.

'Since writing to you this morning, it has occurred to me that Colonel Murray's cattle are grazing at such a distance from Poonah, that it will not be possible to get them in at a period sufficiently early to allow of their arriving at Coraygaum with the rice on the 29th. It is, however, very desirable to avoid sending my cattle farther than that place; and I should therefore wish that Colonel Murray would endeavor to prevail upon his dooley boys to carry some rice thither; and possibly he might be able to get a working party of sepoys to do something in the same way, as the distance is so small. These resources, with the assistance which you may be able to afford him, may enable him to send out the rice to Coraygaum; and thus save my cattle four marches over that desert, and six days of time, which, at this moment, is of the utmost consequence.

‘ I pick up a few bullocks about the country, and have purchasers out in all directions. This resource, and the arrival this day of 250 bullocks, with loads of arrack, however tired they are, enable me to make this detachment to Poonah. But still if I should be obliged to move, I must carry some of the loads on the horses of the cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut General Stuart.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 26th June, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you yesterday, my prospects have mended a little. I have been able to send off some bullocks to Poonah for supplies; and I think that the means which I have employed will produce a larger number of these animals. I am in great hopes that I shall be able to hold my position on this side of the Beemah.

‘ I have just received a letter from the Secretary of Government in Bengal, by which I am authorized to draw for money upon different collectors and officers under that government. Notwithstanding that I have received this authority, as I cannot get money for bills at Poonah, I shall want the supply respecting which I wrote to you on the 9th instant, and yesterday.

‘ There is no news from the northward.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 26th June, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. You will perceive by mine of yesterday, that I also have been enabled to send five hundred cattle to bring loads; and from your letter of the 24th, and Malcolm’s account of the number of coolies of which you have the command at Poonah, I have strong hopes that you will be able to send the loads to meet these bullocks at Coraygaum. I am exceedingly anxious upon this subject, and also to receive the fresh supplies of rice by the coolies; because I shall then be enabled to feed the troops on rice only, and leave the bazaars to the followers. We have scarcely been able to supply the consumption in the bazaars, since flour has been taken from them for the use of the troops; and it will be a great relief to be again able to give the troops rice. I am happy to tell

you, that the orders respecting the issue of flour were well received, and there have been no grumbling or complaints.

‘It appears by the accounts received from Colonel Murray, that the cooly carriage is as cheap as that by bullocks, and it is certainly equally expeditious. I do not, therefore, in any way object to it, excepting that it is not possible to get as many coolies as bullocks.

‘I am getting a few bullocks, and have many means employed to procure more. I think that I am now in a better state than I was a few days ago, and I hope to be able to hold my position.

‘You will observe by my letter of the 23rd, that I am fully aware of the necessity of strengthening Colonel Stevenson, if I should be obliged to draw off. Indeed, that measure is obviously so necessary, that I considered of the propriety of joining Colonel Stevenson myself with the whole corps; but the objection to that measure was the danger of increasing his consumption, so far as to distress him for provisions, at the moment when we might be called upon to act. The detachments which you propose to add to him, you will observe are nearly equal in strength, and will consume nearly as much as the whole of this body of troops: and as they would not have with them the excellent bazaars and means that I have of drawing subsistence from any country in which it can be found, they would fall still more upon Colonel Stevenson’s regular modes of supply for their consumption, and probably would distress him more than even the whole of this body of troops would.

‘It is true, that you propose that further supplies should be brought forward from Hyderabad: but I have to observe, from the account I have received from Colonel Stevenson of the state of his supplies, that it is necessary that further measures should be taken for his subsistence without the smallest loss of time, even supposing that he should not be reinforced: and I strongly suspect, that when he comes to count bags as I have done, he will find the quantity of rice to be much smaller than he imagined it.

‘Another objection to reinforcing Colonel Stevenson at all, and that applies still more strongly to sending the large detachment from this corps which you have proposed, is the risk that, in consequence thereof, this corps may never be of sufficient strength, or so composed as to be able to march forward from Poonah; supposing that there should be a war. We should then be obliged to have recourse to one of two measures: to turn Colonel Stevenson’s attention to pro-

tecting and forming a junction with his corps ; or, to break up General Stuart's army to make this corps so strong as to be again independent. Considering the call for Goa, the probability of the arrival of the French troops at Pondicherry, and the prospect of the renewal of the French war, the question is, would that be prudent ? Would General Stuart consent to that measure ?

' We must certainly keep Colonel Stevenson in such strength as to insure his safety in his advanced position ; but in deciding upon the degree of strength I must give him, and the nature of the troops I must send him, I must consider the circumstances above alluded to : the strength of the enemy, their present state, their probable future state, and their immediate designs. However, as I told you before, my prospects have improved so much within these last two days, that I have strong hopes that I shall be able to retain my position ; and if any of my modes of procuring bullocks succeed, I shall entirely recover.

' Believe me, &c.

' *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

' Sir,

' Camp, 26th June, 1803.

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 24th, and I have seen Major Spens's report to Captain Barclay, of the supply sent off upon coolies. This is, I assure you, very satisfactory to me. I approve of your sending a party to Coraygaum, and of the instructions to the officer commanding it, excepting that there will be no occasion for his making a raft.

' In case Captain Young should, according to your direction, send up any of the bullocks found too small for the pontoons, loaded with rice, I request you to send them on with loads of rice to me, specifying that they are these bullocks, at the time you send them.

' I called upon Mr. Duncan for two thousand carriage bullocks, which he promised me I should have at the end of May : but as they have not yet produced five hundred draught bullocks, which I called for likewise, they have employed part of these two thousand carriage bullocks in drawing the pontoons. All those, therefore, unfit for this work, must be sent on to me as carriage cattle.

' Captain Buchan is to return to join the army. Instructions to that effect are gone to Poonah.

' I omitted to mention to you, that I observe Mr. Duncan has recommended that a person should be especially ap-

pointed to take charge of the cattle with your detachment. I have written to him, however, to say, that although I complained of the state of condition of the cattle, I had no complaint to make of Major Spens; on the contrary, I have reason to be well satisfied with Major Spens in every respect

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 26th June, 1803.*

‘ Since I marched from Poonah I have sustained a great loss in carriage cattle employed in moving provisions and stores for the troops under my command; and the consequence is, that the stock of provisions which I had, and which would have lasted for three months, is much reduced.

‘ From causes which it is not at present necessary to discuss, I have not been able to procure any assistance from the Peshwah’s Government, either to replace the loss of cattle which I have sustained, or to bring forward any part of the depôt of provisions which I had formed at Poonah, with a view to the possible want before the return of the fair season; and it appears clearly that I must find means of subsistence, and of bringing forward the provisions collected at Poonah, independently of the Peshwah’s Government.

‘ Whatever may be my success in effecting these objects, I fear that, when I shall cross the Godavery, I shall be obliged to call upon Colonel Stevenson for assistance; and having taken into consideration the state of his supplies, in order that I might be enabled to judge whether he could afford me the assistance which I might require, I find that although the provision made for him is so ample as to secure his subsistence for three months, at least, he will suffer inconvenience before that time, if he should be obliged to supply me with any part of it. I therefore take the liberty of suggesting to you the propriety of sending towards Colonel Stevenson’s army about 5000 bullock loads of rice as soon as it may be practicable; and that a further supply of the same quantity should be sent in the middle of the month of August.

‘ The cause of the mortality among the cattle attached to the troops under my command has been the great length of the march they made from Seringapatam, in a very dry and hot season; during the greatest part of the march the majority of them suffered from a disorder to which all the cattle were liable in the last year, owing to the scarcity and bad-

ness of the forage at Poonah, and to the weather we have had since I marched from that place. The number of cattle lost by the brinjaries on this service has been so large, and the distance from Seringapatam is so great, that I much fear that I shall not be able to order up many more of this class of people from the Mysore country.

‘I have no reason to expect any assistance from the Peshwah’s government, at least till the conclusion of the rainy season, even if I should receive any at that period; and you will therefore observe, that I must rely in a great measure upon the means which you may be able to prevail upon the Nizam’s government to bring forward.

‘While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you, that upon enquiry I find that the store formed at Dowlutabad consists entirely of dry grain and flour, and I believe that those at Kurdlah and Dharore are of the same description. You are aware that our native troops require rice.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 26th June, 1803.*

‘I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Stevenson, from which you will

**The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘SIR,

‘Fort William, 26th June, 1803

‘The present state of affairs in the Marhatta empire, and the security of the alliance lately concluded between his Highness the Peshwah and the British Government, require that a temporary authority should be constituted at the least possible distance from the scene of eventual negotiation or hostilities, with full powers to conclude upon the spot whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. In such a crisis, various questions may arise, of which the precise tendency cannot be foreseen, and which may demand a prompt decision. The issue of these questions may involve the result of war or peace; and, in either alternative, the delay of reference to my authority might endanger the seasonable dispatch and the prosperity of the public service.

‘2. The success of the military operations, now placed under your directions, may depend on the timely decision of various political questions which may occur with relation to the interests and views of the several Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, and of their Highnesses the Peshwah and the Nizam; on the other hand, the issue of every political arrangement, now under negotiation with the powers of Hindustan or the Deccan, must be inseparably blended with the movements of your army.

be able to form a judgment of the measures taken by Rajah Mohiput Ram at Aurungabad, and of the state of defence in which that place will be hereafter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

‘ 3. It is therefore necessary, during the present crisis, to unite the general direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindustan and the Deccan under a distinct local authority, subject to the Governor General in Council. These powers could not be placed with advantage in any other hands than those of the general officer commanding the troops destined to restore the tranquillity of the Deccan

‘ 4. Your approved ability, zeal, temper, and judgment, combined with your extensive local experience; your established influence and high reputation among the Marhatta chiefs and states; and your intimate knowledge of my views and sentiments concerning the British interests in the Marhatta empire, have determined me to vest these important and arduous powers in your hands.

‘ 5 The nature of your military command under the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart is not likely to admit any doubt, or to lead to any embarrassment. In order, however, to obviate all possible difficulty on this point, I hereby appoint you to the chief command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies serving in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states or chiefs, subject only to the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, or of his Excellency General Lake.

‘ 6. I empower and further direct you to assure and exercise the general direction and control of all the political and military affairs of the British Government in the territories of the Nizam, of the Peshwah, and of the Marhatta states and chiefs.

‘ 7. The instructions addressed to the Resident at Poonah, under date the 30th ultimo (of which the general substance had been previously communicated to the Resident by the note of the 7th of May), convey to you full authority to carry into complete effect all the measures therein provisionally prescribed, as far as the accomplishment of those measures may depend upon your proceedings, without previous reference to my authority.

‘ 8. I hereby confirm that authority; and I further vest you with full powers to decide any question which may arise in the prosecution of the measures prescribed by those orders, according to the general spirit of my views and intentions concerning the affairs of the Marhatta state; directing you, however, to refer to me in all cases in which a previous reference to my authority may not appear to hazard the public interests. Under the same reservation, I authorise and empower you to commence and conclude negotiations with any of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars on the part of the British Government, for the purpose of promoting the general objects of the alliance lately concluded with his Highness the Peshwah, or of that subsisting with his Highness the Nizam.

‘ 9. This general authority especially empowers you, either directly, or

To Colonel Stevenson.

MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 28th June, 1803.

' I have received your letters of the 24th and 25th. I am much obliged to you for the steps you have taken regarding bullocks for me, as mentioned in your letter of the 24th.

through the representatives or officers of the British Government, to negotiate and conclude any engagements with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with the Rajah of Berar, or with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which may induce those chieftains to retire with their forces within the limits of their respective dominions, or to afford any other satisfactory pledge of their respective pacific intentions towards the British Government and its allies. You will be careful to form any such engagements on principles conformable to the dignity, honor, and interests of the British Government and of its allies, and to the spirit and tenor of our subsisting treaties; you are also authorised, under this instruction, to arbitrate, on the part of the British Government, the terms of any convention between his Highness the Peshwah and those chieftains respectively, for the settlement of mutual differences or demands, or for the adjustment of relative pretensions, and to pledge the guarantee of the British Government for the observance of those terms by the contracting parties. You are also empowered to arbitrate and guarantee the terms of accommodation between Scindiah and Holkar, if any points should yet remain unadjusted between those chieftains; and to frame, negotiate, and guarantee any terms between those chieftains, jointly or separately, and the Rajah of Berar. It is my particular intention by these instructions to enable you to conclude such arrangements with any of those chieftains, either separately or combined, as may preclude or frustrate any confederacy, or other measures directed to the subversion of the treaty of Bassein, or to the injury of our rights and interests, or those of our allies.

' 10. You are also empowered to conclude such engagements with any subordinate chieftains of the Marhatta state as may appear to you to be expedient for the purpose of securing their co-operations in the event of hostilities between the British Government and Scindiah, the Rajah of Berar, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, or any other power; you are authorised further to adopt the necessary measures for conciliating the obedience of the subordinate chiefs to the Peshwah's authority

' 11. In the actual relation of the British Government to the Peshwah, we possess the right of securing to the chiefs and jaghiredars of the Marhatta empire the satisfaction of their just and equitable claims, even independently of any direct act of the Peshwah's government; the exercise of that right becomes a duty in proportion to the danger with which the tardy, infirm, or erroneous proceedings of the Peshwah's government may menace the security of the alliance, and the stability of his Highness's legitimate authority.

' 12. The policy of the treaty, and my inclinations, would induce me to limit our interference in the internal affairs of the Peshwah's government

‘ In respect to the rice, if you should deem that which Mohiput Ram may purchase to be in safety at Aurungabad, and that which Sookroodoor may purchase to be in safety at Puttun, it will be equally as convenient to me to have it at those places as in my camp; and more convenient than that

within the most moderate bounds. I am determined, however, to pursue that course which shall lead most directly and speedily to the full restoration and establishment of his Highness’s authority on a permanent basis, and to the efficient operation of the benefits of the alliance. If the imbecility of his Highness’s council, the defect of his personal character, or the intrigues of his servants, should tend to frustrate or to retard the accomplishment of those salutary objects, the provisional interference of the British power must be seasonably and firmly applied to rescue his Highness from the immediate effect of evils which cannot be suffered to operate for a moment, without the hazard of every interest which the treaty of Bassein was destined to restore and confirm.

‘ 13. You will therefore proceed without delay to conclude all such arrangements with his Highness’s jaghiredars, and servants of all descriptions, as may appear to you to be necessary to enable you to meet the exigencies of the present crisis; and you will not abstain from the most direct and even ostensible interposition of the British authority, which may, in your judgment, be requisite to secure the exertions, to animate the zeal, or to reward the services of the Peshwah’s subjects and servants in the common cause of his Highness and of his allies. Whatever immediate expense may be necessary for this purpose, will be defrayed at present by the British Government, and will hereafter become a charge against the Peshwah, as being inseparably connected with his Highness’s restoration and establishment.

‘ 14. All such engagements as you may conclude with his Highness the Peshwah, and with any of the Marhatta chiefs and jaghiredars, or other powers, will be confirmed by me under the limitations and restrictions herein prescribed.

‘ 15. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and to the Residents at the Courts of Poonah, Hyderabad, at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and in the territories of the Guickwar; with directions to those several authorities to assist you, and to co-operate with you in all points connected with the efficient exercise of the powers with which you are hereby invested.

‘ 16. In exercising the powers hereby intrusted to your sole discretion, I direct you to hold the most unreserved and confidential intercourse with the Residents at Poonah, at Hyderabad, and at the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and also with the Resident in the territory of the Guickwar; and you will regularly correspond with Lord Clive and with Mr. Duncan.

‘ 17. You will necessarily continue to receive the orders of his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart, and to submit a full view of all your operations to the direction of his Excellency. I particularly enjoin you to submit to his Excellency the earliest information of your proceedings of a political nature under these instructions.

the bullocks which you may purchase should be delayed to receive it.

‘ You are now so far from me, that it would be difficult to send you twenty thousand rupees, or any other sum to pay for this rice, or the bullocks ; but you shall certainly be re-

‘ 18. If circumstances should render it necessary for his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart to unite the whole force of the army in the field, and to assume in person the general command in the Deccan, in that case I hereby vest the authority conveyed to you, by this dispatch, in his Excellency Lieut. General Stuart ; under the fullest confidence that he will exercise it with the same advantage to the public service which I have uniformly derived from the exertion of his Excellency’s distinguished talents, experience, and virtues.

‘ 19. In the case supposed, I empower his Excellency to delegate the whole, or any part of the said authority to you ; and I desire that in exercising the said authority, or any part thereof, in his own person, his Excellency will be pleased to communicate fully with you, and to receive your advice and opinion.

‘ 20. In the execution of these instructions, I authorise and direct you to employ any additional military staff ; and to require the services of any civil officers, whose assistance you may deem necessary, to the dispatch of the arduous affairs connected with the subject of this order.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

‘ WELLESLEY ’

The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Sir,

‘ Fort William, 27th June, 1803

‘ 1. The conduct of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, requires a special notification to you of my views and intentions with regard to the operations of your army, and to such political proceedings as may be connected with a state of war between the British Government and those chiefs.

‘ First. On the receipt of this dispatch, you will desire Colonel Collins to demand an explicit declaration of the views of Scindiah, and of the Rajah of Berar, within such a number of days as shall appear to you to be reasonable, consistently with a due attention to the period of the seasons, and to the facility of moving your army, and of prosecuting hostilities with the advantages which you now possess.

‘ 2. If that explanation should not be satisfactory on such grounds as, in your discretion, you may state to Colonel Collins, you will desire Colonel Collins to repair to your camp under a proper escort.

‘ 3. In this event, or in any other state of circumstances which may appear to you to require hostilities, consistently with the general tenor of my instructions, you will employ the forces under your command in the most active operations against Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, or against both, according to your discretion.

‘ 4. It is probable that the state of the rivers will afford great advantages to your army, and will embarrass the enemy in a considerable degree, it

paid any sums that you advance on account of this division of the army.

‘The money which is now coming from General Stuart’s camp is not intended for you, but for me. I have received

hostilities should commence during the rainy monsoon. In this event, I direct you to use your utmost efforts to destroy the military power of either or of both chiefs, and especially of Scindiah, and to avail yourself of every advantage which circumstances may offer, to the utmost extent of the strength of your army. It is particularly desirable that you should destroy Scindiah’s artillery, and all arms of European construction, and all military stores which he may possess.

‘5. In the event of hostilities, you will therefore proceed to the utmost extremity which may appear to you to promise success, without admitting pacific negotiation until the power of the opposing chief shall have been completely destroyed. In such case, the actual seizure of the person of Scindiah, or of Ragojee Bhoonslah, would be highly desirable, and the state of the rivers may perhaps favor such an advantage.

‘6. In any crisis which may exist under the terror of your approach, or at any time after hostilities shall have actually commenced, I empower you to conclude peace with Scindiah, or with the Rajah of Berar, jointly or separately, on such terms as may appear to you most advisable. I shall, however, state to you the objects most desirable, in the event of any treaty with either or with both those chiefs, founded on their aggression and on our success or power.

‘7. The entire reduction of Scindiah’s power would certainly afford considerable security to our interests: in the event, however, of a peace with Scindiah, which should leave his power in existence among the states of India, the most desirable arrangements would be:—First, That Scindiah should cede to the Company all his possessions, rights, and pretensions, within the countries to the northward of a line drawn from the north frontier of Gohud, to the frontier of Jynagur, together with all his possessions, &c., to the northward of Jynagur.—This cession would include Agra, Delhi, and the remainder of the Dooh, of the Jumna, and Ganges. The Mogul’s person would necessarily fall under our protection. This article must be a special stipulation of treaty. Our frontier towards the ceded provinces of Oude would then be formed by the small state of Gohud, and by the Rajpoot states of Jynagur and Jeypoor.—The Ranah of Gohud to become tributary to the Company; Gwalior to be occupied by the Company. Defensive alliances to be formed with Jynagur and Jeypoor. By this arrangement the Marhattas would be excluded from the north of Hindustan, and from communication with the Seiks.—2ndly, Scindiah to cede Baroach, and all his maritime possessions.—3rdly, Scindiah to cede all his possessions, rights, &c., in Guzerat.—4thly, Scindiah to cede all his possessions, &c., southward of the Nerbudda.

‘8. Arrangements might be made for a partition of these cessions with the Peshwah and the Nizam. In the event of hostilities with Scindiah and Holkar, and of the complete defeat of those chiefs, the most distinct arrange-

a letter from General Stuart, however, in which he tells me that he is to send you one lac of pagodas; and that sum may be sent to you either with another lac of pagodas for me, through the Nizam's country, or it may go to Hyderabad, according to the wish expressed by you to General

ment would be to take for the Company all the territories, rights, or pretensions of Scindiah and of Holkar, to the northward and westward of the Nerbudda, and to make that river the boundary of the northern frontier of the Peshwah, giving to the Peshwah all the territories, &c. of those chiefs to the southward of the Nerbudda, with the exception of all sea ports which must be reserved to the Company. Bundelcund is properly subject to the Peshwah. It would be desirable to obtain that province for the Company, with a view to secure the navigation of the Jumna, and to the further security of the province of Benares.

'From the Rajah of Berar I should wish to acquire the whole province of Cuttack, so as to unite the northern sircars by a continued line of sea coast with Bengal.—This cession, including Balasore, &c., to be made either absolutely, or upon payment of a moderate rent, or as a security for a subsidiary force to be introduced into the dominions of the Rajah of Berar.—The district of Gurrah Mundela has been an object to the Nizam. This object is to be pursued, according to circumstances, in the event of war with the Rajah of Berar. Without securing one or other of these advantages, you will not make peace with the Rajah of Berar, after he shall have compelled you to resort to hostilities against him, unless, in your discretion, you should deem peace with the Rajah of Berar advisable on different terms.

'9. You are at liberty, generally, to modify the terms on peace herein suggested, at your discretion or to change them altogether, if it should become advisable to detach any chief from the confederacy.

'10. If Holkar should join the confederacy, you will act towards him on the principles of the preceding instructions. It is not desirable to erect Holkar's accidental power into an established state of India. This reduction would certainly be the most advisable policy; but the conduct and modification of our relations with Holkar must be left entirely to your discretion. You will not, however, prosecute hostilities against Holkar, merely for the purpose of obtaining indemnity for the plunder of Aurungabad, or for any other predatory incursions; such question may be reserved for amicable negotiation.

'11. In the event of hostilities, you will take proper measures for withdrawing the European officers from the service of Scindiah, Holkar, and of every other chief opposed to you.

'12. You are at liberty to incur any expense requisite for this service, and to employ such emissaries as may appear most serviceable. You are also at liberty to enter into such engagements as may appear advantageous with any of Scindiah's ministers, chiefs, or servants, or with those of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar; and to afford any useful encouragement to the party of the Bheys, or to any others in the dominions of any of the confederate chiefs.

Stuart, or it may come to Poonah with a lac of pagodas for me. Whenever General Stuart shall apprize me of his determination upon this point, I shall write to you.

‘I think that it would be desirable to increase the guard in charge of the boats on the Godavery to an European officer, and a company of native infantry, in order to provide effectually for their security; and that I might have it in my power, by corresponding with him, to direct their meeting me at any part of the river I may think proper. This same officer might have under his charge the one thousand brinjaries, so far as that he should know where to find them, in case I should want them.

‘The mutaseddee who conducts the Hindustany dawk for Colonel Collins, and who resides, I believe, at Aurungabad, has complained of the want of a boat upon the Godavery, for the purpose of transporting the letters across. He has

‘13. In the event of hostilities, I propose to dispatch proper emissaries to Gohud, and to the Rajpoot chiefs. You will also employ every endeavor to excite those powers against Scindiah. I propose to engage to guarantee their independence, and to secure to them any other reasonable advantages which they may require. The independence of the Rajpoot chiefs would constitute a power which would form the best security to our north-western frontier in Hindustan, in the supposition of Scindiah’s reduction.

‘14. You will apprize his Excellency General Lake, through the most expeditious channel, (if any more expeditious communication should offer than through Calcutta,) of your plan of political and military operations under these instructions.

‘15. Scindiah’s retreat across the Nerbudda (after his insolent and hostile declaration to Colonel Collins of the 28th of May) will not alone be a sufficient proof of his pacific intentions: unless, therefore, Scindiah shall have afforded full satisfaction and security in your judgment, you will pursue him across the Nerbudda, if you should deem that movement advisable for the purpose of reducing his means of mischief.

‘16. The same principle applies to any movement of the Rajah of Berar or of Holkar. The retreat of Ragojee Bhoonslah or of Holkar to any place situated within their respective territories, or elsewhere, will not exclusively amount to a sufficient degree of satisfaction and security, after the recent proofs which the confederacy has disclosed of determined hostility and arrogant ambition.

‘17. You will consider what steps may be taken to excite Cashee Rao Holkar against Jeswunt Rao; and if, in prosecuting hostilities, you should be able to obtain possession of the person of Kunder Rao Holkar, you will avail yourself of that advantage.

‘18. The precise time of action from Oude and in Cuttack cannot now be stated; but I will seize Agra, Delhi, take the person of the Mogul under British protection, and occupy the Dooab, together with Cuttack, at the ear-

written to me to say that Rajah Sookroodoor has taken away the boat which was formerly used for that purpose. If he has done so, it has been by your desire, and for my use; and therefore I cannot but approve of what he has done: but I think that it would be desirable that a basket boat should be upon the Godavery, at the place at which Colonel Collins's dawk crosses, and which may be found out from the mutaseddee above mentioned, who resides at Aurungabad.

'We have no accounts from Colonel Collins since the 18th. I imagine that matters remain at Scindiah's camp nearly in the same state as when I wrote last to you.

'I beg you to be cautious not to advance beyond Roshungaum; and not to go out of the Nizam's territories, or into those, the property of which is divided between the Nizam and the Marhattas; and not to act upon a report from any of the chiefs that Colonel Collins has come away, until you are absolutely certain of it. All these chiefs have interested motives, and where the Marhattas are concerned, their reports are to be received with doubts.

'Your situation is a most delicate one,' and therefore I particularly caution you. It will be our duty to carry on the war with activity, when it shall begin; but it is equally so to avoid hostilities, if we possibly can; and by no means to take any step which can occasion them, or give a pretence for Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar to commence them.

liest practicable moment after I shall have learnt that you deem hostilities inevitable, or as soon as such measures of precaution may appear to me to be requisite.

'19. In the movements of your army, and in all your proceedings under these instructions, you will advert to the precarious state of the Nizam's health, and to the necessity of preserving our interests at Hyderabad, in the event of his Highness's decease. The Resident at Hyderabad will apprise you of the orders which he has received from me respecting the succession to the musnud of the Deccan.

'20. Although a division of the French troops is already arrived at Pondicherry, and the remainder may be soon expected, I desire that you will not be induced, by that event, to precipitate an accommodation with any of the Marhatta powers. The effectual security of our interests in the Marhatta empire is the strongest barrier which can be opposed to the progress of the French interests in India; the early reduction of Scindiah (if that chief should compel us to resort to hostilities) is certain, and would prove a fatal blow to the views of France. An imperfect arrangement with the Marhatta powers, or a delay of active measures, might open to France the means of engaging, with advantage, in the affairs of the Marhatta empire.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

WELLESLEY.

'I return Meer Khan's letter: you will perceive by this postscript that I have received your letter of the 26th.

Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close

'MY DEAR COLONEL, Camp, 28th June, 1803

'From your letter of the 27th, which I have just received, I apprehend that there is some mistake respecting the bullocks which I sent off on the 26th for rice; and that I did not clearly explain myself. My wish was that these bullocks should, if possible, receive their loads at Coraygaum, where they would arrive on to-morrow, the 29th; and that in order that the loads might be sent there from Poonah, I proposed either that Colonel Murray's bullocks should be employed, or that coolies should be hired; or that if coolies could not be hired, Colonel Murray should endeavor to prevail upon his dooley bearers, or a working party of sepoy, to perform this service. At last, if the rice could not be sent out to Coraygaum, I requested that you would be so kind as to write to the officer in charge of the party, and I informed you that he would go on to Poonah for the rice. I was anxious, however, that your arrangements to send on rice to camp by coolies should not be disturbed, in order to send the rice to meet the party at Coraygaum.

'In your postscript to your letter of the 27th, you say you "will of course stop the march of the detachment with the bullocks to Coraygaum." They will be there to-morrow morning, and I think it better that they should march on even to Poonah, than come back without loads. But this letter may reach you in time to enable you to make some arrangements for sending out their loads on to-morrow evening and the 30th, so as to enable them to commence their return to camp on the 1st of July. If this should be the case, I request you to send off an express messenger to Lieut. Walker, the officer in charge of the detachment, to desire him to wait at Coraygaum for the loads.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

'Camp, 29th June, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 27th June, and I conclude that you will have sent the rice to meet the bullocks at Coraygaum.

'I shall write to you respecting sending on rice to us hereafter, as soon as I see the first coolies you sent come into camp. They are not yet arrived, but the first asses have arrived.

'I shall be very much obliged to you if you will send me five hundred bullock saddles upon coolies' heads. I have been tolerably successful in getting bullocks, and want saddles for them. Let me know to what progress Major Spens has made in getting the gunny bags.

'It would be desirable that a note should be written to the officer in charge at Coraygaum, and to Lieut. Brown, whom I have placed for the present at Seroor, upon the Goor, to apprise those gentlemen when you shall dispatch any thing from Poonah.

'Lieut. Stirling ought also to be directed to inform Lieut. Brown when any thing passes his post. I shall direct Lieut. Brown to let me know when the same may pass the Goor. We shall thus have our supplies constantly in our view.

'If your bullock saddles should be supposed to be good, let some be purchased in Poonah.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 30th June, 1803.

'Since I wrote to you last, I have received a letter from Colonel Collins, dated the 22nd, from which it appears very improbable that he should have quitted Scindiah's camp before the 28th; and it is even probable that he will yet be there for some time longer. The question of peace or war still remains in the same undecided state.

'I mention this to you just to show the necessity of caution in giving credit to the reports you may hear.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 30th June, 1803.

'I have received your letters of the 27th and 28th. None of the coolies that have been sent off from Poonah have yet arrived in camp. It is possible that they may have been detained by the rivers; but I request that no more may be sent till I see these come in.

‘I have written a letter to Collins, in which I have urged him to press forward the negotiation with Scindiah. We cannot shrink from the contest into which we must enter, if Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will not remove from the Nizam’s frontier.

‘My plan of operations was to attack Ahmednuggur with my corps; and to keep Colonel Stevenson with his on the defensive, beyond the Godavery, till I should have got possession of Ahmednuggur, and then that both corps should co-operate.

‘You appear to be of opinion that Colonel Stevenson would not be sufficiently strong, opposed to the whole confederacy, in which I agree; but in fact there is no reason to believe that he will be opposed to the whole confederacy. We know that Holkar has crossed the Taptee with all or the greatest part of his force; and that both his army and Scindiah’s are much crippled, and at present very ill equipped for a campaign. Therefore, even supposing that Holkar could recross the Taptee, so as to join in a combined operation against Colonel Stevenson, before I should have made such progress at Ahmednuggur as to give the Colonel some assistance, it is not probable that the confederates would be able to bring such a force upon him, as to give us any reason to be apprehensive of the consequences.

‘But even supposing that Colonel Stevenson is weak, I do not see in what manner I can reinforce him. I cannot send him cavalry, because it is my opinion that the measure which Scindiah will adopt for the defence of Ahmednuggur may be to send a body of cavalry to cut off my communication with Poonah; and I shall want all the troops of that description which I have got. Indeed, I have heard that a small body of pindarries are already arrived in the country. I shall want all the infantry I have for the operation upon Ahmednuggur.

‘On the other hand, I might bring Colonel Stevenson across the Godavery; and certainly if I thought he was in any danger, that would be the measure which I should adopt: but it would be attended by the entire ruin of the Nizam’s territories north of that river, and with the loss of our own reputation, for which evils our success at Ahmednuggur would hardly compensate.

‘Therefore it is my opinion, considering the divided and crippled state of the enemy at the present moment, and the little chance there is that this state will mend before I can cross the Godavery, that I ought to leave Colonel Stevenson

north of that river, at least to keep all small plundering parties in check. In my opinion the great difficulty I shall have to contend with will be to check the Colonel himself. However, I have sent him the most positive orders not to quit the Nizam's territories. I wrote to Mr. Duncan to keep the depôts at Poonah and Panwell well supplied.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

Camp, 30th June, 1803.

'None of the coolies are yet arrived, but I have sent out to look for them.

'In case the depôt at Poonah should fall below 4000 bags, you should purchase; but I make no doubt that Captain Young will be able to keep it up to double that amount. Mr. Duncan will easily have it in his power to keep the store full at Panwell.

'I do not wish you to issue flour to the sepoys; in fact it would not be cheaper than half a seer of rice: it introduces a new practice into the service, which is bad if it is not necessary; and as every change of food causes sickness, it may be prejudicial to their health.

'I have this instant received a letter from Lieut. Walker, who went with the bullocks to Coraygaum; he did not attend to his instructions, and arrived there on the 27th, instead of the 29th. He met there some of the coolies whom you dispatched on the 25th; he took from them their loads and was waiting to retake the loads of others, whom he heard were on the road. All this is contrary to his instructions: 190 of the bullocks are come into the camp already, and God knows when Lieut. Walker will arrive with the others. I have sent off a messenger to him, however, with orders to come on with the bullocks which he will have loaded, and to bring with him all the coolies that may be at Coraygaum.

'I think, however, it is very probable that, as the coolies will have found that the loads of some have been taken from them at Coraygaum, none of them will proceed farther than that place, and they will lay down their loads there. I request you to write to Lieut. Stirling, to inquire whether this is the case; and if it should be so, send coolies from Poonah to carry their loads on to camp; and be so kind as to send an hircarrah with each party that you shall send off.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 1st July, 1803

‘The first coolies dispatched from Poonah are dropping into camp, and notwithstanding the mistake made by Lieut. Walker, of which Colonel Murray will have informed you, I think that we shall do pretty well.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will give directions that 2000 more coolies loaded with rice may be sent to camp. An hircarra and one or two sepoy's ought to come with each party, in order to keep them together and show them the road.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 2nd July, 1803

‘I have just received your letter of the 30th of June. The scaling ladders would be very useful to me, and I shall be obliged to you if you will desire that they may be brought up from Panwell, and sent forward to camp. I also agree in opinion with Lieut. Colonel Close, that the iron 18 pounders might be very useful, and indeed necessary; and at all events there is no harm in having them at Poonah; but in what manner are they and the stores to be brought up the ghaut? I see no mode at present of effecting this object.

‘I wish that you would look at my bullocks, of which Lieut. Brown has charge, and see whether they are at all in a state for work; and if they are, whether they could draw your two 12 pounders and two howitzers with their stores from Poonah. I am well satisfied with the equipment I have, in case it should be necessary to attack the fort of Ahmednuggur; but there is no harm in having a larger one, and the howitzers in particular may be very useful. If, therefore, you should be of opinion that Lieut. Brown's bullocks can work, I should wish you to send forward all these pieces: but if only sufficient for the howitzers, and in condition, send them. You may send a guard with them, and I will look out for them from Seroor.

‘As the pontoons cannot be wanted till after we have got Ahmednuggur; and as, at all events, I suspect that, from the state of their equipments and the breaking of their carriages already, they will be of little use in this campaign, I believe it would be best to send for some of their bul-

locks to move the 12 pounders and howitzers, with their tumbrils, if those under Lieut. Brown's charge are not equal to that work.

'If you should be able to send these pieces of ordnance, I should wish you to send with them about twenty artillery men. Of course these, with the ordnance, will be returned to you, as soon as the operation at Ahmednuggur shall be concluded.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 3rd July, 1803.

'I received last night your letter of the 20th of June, regarding Mr. Mackenzie.

'In exercising the power given to me by Government, in regard to the subsidiary force at Poonah, I shall consider it a duty, and it certainly is my inclination, to select those officers for the situations which are to be filled who may be agreeable to you. The gentleman you now have recommended to me is one for whom I have a respect, and in whose advancement and welfare I am materially interested; as he has been frequently recommended to me in the strongest terms by his relation General Mackenzie, a very old friend of mine.

'But both you and I, my dear Colonel, must attend to claims of a superior nature to those brought forward, either in consequence of our private feelings of friendship or of recommendation. Of this nature are the claims founded upon service.

'Mr. Gilmour, the Staff Surgeon with this division of the army, quitted a situation of emolument at Seringapatam, in order to take the field with the troops, when it was determined that the detachment should march to Poonah under my command, and when Mr. Anderson joined the head quarters. Mr. Gilmour was selected to be at the head of the medical department of that detachment, and his allowances were, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, fixed on the same scale with those of the Staff Surgeon with the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. Since that time, Mr. Gilmour has done all the duty of the Staff Surgeon greatly to my satisfaction and the general good; and when the subsidiary force comes to be established at Poonah, I think that I could not disappoint the expectation which he has had a right to form,

that he would be its permanent Staff Surgeon, without doing him great injustice, and, in his person, violating a principle which ought always to guide those who have the disposal of military patronage, viz., that those who do the duty of the army ought to be promoted, and also ought to enjoy its benefits and advantages.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 4th July, 1803.

‘ Malcolm has communicated to me your letter to him. I acknowledge that, in the event of a war, I have no fears for Colonel Stevenson's safety; considering that the enemy's force is certainly divided, that they cannot bring it to bear upon the Colonel till I shall be within reach of him, and that therefore which they can bring upon him is not very well equipped. If I am mistaken upon this point, I must make up my mind to forego one of two objects, either the capture of Ahmednuggur, or the security of the Nizam's frontier. I do not think it would be proper to try the siege of Ahmednuggur, excepting in full force; and if Colonel Stevenson is not in sufficient force, I must either reinforce him, at the expense of leaving Ahmednuggur in the hands of the enemy; or I must draw him back to the Godavery, possibly across that river, and leave the Nizam's territories beyond that river defenceless.

‘ The only part of my force that it has been ever supposed I could send him, consistently with the plan of attacking Ahmednuggur, is the cavalry. But, considering the state of my supplies, and the total deficiency of country cavalry with this division, from the failure of the sirdars, that is the part of my corps which I may most want.

‘ From the last letters from Colonel Collins, of the 29th of June, I think it probable that we may expect from him something which will give us a tolerably clear idea of the views and intentions of the chiefs. Circumstances have certainly altered materially since Colonel Collins commenced his negotiation on the 28th of May. He has remained in Scindiah's camp, and it is not impossible but that he may be drawn into a negotiation, to be carried on while these chiefs are seated upon the Nizam's frontier. The question whether it will be prudent or not to negotiate on the demands of the chiefs, or even to grant them, may depend upon their being

forced to quit the Nizam's frontier ; and that being the case, it will occur, are they more likely to withdraw from the Nizam's frontier, being threatened by an attack from the whole of our forces, or by an attack upon Ahmednuggur ?

‘ Upon this point I have to observe, that the threat of the attack upon Ahmednuggur, combined with Colonel Collins's remaining in Scindiah's camp, has hitherto produced no effect ; and that to carry it into execution will certainly bring on hostilities.

‘ The threat of the attack of our whole force upon their camp may induce them to retire, and thus prevent the war altogether.

‘ On the other hand, it is obvious that the objections to this measure, referrible to subsistence, exist ; and that in case there should be a war, I must return upon Ahmednuggur, or must lose my communication with Poonah. In short, the receipt of Colonel Collins's next dispatch must determine my conduct.

‘ I observe from your dispatch to Malcolm, that you are of opinion that the Coast battalion at Poonah is not wanted there. If that should be the case, I wish that you would desire Colonel Murray to send it to camp, as its arrival will enable me to detach a corps to the Godavery ; and thus, at all events, secure the boats and a passage over that river. They may take with them five seers of rice for each man.

‘ I have got a party at Seroor ; but it is best to send the coolies with the rice on to camp, as long as they will come.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close* ’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.* ’

To Colonel Murray.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 4th July, 1803.*

‘ I have received this morning your letter of the 2nd. I am under no apprehensions respecting the depôt wearing out. It consisted of about 16,000 half-bags, of which you may have sent me 5000. I take your consumption to be about 30 half-bags a day, and at this estimate you may have consumed 1000 half-bags. There will still remain there 10,000.

‘ I should certainly wish, if possible, to have more rice sent up ; and I think it very probable that in some of the intervals of fair weather, Captain Young may have it in his power to send some, and that Mr. Duncan may be able to assist him. But I do not think that the want of rice is at present or is likely to be so pressing, or that it is necessary to take the means from the pontoons to carry it up.

‘You will always have the bazaar of Poonah for your force, and you will of course use it as soon as the stock in the depôt comes to 4000 double bags. I think there is but little hope that I shall be able to move that quantity of rice from Poonah, till long after it will be in the power of Captain Young to send up an additional supply.

‘I certainly do not expect much benefit from the pontoons in this campaign, for many reasons; but I consider a bridge to be a very necessary part of the equipment of a corps stationed on this frontier, the operations of which, as connected with other corps, are so liable to be cramped during a great part of the year by rivers not fordable: therefore, though I may not have the use of the bridge, it is very proper that it should be brought up, that we should examine it and its equipments in how far they are calculated to answer the purpose intended, and how the equipments, carriages, &c., can be improved. This can be only done in the rainy season; and persons who have been in the habit of seeing carriages moved in all situations must be considered the most competent judges on these points, and I must employ some of those in my camp to examine this equipment. Therefore although I am not in a hurry about the bridge under present circumstances, I should not like to forego all prospect of getting it up; excepting that the coolies employed in that work may be employed in bringing up rice, which, after all, I think I shall not be able to move away.

‘The bags which I wished that Major Spens should get are bullock gunny bags, made of the best gunny, and capable of containing grain. The Bombay bags, which you mean, are, I believe, those which came up from Panwell with rice, or double bags made of the same kind of gunny. These are not used to carry rice on the backs of bullocks.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Adjutant General.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 6th July, 1803*.

‘Affairs in this country have remained nearly in the same state for the last two months.

‘Jeswunt Rao Holkar has withdrawn gradually from the

* *Lieut. Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Governor General.*

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp near Jumner, 6th July, 1803.

‘In the afternoon of the 4th instant I had an interview with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and with Ragojee Bhoonslah, at the tent of the latter chieftain. I

frontiers of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and has at last crossed the river Taptee, with the greatest part of his army. Scindiah has remained encamped in the same place in the neighborhood of Mulcapoor since the beginning of May, towards the latter end of which month his army was joined by that of the Rajah of Berar. It is reported, that both

was attended, on this occasion, by Captain Paris Bradshaw, Moonshee Mirza Bauker Khan, and Gunput Rao; Sereedhur Punt, Cashee Rao, the eldest son, and the brother of the Berar Rajah, were present at this conference; also Jadoon Rao Bhasker, Unna Bhasker, Etul Punt, and Ambajee, Inglia, on the part of Scindiah.

'2. After an interchange of compliments, I commenced the conversation by observing, that I had for some time past been extremely anxious to obtain an audience of those chieftains, in order to learn their final determination respecting the line of conduct which they intended to pursue, in consequence of the engagements lately concluded at Bassem between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government; and I concluded with expressing my belief, that the result of the present meeting would enable me to assure your Excellency of the friendly disposition of both chieftains towards the British government.

'3 Here I paused, in the expectation of a reply; but as none was given, I proceeded to state, that the treaty of Bassem was purely of a defensive nature; that it contained no stipulation whatever injurious to the just rights of any of the Deccany sirdars; but, on the contrary, had expressly, provided for the security and independence of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs; that the principal object of the treaty of Bassem was to preserve the peace of India; that your Lordship regarded Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah as the ancient friends of the Honorable Company, and was, on this account, willing to improve the existing connexion between their states and the British government. I insisted on the right of the Peshwah to contract engagements with the English, without consulting with any of the Marhatta sirdars. I desired the Berar Rajah would advert to the very clear exposition of the views and principles which induced the treaty of Bassem, as set forth in your Excellency's letter to his address, under date the 13th of last May. I observed, that this letter contained the most satisfactory proofs of the moderation and justice of the British government. Then addressing myself to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I said, that conformably to your Lordship's directions I had already given the same explanation to him verbally; and I reminded the Maharajah of his having positively assured me, on the 24th of last May, that he had no intention whatever to obstruct the completion of the engagements lately concluded at Bassem. I then remarked, that I only required from him a confirmation of this assurance, together with a similar declaration on the part of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah; and, in conclusion, I declared, that it was your Lordship's earnest desire to promote the prosperity of their respective sircars; and that they might safely rely on the continued friendship of the British government, so long as they refrained from committing acts of aggression against the English and their allies.

'1. Instead of making any observations on the foregoing discourse, Scree-

chiefs moved farther to the southward in the end of June ; but I have received no accounts of their movements since the 27th of June. The existence of the combination of

dhur Punt entered into a most tedious explanation of the conduct which ought to have been adopted by the Peshwah, previously to his forming a new treaty with the British government. He said, it had been invariably the usage on such occasions to consult with the Deccany sirdars ; whereas Bajee Rao had acted, in the present instance, not only without the concurrence, but even without the knowledge, of Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, although they were his friends, and confessedly the most powerful chiefs in the Marhatta empire. This is the substance of the only material points urged by Sereedhur Punt. I replied, that his Highness the Peshwah had repeatedly written both to the Maharajah and to the Berar Rajah to repair to Poona, but that these requisitions of his Highness had not been complied with : that in consequence the Peshwah was left without any means of defence against his enemies, except that which he derived from the English, to whom his Highness was solely indebted for the preservation of his life, honor, and dignity. I further observed, that his (the minister's) reference to old usages was inconclusive, in as much as no one instance had been adduced tending to prove that the Peshwah had not an undoubted right to enter into new engagements with the English, independently of the consent of any of the feudatory Marhatta chiefs, and that, in fact, the only point for consideration was, whether Ragojee Bhoonslah and Dowlut Rao Scindiah designed to oppose the completion of a treaty actually concluded between his Highness the Peshwah and the British government.

'5. Here again Sereedhur Punt made a long speech, containing, for the most part, professions of the friendly disposition which his master entertained towards the British government. He ended by remarking, that the English troops, having crossed the Godavery, were advancing towards the ghaut of Adjuntee. In consequence of which, he requested I would write to the Hon. General Wellesley, for the purpose of prevailing on him to recall that detachment. I excused myself from preferring any request of the kind ; and observed, that the British troops generally advanced when any army was approaching them, but never retreated. I then returned to the question which I had so frequently stated. Sereedhur Punt said, that he had a great many remarks to make on the different articles of the treaty of Bassem. I replied, that these remarks might be committed to writing, and hereafter be sent to your Excellency ; but in the mean time I expected he would answer my question. The Bhoonslah's minister then objected, that the Peshwah had not, to this hour, informed either Scindiah or Ragojee of his having concluded a new treaty with the English. I reminded Sereedhur Punt of the duplicate letters which both the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah had received through me from his Highness the Peshwah, and in which his Highness expressly mentions having improved the friendship that had so long subsisted between his government and that of the Honorable Company. Both Jadoon Rao and Sereedhur Punt admitted the correctness of this statement ; but said, that their masters had never received the originals ? and gave me to understand, that they yielded no credit whatever to the duplicates. On

those chiefs with Holkar is still reported, but it is certain that there is no confidence yet among them.

‘Colonel Stevenson crossed the Godavery, near Puttun, when I marched from Poonah, and he is now encamped in the neighborhood of Aurungabad.

this head much warm conversation ensued; but both Sereedhur Punt and Jadoon Rao declared that it was necessary, for the satisfaction of the Bhoonslah and of Scindiah, that they should receive the foregoing information from the Peshwah himself; and that, for this purpose, they intended deputing two confidential persons to Poonah. In the mean time they assured me, that their masters had no design whatever to oppose any engagements which the British might have contracted with his Highness; and they also promised that their armies should not advance towards Poonah, nor ascend the Adjunttee ghaut.

‘After giving these assurances, they requested I would endeavour to prevent the nearer approach of the British troops, under the command of Colonel Stevenson. I replied, that to evince the sincerity of their present professions, it was indispensably requisite that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and the Bhoonslah repair to Nagpoor; that, while they continued in this quarter with their armies, it was impossible for your Excellency to rely on their friendly promises; and I added, that if the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah would immediately return to their respective capitals, that I had no doubt of obtaining the consent of the Hon. General Wellesley to withdraw his forces also. But although I persisted in contending and urging this point a considerable time, and did not fail to state that the continuance of the Marhatta armies in this quarter would most probably be productive of serious evils, yet I could obtain no satisfactory assurance either from Jadoon Rao or Sereedhur Punt, that Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would shortly return to their respective capitals; and hence I am inclined to infer that their friendly professions are insincere.

‘G. Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah both promised to send me letters on the following day for your Excellency, containing the strongest assurances of their determination to preserve and maintain the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between their states and the British government. I waited for these letters during the whole of yesterday; but as they are not yet sent to me, although this day be far advanced, I shall no longer defer the dispatch of my present address.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘J. COLLINS.’

The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to the Governor General.

‘I have received your Lordship’s friendly letter, testifying the conclusion of new engagements between his Highness the Peshwah and the English Company, at Bassein, together with a copy of the treaty; and I have been fully apprized of every word of its contents, which have also been fully communicated to me by Colonel Collins.

‘Whereas the engagements subsisting between the Peshwah and me are such, that the adjustment of all affairs, and of the concerns of his state and government, should be arranged and completed with my advice and parti-

‘The detachment has suffered a considerable loss in cattle since it marched from Poonah, occasioned immediately by the rain, but remotely by the length of the march which the cattle had made, the dearth and bad quality of the forage at Poonah, and by the want of care of the owners of the hired cattle.

cipation; by the favor of God, through a regard to what is above stated, the degrees of mutual concord have so increased, that to this time no interruption or derangement of them has occurred on either side. Notwithstanding this, the engagements which may have lately been concluded between that quarter (British government) and the Peshwah have (only) now been communicated; and on the part of the Peshwah, to this time of writing nothing. Therefore, it has now been determined with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and the Rajah, be dispatched to the Peshwah, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time, no intention whatever is entertained on my part to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, which has been concluded at Bassein between the British government and the Peshwah, on condition that there be no design whatever on the part of the English Company and the Peshwah to subvert the stipulations of the treaty which, since a long period of time, has been concluded between the Peshwah’s sircar, me, and the Rajah and the Marhatta chiefs.

‘Further particulars will be communicated by the letters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters continue to be the means of gratification to me.’

Ragojee Bhoonslah, Rajah of Berar, to the Governor General

‘I have received your Lordship’s four friendly letters in succession, notifying the conclusion of new engagements between his Highness the Peshwah and the English Company at Bassein, together with copies of the treaty; and I have been fully apprized of every word of its contents, which have also been fully communicated to me by Colonel Collins, who is with Dowlut Rao Scindiah on your Lordship’s part.

‘By the favor of God, since the first establishment of mutual union, the degrees of concord and attachment have so increased, that, to this time, no interruption or derangement of them has occurred, nor is it in contemplation on this side to interrupt or derange them. Whereas, since a long period of time, the integrity of the Rajah, (meaning the whole Marhatta state,) and the identity of the affairs and concerns of the state and government have been such, that if any momentous affair or political object arising out of the circumstances of the time occurred, the arrangement of it depending on mutual concert and communication; yet, notwithstanding this, the engagements which have lately been concluded between that quarter (British government) and the Peshwah have (only) now been communicated; and on the part of the Peshwah, to this time of writing, nothing. Therefore it has now been determined with Dowlut Rao

'The brinjarries also have lost vast numbers of cattle: they consequently left behind and sold their grain in the villages; and there was some risk that I should be distressed for the want of rice.

'In a letter which I addressed to Government on the 24th of June, 1800, I pointed out to them the evils which attended the system in practice of hiring cattle for the service, of which evils the Commander-in-Chief has had experience in this campaign. It cannot be expected that it will answer for light detachments, or, indeed, for any body of troops which is obliged to move to any distance: and the expense which is incurred affords no security that the troops will enjoy, in the moment of need, the advantages of the stores and provisions for which the carriage is provided.

'On these grounds, when it has been necessary to procure additional bullocks, I have not made advances for them to the owners of the hired cattle; but I have preferred to increase the establishment of cattle belonging to the Government of Bombay, which I have brought with me, as you will observe by the orders of the 25th of May, enclosed herewith.

'The cattle will be purchased for the sum which I should be obliged to advance to the owners of the hired cattle to replace their losses; and, at least, I shall be certain of having some service for the expense incurred

'I have been very successful in the purchase of bullocks, and have got nearly as many as will carry the stores I have in camp at present. I have also the pleasure to inform you, that I have been able to bring up from Poonah such quantities of rice as have enabled me to issue that grain entirely to the troops again, and have removed all apprehension of a want.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Adj. Gen.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Scindiah, in presence of Colonel Collins, that confidential persons on my part, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, be dispatched to the Peshwah, for the purpose of ascertaining the circumstances of the (said) engagements. At the same time, no intention whatever is entertained on my part to subvert the stipulations of the treaty, consisting of nineteen articles, which has been concluded at Bassein, between the British government and the Peshwah, on condition that there be no design whatever on the part of the English Company and the Peshwah to subvert the stipulations of the treaty which, since a long period of time, has been concluded between the Peshwah's sircar, me, and the said Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Marhatta chiefs,

'Further particulars will be communicated by the letters of Colonel Collins. Let the receipt of friendly letters continue to be the means of gratification to me.'

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 7th July, 1803.

‘I hope that you will not have sent off any more rice after the dispatch of the 2000 bags, as we shall have rather more than we can carry.

‘I had written to Colonel Close, to ask his opinion whether the Coast native battalion could be spared from Poonah for a time, as I thought it possible that I should be obliged to detach a battalion to secure the boats on the Godavery. This is still a great object; but I doubt much the propriety of drawing the battalion from Poonah at present; because I have this day received a letter from General Stuart, by which I learn that, in consequence of the probability of the renewal of the war with France, and of the landing of some French troops at Pondicherry, with the expected arrival of others, he had determined to cross the Toombuddra. This measure weakens us most considerably, and your part of the force in particular; and it may possibly be attended by many inconvenient consequences, as well in the Nizam’s territories as in those of the Marhattas bordering on the Kistna and the Toombuddra; therefore I think it will be best not to send the 2nd of the 3rd from Poonah.

‘All the expenses attending the forwarding of the supplies from Poonah are to appear in Major Spens’ accounts, are to be paid by Captain Matheson, and are to be sent to the government of Bombay.

‘But if Captain Matheson should require money for that or any other service, of course he must take up some of that belonging to me in Colonel Close’s hands, and that account can be adjusted between him and Captain Graham.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 7th July, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 26th and 27th June.

‘I have requested the postmaster of the Residency at Poonah to post his runners on as far as the Kistna from Beejapoor, and I have no doubt but that they will have been posted by this time.

‘I have already written to you respecting the position of

the troops in the Tenim ghaut; Seedasheegur will answer best until the monsoon in some degree shall be over.

‘By my letter to the Adjutant General of yesterday’s date, you will observe that my situation is much improved. In fact, I am enabled to move again; and, if I am tolerably fortunate in respect to forage, of which my prospects improve daily, as the green forage is coming in, I hope to be able to get on well.

‘Before you receive this letter you will have seen how matters stood at Scindiah’s camp on the 29th June. I have not since heard from Colonel Collins; but I know that Scindiah had not moved farther to the southward on the 1st of July. Holkar was across the Taptee, with all his army, and Scindiah had sent two brigades, and a brigade of Ambajee Inglia, across that river likewise, and the Nerbudda, as it was said, to Ougein. The report of the camp was, that Holkar was unwilling to join Scindiah; to which measure both Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar were pressing him most anxiously.

‘It appears now, either that we shall have a war immediately, or a protracted negotiation with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, seated upon the Nizam’s frontier. If there should be war, I must proceed according to the original plan; if there should be a negotiation, I think that I should cross the Godavery, in order to press the conclusion and the result before the breaking up of the monsoon, and the full of the rivers.

‘I regret most exceedingly the necessity of your abandoning the excellent position which you had taken at Moodgul. It was that which gave us all strength and security, and provided effectually for the tranquillity of Hyderabad and the Nizam’s territories, notwithstanding the absence of the army and the expectation of the Nizam’s death; and also for that of Poonah and the Marhatta territories, notwithstanding the weakness and the wavering conduct of the Peshwah. It threatened Meritch, by which the Putwurdun family and all the southern chiefs are kept at least in a state of neutrality; and it provided effectually for the security and tranquillity of the territories of the Company and the Rajah of Mysore.

‘All these benefits, which are not attributed entirely, as they ought to be, to your position, will be lost when you shall recross the Toombuddra; and then, if we should have a war, our situation in this country will be uncomfortable. I should still hope, however, that Government will take this subject into their consideration, and will allot something like a corps

of reserve for the security of the objects for which your commanding position at Moodgul has hitherto so well provided.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Gen. Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ 8th July, 1803.

‘ I have not written to you since the day I marched from Poonah, because, in fact, matters have remained exactly in the same state; indeed, Colonel Collins’s negotiations have not advanced one step since the day on which Scindiah marched from Burhampoor to meet the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Holkar has crossed the river Taptee, with his whole army, and appears disinclined, and I hear has positively refused to trust his person in the same camp with Scindiah.

‘ Notwithstanding Colonel Collins’s assertion, Indore has not been given over to Holkar; and I believe that the peace which the Colonel supposed to have been concluded is only a cessation of hostilities, which Scindiah has been prevailed upon to grant by Ragojee Bhoonslah, in order to gain time for the negotiation of a peace; and of which Holkar has taken advantage, in order to place the Taptee between his army and that of Scindiah.

‘ In the mean time we, who were ready on the 4th of June, have lost that month and part of this for our operations; and unless Colonel Collins has attended to a second representation, which I made to him in the end of June, we are as far from our point as we were in the month of May. The Colonel has gone upon a false notion from the beginning. He has supposed that peace was concluded between Holkar and Scindiah, because Scindiah’s ministers had told him so; and he has had no other information, and has never produced any one proof of the fact, the truth of which he believed and invariably asserted. Under this notion he has been timid, and has afforded them time to conclude the peace, and to intrigue, which is all that they desired.

Matters also at Poonah are nearly in the same state in which they were when I marched. The Peshwah promises every thing and performs nothing. The Marhatta sirdars are still in that city, excepting Goklah, who is encamped at a small distance from me. The Peshwah has not satisfied them, and they wait to see the result of the first operations against Scindiah, and who has the upper hand. They are

prevented from joining the confederates at present by General Stuart's position at Moodgul in the Dooab. I observe, however, that General Stuart is inclined to withdraw from this position, in consequence of the arrival of the French at Pondicherry. But I have written to represent to him the advantage which we all derive from it. I have shown him that he keeps in tranquillity the territories of the Nizam and Hyderabad, notwithstanding his Highness's sickness, the probability of his death, and the absence of all his troops beyond the Godavery; that he awes Poonah, and keeps in tranquillity all the Marhatta territory south of the Beemah, notwithstanding the conduct of the Peshwah, which must appear to his subjects like treachery, and a desire to break his treaty with the British Government; that by threatening Meritch and Darwar, he secures at least the neutrality of the Putwurduns, and the continuance of the cessation of hostilities between that family and the Rajah of Kolapoor, which is so necessary to the existence of my communications; and that he defends the Company's territories, and those of the Rajah of Mysore, and secures their tranquillity. At the same time, in the event of the Nizam's death, and consequent disturbance of Hyderabad, he can reach that capital in a few marches; or in the event of any accidents happening to the troops in this quarter, he has equal facility in moving to Poonah.

'In short, I may call General Stuart's position the mainstay of all our operations; and it is that which in case of a war with the Marhattas, will prevent a general insurrection in the territories of the Company, the Nizam, the Rajah of Mysore, and the southern Marhatta chiefs. It was with a view to these advantages that I first recommended to General Stuart to take it up; and every day's experience has shown the benefits which we have derived from it.

'I have been in some distress in consequence of a great loss of bullocks; but I have recovered so as to be able to move again with a very good stock of provisions, and I have made arrangements to receive further supplies north of the Godavery. I have always been equal to the siege of Ahmednuggur, in which place I believe that I should have found plenty of all that I required.

'I have not written to the Secretary of State since the middle of May. Indeed upon a review of our situation, I found that I could tell him nothing, excepting that we were in the same state in which we were at the time I before wrote, unless that I had moved across the Beemah, and that

I was disappointed in my expectations of having with me the Marhatta sirdars.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘ Since writing this letter, I have seen a copy of Colonel Collins’s dispatch of the 2nd. I think matters look better than they did ; but I see that he has again allowed Scindiah to delay giving him an answer.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR, *

‘ Camp, 9th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th of June, and I am infinitely obliged to you for the assistance which you propose to send to me. The road which Major Dallas will take will be convenient ; and I believe that he will find more forage upon it than he could upon that on the other side of the Beemah. I shall send orders to meet him at Perinda.

‘ You will have observed by my last letters that I am much recruited ; but the supplies which you have sent are of the utmost consequence. There was a letter yesterday of the 2nd, which gives more hopes of peace than we have had hitherto. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had separated, and the latter gone back to Mulcapoor ; as he says, for want of carriage for his baggage ; as Colonel Collins supposes, to afford another pretext for delay ; but, as I believe, it is the prelude of their breaking up entirely.

‘ Colonel Close sends you a copy of this dispatch.

‘ There is no doubt but that Holkar is across the Taptee ; and the akbars from Scindiah’s camp do not now conceal that the peace between those two chiefs is not concluded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 10th July, 1803.

‘ I return your letters. In my opinion, Colonel Collins has not accounted in a satisfactory manner, either for his own assertion that peace has been made between Scindiah and Holkar, or for that of his moonshee, that we should attack the latter. In this extraordinary dispatch, one of the

most extraordinary parts is, that he has given as a proof of a peace between those chiefs, that Scindiah has made sacrifices of territory to Holkar; whereas that fact requires proof, as well as every other part of the letter.

‘Goklah has just paid me a visit. He has expressed a most anxious desire to hoist the Peshwah’s colors in a village called Mandegaon belonging to Holkar, and one of the ancient possessions of the Holkar family. I have requested him most earnestly to desist from this measure for some days, as I wish to be at peace with Holkar, and do not intend to attack that chief unless he should attack the Company or their allies.

‘Goklah is rather anxious upon this subject, as he received the Peshwah’s orders to hoist his colors in all the possessions of the Holkar family, near which he should march. I wish that you would explain that I have prevented him from taking possession of this village. Goklah is also very anxious respecting his pay. I wish that you would urge the durbar to make some permanent provision for him. If they would promise that we should be repaid the sums which we should advance him, we might contrive to keep him afloat, by means of bills upon Bombay or Bengal, upon which he would be able to get money. Consider this subject, as it is really very desirable that we should have this body of troops paid.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Licut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 12th July, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th. It appears that you intend immediately to bring up the 18 pounders. It is certainly desirable to have two pieces of ordnance of that kind at Poonah; and they may as well be brought up when matters do not press; but it is of so little importance to bring them up at present, that I do not wish that any of the cattle should be turned to that service from any other that is going on. Besides draught cattle, I dare say that it will take not less than five hundred carriage bullocks to carry up the stores for the 18 pounders, without which they will be useless. Indeed, I should almost doubt whether the stores are in a state of preparation to move; that is, whether there are gunny bags for the shot, powder, &c.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 13th July, 1803.

‘Many days have elapsed since I have written to you ; but in fact I had nothing interesting to communicate.

‘Matters in Scindiah’s camp remain nearly as they were. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have each written a friendly letter to the Governor General, in which each has declared his intention to remain at peace with the Company and their allies ; but they are going to take up their station at the Adjuttee ghaut, not to attack the Nizam, as they say, nor to march to Poonah.

‘This movement is entirely inconsistent with their pacific declarations ; and I have accordingly written a letter to Scindiah, in which I tell him that I must consider it as hostile ; and that advantage will be taken of the position of the British troops to attack him on those points where he is most exposed, unless he shall withdraw within his own territories, and to his usual stations.

‘You shall be made acquainted with his answer, and with my consequent determination. I think it probable that he will withdraw, and that we shall have peace.

‘In respect to Rajah Mohiput Ram’s proposal that you should move nearer to the Adjuttee ghaut, I object to it on this ground, that when you shall once have advanced, you cannot retire again ; and the negotiations to induce Scindiah to withdraw may take much time, and you may be distressed for forage in your advanced position.

‘It is also my intention, if we should commence hostilities, to desire you to approach the ghaut as near as you can, with convenience, in order to check Scindiah in his endeavors to ascend it with his guns ; and it will be necessary that you should have as much fresh forage in your power as possible, at this time. I therefore think that, upon the whole, it is best that you should not approach the ghaut, or move from your present position, till you shall hear further from me.

‘I have no objection to Salabut Khan’s correspondence with Ragojee Bhoonslah, and advantage might be taken of it to recommend peace ; you ought, however, to see his correspondence.

‘If you are sure that Gopal Bhow, &c., are within the Nizam’s territories, and if you think that you can get at them, I recommend that you should dash at them with the cavalry, and cut them up.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 13th July, 1803.

‘I return the dispatches from Mr. Duncan. It does not appear to me to be very clear that Songhur has been attacked, or that Shamunt Khan is the person in the neighborhood of that fort. I understood that there was an English garrison there; and we might expect that the officer commanding would write to somebody. But in the usual style, I suppose that the English officer is under the orders of the black man.

‘It is not possible to give Mr. Duncan any assistance at present. He has increased his territories, and, of course, the demands upon his Government for the service of troops, and the means of paying them most enormously. But he has never contemplated the necessity of making a corresponding increase of his army. This is the cause of the present difficulty, and I can give no hopes that I shall be able to relieve it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 13th July, 1803.

‘I think it proper to communicate to you a piece of intelligence, which one of my hircarrahs brought me yesterday. He says that, in consequence of discontent and want of money in the service of Holkar and Meer Khan, 4000 Patans, who had been in the army under the command of the latter, had quitted camp, under pretence of returning to their homes in the Cuddapa, &c., countries south of the Toombuddra. The hircarrah came with them from the camp as far as the neighborhood of Toka, on the Godavery; where, hearing that I had a guard at Toka, over the boats, with a body of Mysore horse to watch the river, they turned off, intending to cross it below Puttun, in the Nizam’s territories. They intended to separate and pass through those territories in different small parties. I have sent out to look after them, and, if they should be within my reach, I will try to take up some of them; but I fancy that they will keep at a distance from me. The name of the principal sirdar with them is Abdoolah Khan, and he belongs to Cuddapa.

‘It may happen that the story they have told of them-

selves is true, and that they are going to their homes ; as it is very certain that the distress in Holkar's camp, particularly in that commanded by Meer Kkan, is great. When Colonel Stevenson's hircarrah went to him lately with a letter, he found him surrounded with armed men, some of whom had their swords and daggers at his throat, threatening to put him to death, if he did not produce money to satisfy their demands ; and I have accounts that this was not the first time that he had been threatened in the same manner.

' But on the other hand, it is hardly possible to believe that Meer Kkan, Holkar, or even Scindiah, would allow those Patans, who are the best troops in the Marhatta armies, to depart, while there is a chance of a war with the Company's government, or a continuance of the contests between Holkar and Scindiah ; which must be the case, if there should be no war with the Company.

' I am, therefore, induced to suspect that these Patans are sent to the southward for purposes entirely different from those given out, and that their object is to head a disturbance either in the Nizam's territories or in the Ceded districts. At all events, their residence in the Ceded districts, while we shall be engaged in a war with the Marhattas, is not desirable ; and, even if it should be permitted, they ought to be closely watched.

' You will be the best judge whether the force which will remain in the Ceded districts will enable you to seize the horses in that country, or to enforce a regulation to prevent horsemen from travelling through the country without a passport from the collector. At all events, this Abdoolah Khan ought to be closely watched.

' You will see by the letter from Colonel Collins of the 9th, which Colonel Close will send you, that the declarations of Scindiah, as well as of the Rajah of Berar, are pacific ; but those chiefs still intend to remain upon the Nizam's frontier.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *Lieut. General Stuart.*

' *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To Lieut. Colonel Collins.

' *SIR,*

' *Camp, 14th July, 1803.*

' I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 9th instant and I have taken into consideration the subject upon which you have desired that I should communicate to you my opinion.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared in their letters to the Governor General, that they have no intention to obstruct the arrangement concluded at Bassein between the British Government and the Peshwah ; and that they are desirous of maintaining the relations of amity which so long subsisted between the British Government and them, and that they will not ascend the Adjuttee ghaut, or march towards Poonah.

‘I am sorry to observe, however, that they still intend to advance with their armies to the Adjuttee ghaut, upon the Nizam’s frontier, notwithstanding their peaceable declarations. These declarations have been preceded by others of a directly opposite tendency. The chiefs have declared that they were united for the purpose of attacking the British Government and their allies ; and Scindiah in particular has said that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the English. Is the advance to the Adjuttee ghaut, which is the acknowledged boundary between the Marhattas and the Nizam, consistent with the hostile or with the pacific declaration ? Upon this point there can be no doubt ; there can be no use in assembling an army upon the Nizam’s frontier, particularly at the present moment, when their services must be required elsewhere, excepting to attack the Nizam.

‘But it may be asked, for what reason should these chiefs endeavor to deceive the British Government, if their intentions are hostile ? To this I answer, that their measures are not prepared ; they have not yet brought Holkar into them ; the British troops are prepared for action, and they are not ; some valuable points in Scindiah’s territories are exposed to the attacks of the British troops ; and the British territories, and those of their allies, are defended at present at all points.

‘By the delay of the commencement of hostilities, they hope to have matters better prepared ; the rivers will fall, and Scindiah will have it in his power to make better arrangements for the defence of his territories ; and, on the other hand, those belonging to the Company and their allies will lose the protection which all the forces give them at the present moment. Therefore I conclude that the advantage of delay is theirs ; that they have made their pacific declarations in order to gain time ; and that their real intentions are to be known only from their actions.

‘If there had been no hostile declarations from Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, common prudence would have prevented

us from viewing with indifference the assembly of their armies upon the Nizam's frontier, and the British Government must have insisted upon their withdrawing. Pacific declarations would not, in that case, have been deemed sufficient security for the Nizam; nor can they in that at present under consideration, particularly as I have above pointed out the great advantages which those chiefs will derive from the delay to commence hostilities.

'I am therefore decidedly of opinion, that if the Rajah of Berar does not withdraw to Nagpoor, and if Scindiah does not remove his army to stations usually occupied by his troops, north of the river Nerbudda, their intentions must be considered hostile, and we ought to take advantage of our position to attack them without loss of time. Accordingly I have written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I enclose, together with a translation of it.

'If you should find that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar remain encamped in the neighborhood of the Nizam's frontier, I request you to deliver that letter, unless you should be of opinion that a verbal communication from yourself of my sentiments and intentions would be more likely to induce that chief to withdraw; or unless you should have other solid grounds for believing that he is sincere in his last declaration, and that his intentions are pacific. But, in my opinion, his declaration and his intentions cannot be trusted, unless he separates from the Rajah of Berar, removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his march to Nagpoor.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Collins*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 14th July, 1803.

'Since writing you the enclosed letter, I have received your two letters of the 11th. Major Kirkpatrick was mistaken. General Stuart has sent off five thousand bullocks towards my camp, two thousand of them loaded with rice. But even if he should have sent none, I conceive that the troops with you must be well fed, as well as those with me; and you certainly now are more in want than I am, or than I am likely to be. Therefore I request that you will make use of the rice laid in for my use at Aurungabad and Puttun.

‘But, viewing these distresses of yours, and the disappointments which both of us have met with from the brinjaries, and knowing that these people are not to be depended upon, I strongly recommend that you should urge Mohiput Ram to collect as much rice for you as he can : and that you should establish a grain department in your detachment, consisting of at least two thousand loaded bullocks. You will then be always sure of having a certain quantity for your troops ; and the misbehaviour of your brinjaries will not be so fatal as it would prove under these circumstances.

‘I do not think that I shall want any more bullocks from Rajah Mohiput Ram, particularly if those sent and expected from Kurdlah are good. I think the price not very material ; we must pay well in order to be well served, and with celerity. But, with respect to the rice, I think that you ought to call upon the Rajah’s officers for an account of its prime cost, and all the expenses of carriage, &c., to the places where it is lodged ; and not pay more for it than that amount.

‘I approve of the orders you have given Mohiput Ram, as reported in your letter of the 11th. I see, by the ackbar from Scindiah’s camp, that Gopal Bhow is not within the Nizam’s territories ; you should therefore be cautious about attacking him, according to the suggestion contained in the enclosed letter of yesterday.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

SIR,

‘Camp, 14th July, 1803.

‘I have received a letter from Colonel Close, from which I learn that a brinjarry has engaged to attend this body of troops with five thousand bullocks at monthly hire ; that these bullocks are in the first instance to receive their loads at Panwell, and to proceed thence to join me.

‘The loads which I should wish them to receive is rice ; but it will be necessary that some arrangement should be made respecting the packing of it. The small Bombay bags ought to contain sixty pounds, or two mercalls, six seers ; but, according to our measurement, they do not contain, some of them, more than two mercalls, two and a half seers ; and some of them not that quantity. At all events, these small bags are inconvenient for carriage on bullocks’ backs, and, in case of bad weather, the rice receives damage in them.

‘In general, the brinjarries have bags of their own, and it is possible that those now hired may have them; but, if they should not, it would be necessary that five thousand good bullock rice bags should be prepared at Bombay. I shall be obliged to you if you will ascertain whether the brinjarries have bags; and, if they should not have them, I request you to write to Bombay to order them as soon as possible.

‘The small bags, if they should be filled up, each to the full amount of three mercalls, or seventy-two pounds, would answer well to be placed in the other bags, one on each side, and would be an additional protection to the grain; but, if they cannot be filled to that amount, it would be best (particularly if care be taken to make the new bags of the best gunny) to start the rice into the new bags, and to take care to put on each bullock full six mercalls, or seventy-two seers. By the present arrangement we lose, in each bullock’s load, twelve seers at least, supposing the small bags to contain two and a half mercalls: but in general they contain only two mercalls, two and a half seers, and we therefore lose twenty seers upon a bullock load, which would feed a soldier forty days. From this statement, you may conceive what the loss would be upon five thousand bullock loads. I shall be obliged to you if you will give the necessary directions upon this subject to Captain Young.

‘I beg that you will send to camp the 1000 gunny bags which are completed.

‘Captain Barclay writes to Poonah this day upon the subject of receiving grain from some Mysore brinjarries on their road between the river Kistna and Poonah, and delivering to them rice in lieu thereof.

‘Since writing the above, I have received your letter of the 12th.

‘I approve of the bargain you have made with the brinjarry naig. But you will observe that there is a still stronger necessity for having proper gunny bags; and these bullocks must carry the full loads for which they were engaged.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 14th July, 1803.

‘Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of

any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire, and that when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah's sunnuds, they had been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness's sunnuds torn. He said that the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah. He had been obliged to discharge and pay the arrears of all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of serinjaumy lands; and that, in order to pay those arrears, he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession. That, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds: and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no benefit from them for some time; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees per mensem to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghire. They had consented to his proposal, but hitherto they have paid him nothing.

'I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah's ministers, whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees per mensem, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghire. If they did, I beg of you to urge them to pay him the money. At all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence, and I request you to urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available.

'If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghire; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will endeavour to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him.

'I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness's troops.

'In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer, to proceed in concert with Bappojee Goneish Goklah to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck, and to go as far even as to the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

'I beg you to remind the Peshwah's ministers that his Highness is bound, by his treaty with the British government, to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops; instead of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them,—

'1st. That when a large body of the enemy's troops are assembled upon the frontiers, and when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness's musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced.

'2ndly. That as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontiers, his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle, his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to, and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized.

'3dly. That no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighborhood; but that this expedition against Amrut Rao's troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah's

'4thly. That the only chance of success against the hostile armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in the front.

'5thly. That many rivers will divide these detachments with Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops; that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable; and that, upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

'It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao: although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said

that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage. I propose, however, to endeavor to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprise the Peshwah's ministers. 'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'Camp, 14th July, 1803.

'In consequence of the reports that you had confederated with other chiefs to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein, between the Honorable Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; of your military preparations, and your advance to the frontiers of the Nizam; and, above all, of your declaration to the British Resident with your camp, that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war with the Company; I received the orders of his Excellency the Governor General to move with the troops to the frontiers, to take means of precaution, and to be prepared to act if you should carry your threats into execution.

'The treaty of Bassein has since been communicated to you, and you must have observed that it provides amply for your security; and that, in consequence of this instrument, you will hold your territories in the Deccan by the same secure tenure that you have long held those in Hindustan bordering upon the Company's frontier, notwithstanding your absence from them with your armies.

'I perceive by your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of which Colonel Collins has communicated to me a copy, that you have declared that you have no intention to commence hostilities against the Company or their allies, or to oppose the execution of the treaty of Bassein by the parties who had a right to enter into it.

'I have accordingly the greatest pleasure in contemplating the probability of the duration of peace between the Honorable Company and your government, which has long subsisted with much benefit to both parties.

'But, if you are sincere in this declaration of your friendly intentions, there appears to be no occasion for assembling your army, and joining it with that of the Rajah of Berar, on the Nizam's frontier.

'That measure, uncombined with other circumstances, would at any time render necessary corresponding measures of precaution, the result of which would be either your removal from the frontier of the Company's ally, or an

appeal to arms; but when it has been accompanied by declarations of an hostile nature, when you have declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war between the Company and your government, it becomes more necessary that you should remove your troops to their usual stations.

‘Whatever respect I may have for your word, so solemnly pledged as it is in your letter to the Governor General to which I have alluded, common prudence requires that I should not trust to that alone for the security of the Company and their allies, which has been given to my charge.

‘Accordingly, I call upon you, if your professions are sincere, to withdraw, with your troops, to their usual stations across the river Nerbudda.

‘You were the first, by your hostile measures and declarations, and the expression of doubts of the duration of the peace between the Honorable Company and your government, and by the movement of your troops, to render necessary corresponding measures of precaution by the Company’s government; and you ought to be the first to withdraw your troops, if your intentions are really as pacific as you profess them to be.

‘When you shall have withdrawn your troops to their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I also shall draw back those under my command to their usual stations.

‘But if unfortunately I should have learnt that, after the receipt of this letter, you have advanced towards the territories of the Nizam, or if I find that you do not commence the march of your troops towards their usual stations beyond the Nerbudda, I must consider your intentions to be hostile, notwithstanding your professions, as there can be no use in keeping your armies in the country, excepting for the purposes of hostility; and I shall immediately carry on those operations against you which are in my power, in consequence of the advantageous position of the Company’s armies.

‘In your letter to the Governor General, you have declared that you do not intend to oppose the arrangement concluded at Bassein, provided the arrangements of the Peshwah with you and Ragojee Bhoonslah, and other chiefs of the Marhatta empire, are respected. The treaty of Bassein secures your interests: and it is not consistent with that treaty, or with the principles of the British government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty: you may therefore be satisfied on that head.

‘*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 15th July, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Close. He will have sent you one from Colonel Collins, in which the latter requires the opinion of Colonel Close and myself, respecting the security which it might be necessary that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should give of the sincerity of their pacific declarations. In consequence of the receipt of that letter from Colonel Collins, and of that of the 10th of July from Colonel Close, a copy of which is enclosed, I have thought proper to address a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, of which I enclose a translation, and also a copy of a letter to Colonel Collins.

‘It is my opinion, that if matters had been brought to this short issue a month ago, we should have had peace to a certainty; and I think it very probable that we shall still have it.

‘Major Malcolm has received a letter from Mr. Piele, in which he informs him that he has a lac of pagodas in his chest. Have you any objection that this lac should be sent to me? If you should not have any, I shall be obliged to you if you will intimate it to Mr. Piele, and he will prevail upon Purneah to send the money upon some of his horse. Our expenses have increased a little from the advanced price of grain for the horses of the cavalry, &c. and our disbursements from the tumbrils are vastly greater than they were two months ago.

‘Last month scarcely any money was received from officers for bills; the cause of which is the great expense incurred by every individual literally for the support of himself, his cattle, and followers. The commanding officers of corps have suffered great losses of cattle; and some of the subaltern officers have been obliged to leave behind their tents for want of carriage to move them, or of means to purchase cattle.

‘Under these circumstances, every man draws his full pay from the tumbrils in camp; and, although the expense of the detachment to the public is also materially increased by the higher price of grain for the horses, &c. the disbursement from the tumbrils is much greater than it was, and now exceeds a lac of pagodas monthly.

‘I have no hopes from Mr. Duncan; indeed, the Bombay

detachment at Poonah runs away with all the money which I should get in that city for my bills, if that detachment were not there, or that Mr. Duncan could supply them with cash from Bombay. I am therefore desirous to have this Mysore lac, if you should not want it for other purposes.

‘Several of the subaltern officers have inquired from me, whether, having been obliged to leave behind their tents, in consequence of the loss of their cattle, and of the circumstances which have prevented them from purchasing fresh cattle, (of which I am perfectly aware,) they should be permitted to draw their tent allowance, although they should not have produced their tents and cattle at muster?’

‘I am aware of the inconvenience which may be the result of granting this request; but I should hope, that, if the bill for the tent allowance were accompanied by a certificate of the commanding officer of the corps and of the detachment, stating the unavoidable causes of the loss of cattle incurred, and the circumstances which prevented them being replaced, the payment would not be brought forward as a precedent hereafter, upon which an abuse could be founded.

‘I have also to observe, that, if the officers who have lost their tents should immediately lose their tent allowance, there is not a chance that they will be able to replace them.

‘In obedience to the orders of the 22nd of September, 1802, I had determined to order a committee to assemble for the inspection of the bazar accounts; but I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give me your orders whether I am to charge against the fund all the expenses attending the collection of the brinjarries.

‘As there are no duties upon grain or provisions of any kind, or indeed upon any thing excepting intoxicating drugs, it is my opinion that the expenses attending the collection of the brinjarries, any more than those attending the formation of any depôt for the consumption of the troops in the field, ought not to fall upon the fund. I shall also be obliged to you to let me know whether I shall send the amount of the produce direct to the treasury or to your camp, in order that it may be disposed of under your orders.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘*MY DEAR COLONEL,*

‘Camp, 15th July, 1803.

‘I received last night your letter of the 12th, enclosing one from Salabut Khan. You express your opinion in this

letter that the Rajah of Berar is likely to endeavor to make peace, through the means of Salabut Khan; and I beg you to communicate my sentiments to Salabut Khan upon this subject in the following terms.

‘The Rajah of Berar and the Company have always been on the most friendly terms, and there is at this moment no cause of quarrel between the two powers. The Rajah of Berar has declared his determination not to obstruct the treaty concluded at Bassein between the Company and the Peshwah. But the Rajah of Berar has collected his forces and has united them with those of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in a station close to the Nizam’s frontier: this can have been done only with an intention to attack the Nizam or his subjects; and the Company are bound by treaty to assist the Nizam, and protect his territories and subjects, whenever they may be attacked. The Company will always adhere to this treaty, and the enemies of the Nizam will always be the enemies of the Company.

‘If the Rajah of Berar intends peace, it depends entirely upon him. The peace which has lasted so long will still be maintained, and the friendship between the two governments will even become stronger, if he will remove his army from the Nizam’s frontier: but if he does not do so, he cannot expect a continuance of the peace.

‘If the Rajah has any demands to make upon the Company’s government, the best mode of obtaining them will be to remove his army from the Nizam’s frontier, and to return to his own capital. The British government have always been, and will always be, ready to attend to those who express their wishes in a friendly and peaceable manner.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Amrut Rao.

‘Camp, 16th July, 1803.

‘I was in hopes that before this time I should have been enabled to communicate to you the final result of the repeated recommendation of your situation, which I have made to the Peshwah, but hitherto his Highness has come to no decision in respect to your case. I feel most sensibly the difficulties under which you labor, and you must be convinced that I have done every thing in my power to remove them.

‘However, although I cannot at present tell you that any thing is absolutely settled for you with the Peshwah, you

may depend upon it that the British government will take care that you shall have such a provision as will be gratifying to you, provided you continue in the manner in which you have conducted yourself since you last wrote to me.

'*Amrut Rao.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

'Camp, 16th July, 1803.

'Much time has elapsed since I have had the pleasure of hearing from you, although I am anxious to cultivate the good understanding which has subsisted between the Honorable Company's government and you.

'With this view, I now send you a copy of the treaty concluded at Bassein between the Honorable Company and Rao Pundit Purdhaun; from the general defensive tenor of which you will observe, that the peace and security of India are provided for. You will also perceive, that the 12th article provides effectually for the security of all the great Marhatta jaghiredars, and that those of the Holkar family are particularly named. This article will satisfy your mind, notwithstanding the endeavors which have been made to raise your doubts; and you will see that the interest and security of your family are connected with this treaty, and that, in fact, they can be provided for in no other manner.

'That being the case, whatever others may do, I have little doubt but that you will conduct yourself in the manner which your own interests will dictate, and that you will continue in peace with the Company.

'I send this letter in charge of Kawder Nawaz Khan, a respectable officer, who enjoys my confidence, and who will explain any thing you desire to know respecting my wishes.

'*Jeswunt Rao Holkar.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

'Camp, 16th July, 1803.

'I shall be very much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that 200 bullock loads of arrack may be sent to me. It will be well to make a bargain with the people who are to carry this arrack, that they must take back the empty arrack kegs in camp.

'I also recommend to you to send down to Panwell, not only these empty arrack kegs, but those you may have at Poonah, as I suspect that the government of Bombay have not many more prepared.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Colonel Murray.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 16th July, 1803.

‘There was a report in this camp yesterday, stating that the officer in command of a detachment coming from the Kalachabootra ghaut, on the river Kistna, with supplies of money and provisions, had been stopped at Perinda, in consequence of a dispute between some of the troops under his command and those belonging to that fort. I knew that, as Major Dallas had not crossed the Kistna on the 5th, it was not possible that this report could be founded in fact; but it proved at least that the march of the detachment was known, and was a subject of conversation in the country; and, as it is imagined that the killadar of Perinda is not faithful to the Nizam’s government, and he may have formed the plan to stop the detachment, which the report supposes that he has carried into execution, I have thought it proper to detach a body of Mysore horse, under the command of Bistnapah Punt, to Perinda, to join Major Dallas.

‘I mention these circumstances to you, in order that you may apprise the Nizam’s government of them, in case any notice should be taken of the entry into his Highness’s territories of the body of horse under Bistnapah Punt.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 4th July.

‘The difficulties under which I laboured when I wrote to you on the 26th June have been relieved, in some degree, by the supplies which I have received from Poonah, and by the success which I have had in the purchase of cattle in the country. The arrival of the cattle sent by General Stuart, if they should be in tolerable condition, will remove them entirely. I have besides expectations of the arrival of a convoy, now on its road from Mysore; and the prospect that I shall bring forward the Poonah brinjarries is better than it was. But still it is very desirable that Colonel Stevenson should receive some further supplies from Hyderabad. He will have informed you that, upon reckoning the bags in his camp, he found that he had not a supply of rice for his troops for more than twenty days; and, in consequence of this failure, I desired him to take for the use of his detachment the rice which had been collected at Moongy Puttun and Aurungabad, for the use of my troops. He had also made an advance to the brinjarries for 5000 loads of rice. The supply sent to me by General Stuart is only 2000 bags; but I shall be able to get rice at Poonah to load the remainder of the bullocks.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

SIR, 'Camp, at Sangwee, 17th July, 1803.

I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 15th instant, enclosing the copy of one which you had written to Lieut. Colonel Collins on that day.

When I heard the report that the northern Marhatta chiefs intended to confederate, for the purpose of obstructing the treaty of Bassein between the Honorable Company and his Highness the Peshwah, I was of opinion that it was necessary for the British government to lose no time in bringing those chiefs to a decision, whether there should be peace or war, and in obliging each of them to place his troops in their ordinary position.

The grounds of this opinion were, that two of the chiefs at least were in a state of determined and inveterate hostility against each other which it would require time to pacify. The season in which the rivers fill was approaching, during which the Marhatta armies find it difficult to carry on operations; and some of the most valuable of the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah would be exposed to our attacks. On the other hand, the rivers would cover the territories of the Company and of their allies, in a great degree, from the incursions of the Marhatta horse, and would protect our convoys.

The most proper time, therefore, to press Dowlut Rao Scindiah to decide whether he would remain at peace with the Company, and to induce him to withdraw his army to Hindustan, as the only proof which he could give of his pacific intentions, would have been in the month of May; and as it appears that the peace between that chief and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not yet concluded, and at all events, that Holkar is not yet united in councils with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, it is very probable that if Scindiah had been obliged to decide between peace and immediate hostility, he would have found himself under the necessity of adopting the former alternative.

Since that period, six weeks of valuable time have elapsed; during which some progress must have been made in pacifying the hostility between Scindiah and Holkar, and in uniting their councils. We have gained nothing: on the contrary, we have consumed our resources, and the supposed enemy is nearer to the frontier which we have to defend than he was. But still, to bring the question of

peace or war to an immediate issue is attended with many advantages.

‘It is certain that the councils of the chiefs are not yet united. Holkar’s army is to the northward of the Taptee; and supposing him to be inclined to hostility with the Company, which I think there is reason to doubt, it is not possible that he can bring his forces to co-operate with those of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar for a length of time. The swelling of the rivers still exposes to an attack many valuable points in Scindiah’s possession, and protects the territories of the Company and those of their allies, and the convoys going to the British armies.

‘It is obvious, however, that every day’s delay to bring Scindiah to a decision, and to force him to give the only proof of his pacific intentions, deprives us of part of these advantages; and therefore no time should be lost.

‘The declarations which have been drawn from Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in their letters to the Governor General, are favorable, so far as they deprive those chiefs of their favorite pretence of hostility, viz., the injury they apprehended from the treaty of Bassein. They prove also most clearly, that the chiefs are aware of the disadvantages under which they will labor by the immediate commencement of hostilities.

‘According to these sentiments, and finding by your letter of the 10th instant. that you agreed in opinion with me, I wrote to Dowlut Rao Scindiah a letter, a copy and translation of which have been already transmitted to you, and one to Lieut. Colonel Collins, of which also you have a copy. You will observe that in the former I have apprized Dowlut Rao Scindiah of my intention to take advantage of the position of the Company’s troops to attack his possessions, if he should advance one step towards the Nizam’s frontier after the receipt of my letter; or if I found that he did not withdraw his troops to their usual stations north of the river Nerbudda.

‘I have not fixed when he should withdraw: First, because I wish to keep in my own breast the period at which hostilities will be commenced; by which advantage it becomes more probable that I shall strike the first blow, if I should find hostile operations to be necessary: Secondly, there is every reason to expect instructions from the Governor General, applicable to the present situation of affairs in India, as well as in Europe. His Excellency must have received, by the 20th of June, the dispatches from England of the month of March, the intelligence of my march from

Poonah, of the state of affairs at the Peshwah's durbar at that period, and of the state of the negotiation with Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the end of May.

'Excepting that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made a public declaration, the sincerity of which must be doubted as long as their actions are not conformable thereto; that those chiefs have approached nearer to the Nizam's frontier; that more progress has been made in effecting the pacification between Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Holkar, and more of the resources of the British troops have been consumed; circumstances are nearly in the state in which they were at the period of which the Governor General then received accounts.

'By avoiding to fix a day on which Scindiah must retire, I have it in my power to alter my course of action, in conformity to these instructions, in case that measure should be necessary.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Collins.

'SIR,

'Camp, 18th July, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter, which I have received from his Excellency the Governor General, from a perusal of which you will perceive that his Excellency has been pleased to intrust to me extraordinary powers, for the purpose of concluding whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war. I request you to be so kind as to communicate this circumstance to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

'You will be so kind, at the same time, to inform those chiefs that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests, and to enter into negotiations with them upon objects by which they may suppose those interests to be affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up upon the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan and Berar respectively; and, on my part, I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations. You will point out to those chiefs, that, as they have declared they have no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw their troops to

their several stations is only consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they are sincere. On the other hand, to retain their position upon the Nizam's frontier is the strongest proof they can give of the insincerity of those declarations.

'You will, therefore, again call upon them to retire, as being the only measure by which the peace between the British government and them can be preserved.

'It may happen that Dowlut Rao Scindiah will urge the difficulty of crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, as an excuse for not withdrawing his troops at the present moment; that excuse will not apply at all to the Rajah of Berar, to whose return to Nagpoor there are no impediments whatever, and therefore his march to his capital is indispensable. It might be disputed in respect to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; for it is certain, that the passage of the army of that chief over those rivers will be attended with some difficulties.

'Those difficulties, however, are to be surmounted; and at all events, there is nothing to prevent his retiring to Burhampoor, and commencing to send his troops across the Taptee, and making arrangements for sending them across the Nerbudda.

'If he should urge these difficulties, you will make known to him my sentiments upon them as above stated, and you will require him to give a proof that his declarations are not insincere, by falling back to Burhampoor, and by commencing to pass his troops over the Taptee and his arrangements for crossing the Nerbudda.

'If the Rajah of Berar should return to Nagpoor, and Scindiah should adopt the measures above pointed out, as preparatory to his crossing the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, I shall be satisfied. But if you should find those chiefs obstinately determined to remain in their positions upon the Nizam's frontier, you will be so good as to inform them, that I have requested you to withdraw from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, accordingly, you will leave it on the following day.

'In that case you might proceed to Colonel Stevenson's camp, which you will find about ten coss to the northward of Aurungabad, and from thence the Colonel will furnish you with an escort to enable you to join me.

'If you should find it necessary to quit Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp, I request you to take the earliest opportunity to acquaint Colonel Stevenson thereof; as I have directed

‘I have written most fully to General Stuart upon the subject of his crossing the Toombuddra. He is of opinion that he ought to adopt that measure; but whether he will adopt it or not depends upon the orders he will receive from Madras.

‘You have a translation of a letter that I have written to Appah Saheb, which I think will make an impression upon him. I shall write again this afternoon.

‘I do not know well what we can do, excepting we give money to Appah Saheb, to bring him forward; for all his objects were promised to him, and he still holds off. Chintomeny and Rastia depend upon him.

‘The young vakeel arrived in camp some days ago, and does neither harm nor good. We are most plentifully supplied.

‘I do not believe a word of Sir W. Clarke’s intelligence, because I have a man upon the spot to report every thing, and he does not mention it: but I have no doubt that if we delay much longer in the way in which we are, we shall have the Rajah of Kolapoor upon our communication.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Sterenson.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 18th July, 1803.

‘Having received from his Excellency the Governor General full powers to conclude whatever arrangement may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war, I have written to Lieut. Colonel Collins to request that he will urge Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to withdraw their troops from the stations which they have occupied in the neighborhood of the Nizam’s frontier: and I have requested him to come away from Scindiah’s camp, if those chiefs should refuse to give that proof of the sincerity of the pacific declarations which they have made. I have likewise requested the Colonel to give you the earliest intimation of his coming away from Scindiah’s camp, if that measure should be necessary.

‘If you should receive notice from Colonel Collins that he has withdrawn from Scindiah’s camp, you will be so kind as immediately to take up a position as near to the Adjuntee ghaut, which leads into the Nizam’s territories, as the conveniences of water and forage will permit. From this position you will watch with vigilance the designs and move-

ments of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If you should find that those chiefs attempt to ascend that, or any other ghaut, you will fall upon them immediately, before they shall have time to deploy their forces above the ghaut.

‘I do not however propose that your troops should descend the ghaut, but only that they should attack that part of the enemy which shall ascend, before the remainder can come to their assistance. It is possible that they may leave the Adjuntee ghaut, and endeavour to penetrate by the Casserbarry ghaut, towards Aurungabad. You will, in that case, move towards the latter, and place yourself in such manner as to attack them with advantage if they attempt to pass there.

‘My object is to avoid, if possible, that your troops should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah’s infantry, with his guns, before my operations to the southward of the Godavery shall be so far advanced as to enable me to reinforce you. Your efforts to prevent Scindiah from penetrating by some one of the passages may not be successful; and, indeed, it is probable that they must finally fail; but the delay of a few days is all I require, and that I conceive must be gained.

‘I have, however, no apprehension for the result, even if you should be engaged with the whole of Scindiah’s force. I have received your letters of the 18th.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘*Sir,*

‘18th July, 1803.

‘The only objections which I have to your making the gunny bags at Poonah are, that I fear they will not be at Panwell before the bullocks will be there which are to carry away the rice; and that the expense of them may be greater than those made at Bombay. You must advert to the circumstance that the expense of the carriage to Panwell must be added to that of the manufacture at Poonah.

‘However, you will act in this respect as you may think will answer best in regard to the goodness of the bags, the time at which they will be at Poonah, and their cheapness.

‘I wish that you would desire Captain Spens to order the coolies to come on to camp, wherever it may be. We have moved from Pepulgaum, and are now upon the Seenah river, and they have left at the former place bullock saddles, rice, &c. and gone back to Poonah. ‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘Camp, 18th July, 1803.

‘You will have observed, by a letter addressed to me by his Excellency the Governor General, on the 26th June, that his Excellency has thought proper to trust me with certain full powers to conclude whatever arrangements may become necessary, either for the final settlement of peace, or for the active prosecution of war; and to appoint me to the command of all the British troops, and of the forces of our allies, in the territories of the Peshwah, of the Nizam, or of any of the Marhatta states.

‘The troops serving in the territories of the Guickwar are included among those placed under my command; and I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to give directions that I may receive from Bombay returns of the strength and state of the equipment of those forces, their present distribution, an account of the state of defence of the posts which they occupy, and the names of the officers who command them.

‘I am also desirous of having a sketch of the territories of the Guickwar, which it is intended that the troops should defend; and any general topographical account of the country from which I may be able to form a judgment respecting its great communications, as well with the sea coast as with the territories of the Holkar family, of Scindiah, &c., and with those lately ceded to the Company by the Peshwah. With the assistance of these documents, I hope to be able to form a system for the defence of those territories, which will tend to their security. It is accordingly desirable that the officer in command in the Company’s territories should communicate with me, and with the officer in command in the territories of the Guickwar.

‘While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should urge a request before made by the Resident at Poonah, that Lieut. Colonel Reynolds might be ordered to send me a map of the countries which are at present, or may be, the scene of the operation of the troops under my command.

‘You will have received, from the Resident at Poonah, copies and translations of the letters by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and his Excellency the Governor General, in which those chiefs have declared their intentions not to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, not to march to Poonah, and not to enter the territories of the Nizam. They still, however, remain in their position upon the Nizam’s frontier.

‘I have in consequence written to Lieut. Colonel Collins this day, to request that he would call upon them to withdraw from that position to the stations usually occupied by their troops within their own territories; and that he would promise them, that I also would order the Company’s troops to retire to their usual stations.

‘In case they should refuse to adopt these measures, I have requested Lieut. Colonel Collins to quit Scindiah’s camp; and it is my intention to commence hostilities against that chief without loss of time. I will make you acquainted with the result of Lieut. Colonel Collins’s conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject; and I beg leave to recommend that you should give orders to the commanding officer in the territories of the Guickwar, to be prepared to attack Baroach without loss of time.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 20th July, 1803.

‘I am sorry to tell you that General Stuart will have crossed the Toombuddra before this time, by orders from the Government of Fort St. George.

‘It is impossible to do any thing for Ball Kischen Bhow at this time; but it would be very desirable to see him firmly seated in his soubahdarry, if it could be effected without a contest in our rear. I shall write to him upon this subject.

‘I have seen your letter to Malcolm. I think it a matter of indifference whether Salabut Khan corresponds with Ragojee Bhoonslah or does not. At all events, we cannot prevent it; and for this reason, I have told Colonel Stevenson that I have no objection to it. I also desired him to tell Salabut Khan, that if Ragojee Bhoonslah wished for peace with the English, he must return to his own countries, and that nothing else would insure that object.

‘What has passed in Guzerat is disgusting to a degree. The English name is disgraced, and the worst of it is, that endeavors are made to conceal the disgrace, under an hypocritical cant about humanity; and those feelings which are brought forward so repeatedly respecting the garrison of Parneira, are entirely forgotten in respect to the unfortunate British soldiers of the 75th and 84th regiments, who, unlike the gentlemen, submitting to be humbugged by a parcel of blackguards, are suffering in the rains.

‘I am more than ever convinced that no attempt ought to have been made to get possession of the ceded countries, till the question of the Confederacy was settled. A little delay would have enabled us to have a good detachment in a field cantonment near Songhur, which would have saved that province. As matters stand now, our forces are frittered away, and we have none for any efficient purpose. The country will be overrun, and, after all our haste, we shall get no revenue from it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To Lieut. Colonel Harness, Lieut. Colonel Wallace, and
Lieut. Colonel Maxwell.*

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘Camp, 20th July, 1803.

‘I have to inform you, that it is generally reported in camp that the late Captain B——, of the 78th regiment, was shot in a duel; and a letter addressed to me, which I enclose, and which was found among Captain B——’s papers, tends to confirm the truth of that report; I therefore request you will meet and ascertain the cause of the death of the late Captain B——.

‘You will call upon the surgeon who attended him in his last moments to give you an account of the state in which he was when he first saw him, and of the symptoms which attended his sickness and death.

‘You will also require the attendance of any other person whom you may think proper, to give an account of any transactions which immediately preceded the death of Captain B——, particularly those who saw him a short time previous to his decease.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Harness,*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

—————*Wallace,*

—————*Maxwell.*’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 20th July, 1803*.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th.

‘I am concerned to hear of the desertion of the soldiers of

* *Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp near Julgong, 20th July, 1803.

‘1. Yesterday I had the honor to receive your favor of the 14th instant, covering a letter to the address of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, with copies thereof in Persian and English.

the 84th, and I dare say that they are come to Ahmed-nuggur; but, possibly, I shall shortly be able to give a good account of them. It is now too late to send out to look for them.

'If you can catch the people who enticed them to go away, let me know, and I will send you an order to assemble a General Court Martial to try them. They shall certainly be hanged, if to punish them in that manner be allowed by the sentence of the Court Martial.

'In the mean time I recommend that you should take this opportunity of forbidding your soldiers to go into Poonah at all, and punish any man who goes there. Also take up and punish any low European or half caste man, or the attendant upon such an one, such as a strange cook boy, whom you may find about the bazaar, or barracks, or the lines, or any where in communication with the soldiers.

'When first I came to the Marhatta territory, these animals flocked about my camp, but I seized and punished them, and sent all I caught to Bombay, to be returned to Goa by the

'2. As the 19th paragraph of my instructions from his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, under date the 3rd ult., directs me to accept of no proof of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's determination to refrain from any attempt to obstruct the complete operation of the Treaty of Bassein, but such as shall be satisfactory to you and to Colonel Close; and it being your opinion, in which Colonel Close concurs, that the declarations and intentions of Scindiah cannot be trusted unless he seperates from the Rajah of Berar removes to Burhampoor, and makes preparations for crossing the Taptee, and unless the Rajah of Berar commences his route to Nagpoor influenced by these opinions, I felt no hesitation in resolving to present your address to Dowlut Rao Scindiah without delay.

'3. Accordingly, I yesterday apprized Jadoon Rao Bhow, that, having a matter of importance to communicate to the Maharajah, I requested he would name an early hour for my moonshee to attend at the Durbar. Jadoon Rao replied, that the Maharajah was then engaged in the performance of some religious ceremony, and had in consequence appointed the afternoon of the following day for the attendance of Mirza Bauker Khan

'4. As the procrastinating spirit which so much prevails at this court may probably prevent an immediate decision on your requisition to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I shall not wait to learn the result of my moonshee's conference, but immediately forward this letter, that you may be speedily apprized of my having received the remonstrance which you addressed to the Maharajah, as well as my intention to have the same fully explained to him without delay

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

first opportunity. By these means I have not lost one European deserter.

‘I long to hear of your catching the palanquin gentleman. If you can prove against him that he enticed away your soldiers, you may seize and punish him, if you find him in your bazaar, and send him a prisoner to Bombay; that measure will stop this trade.

‘Try the thieves by a Line Court Martial and punish them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 21st July, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 12th, and its enclosures. I had already received, from the Chief Secretary of the Government of Fort St. George, a copy of the letter which he addressed to you on the 5th instant. In my answer, I apprized him of the state of the money market at Poonah at the present moment, and pointed out the facts which had prevented my reaping much benefit from the permission which I had received to draw bills upon the principal treasuries in the Company’s territories, and in those of their allies.

‘These are principally the want of cash at Bombay, which has rendered it necessary for the detachment of the Bombay army stationed at Poonah to subsist entirely upon the money resources of that place, and the small amount of those resources at the present moment. I have written to Mr. Buchan to request that, if possible, he will supply the detachment of the Bombay army with cash, which will leave the resources of Poonah for the use of this division; and I have hopes that these resources will increase, as it is certain that many of the soucars found means either to remove their money, or to conceal it there during the Peshwah’s absence, and that they had not brought back their treasures when I marched from that city.

‘It is to be hoped, therefore, that a greater proportion of the money resources of Poonah will be available for the use of this division of the army hereafter than we have had hitherto; but I still doubt whether I shall be able to procure any large sums of money for bills upon any other treasury excepting Bombay. Hitherto I have procured only two small sums for bills upon Benares, although I have apprized the shroffs and soucars that I could give them bills upon any part of India in which it might be convenient to them to make payments.

‘I am of opinion, however, that it will be very convenient to have at Hyderabad the lac of pagodas to that place from

Masulipatam; and that that sum should be increased, as far as may be practicable; as, even if I should not be able to procure money at Poonah for bills upon Hyderabad, there will be no difficulty in transporting the money from that city to camp.

'I am much indebted to you for the attention which it appears you have given to this important subject, as well as to the supply of an additional quantity of Batavia arrack, at an advanced station. I have the pleasure to inform you, however, that I am well supplied with that article from Bombay, *via* Poonah; and as the distance to that settlement will always be shorter than to any port on the Eastern coast, I think it will be better to depend solely upon Bombay for that article.

'The western coast is deficient principally in bullocks and rice; and I must therefore depend principally for those articles on the territories to the eastward.

'I am very sensible of the trouble which you have taken to send forward additional supplies of rice to Colonel Stevenson's detachment. The brinjaries are so unmanageable, unless their profits are enormous, which the circumstances of the present moment will not allow us to give; and they have behaved so ill to Colonel Stevenson, as well as to me, and, from the nature and state of their cattle, they must be so useless in a campaign carried on by troops lightly equipped, that I prefer the hired cattle. Their owners must at least obey orders.

'The time which you have agreed to give is very reasonable; and, for the reasons you have stated, it is more advantageous to give monthly hire, than a sum of money for a trip to any place. It will be desirable to send those bullocks to Aurungabad in the first instance, and they can afterwards be ordered to any place at which it would be convenient to have them.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR,

'Camp, 21st July, 1803*.

'Since writing to you this morning, I have received your letter of the 13th. If the bullock owners to whom you allude refuse positively to go farther than Aurungabad, it would be

* Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Camp near Julgong, 21st July, 1803.

'I. A few hours after I had sent off my letter to you of yesterday's date, I received two dispatches from Mr. Secretary Edmonstone of the 27th and 28th

the best and cheapest bargain to pay them eleven rupees for the trip; and in that case, I recommend this measure particularly, because there is reason to hope that they will be a shorter time on the road if paid by the trip, than they would be if paid monthly hire.

ultimo; the former containing a copy of the instructions of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General to you, under date the 26th of last June, accompanied by orders from his Excellency for the guidance of my conduct, in consequence of the powers delegated to you by those instructions; the latter enclosing an extract of a letter from the Most Noble the Governor General to your address, dated the 27th ultimo.

‘2. I trust, Sir, it would be needless in me to offer any assurances that I shall have great pleasure in obeying the orders I have received on this occasion; and which direct me to comply with such intimations as you may convey to me, in conformity to the powers lately delegated to you by his Excellency, as well as to afford you every degree of practicable aid in the exercise of those powers.

‘3. I shall now proceed to state the result of the communication made by Moonshee Mirza Banker, of the contents of the letter addressed by you to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Jadoon Rao Bhow being the only minister at this court who possesses influence and ability, I directed Mirza Banker to call on him, previously to his repairing to the Durbar, and to represent as follows.

“ That Colonel Collins, regarding Jadoon Rao Bhow as a man of understanding, and as one desirous of preventing hostilities between the two Sirsars, had sent to apprise him of the contents of the Hon. General Wellesley's letter, before it was presented to the Maharajah, in order that Jadoon Rao might consider maturely its important tendency, and be enabled to give his prince such advice as the present critical situation of his affairs so immediately required. Mirza Banker then proceeded to state, that General Wellesley's letter contained a confirmation of what Colonel Collins had so repeatedly stated to this durbar; namely, that the continuance of the united forces of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar in this quarter would speedily involve those chieftains in a war with the English, since their present position could have been assumed for no other purpose than that of menacing the territories of our ally, the Nabob Nizam. That the observations which the Honorable General has made, as well on the conduct as on the language of the Maharajah, were indisputably just, as was also the inference which the General had drawn therefrom, that the offer of General Wellesley to withdraw the British forces whenever Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah should repair to their respective capitals, was a most convincing proof on his part of pacific intentions: consequently, that should the Marhatta chiefs refuse to comply with the General's reasonable requisition, it would be apparent to every power in Hindustan that their designs had all along been hostile towards the British Government and its allies, notwithstanding their late friendly professions; that the assurance contained in the last paragraph of General Wellesley's letter to the Maharajah was

‘But it would be desirable, if possible, to prevail upon them to allow their cattle to go a little farther than Aurungabad; and on this ground I would recommend that you should propose to them to go, on monthly hire, as far as Colonel Stevenson’s detachment, provided they did not quit the territories of the Nizam.

‘If they should not agree to this proposal, I recommend that, at all events, they should be sent with rice to Aurungabad, hired as proposed for the trip; as, although the rice, when laid down at that city, will cost nearly a rupee for four seers, it can be got in that neighborhood in such small quantities, that it is better that it should be sent even at that price.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

so liberal and explicit, as to leave Scindiah and the Bhoonslah no possible excuse for delaying their march towards their respective countries; and lastly, that the Honorable General was of a character not to be trifled with, and therefore Jadoon Rao might depend on it as a positive certainty, that in the event either of evasion or of procrastination in the present instance, the British troops would enter upon action without further delay.”

‘4. The foregoing discourse appeared to make a deep impression upon Jadoon Rao Bhow, who acknowledged that the assurance contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah was very satisfactory. He likewise told Mirza Bauker, that he was much obliged by the confidence I had placed in him. Jadoon Rao then proposed that they both should attend the durbar, and advised the Mirza to repeat the foregoing arguments in the presence of the Maharajah. This was accordingly done, after your letter had been fully explained to Scindiah; and Jadoon Rao took this occasion to observe, that, considering the rank, authority, and connexion of the English sirdar who had written to the Maharajah, no doubt could be entertained but that his assurances would be confirmed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General; and then asked permission of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to wait on the Rajah of Berar with your letter, in order to consult with that chief on its important contents. Scindiah having consented to this proposal, Jadoon Rao immediately set off towards the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah; and I expect to be informed of the result of his visit during the course of this day.

‘5. Early this morning, Mirza Bauker Khan repaired to the camp of the Berar Rajah, in order to make a representation to that chieftain, and to Sereedhur Punt, exactly similar to that which he had yesterday offered to the consideration of Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and I must confess that the late change in the language of the ministers of the Maharajah induces me to hope that your requisition will shortly be complied with.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘*J. COLLINS.*’

To Colonel Murray.

' SIR, ' Camp, 22nd July, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 20th. You will receive this day orders to carry into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial, which tried a Bombay sepoy, who deserted some time ago; and orders to assemble a General Native Court Martial to try the deserters you mention. If there is evidence of the desertion with their arms and accoutrements of the three men, I beg that they may be all tried; if there should not be evidence, one of them may be admitted to give evidence against the others.

‘ But I should think that there will be no want of evidence that they left their corps and were brought back prisoners. They shall be shot also, if the Court Martial should sentence that punishment.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

' SIR, ' Camp, 22nd July, 1803*.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant; and I am much obliged to you for the additional

* *Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

'SIR, 'Camp, near Julgong, 22nd July, 1803.

‘1. I had the honor to apprise you in my letter of yesterday’s date, that Moonshee Mirza Banker Khan had been sent to the camp of the Rajah of Berar for the purpose of representing to that chief the necessity of his repairing to his capital without delay.

2. Mirza Bauker Khan returned from this visit early yesterday, and I am concerned to state, that he did not find Ragojee Bhoonslah well disposed to comply with your requisition, although the Mirza did not fail to urge the same arguments which had apparently made a due impression on the minds of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow. The Bhoonslah admitted, however, that the assurance in the concluding paragraph of your letter to Scindiah was fully satisfactory, so far as it related to the intention of the British Government; but he insisted on it as proper, that his Highness the Peshwah should give similar assurances, as well to Dowlut Rao Scindiah as to himself, before their forces separated, or quitted their present position. The conversation on this occasion was carried on for several hours; at the conclusion Ragojee said, that he would consult personally with Scindiah in the evening, after which a reply should be given to your letter. Ac-

supply of bullocks, which you have sent under Lieutenant Griffiths.

'You are aware, I believe, of the state of Perinda and its neighborhood. That place and the Nizam's frontier, as far as Aurungabad, was under the government of Nizam Nawaz Jung, a sirdar who was, I believe, discovered to have had improper communications with Holkar. He is in confinement at Hyderabad. His brother has been deprived of his charge at Aurungabad, and orders have been given to deprive his officers of the fort of Perinda, which they have still held out, against the Nizam's troops.

'There was a report in this camp some days ago that Nizam Nawaz Jung's killadar of Perinda had attacked the convoy under Major Dallas, coming from the Kalachabootra

cordingly, the Maharajah waited on the Berar Rajah last night, and the conference between these chieftains lasted several hours. In consequence of the above intelligence, I this morning addressed a note to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, copies of which, in English and Persian, I do myself the honor to enclose for your perusal.

'3. It being, I think, probable, from the conversation which passed between Mirza Bauker and the Bhoonslah, that Scindiah may be induced to refuse or to evade compliance with your requisition; and as it appears by the extract of the letter to your address from his Excellency the Governor General, under date the 27th ultimo, transmitted to me by Mr. Secretary Edmonstone, that I am not at liberty to leave this court unless by your desire, I have to request your instructions for the guidance of my conduct in the event of refusal or procrastination on the part of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or of Ragojee to separate and retire with their forces to their respective countries.

'4. As I am anxious to learn your resolve on the above question, I shall close this letter without waiting for a reply to the note which I just now addressed to the Maharajah.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

Note addressed by Colonel Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 22nd July, 1803.

'As Colonel Collins understands that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah held a conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah last night, for the purpose of determining on the answer that should be given to the letter addressed to the Maharajah by the Hon. General Wellesley, Colonel Collins requests that Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah will favor him with a communication of the result of that conference; and as the Hon. General Wellesley expects an early reply to his letter, the Colonel trusts that the Maharajah will no longer delay writing to the General, in order to satisfy him that his requisitions will be immediately complied with.

'The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.'

'J. COLLINS.'

ghaut. I knew that this report could not be well founded, as Major Dallas could not have reached Perinda at the time he was supposed to have been attacked. But as it was possible that a design might have been formed to intercept this important convoy; and, at all events, as this design was a subject of conversation in the country, I thought it as well to send Bistnapah Pundit with his cavalry to join Major Dallas, which would secure him against any insult.

‘ Bistnapah Pundit arrived at Perinda some days ago, and found the new killadar in the pettah, and the old killadar in the fort; and, as usual, a negotiation on foot for the delivery of the fort to the former, in obedience to the Nizam’s orders. He sent on a party of horse from thence, to gain intelligence of Major Dallas’s detachment, but they were stopped before they had gone far, by a body of troops, in a place called Bursee, and four of them were taken prisoners. This is a place which lies to the eastward of Perinda, but belongs to the Peshwah; and was taken possession of by Baba Phurkia, when he went on his embassy from Holkar to the Nizam, and his troops have remained there ever since.

‘ The killadar of Bursee has since released the four men, the moment, as he says, he found they belonged to me. I have desired Bistnapah Pundit to go on till he joins Major Dallas; and I have sent by him a letter, which has been addressed to Lieut. Griffiths, in which orders are given to that officer to strike off from the road on which Major Dallas will have marched, as soon as possible after he shall have reached Culburga, to proceed from thence to Naldroog, and from Naldroog to Tankie to the eastward of Toljapoor, thence to Sirpoor on the Mangeyra river, and then to Kurdlah, at which place he shall find further orders from me.

‘ By this route he will avoid the frontier, which, you will observe, is on both sides in a state of confusion. Lieut. Griffiths’s party shall also be reinforced; but as I do not yet know that I may not have more occasion for Bistnapah Pundit’s cavalry than for any of the other troops, I doubt whether I shall be able to send them.

‘ Any other convoys that come had better take the Beejapoor road. We have a tappall upon it, and shall always know from the runners of any collection of troops upon that road; and by this time the forage has every where improved.

‘ The state of the frontiers of our allies is rather curious. The garrisons on the Nizam’s frontier are in the hands of a traitor, who will not deliver them up. The Peshwah’s frontier has been seized by a rebel; and although that

excepting an assertion that he had not moved from Colridze with any intention to go to the southward, but with a view to procuring better forage. He promises fidelity to the Peshwah, but complains of the state of his health, and does not say that he will join.

points connected with the duties committed to that officer's charge by the tenor of those instructions.

'3. General Wellesley has, since the receipt of the said instructions, advised the Governor, that the command of the troops in the Guickwar territories has thus been vested in him : and desired that, for the further promotion of the service, a co-operation may be directed between the troops in the Guickwar's territories and those in the Company's (by which is understood those at Surat) ; and the proper local authorities may be directed to communicate with him on the means of defence in the event of a war breaking out, all which has been ordered accordingly.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General Nicolls.'

'J. A. GRANT, Sec. to Govt.'

Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the Governor General.

'MY LORD,

'Camp, Julgong, 23rd July, 1803.

'1. Since I had the honor to address your Excellency on the 17th instant, I have been favored with the reply of the Hon. Major General Wellesley to the reference that I made to Colonel Close in my letter of the 9th of this month, a copy of which formed a part of my dispatch to your Lordship of the same date.

'2. As the Hon. General Wellesley has given a very clear and decided opinion on the necessity of Dowlut Rao Scindiah's withdrawing his troops from the Maharajah's frontier, and in consequence of this opinion has addressed a representation to the Maharajah, calculated to induce that chief and the Maharajah to retire to their respective capitals, I deem it my duty to forward to your Excellency copies of the letters which have passed between the Honorable General and me on that important subject.

'3. Dowlut Rao Scindiah has not yet replied to the note that I addressed to him yesterday morning, a transcript of which is contained in the enclosure. Indeed, I understand that the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah are as yet undecided whether to comply with, or refuse the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley. In order, however, to hasten their determination, I shall this day demand an audience of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the express purpose of obtaining an answer to the General's letter.

'4. Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg have marched with their corps towards Hindustan, conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to communicate to your Excellency on the 17th instant ; but I must beg leave to correct a mistake that I then made respecting the strength of Colonel Doudernaigue's Brigade, which consists of seven battalions of infantry and five hundred cavalry, instead of eight battalions, as before stated.

'I have the honor to be, &c,

'The Governor General.'

'J. COLLINS.'

‘It is obvious that this chief is looking forward to the result of the expected contests; and nothing will induce him or any one of those not at present in camp to come forward, till they see which party is likely to prevail. It will therefore be useless to offer to him money, or additional jaghires or honors. If I was sure that General Stuart’s army would be applicable to the Marhatta service, I would request you to desire the Peshwah to send an order to Appah Saheb to move him forward; I would then make offers to him, and threaten him with the attack of Meritch, if he did not obey the Peshwah’s orders. But as General Stuart is now crossing the Toombuddra, to send the order would only have the effect of creating an enemy in that quarter, in which one would be most inconvenient, and at a point in which we are likely to be least guarded.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, all I can hope for the present is to keep Appah Saheb in a state of neutrality to be turned hereafter into active hostility, either towards us or towards the enemy, according as there may be appearance of success on our side or on that of the enemy, in the commencement of the expected contest. I believe I may say the same also of every Marhatta sirdar, excepting possibly those now in the camp. These two we must keep, and I shall go into a consideration of Appah Dessaye’s affairs, in an interview which I am to have with that chief to-morrow. I expect your answer soon respecting the three lacs for Goklah.

‘The frontiers of the Peshwah and the Nizam are in a terrible state. Nizam Nawaz Jung’s killadar is still in Perinda, and Baba Phurkia’s troops hold the Peshwah’s districts bordering on the Nizam’s, which I believe have been given in jaghire to Suddasheo Munkaiseer. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know what are the forts and countries belonging to the Peshwah, which have been seized by Holkar and his adherents; specifying where they are situated, to what chief they belonged, and to what chief the Peshwah wishes that they should be delivered hereafter.

‘I have heard nothing yet of Major Dallas, but I have Bistnapah looking out for him. ‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 23rd July, 1803.

‘Lieut. General Stuart will have informed you that he had sent forward from the Grand Army a second convoy under Lieut. Griffiths on the 12th instant, with orders to proceed by the road on which Major Dallas will have marched.

‘That road follows the line of the frontier, and passes through districts which belong to the Peshwah, as well as others belonging to the Nizam. The districts belonging to both powers are in a state of confusion. Baba Phurkia seized those belonging to the Peshwah bordering on the Beemah, when he went on his embassy to Hyderabad, and has kept them ever since; and Nizam Nawaz Jung’s troops are still in possession of the fort of Perinda, and his amildars of some of the neighboring districts. Under these circumstances, the second convoy, under Lieut. Griffiths, would not be in security in the road on which Major Dallas may have marched; and it may happen to be very inconvenient to me to detach the Mysore cavalry to escort it. I have therefore directed Lieut. Griffiths to alter his route.

‘The route by which he will now march is from Culburga to Naldroog, thence to Tankie, leaving Toljapoor a few miles on his left; thence to Sirpore, on the Mangeyra river, and along that river to Kurdlah. I shall be obliged to you if you will be so kind as to procure orders written in triplicate to the Nizam’s amildars in that part of the country, to supply Lieut. Griffiths with whatever he may want, and to give him assistance if he should require it, and to send these orders to meet him at Naldroog, Tankie near Toljapoor, and Sirpore.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter, in which you enclose copies of the orders which you had received from his Excellency the Governor General, relative to the succession of Secunder Jah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 24th July, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your Excellency’s letters of the 26th and 27th June.

‘Before they had reached me, in obedience to your Excellency’s orders of the 8th and 30th May, and in consequence of a reference made to me by Colonel Collins, I had written a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to require that chief to separate himself from the Rajah of Berar, and to retire with his troops across the river Nerbudda. A copy of that, and a copy of the letter which I wrote on the 14th instant to Colonel Collins, have been already transmitted by Lieut. Colonel Close, to be laid before your Excellency.

‘From the day on which Dowlut Rao Scindiah was called upon, in the name of your Excellency, to declare his views in his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that he was urged not to advance to Poonah, it was obvious that his only design was to gain time. He had not concluded his negotiations with Jeswunt Rao Holkar till a late period in this month; and he, as well as the Rajah of Berar, saw clearly the disadvantages under which they would commence hostilities during the season in which the rivers are full. Those disadvantages were so great, particularly as the troops of Jeswunt Rao Holkar were to the northward of the river Taptee, that it was probable that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar would separate, and order their troops to their usual stations. In this they incur the risks of those evils which must result from the commencement of hostilities at that moment. I therefore thought it proper to urge forward the decision, whether there should be peace or war; and at the same time that I gave Dowlut Rao Scindiah every assurance of the pacific views and intentions of the British government, I called upon him to adopt that measure, which your Excellency conceived would give the British Government a security that the peace would last.

‘On the 18th I received your Excellency’s letter of the 26th June; and I wrote a letter to Colonel Collins, of which I enclosed a copy, in which I desired that officer to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar of the powers with which your Excellency has been pleased to trust me. I requested him again to call upon those chiefs to separate, and to send their troops to their usual stations; and to inform them that, if they refused to do so, he had been directed to withdraw from the camp, of Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the following day.

‘Since I have written that letter, I have received your Excellency’s letter of the 27th; and I am induced to hope that you will approve of all the steps taken till that moment, to bring to a decision the question of peace or war.

‘I have perused a copy of Colonel Collins’s dispatch to your Excellency, of the 18th, which contains a recognition on the part of Scindiah of the benefits which he will derive from the treaty of Bassein, and other symptoms of a change of councils in the durbar of that chief. But, notwithstanding the contents of that dispatch, the intention of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah cannot be considered pacific, unless they shall separate, and each shall withdraw his troops to their usual stations. I have therefore made no alterations in the instructions which I gave to Colonel Collins on the 18th,

and he will certainly depart from Scindiah's camp if he finds that the chiefs will not retire.

'If, however, they should retire, I consider that the British Government will have security for the duration of the peace, as amply as it can have while the power of these chiefs shall last. On the one hand, it will be obvious that fear of the power of the British Government was the cause of their retreat; on the other, it will be equally obvious that the power which will have removed these formidable armies to a distance must increase; that no circumstances of distress from European enemies can prevent the growth of the strength of the British Government in this quarter, and therefore that an attempt to attack it hereafter must be hopeless.

'The difficulties under which the force of the British Government labors at the present moment, and which give the greatest encouragement to the confederate chiefs, are the state of weakness and confusion of the Peshwah's Government; the general unsettled and ruinous state of the country; and the wavering disposition of the majority of the southern jaghiredars, who alone preserve the appearance and relations of fidelity towards the Peshwah.

'The weak and confused state of the Peshwah's government is to be attributed principally to his personal character, but also in a great degree to the rebellions and disturbances which have prevailed throughout the Marhatta empire for the last seven years. It could not be expected that even a government regularly organized would be able to resume its functions and its powers immediately after a revolution such as that effected by the victories of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, preceded as they were by the long usurpation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, much less one conducted by a man so weak as Bajee Rao. But it may be reasonably expected this state of affairs will improve with the assistance of the British Government, and that the Peshwah will have an authority for which there will be some respect.

'The whole of the Marhatta territory is unsettled and in ruins. Holkar's armies consumed the produce of the last year, and owing to their plunder and extortion, entire districts were depopulated, and the habitations of the people destroyed.

'But it is obvious that, for a series of years, the government, and even jaghiredars, can have received but little, if any revenue; and both have been obliged to wink at, and even authorize the plunder of their own territories, for the

subsistence of their troops. The consequence is, that every man is a plunderer and a thief; and no man, who can find any thing to seize or to steal, will cultivate the land for his subsistence.

‘The jaghires and forts, many of them close to Poonah, are in the hands of the adherents of Holkar, who are rebels to the government of the Peshwah. His Highness has passed orders for the resumption of these forts and jaghires; but there is no strength to carry them into execution; and thus a set of rebels and adherents of the confederate chiefs are in the midst of his possessions.

‘The state of affairs must improve, indeed it has improved already in those parts of the country in which the British army has been; and where the necessity of employing the troops to oppose the confederate chiefs will no longer exist, it will be possible to enforce the Peshwah’s orders for the resumption of the forts and jaghires, and to place in them those who will be faithful to his Highness’s government. But the possession of these countries by the adherents of the Peshwah’s enemies, at the present moment, must encourage the confederates.

‘The chiefs of the Marhatta empire have been accustomed to look at a confederacy of the greater powers among them, as a force which nothing could withstand. They recollect its success against the British Government in former times, and they anticipate the same success in the expected contest. They do not compare the strength of the British Government at this time with its former weakness; nor do they consider the difficulties under which the British Government labored at the time of the former contest; nor do they compare their own strength at that time with their weakness at the present moment.

‘The southern chiefs, and all those connected with Amrut Rao, wish well to the British Government, and see clearly that the only chance of security they have, is in the establishment of the power of the Peshwah under British protection. But they dread the power of the confederated chiefs, and fear to venture into the contest, till they shall see which side is likely to be successful. The first success in the contest will bring those forward who may not be rebels to the Peshwah’s government; and will preserve Amrut Rao and his adherents in a state of neutrality, till they can make terms for themselves.

‘But if the confederates should withdraw, the southern chiefs will be convinced that the northern chiefs have no

confidence in their own strength, opposed to the British Government ; and in case of any future contest, they will not be unwilling to come forward in the support of a power to which they will attribute many of the advantages which they might enjoy. The Peshwah's government, also, as it will have more strength, will have more power to enforce obedience to its orders than it has at the present moment ; and they will be more fearful of the consequences of disobedience. The confederates are well aware of this wavering disposition of the southern chiefs, and it is a strong inducement to them to go to war.

‘ Another circumstance of difficulty, at the present moment, which probably could not exist hereafter, is the state of the Guickwar government. The rebels have only lately been expelled from that country, and the government has not yet had time to gain strength. The hopes of the confederates must be founded, in some degree, upon the certainty of a renewal of the rebellion in the case of a war.

‘ The precarious state of the Nizam's health is another circumstance of encouragement to the confederates, which it is probable would not exist at any future period. It does not weigh as a difficulty upon the British force now, and Major Kirkpatrick writes with confidence, that Hyderabad will not be disturbed if his Highness the Nizam should die.

‘ But in the event of a war, particularly if there should not be speedily a signal success on the part of the British troops, it must be expected that the Nizam's death will be attended by the assumption of independence by some of his chiefs, and by confusion and disturbance in parts of his Highness's territories. It may be very certain that the confederates will encourage any symptoms of these evils ; and that the hope of success in producing confusion in the Nizam's territories is one of the principal inducements to go to war at the present moment.

‘ Your Excellency will observe, in this view of the question, the improvement of the British strength in this quarter will be owing, and in proportion, to the improvement in the state of the government of the allies, to that of the country, to that of its interior state, and to the confidence which the southern jaghiredars will have in the superior strength of the British Government, from contemplating the effect which that strength will now have upon the northern confederated chiefs.

‘ No war in which the British Government can be involved with an European power can shake this strength. As long

as the British troops maintain their formidable position in the territories of the Peshwah, the Nizam, and Guzerat, it must increase with the strength and prosperity of those governments to which it gives protection; and there will be daily a smaller prospect that the northern chiefs will venture to confederate against it.

‘The breaking up of the confederacy, therefore, as it will add so much to the strength and reputation of the British Government, will be the best security for the duration of the peace.

‘Although, in considering the various advantages which must result from the retreat of the confederates, and must add to the strength of the British Government, I have pointed out to your Excellency certain disadvantages under which we labor at the present moment. I do not wish to impress your Excellency with the notion that I consider them to be of such magnitude as to render doubtful the event of a contest. They are certainly inconvenient, and we should be stronger if the Peshwah’s government was in strength: but if we can strike such a blow during the rains as will give us the superiority, and keep our rear in tranquillity, we shall not probably feel those inconveniences further than in the want of pecuniary resources by the Peshwah’s government.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close has laid before your Excellency the correspondence which passed between Amrut Rao and me, since my arrival at Poonah; and the memorandum which he proposed to the Peshwah’s ministers that his Highness should give to me, by which his Highness was to consent to give to Amrut Rao a revenue amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum. The Peshwah would not agree to the proposed arrangement, but, on his departure to Wahy, referred the subject to his ministers, who made a proposition to Lieut. Colonel Close respecting Amrut Rao, which he will have laid before your Excellency. This proposition appeared to me inadmissible: it went to place Amrut Rao in the state of a prisoner, under the most degrading circumstances; and I was convinced that, if I had communicated it to the vakeel of that chief, he would have instantly joined the confederates. In the mean time, however, this vakeel pressed me for a decision on his employer’s case. He urged, that at my desire Amrut Rao had separated himself from the councils of Holkar and of Scindiah nearly three months ago; that those chiefs were become his enemies; that, in his position beyond the Godavery, he was liable to be attacked by them; and that he was not at peace with the Peshwah.

‘As, in the memorandum received from the Peshwah’s ministers they consented to give four lacs of rupees per annum to Amrut Rao, (although the gift was to be attended by conditions to which Amrut Rao would never consent,) I thought it proper to write that chief a letter, of which the enclosed is a translation, in which I gave him assurances that the British Government would take care that he should have a provision which would be agreeable to him.

‘I am convinced that, excepting in the event of the retreat of the confederates, Amrut Rao will not be satisfied with a jaghire of that amount; but I am also of opinion that nothing will induce him to come forward in support of the British Government, excepting his conviction that, in case of a contest with the confederates, the former will be successful.

‘The promise of some provision will be sufficient to keep him in a state of neutrality for a time; and hereafter, (when it shall be certain that he will come forward in support of the British cause,) will be the proper season to fix the amount of the jaghire which he is to have.

‘I enclose the translation of a letter which I sent to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, with a copy of the treaty of Bassein. I sent this letter by soubahdar Kawder Nawaz Khan, of the native cavalry, with orders to write to Jeswunt Rao Holkar from Amrut Rao’s camp, to inform him that he had a letter from me, which he would deliver in person, if Jeswunt Rao chose to receive him.

‘I instructed the soubahdar to tell Jeswunt Rao Holkar that the British Government had no intention to injure or interfere with him; that I was much pleased at his having crossed the Taptee, and that I should be still more pleased to hear that he had gone across the Nerbudda into the territories of his family.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 24th July, 1803.

‘Appah Dessaye paid me a visit this morning, and entered much in detail into the situation of his affairs. He represented that he had not been able to obtain possession of any one of the places which had been made over to him by the Peshwah in jaghire; and that when his amildars had gone to the villages with the Peshwah’s sunnuks, they had

been ill treated, their troops attacked, and his Highness's sunnuds torn. He said that, as the Peshwah's ministers had refused to consent to incur the expense of paying a proportion of the troops which had marched with me to Poonah, he had been obliged to discharge and pay the arrears of all above the number of 1000, for which he obtained grants of serinjaumy lands; and that in order to pay those arrears he had disposed of all the valuable property in his possession; that, under these circumstances, he had no means of paying his troops. He said that he had represented to the Peshwah's ministers the probability that he should not be able to obtain possession of the districts for which he had sunnuds; and that, at all events, if he should obtain possession of them, the lands would be in an uncultivated state, the villages deserted, and that he should derive no benefit from them for some time; and he requested that he might receive 25,000 rupees per mensem to pay his troops, until he should derive some benefit from his jaghires. They had consented to this proposal, but hitherto they had paid him nothing.

'I request you to ascertain from the Peshwah's ministers whether they did give Appah Dessaye to understand that he should receive 25,000 rupees per mensem, till he should be in the receipt of the revenues expected from his jaghires. If they did, I beg you to urge them to pay him the money; at all events, whether they did or did not consent to this arrangement, it is very obvious that this body of the Peshwah's troops has no fund from which it can draw its subsistence; and I request you to urge the Peshwah's ministers to allot one which shall be available.

'If the Peshwah's ministers should avow that they had encouraged Appah Dessaye to expect that they would provide funds for the subsistence of his troops, till he should receive the benefits to be expected from his jaghires; or if, in consequence of the representation which I now send you, they should consent to provide funds for the payment of Appah Dessaye's troops, I will endeavor to assist that chief, and trust to future arrangements with the Peshwah for repayment of the sums which I may advance him. I beg you to represent these matters to the Peshwah's ministers, and to take every opportunity to urge them to provide means for the payment of his Highness's troops.

'In the course of the conference which I had with him this morning, Appah Dessaye produced an order which he had received from Suddasheo Munkaiseer to proceed, in concert

with Bappojee Goneish Goklah, to attack the troops of Amrut Rao, and dislodge them from some stations which they had occupied between Poonah and Nassuck ; and to go as far even as the latter place, to give assistance to the troops stationed there.

‘I beg you to remind the Peshwah’s ministers that his Highness is bound by his treaty with the British Government to produce an army of 16,000 men, to act with the British troops ; instead of which number only 3000 men have been sent, and no provision has been made for the payment even of that number. You will be so kind as to represent to them that, when a large body of the enemy’s troops are assembled upon the frontier, when the Rajah of Berar has in a public manner asserted his hereditary claim to his Highness’s musnud, it appears to be prudent not to fritter away the small force which his Highness has produced. That, as long as those armies are assembled upon the frontier his Highness may depend upon it that his government will not settle ; his orders and sunnuds will not be attended to ; and his enemies will remain in possession of the lands which they have seized : that no partial operation against Amrut Rao, or any other chief, even if it should be successful, can be attended by the benefits which must result from removing to a distance from the frontier the hostile armies which have assembled in the neighborhood. But that this expedition against Amrut Rao’s troops cannot be successful, as, in fact, there are twice the number of them that there are of the Peshwah’s ; that the only chance of success against the hostile armies which have joined upon the frontier is, that our troops should be united, and that they should have no other object excepting to attack the enemy in their front ; that many rivers will divide these detachments under Goklah and Appah Dessaye from the British troops ; and that their co-operation with the latter will become impracticable ; and that, upon the whole, I have taken upon me to prevent Appah Dessaye from going upon this expedition.

‘It appears, by a letter from Bappojee Goneish Goklah, that he has marched upon the expedition against Amrut Rao ; although, in a letter which he wrote to me, he said that he removed to a distance from my camp only for the sake of forage.

‘I propose, however, to endeavor to stop that chief likewise, of which I beg you to apprise the Peshwah’s ministers.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close,’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 24th July, 1803.

‘ I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 22nd. I had already written to request that you would take the rice collected at Aurungabad and Puttun for my use. The quantity at the two places will, I should imagine, amount to above 1000 loads. I have besides written to the officer at Toka, to send back to you the 500 loads of rice which you sent there for me.

‘ You can have no difficulty in getting the rice out of Aurungabad; and I recommend that you should send either the bullocks of your departments, or those belonging to the brinjarries, to bring that at Moongy Puttun.

‘ If you should send those belonging to the brinjarries, it will be necessary that you should either make an arrangement with them for the hire; or that you should sell them the rice at the price at which they would get grain in the country, and afterwards take it from them as wanted, at the camp price. Do in this as you may think proper: at all events the rice is at your service.

‘ I told you before that General Stuart sent me only 2000 loads of rice, but he sent 5000 bullocks: 2000 loads more are following. Major Kirkpatrick also writes word that 2000 loads will leave Hyderabad for Aurungabad at the end of the month: this also will be applicable to the consumption of your detachment. But you must make your own arrangements for moving it forward to your camp from Aurungabad.

‘ Before all this can be consumed, your brinjarries will have filled again. Care must be taken to watch them closely, and to make them fill as fast as they shall empty their bags.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 24th July, 1803.

‘ I have this morning received your letter of the 21st and 22nd. I return your paper containing the deposition of the soldiers against the foreigners, supposed to have enticed away the three men of the 84th who are missing; and, although they may not be the persons who took those three men away, it is very clear that their occupation is to entice the British soldiers to desert. I request, therefore, that,

upon the receipt of this letter, you will punish these men publicly in the bazaar and lines of the detachment under your command: you will afterwards keep them in confinement till an opportunity shall offer, when you will send them to Bombay, in charge of a guard, and report to the Governor that they are sent as deserters from the Portuguese service and from the ships. You will also request that they may be sent to Goa. If you should be able to catch the third man, let him be treated in the same manner; and if any European or half caste man should hereafter appear in your lines, let him also be taken up and sent down to Bombay.

‘Be so kind as to give to each of the soldiers employed in taking those men five pagodas.

‘Let me know the day on which Captain Douglas takes charge of the bullocks, in order that the accounts here may be made out in his name from that day.

‘It is very necessary that you should keep the depôt of Poonah full; and I am clearly of opinion that it is better to send coolies down to Panwell for rice than to purchase in the bazaar at Poonah more than your former consumption, according to my former direction, as soon as the quantity in the depôt shall not amount to more than 4000 bullock bags. If, therefore, Captain Young cannot procure coolies or bullocks to keep the depôt full, you ought to hire as many people as you can with convenience for that purpose.

‘However, I acknowledge that I have not much fear that the depôt will fail. If the war should be carried on in such a manner as that the communication between Poonah and Panwell shall be cut off (which, by the by, is not very probable, for at least two months, unless the killadar of Loghur should enter into it), the communication between me and Poonah will likewise be interrupted. It follows, then, that I shall not be able to draw any thing from Poonah, the depôt at which place will be applicable solely to your detachment, and I believe that it will last them for many months. However, it may as well be kept full.

‘I think also that you ought to get up some gunpowder, some 6 and 12 pounder shot, $4\frac{1}{2}$ and $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch shells, fuzes, &c., for the 12 pounders and howitzers. Your stock in these articles is much more likely to be consumed than your provisions.

‘The Mysore brinjarry will be at Poonah about the end of the month.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp, 25th July, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, with copies of its enclosures.

‘I have received no answer from Colonel Collins to my letter of the 18th. He had sent my letter of the 14th to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but I have not heard that he had received an answer.

‘Hircarrahs report that Holkar had refused to join, even after Kuddee Rao Holkar had been delivered over to him, unless he also got possession of the Holkar territories.

‘I have as yet heard nothing of Major Dallas.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 25th July, 1803.

‘The Peshwah’s vakeel called upon me yesterday, and desired that I would write to one of the Nizam’s amildars to pay choute to Bulwunt Rao Nagonath for a particular village, which he named, in this neighborhood.

‘I am very anxious to oblige Bulwunt Rao Nagonath, and shall certainly write to the amildar, if it should be proper; but I wish first to know whether the choute claimed is disputable by the Nizam’s government; and whether it comes under the head of those disputed claims which are referred to the arbitration of the British Government by the treaty of Bassein. If it does, Bulwunt Rao Nagonath must see that I cannot write to the amildar to satisfy the claim, without taking upon me to decide a disputed question, before I shall have heard both parties. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention to him this subject.

‘Appah Dessaye also has some claims of choute among his serinjaumy grants. But I have written to Colonel Stevenson to desire that he will speak to Rajah Sookroodoor about them, who will certainly object to paying them, if they can be disputed. If they cannot be disputed, Colonel Stevenson will make him pay them.

‘I send you with this a letter to Lord Clive. It contains the copy of a dispatch which I wrote yesterday to the Governor General, of which I request you to send a copy to Mr. Duncan.

'Goklah has escaped from me to the distance of twenty-eight coss; but I have ordered him back again.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD,

'29th July, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose copies of letters of the 24th and 25th instant, which I have received from Colonel Collins*, and the copy of a letter which I have written to that officer this day.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

* Lieut. Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon A Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Camp near Julgong, 24th July, 1803.

'1. I had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th instant, yesterday morning, and conformably to the instructions contained therein, per addressed memorial to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which every argument and observation you have furnished me with were stated nearly in your own words. I do myself the honor to enclose copies in English and Persian of my memorial to Scindiah; that to Ragojee Bhoonslah was precisely the same, except in one passage, which is noticed in the enclosure.

'2. Yesterday at noon I sent a message to the Maharajah, intimating, that as he had not replied to my note of the 22nd of June, I expected he would grant me an audience that evening; but Scindiah was then engaged at a nautch, and could not be spoken with. This morning early I sent Mirza Bauker Khan to the durbar, in order to explain the contents of my memorial, and at the same time insist on my having a conference with the Maharajah in the course of the day. The Mirza repaired to the camp of Scindiah at seven o'clock, but is not yet returned, although it is now two in the afternoon.

'3. If, after another conference with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, I should find them actually determined to retain their present positions on the Nizam's frontier, I shall, in compliance with your instructions, inform those chieftains that I have been directed by you to leave the camp of the Maharajah; and in this event, I shall instantly apprize Colonel Stevenson of my departure.

'4. The troops which your hircarrahs saw at the Adjuttee ghaut were sepoy battalions in the service of the Berar Rajah. These corps have been since withdrawn, and are returned to the camp of Ragojee Bhoonslah. They were commanded by a Native officer named Beny Sing. Twenty-two guns were attached to these corps.

'5. In my address to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, under date the 17th instant, I mentioned that Scindiah had

To Major A. Walker.

' Sir,

' Camp, 26th July, 1803.

' From the tenor of letters which I have this day received from Colonel Collins, it is probable that that officer will have

detached Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with the corps which they commanded, towards Hindustan. This intelligence was true, but I made a mistake with respect to the strength of Colonel Doudernaigue's brigade, which consists of seven battalions and five hundred cavalry, instead of eight sepoy battalions, erroneously stated in my letter to his Excellency.

' 6. Allow me, Sir, to remind you that I formerly gave you very particular statements as well of Scindiah's forces as of the Bhoonslah's; and although those statements are communicated in private letters, yet I conceived they might have proved sufficiently satisfactory: I shall however take an early opportunity of transmitting to you an official report on this subject, conformably to your wishes. In the mean time I can assure you that Scindiah has only eleven battalions of infantry with him at present, and that no brigade of his was ever posted at the Adjunttee ghaut; my last advices from the camp of Colonel Doudernaigue mentioned, that he had marched twenty coss on the direct route towards Burhampoor.

' 7. I have the honor to enclose a copy and translate of a note I this instant received from the Berar Rajah.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

' J. COLLINS.'

Memorial addressed by Colonel John Collins to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd July, 1803.

' Colonel Collins apprizes Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has been pleased to delegate the direction and control of all political and military affairs in Hindustan and the Deccan to the Hon. Major General Wellesley, who is also vested with full powers to conclude a negotiation with the Marhatta chieftains and jaghiredars, on the part of the British Government. Colonel Collins further informs the Maharajah, that all engagements which General Wellesley may conclude will be confirmed by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General. The Hon. Major General Wellesley has in consequence instructed Colonel Collins to assure Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that he is perfectly ready to attend to the interests of the Maharajah, and to enter into a negotiation with him upon objects by which the Maharajah may suppose those interests to be affected; but that, in the first place, the General expects that the troops of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah shall withdraw from their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, and return to their usual stations in Hindustan, in which case,

departed from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah by this time; and if that should be the case, I propose to commence hostilities against that chief and the Rajah of Berar immediately.

the General on his part will withdraw the Honorable Company's force to their usual station. 'The Hon. Major General Wellesley has likewise directed Colonel Collins to observe, that since the Maharajah has declared he has no intention to obstruct the treaty of Bassein, or to march to Poonah, or to invade the territories of the Nizam, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations would only be consistent with those declarations, and a proof that they were sincere; while, on the other hand, should the forces of the Maharajah retain their present position upon the Nizam's frontier, after the friendly representations which the Hon. General Wellesley has made on the subject, such a proceeding would be the strongest proof which the Maharajah could give of the insincerity of those declarations; the Hon. Major General Wellesley has therefore instructed Colonel Collins to repeat his former application to the Maharajah to retire with his troops from the Nizam's frontier, that being the only measure by which the peace between the British Government and his Sircar can be preserved.

'Dowlut Rao Scindiah.'

'J. COLLINS.'

'N.B.—A similar representation was presented to the Rajah of Berar, with the exception of one passage, in which he is required to withdraw his troops from the Nizam's frontier, and return to Nagpoor.'

Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to Colonel Collins. (Received on the 24th of July, 1803.)

'The letter which you sent to me is received, and the particulars of its contents thoroughly understood; the answer to it depends on a meeting between me and Dowlut Rao Scindiah Behauder. after we shall have met and personally discussed the subject of it, the reply will then be certainly committed to writing.'

Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Colonel Collins.

'24th July, 1803.

'Your letter is received, and its contents understood.

'Whenever Senah Sahab Soubah Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah and I shall meet and be seated together in the same place, you will then be requested to attend; and whatever is to be stated will then be discussed: an interview between the Rajah and me is indispensable on this occasion. If you are resolved on having an audience. come to-morrow, when only two ghurees of the day shall remain. My house is your own.'

'From papers received from the government of Bombay, I understand that you have directed that preparations should be made in Guzerat for the attack of Baroach. I request

Colonel Collins to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Camp near Julgong, 25th July, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a copy and translate of a note which I received last night from Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'The Maharajah was not visible yesterday, in consequence of his having sat up at a nautch during the whole of the preceding night. But Mirza Bauker Khan had a long conference with Jadoon Rao Bhow, on the subject of my last memorial to Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and although this minister did not appear altogether pleased at the idea of his master being compelled to retire from his present position, yet, from the general tenor of his discourse on this occasion, Mirza Bauker inferred, that Jadoon Rao was of opinion it would be more advisable for Scindiah to withdraw his forces from the Nizam's frontier than to hazard a rupture with the British Government.

'I have the honor to forward a statement of the forces of the Maharajah, and of the Rajah of Berar, in which their respective positions are particularly described.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

*The Force with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, at Julgong :
25th July, 1803.*

	CAVALRY. INFANTRY. ORDNANCE.					
	Hindustanny.	Deccanny.	Sepoy Battalions	Matchlock Men	Heavy Guns.	Field- pieces.
Under the command of Colonel } Pohlmann }	500	—	7	500	8	40
Under the command of Colonel } Sohever, in the pay of Begum } Sumroo }	—	—	1	—	2	30
Under the command of different } native Sirdars }	12,000	2000	—	—	—	—
Under the command of Bappojee } Scindiah, which joined the } Maharajah on the 23rd of } May last }	4000	—	—	—	—	—
Park of Artillery	—	—	—	—	25	100
	16,500	2000	11	500	35	170

N.B.—Each Sepoy Battalion consists of 700 rank and file.

The Force

you to urge forward those preparations as much as possible, and to desire the officer in command of the troops to be in such a state and position as to be able to make his attack upon Baroach, as soon as I shall send him notice that I have commenced hostilities in this quarter.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Walker.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

The Force of the Rajah of Berar : 25th July, 1803.

	ORDNANCE.					
	CAVALRY.	INFANTRY.	Heavy Guns.	Field-pieces.	Rockets.	Sutanants.
Under the command of different } native Sirdars	20,000	—	—	—	—	—
Under the command of Beny Sing	—	6,000	—	35	—	—
Camels carrying Rockets	—	—	—	—	500	—
Camels carrying Sutanants	—	—	—	—	—	500
	20,000	6,000	—	35	500	500

‘ The Maharajah, with the whole of his cavalry, is encamped to the north of the range of hills called the Adjuttee ghaut, ten coss from the pass of Ferdapoor, and nine from Adjuttee, which is impassable for guns. On the right of the Maharajah, at the distance of two coss, Colonel Pohlmann, with his brigade, is posted; and about one coss in the rear of Colonel Pohlmann, Colonel Soliever, with the corps of Begum Sumroo, is posted.

‘ Gopal Bhow having been left in the Deccan by Scindiah, on his return to Hindustan in 1801, and the strength of his detachment having at different times varied according to circumstances, the exact number of his forces cannot be ascertained. It is, however, certain that he has been repeatedly and positively ordered to join the Maharajah.

‘ The Rajah of Berar is encamped two coss on the left of Scindiah, with the whole of his artillery, cavalry, and infantry.

‘ Colonel J. Shepherd, with the whole of the regular infantry and guns of Ambajee Rao, has already crossed the Nerbudda.

‘ Colonel Doudernaigue and Major Brownrigg, with eleven battalions of sepoys, and a large park of artillery, marched from Julgong towards the Nerbudda on the 18th instant.

‘ *J. COLLINS.*’

To Colonel Collins.

'SIR, 'Camp at Sangwee, 29th July, 1803.*

'I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 24th and 25th instant.

'I am happy to observe, from the tenor of the last, that

* *Colonel Collins, Resident with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

'SIR, 'Camp, near Julgong, 26th July, 1803

'1. Conformably to the intimation which I had the honor to give you in my letter of the 25th instant, I waited on Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Captain Bradshaw and Bauker Khan; Ambajee Ingliia, Jadoon Rao Bhow, Unna Bhasker, Suddasheo Eitul Punt, and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, were present at the durbar on the part of the Maharajah.

'2. After an interchange of compliments, I asked Scindiah whether the contents of your letter had been explained to him, and whether he fully comprehended the substance of my last memorial? Scindiah replied, that the contents of both those papers had been particularly explained to him, and that he perfectly understood the nature of your requisition, as well as the motives which had induced the same. Notwithstanding this positive assurance, I recapitulated every argument and observation with which you had furnished me, and then advised the Maharajah, as he regarded his own interests, to afford you the satisfaction you required without delay.

'3. Jadoon Rao Bhow, in reply, entered into a long discussion on the subject of your requisition, of which what follows is an abstract:—That the forces of Dowlut Rao and of the Rajah of Berar were encamped in their own territories; that those chieftains had solemnly promised not to ascend the Adjuttee ghaut, nor to march to Poonah; that they had already given his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General assurances in writing, under their own seals, that they never would attempt to subvert the treaty of Bassein, which assurances were unequivocal proofs of their friendly intentions; that they proposed sending vakeels to the Peshwah, in order to obtain an assurance from his Highness similar to that which they had lately received from the Hon. General Wellesley: lastly, that the treaty now negotiating between Scindiah and Holkar was not completely settled, and that until it was finally concluded, the Maharajah could not return to Hindustan.

'4. In answer to these objections on the part of Jadoon Rao, I observed, that the Hon. General Wellesley had already pointed out to Dowlut Rao Scindiah how impossible it was that he (the General) should trust to promises alone for the security of the Honorable Company and their allies, whilst two large armies occupied a position so near the frontier of the Nabob Nizam: I said, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah derived any advantage from his present position, or if it were in the least necessary for the defence

the confidence of that minister, who has been most active in negotiating the supposed confederacy among the northern Marhatta chiefs, is shaken respecting the strength and power of that confederacy, and that even he is apprehensive of the consequences of a contest with the British Government.

of his possessions, in either of these supposed cases General Wellesley would have made proper allowances; but it was notorious, that the Maharajah had no enemies in this quarter, and was so far from deriving any advantage, that he incurred a most intolerable expense in his present situation, and therefore his retaining it could be only ascribed to hostile designs against the British Government or its allies.

'5. Pursuing my discourse, I reminded Dowlut Rao Scindiah, that at the time when it was proposed at this durbar to give assurances in writing to his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, of the intentions of the Berar Rajah and of the Maharajah to respect the treaty of Bassein, I had then said, that his Excellency would yield no credit to the sincerity of their promises, unless those chiefs returned to their respective capitals; and that on this occasion I had further declared, that I would not be responsible for the Hon. General Wellesley abstaining from hostilities, if their troops did not immediately retire from the Nizam's frontier. I then remarked, that as General Wellesley was now vested with full powers, as well political as military, the assurance contained in his letter to the Maharajah was of equal validity as if given by the Most Noble the Governor General, and consequently ought to satisfy all doubts whatever; however, that General Wellesley would have no objection to the sending vakeels to the court of Poonah, provided Scindiah and the Bhoonslah would, in the first instance, retire from the frontier with the Nabob Nizam: lastly, I observed, that if any part of the treaty of Jeswunt Rao Holkar still remained unadjusted, that Burhampoor was a much more eligible situation for carrying on a negotiation than the Nizam's frontier; and I concluded with insisting on an immediate and distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley.

'6. As Jadoon Rao Bhow appeared at a loss to answer the foregoing observations and arguments, he evaded the subject by promising to give me the satisfaction I demanded in the course of a few days. I replied, that General Wellesley's letter had been presented to the Maharajah five days since, consequently that there had been time sufficient for Scindiah and his ministers to consider maturely on its contents; and therefore I should not submit to further procrastination on the part of this court on this head. There was some altercation; but at length Scindiah and his ministers, having solemnly pledged their words that I should have a distinct and pleasing answer on the 28th of this month, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, I consented to wait till then for their ultimate decision.

'7. Last night I was favored with your letter of the 21st instant, enclosing a kharacetah to the address of the Rajah of Berar, which I this morning forwarded to the Rajah, accompanied by a note from myself.

'I have the honor to be, &c

'Major Gen. the Hon A Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

‘It is probable that the apprehension of this contest, which will be commenced under great advantages on our side, if not delayed, is general in the durbars of those chiefs, but still they and their servants must feel sensibly the disgrace and disadvantage which must be the consequence of their retreat to their own territories, after all their preparations for hostilities, and their boast that they would commence them.

‘Under these impressions, it is probable that they will have promised you that they will separate and retire to their own territories, but they may still have kept their armies in one body, and may have delayed that event, which can alone give security to the British Government for the duration of the peace: on the other hand, if they should not be sincere in their intentions of retiring, we shall lose the advantages which we possess at present for the commencement of hostilities.

‘If they should not have manifested their intentions to separate and retire to their own territories, you will of course have quitted the camp, according to my letter of the 18th instant; but if they should have declared their intention, and should still be joined, and should have made no movement towards their own territories, or if they should delay their marches under any pretences whatever, I request you will write letters to inform them, that I can trust them no longer; and that if they do not separate on the following day, and move each towards his own territories, it is my intention to commence my operations, for which I am fully prepared: that I have sent orders to the troops to approach to Baroach, against which place also operations will be commenced; and that I have apprized his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of the present state of affairs, in order that they also may be prepared to commence their operations.

‘You will also be so kind as to withdraw from Scindiah’s camp; and you will apprize that chief that I have made this request, in case he should not immediately separate from the Rajah of Berar, and should not retire towards Hindustan.

‘I have received a letter from Colonel Stevenson, from which I observe, that, having had occasion to write a letter to Gopal Bhow, to desire that chief to withdraw from the Nizam’s territories, he made use of an expression which is not commonly used to a person of that description, which appears to have offended Gopal Bhow.

‘It is very certain that that chief ought not to have entered the Nizam’s territories, and that if he had not retired from them, and beyond Colonel Stevenson’s reach, that officer would have shown him that the British army was capable of protecting the territories of an ally of the British Government.

‘However, I cannot approve of the expression inadvertently used in Colonel Stevenson’s letter, and I have desired that officer to take an opportunity of writing to Gopal Bhow to explain it.

‘It is probable that this expression may be made a subject of complaint in Scindiah’s durbar, and I mention the circumstance in order that you may inform the ministers of the steps which have been taken in consequence of it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Collins.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 29th July, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 16th, 18th, and 20th, but I defer to reply to them till tomorrow.

‘I now enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to the Governor General*, with copies of its enclosures. I think we shall settle matters with the northern chiefs yet.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To his Excellency General Lake, Commander-in-Chief
in India.*

‘Camp at Sangwee, on the Seenah.

‘SIR,

29th July, 1803.

‘You will have received copies of the instructions of his Excellency the Governor General addressed to me on the 26th and 27th ultimo, by which you will have been made acquainted with the means by which his Excellency proposed to bring to a close the important questions at present depending with the northern Marhatta chiefs.

‘I had long been of opinion that the only mode by which those questions could be brought to a close was to urge forward the decision whether there should be peace or war. This opinion was founded upon the knowledge I had that the territories of the Company and the allies would be protected, during the monsoon, by the temporary swelling of

* Dated 24th July.

the rivers which rise in the western ghauts; that several important points in the territories of our enemies were exposed to our attacks during the same period; and that from the nature of their troops and mode of warfare compared with ours, that season was most unfavorable to their operations, and, although inconvenient in some respects, most favorable to ours.

‘As soon, therefore, as I received the Governor General’s instructions of the 26th June, I wrote to Colonel Collins to desire that he would call upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar to separate their armies, and retire to their own territories from the position which they had taken up contiguous to the Nizam’s frontier, and to withdraw from their camp if he should find them disinclined to attend to this requisition.

‘I had previously written to Dowlut Rao Scindiah upon this subject, and had given him every assurance which he had required in his different conferences with Colonel Collins upon points which he stated that he entertained doubts; and from the result of different conferences between Scindiah’s ministers and Colonel Collins’s native servants, I am induced to hope that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar will retire to their respective territories. In one in particular which Colonel Collins’s moonshee had with Scindiah’s ministers on the 24th, it appeared that he was not confident in the strength and power of the confederates to contend with the British Government, although he had been the person most anxious to form the confederacy; and he appeared to prefer the disgrace and disadvantage of a retreat at the present moment, of the extent of which he was perfectly aware, to the risk to be incurred in a contest with the British Government.

‘But although the confederates may promise to break up and retire, it will not answer to allow them to delay that measure: particularly as, if they should not be sincere in their intentions to perform their promise, we shall lose the advantages which we now hold. I have, therefore, this day written to Colonel Collins to desire that he will write to apprise them, that if they do not separate and retire to their own territories on the day after they receive that letter, I shall commence operations in this quarter; and that I should acquaint your Excellency, and the officer commanding the troops in the Ganjam district, of this my intention, and of the circumstances which had occasioned it.

‘The troops under my command are stationed as follows:—the Nizam’s army, including the subsidiary force, are posted

at Aurungabad, north of the river Godavery. The corps under my immediate command, including about 3000 Marhatta horse, and 2000 excellent horse belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, are at Sangwee upon the Seenah, about twenty miles south eastward from Ahmednuggur, in which fort there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah; there are two battalions of native infantry under the command of Colonel Murray at Poonah.

‘In the present season it is impossible for the enemy to make any impression on Guzerat; but since the troops in that province have been placed under my command, I have not been able to get a return of their number or disposition. I know, however, that the fort of Songhur, which is contiguous to the principal entrance into Guzerat, south of the Taptee, is occupied by our troops; and that a corps is in readiness in Guzerat, north of the Nerbudda, to commence operations against Baroach, in which place there is a garrison belonging to Scindiah.

‘The enemy is posted in the following manner. The whole of Holkar’s army is to the northward of the river Taptee: his troops are in the greatest distress, and I am informed that he has repeatedly refused to join Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘Scindiah is encamped at Julgong with 18,000 horse, 11 battalions of infantry, and 150 guns. The Rajah of Berar has likewise 20,000 horse, 6000 infantry, and 40 guns. Julgong is in the rear of the Adjuttee pass near the Nizam’s territories.

‘Scindiah has an advanced corps of a few thousand horse in the Adjuttee hills.

‘My plan of operations, in case of hostilities, is to attack Ahmednuggur with my own corps, by the possession of which place I shall secure the communication with Poonah and Bombay, and keep the Nizam’s army upon the defensive upon his Highness’s frontier. When I shall have finished that operation, and have crossed the Godavery, I shall then, if possible, bring the enemy to action.

‘As the passes through the Adjuttee hills are difficult, particularly for the large quantities of artillery which the enemy have, it is probable that Colonel Stevenson may be able to succeed in preventing them from deploying their force on this side of the hills till I shall have joined him. If he should not, he is strong enough to defend himself, and the enemy will find it very difficult to pass through the hills again after I shall have crossed the Godavery.

‘The corps in Guzerat will attack Baroach, and after having got possession of that place, I intend that the troops in that province should be collected as fast as circumstances may render necessary.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*General Lake.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To the Governor General.

‘*MY LORD,*

‘Camp, 29th July, 1803.

‘The letters which I send you this day will show you how matters stand in Scindiah’s camp. I think it very probable that that chief and the Rajah of Berar will retire immediately after Colonel Collins shall have received my letter of this day, if they should have been suffered to remain in their positions so long. However, we may yet be disappointed; but if we should succeed in driving them off without striking a blow, I shall think we have accomplished a great object, and we shall have gained it by our steady perseverance in our plan of action originally laid down.

‘By letters which I have received from General Stuart, I observe that he is much annoyed by the arrival of the French at their settlements on the eastern coast; and the late disgraceful issue of the folly in Ceylon has increased his difficulties and his alarms.

‘The arrival of the Royal Artillery at Trincomalee has been a fortunate event, and has, in some degree, made up for the loss sustained in the ill-fated expedition to Kandi: but still there is a great deficiency of the number of troops necessary for the defence of the island of Ceylon, particularly of Colombo and Pointe de Galle, in case there should be a French war; and this deficiency can be made up only from the establishment of Fort St. George.

‘The corps lately ordered to be raised at Fort St. George will not be fit for service for a great length of time: and even if we should have peace in this quarter, the necessity of providing for the security of Goa, of taking possession of the districts ceded by the Peshwah, of having some force in the Carnatic to guard against the French designs (particularly if there should be a war), and of checking the rebellion in Malabar, create demands for troops which will render it quite impossible to supply the deficiency in the island of Ceylon.

‘Under these circumstances, it has occurred to me, that it would be advisable to collect six battalions of Bengal

sepoys at Midnapore, as soon as the season will permit ; to march them at the earliest possible period towards Hyderabad, to be stationed there ; and then, as soon as they shall approach the Nizam's eastern frontier, either the corps allotted for Hyderabad, or that for Poonah, might fall back upon Mysore or the Ceded districts, to be at the disposal of the Government of Fort St. George.

' This measure would give strength in the Deccan in the month of November, when it might be wanted ; besides that, it would place, in the month of January, six good battalions at the disposal of the Government of Fort St. George. It would also be attended by other advantages referable to the Bengal establishment.

' The only question is, whether the troops can be spared from Bengal, of which I can be no judge : but I suggest the measure as a preventive of serious inconveniences for want of troops likely to be felt at Fort St. George, in case it should not be inconvenient in Bengal.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 29th July, 1803.

' I have received your letters of the 26th. The expression inadvertently used in your letter to Gopal Bhow was unfortunate, to a chief of his rank, particularly at this moment. By a letter from Colonel Collins, of the 25th, I observe that there was then the fairest prospect of peace ; and it would be very unfortunate if this prospect were to be overturned by a mistake of this kind. Gopal Bhow appears sore about the expression, and it is probable he will complain to his sircar of it, and it may become a question of difficulty.

' I wish, therefore, that you would take an opportunity of explaining it : you might tell him that you had come unattended by the moonshee who usually writes your letters, and had made use of one whom you found in the village of Roora, who inserted in the letter an expression which you did not intend to use to a sirdar of his rank, in the service of a chief at peace with the British Government. That you had heard that, notwithstanding the existence of the peace, he had entered the Nizam's territories with his troops, and that you had advanced to defend them ; and that if fortunately he had not retired from them, your duty would have

obliged you to adopt measures very disagreeable to you; but that you intended to explain that intention to him, and by no means to use an expression which could be offensive to, or hurt the feelings of any individual.

‘I am happy to observe that your prospects in supplies are so much better than they were. Remember, however, that you cannot have too much, and I beg you to send out your brinjarries, &c., to get fresh loads as fast as you shall consume those they now have. I do not know how you have arranged your brinjarries: if you allow them to sell rice in the bazaar, the best thing you can do is to buy rice there for your grain department, and issue it at half a seer per diem *gratis* to the troops, and buy the grain from the brinjarries. I recommend, at all events, that you should not issue more, at any time, than half a seer to the troops; and, unless you should be hard pressed for rice, it is better always to issue that quantity.

‘I do not know how you manage to give money in lieu of rice to the sepoy; for you know that they have already a fanam batta in lieu of rice. I therefore recommend that when you find it necessary to stop the issue of rice, you should issue a sufficient quantity of some other grain, *gratis*, which you can buy in the bazaar, rather than give the money,

‘You must take care to keep the company at Toka fed.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 30th July, 1803.

‘I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 16th, 18th, and 20th.

‘The tragical result of the military operations in Ceylon has added considerably to the difficulties of the present moment, for want of troops. There is no doubt but that Mr. North will require reinforcements from the Government of Fort St. George, but I cannot imagine from what quarter they are to be sent.

‘I have certainly recovered much in point of means of moving; and I have not received any very great injury from the late rains. When the cattle which you have sent shall reach me, I shall be well supplied. I have besides some hopes, founded, however, upon promises, that I shall be able to bring forward the services of a large number of the Poonah brinjarries.

‘I have written to the Rajah of Kolapoor, and have spoken very seriously to his vakeel in this camp, respecting the conduct of Succaram Ghautky ; and I think that the Rajah will be tranquil, and will not impede our communication. My letter to you upon the subject of the communication through the Nizam’s country will have shown you that it is not much more secure than that which goes by Meritch. Indeed, as I know the Rajah of Kolapoor, and he knows us, I believe that we have a better hold upon him than we have upon the petty chiefs in the Nizam’s territories. However, I shall alter the line of communication, if I should find it liable to be materially interrupted.

‘The departure of the French fleet is a sign either that war was declared when the corvette which arrived at Pondicherry left France, or that the declaration of war was expected immediately. The French Admiral may be expected to return to India, as soon as he may be joined by his reinforcements. I hope that Admiral Rainier will also receive reinforcements.

‘I am infinitely obliged to you for the further reinforcement and supply, which you state in your letter of the 20th that you intended to send me. This makes me quite easy respecting the enemy in our front; and the position of General Campbell’s division secures my communication with, and the tranquillity of the countries in my rear.

‘You will have observed, by my letter of the 7th, that I had thoughts of the measure you have suggested ; but I persevered in the original plan, because, in fact, in the event of war, it is the best and most secure, and places all our further operations beyond a risk.

‘I learned from Colonel Collins’s correspondence that my position caused the greatest uneasiness in Scindiah’s camp ; and, therefore, it was more likely to influence the result of the negotiation than any that I could take up beyond the Godavery ; and besides these two reasons for still maintaining it, it was necessary that I should look out for the important convoy expected under Major Dallas, of the march of which I received intelligence at the very time that I had it in contemplation to move across the Godavery.

‘All these reasons still operate for adhering to the original plan ; and I have besides to observe, that as Scindiah has detached a part of his army to Hindustan, and as we now know, from his own ministers, that he has not yet arranged his peace with Holkar, there does not appear to be any chance of his being joined by the forces of that chief, and

by this junction becoming superior to Colonel Stevenson. The Colonel has actually in his camp 23,000 men, all of whom are better troops than those of the enemy, and nearly 8000 of whom are probably the best troops in the Company's army.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I think it best to adhere to the original plan.

‘I shall attend particularly to your orders respecting any requisitions I may have to make upon General Campbell's corps. Indeed, my former letters, as well as this, will show you, that I think a corps posted in the Dooab is of greater importance than an increase to our forces in this quarter.

‘I have again to return you my thanks for your great kindness and attention to me in the arrangement which you propose to make, in case I should find it necessary to make a requisition upon General Campbell; but, at all events, I am convinced that the General and I shall carry on the service together with the harmony which you would wish; and I shall certainly pay him every attention in my power. I conclude, however, that you intend that I should continue to keep you regularly informed of every thing that occurs here, although you have moved into the Carnatic.

‘I have received a letter from Colonel Montresor, from which I observe, that the detachment intended for the security of Goa is marching through Canara, and is to move up one of the ghauts into Soonda, and march through that province to the Tenim ghaut. You are already apprized of my opinion, that they ought not to be posted on the Tenim ghaut till the month of October; because the rains are more violent there than in the lower country, and will not cease till that period. But, at all events, I doubt whether it is practicable to move guns up any of the northerly ghauts from Canara, excepting the Tenim ghaut; and I am convinced that if they can be moved by any of those roads the troops will suffer much from bad weather and fatigue, as well as from want of supplies.

‘It is therefore my opinion, that the best mode of bringing the troops into the upper country is either by the Soobranary or by the Kindighul ghauts, from Mangalore into Mysore, and thence through the Savanore and Darwar countries to Hullihall in Soonda. If they should have passed Mangalore, they might come up the Hyderghur or Bilghy ghauts into the Nuggur country. If they come by the former they move by Shakarpoor and Massoor, through the Dooab of the Werdah and Toombuddra to Deogerry; if

they come by the latter, they move by Chandergooty and Banawassay, north of the Werdah, to Hongul, near Banca-poor, and thence through the Savanore and Darwar countries to Hullihall.

‘ I do not send any orders on this subject to Colonel Spry, who commands these troops, because I do not know what orders you may have given him; but I beg leave to recommend that they should be ordered to march by one of the roads I have above mentioned. The Bilghy ghaut is better than the Hyderghur.

‘ I enclose a copy of a letter I received this day from Colonel Collins. The Colonel has not done exactly as I desired him, but I think we shall yet have peace.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY* ’

To Colonel Murray.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 30th July, 1803.*

‘ Upon the whole, I think that it will be as well to send down coolies from Poonah, and bring up a supply of rice from Panwell, if Captain Young has it not in his power to send you one.

‘ The Mysore brijarries will, I dare say, take 1200 bullock bags; and 600, lately ordered to camp, will reduce your stock very much.

‘ I have no fear of any of the forts between Poonah and Panwell; and Angria will, I think, be as quiet as the others, if we are tolerably successful at first: much depends upon the first blow.

‘ I have no intention to keep the howitzers or the 12 pounders. General Campbell has taken up a position with a corps in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, which relieves me from all anxiety respecting my rear and your position at Poonah. I should now wish, therefore, to secure the boats upon the Godavery rather better than they are secured at present, by sending forward a battalion to that river. But I cannot venture to do that till I am joined by a battalion from Poonah. I wish therefore that you would order forward the 2nd battalion of the 3rd. They shall return to you with the ordnance and artillery as soon as the siege of Ahmednuggur is concluded. Captain Campbell shall return after to-morrow’s march, with the Bombay company.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

with their troops in their positions on the Nizam's frontier are the strongest proofs of the insincerity of the declarations which the chiefs have made; and I hope, that if they should not have satisfied you in your interview, you would have withdrawn from their camp, according to the request conveyed in my letter of the 11th instant.

'But in case you should still be in their camp when this letter shall arrive there, I repeat the request which I made in my letter of the 29th, that you will withdraw forthwith, if they should not commence their march, with all their troops, towards their usual stations.

'The fact that Scindiah has not concluded his peace with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, which is now acknowledged, is the strongest reason for pressing forward at the present moment the decision, whether there shall be peace with security, or war; besides, it is in conformity with the instructions from his Excellency the Governor General.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Collins.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

'Camp at Roore, on the Seenah,

'HONORABLE SIR,

31st July, 1803*.

'1. Lieut. Colonel Close has communicated to me the letters from the Secretary to the Government of Bombay of

* *To Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

'SIR,

'Camp near Julgong, 30th July, 1803.

'1. On the morning of the 28th instant, I addressed a note to Jadoon Rao Bhow, requesting he would inform me what hour of the day would be most convenient and agreeable to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah to grant me the promised audience. The enclosed (No. 1.) contains a copy and translate of the answer of Jadoon Rao Bhow to the foregoing request; and No. 2, transcript (in English and Persian) of my reply to that minister.

'2. In consequence of the intimation conveyed in No. 2, Jadoon Rao Bhow appointed the afternoon of the following day for me to wait on the Maharajah; and as I was desirous to make one more effort in order to induce Scindiah to comply with your requisition, I consented to postpone my departure; partly from the consideration already stated, and partly with a view of resting the responsibility upon this court, in the event of hostilities.

'3. Accordingly I waited upon Dowlut Rao Scindiah yesterday afternoon, accompanied by Captain Bradshaw and Moonshee Banker Khan. The usual servants of the Maharajah attended on this occasion. The Peshwah's va-keels, Ballojee Koonger, and Kistnaje Bhuwarry, were likewise present. But, contrary to agreement, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah absented himself from this conference.

the 17th and 23rd instant, with their enclosures, and I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

‘ 4. I commenced the discourse by observing on the absence of the Berar Rajah, whom I expected to have seen at the durbar, conformably to the promise I had received, as well from the Maharajah as from Jadoon Rao. I then said, that no doubt Dowlut Rao Scindiah was fully apprized of the real opinion of Ragojee Bhoonslah, with whom he had held a conference the preceding day; consequently, that I expected to be informed of the sentiments and intentions of both those chieftains on the subject of your requisitions.

‘ 5. Instead of giving me any direct reply, Jadoon Rao Bhow merely recapitulated the objections which he had urged at our conference of the 25th instant, against withdrawing the troops of the Maharajah and of the Rajah of Berar from their present position; and my replies to his objections were exactly similar to those which I had the honor to communicate to you in my letter of the 26th instant. In fact, every argument that could be adduced on this question had been already exhausted: this I remarked to Jadoon Rao, and at the same time told him that he had not brought forward a single new observation.

‘ 6. Scindiah’s minister then said, that his Highness the Peshwah had lately deputed a vakeel to the Maharajah, and that it was indispensably requisite that I should be informed of the objects of his mission. I replied, that I should most readily attend to any report which the vakeel of his Highness might make, and desired that Kistnaje Bhuwarry (the person alluded to) would state whatever he had to propose on the part of the Peshwah. They called Kistnaje, who said that he had been deputed by Rao Pundit Purdhaun to apprise Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, of his having entered into new engagements with the British Government to prevent their completion thereof, and to compose any differences that might have arisen between the English and those chieftains.

‘ 7. When Kistnaje Bhuwarry had finished his discourse, I observed to Jadoon Rao, that the friendly intentions of his Highness the Peshwah were very apparent, and that it only remained with the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah to give them effect, by withdrawing their troops from the Nizam’s frontier, in which event all doubts would be removed, and friendship re-established between those chiefs and the British Government. I further said, that the Hon. Major General’s proposal by no means tended to degrade Dowlut Rao Scindiah or Ragojee Bhoonslah; since, at the same time that the General required of those chieftains to retire with their forces to their respective countries, the Hon. General had likewise promised, in the event of their compliance, to withdraw his troops to their usual stations; and, in conclusion, I strongly urged both the Maharajah and Jadoon Rao not to suffer a trifling punctilio to be the cause of involving their sircar in a war with the British Government. But Scindiah’s minister persisted in declaring that his master must again consult with the Rajah of Berar before he could give any decided answer to your requisition, and requested that I would defer my departure for two or three days longer. I replied, that as I now was satisfied this court only wanted to gain time for some particular

'2. I shall take an early opportunity of replying to the letter; but I now think it proper to address you upon some subjects to which the enclosures in the former relate.

purpose of its own, I should be deemed inexcusable were I to suffer myself to be further amused. But, independent of this consideration, I was positively directed by the Hon. General Wellesley to leave the camp of the Maharajah as soon as ever I had reason to be convinced that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah were determined to retain their present position on the frontier of the Nabob Nizam; that accordingly, on the 30th instant, I should send off my pesh-kanah and heavy baggage five coss on the road towards Aurungabad, and proceed myself on my journey thither early in the morning of the next day.

'8. As Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jadoon Rao Bhow repeatedly declared that they would not permit me to depart hence, I was obliged to explain to them, that although their opposing my departure might subject me to some inconvenience, on account of the difficulty of procuring supplies of grain, yet that they might be assured no personal consideration whatever should prevent me from paying implicit obedience to the orders of the Hon. General Wellesley. After saying this, I made my farewell compliments to the Maharajah in the most respectful manner, and immediately withdrew from the durbar.

'9. As the Berar Rajah was not present at my last audience with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I thought it proper to apprize him of my determination to leave this camp, and accordingly did so in a memorial, of which the enclosed contains a copy in English and Persian.

'10. My pesh-kanah has been sent on five coss, and I shall follow to-morrow morning at daylight, unless the Marhatta chieftains should, contrary to expectation, assure me of their resolution to comply with your requisition. But as such an assurance would be consistent with good faith and good sense, I almost despair of receiving it. However, I shall not close this letter until sunset.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

To Colonel Collins

'28th July, 1803.

'Your kind reply to my friendly letter, with which I have been favored, has increased our friendship. With respect to your request for an answer to the points in question, and that I would repair to the durbar at the time I should appoint: my friend, yesterday was fixed on for the Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to visit the Maharajah; but the interview was prevented by the continuance of the rain. The Rajah will certainly come to-day, and the matter in agitation will be debated, for which reason it will not be proper for you to visit the durbar this day. Should it be necessary for you to attend, I will undoubtedly acquaint you with it, otherwise you shall be apprized of the time that may be settled for this purpose; but to-day is not the 9th: you shall, however, have intimation sent to you at the time that may be agreed on.

'Colonel Collins.'

'JADOON RAO BHOW.'

‘3. I observe that by the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, of the 15th instant, nothing had been done till that day towards throwing into Songhur supplies of provision or

To Jadoon Rao.

‘28th July, 1803.

‘The friendly letter of the Maharajah, along with yours, in reply to my notes, have reached me ; and I comprehend their contents, which plainly manifest both indifference and procrastination on the part of the durbar of the Maharajah ; for on Monday it was agreed upon, that on the 3rd day both sirdars, Ragojee Bhoonslah and the Maharajah, would meet together, and desire my attendance at once ; whereas the contrary has now taken place. If the Maharajah was desirous of giving me an explicit answer, it is not possible that he would again put it off till to-morrow, which is Friday. But the Maharajah has written to prohibit me from being present at the interview which is to take place this day between him and Ragojee Bhoonslah, from which I conclude, that it is not the intention of the Maharajah to give me an explicit answer. Besides this, it is now the 9th day since the Kharectah from the Hon. General Wellesley was presented to the Maharajah : I shall therefore wait till 12 o’clock to-morrow for an explicit answer from the Maharajah. After that I shall send my pesh-kanah on the road towards Aurungabad, and take my departure from this on the following day, pursuant to the orders of the Hon. General Wellesley. Of this I trust you will inform the Maharajah, with my best respects.

‘I have the honor to be, &c

‘Jadoon Rao.’

‘J. COLLINS.’

Memorandum from Colonel Collins to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.

‘30th July, 1803

‘On the 4th of Rubee-ul-Saunee (24th July) a memorial was delivered to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah on the part of Colonel Collins, of which the enclosure is a copy* Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah acknowledged the receipt of this memorial in a note to Colonel Collins, dated the same day, in which the Rajah informed the Colonel, that the answer to this memorial depended on a meeting between him and Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and that after they should have met, and personally discussed the subject of it, a reply would then certainly be committed to writing.

‘On the 6th of Rubee-ul-Saunee (26th July) Colonel Collins sent a letter to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, written by the Hon. General Wellesley, and addressed to the Rajah. This letter was accompanied by a note from the Colonel, in which he requested that Rajah Ragojee would return a speedy and proper answer to it. But the Rajah has not to this hour replied to that note, or to the letter of General Wellesley, although Sereedhur Punt immediately acknowledged to Mirza Bauker Khan the receipt of both these papers.

* See page 125.

ammunition. Reference had been made to European and native officers, but no decided step had been taken.

‘On the 8th of Rubee-ul-Saunee, Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah had a conference with Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; and, notwithstanding the Maharajah had promised to give Colonel Collins a distinct reply to the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley on that day, in the presence of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, yet Jadoon Rao Bhow, the chief minister of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, apprized the Colonel that it would not be proper for him to attend on that occasion.

‘Yesterday Colonel Collins had an audience of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, when the Colonel expected to receive a satisfactory answer to the requisition of General Wellesley, and declared, that, if it were not then given, he (the Colonel) should send off his pesh-kanah and baggage the next day, and proceed himself towards Aurungabad early on the morning of the 11th Rubee-ul-Saunee; yet Jadoon Rao Bhow insisted that no determinate reply could be given to the letter of General Wellesley until the Maharajah had held another conference with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah. Colonel Collins then explained that he had been directed by the Hon. General Wellesley to leave the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, should the Colonel perceive that the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar were determined not to comply with his (the General’s) requisition; and that, in consequence of the refusal of Jadoon Rao Bhow to give a direct answer thereto, Colonel Collins should certainly send off his pesh-kanah the next day, and proceed early in the morning of the 11th Rubee-ul-Saunee, towards Aurungabad.

‘Colonel Collins deems it necessary to recapitulate the foregoing particulars, in order that Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah may be fully apprized that the Colonel cannot, without being guilty of disobedience of orders, remain longer than to-morrow morning in the camp of Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah; unless the Colonel should receive assurances, in the intermediate time, from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, and from the Maharajah, of their intentions to comply with the requisition of the Hon. General Wellesley.

‘In conclusion, Colonel Collins requests an immediate answer to this memorial, a copy of which will be sent to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘*Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah.*’

‘J. COLLINS.’

Colonel Collins to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, Julgong, 1st August, 1803.

‘1. I little thought I should have the honor of addressing you again from the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, but the very heavy and incessant rains which have fallen since I wrote to you on the 30th ultimo rendered it impossible for me to proceed on my journey.

‘2. About four o’clock yesterday morning, Captain Lyons, who commands my escort, came to my tent and stated, that, in consequence of the great quantity of rain which had fallen since eleven o’clock the preceding

‘4. It appears that the garrison which Lieut. Colonel Callander has proposed to allot to that place is to be 150

night, the roads were become impassable for guns; although I was perfectly satisfied of the justness of this representation, yet I deemed it necessary, for your information, to desire Captain Lyons to address an official report to me on this subject in writing, and I have now the honor to enclose it.

‘3. On the 30th ultimo, at ten o’clock at night, Dowlut Rao Scindiah sent me a note, a copy and translation of which I herewith forward. At the time when I received it the weather had cleared up, and I had not a doubt of being able to march on the following morning; I therefore told the person who brought the note from the Maharajah that I would reply to it the next day after my arrival at Tondapoor, to which place my pesh-kanah and baggage had been sent, and where they still remain.

‘4. Having, however, been necessarily detained here the whole of yesterday, and Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah having prepared a request similar to that contained in the one from Dowlut Rao Scindiah, (No. 2.) I conceived it might be giving those chiefs an advantage, were I to refuse the interview which they so pressinglly solicited, and in this idea I returned an assenting answer. The enclosed (No 3) contains a copy and translation of my reply to both chieftains.

‘5. I arrived at the tent of the Berar Rajah at four o’clock yesterday afternoon, but not without considerable difficulty, on account of the extreme heaviness of the roads. Captain Paris Bradshaw and Mirza Bauker Khan attended me on this occasion, and I was received with great politeness, as well by Scindiah as by Ragojee Bhoonslah, in the fullest durbar that I have yet seen.

‘6. Although our conference lasted more than four hours, yet, as the arguments on the part of the Marhatta ministers contained no new matter whatever; and as my replies were, of course, the same as I had so often given at our former interviews, I shall not trouble you with a repetition thereof, but proceed to state the propositions that were made to me by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, after numberless evasions and much disagreeable altercation.

‘1st Proposition. That the united forces of the Maharajah and the Berar Rajah should retire to Burhanpore, and that the Hon. General Wellesley should withdraw the Company’s troops to their usual stations. This proposition I rejected, as altogether inadmissible, in as much as it was in opposition both to the letter and spirit of your requisition, which demanded that Dowlut Rao Scindiah should recross the Nerbudda, and the Berar Rajah return to Nagpore. As this proposal was strongly contested on their part, I said at length, that, if Ragojee Bhoonslah would repair to his own capital, and Scindiah to Burhanpore, I would not, in such case, leave the camp of the Maharajah until I received your further instructions. But this concession did not satisfy those chieftains, who then introduced a second proposition.

European troops and 100 native troops : and it appears that the Committee have information, upon which they place re-

‘2nd Proposition. That I should fix on a day for their marching hence with their respective forces, and at the same time pledge myself that the Hon. General Wellesley should withdraw his troops on the precise day that they moved towards their usual stations. I replied that you required, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from their present menacing position on the frontier of our ally, the Nabob Nizam ; and, exclusive of this condition, I observed, that, as the political and military authorities were vested in the Hon. General Wellesley, I could not be responsible for the execution of any measure but such as the Honorable General had particularized in his instructions to me, and in his letters to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah. This remark produced their third and last proposition, and from which they positively declared they would not recede.

‘3rd. Proposition That Scindiah and the Bhonslah would propose to the Hon. General Wellesley, by letter, that he should speedily fix some particular day for withdrawing his armies, and for the removal of theirs from their present position on the Nizam’s frontier ; and that, on the day so specified, they would assuredly commence their march. These chieftains further said that they would also request of the Hon. General Wellesley, in the same letter, to name the time when the forces under his command might be expected to reach their usual station ; and that they (Scindiah and the Bhonslah) would so regulate their marches as to arrive at their usual stations precisely at the same period of time

‘7. I objected to this proposal on the ground of its being different, in one particular, from your requisition, which demanded, in the first instance, the removal of the Marhatta armies from the Nizam’s frontier. But as Scindiah’s ministers declared that, unless you consented to this proposition, their prince could not retire without an indelible stain on his honor, and as the servants of the Berar Rajah maintained the same sentiments with great firmness, I at last agreed to refer the point in question to your consideration, and to remain with the Maharajah until I received your determination on this proposition, provided letters to your address were sent me for transmission before noon on the following day, and provided those letters were expressed conformably with the terms which they had then proposed. Here the conference ended, and I took my leave, after the usual compliments of attar and paun.

‘8. It rained during the whole of yesterday, and until the present hour, which is eleven o’clock in the forenoon. Whatever, therefore, may be the line of conduct pursued by the Marhatta chieftains, with respect to the proposed letters to your address, it will be utterly impracticable for me to proceed towards Aurungabad until an interval of fair weather, as well on account of the heavy roads as of the overflowing of the nullah, about midway between this and Tondapoor.

‘9. I have just received a letter to your address, from Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah, in which this chief proposes to retire to Burhampoor with

liance, that there are no provisions whatever for this force. It surely requires no reference to find out the quantity of

Dowlut Rao Scindiah, instead of returning to Nagpoor, conformably to the proposition that his own minister, Sereedhur Punt, first brought forward. I am too much accustomed to Marhatta tergiversations to be surprised at the disingenuous conduct of the Berar Rajah on the present occasion; but I must confess that I feel extremely hurt at my inability to leave the camp of the Maharajah this very day. I have acknowledged the receipt of the Bhoonslah's khareetah, and told him that I should march from this the instant that the roads were passable 'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'J. COLLINS.'

'P.S.—I have the honor to enclose the Bhoonslah's letter.'

Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Colonel Collins.

'30th July, 1803

'I have received your letter, together with a copy of your address to Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder, and thoroughly understood the contents of both.

'In consequence of the haste with which you require an answer, and urge your departure, Senah Saheb Behauder came to-day to my tent, where we had an interview. I shall return Senah Saheb Behauder's visit at twelve o'clock to-morrow, on which day do you also repair to his tent, when only six ghurries of daylight shall remain, that we may, in the presence of each other, discourse of whatever is to be discussed. It is not proper for you to hurry your march. Do not depart, but come to-morrow, at the time appointed to the tents of Senah Saheb Soubah Behauder. Your going off with such expedition is repugnant to good sense'.

N. B.—Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah addressed a letter exactly to the above purport to Colonel Collins, which was received at three o'clock in the morning of the 31st of July, 1803.

Colonel Collins to Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'Six A.M., 31st July, 1803.

'I have received your favor, and understand its contents. In obedience to the commands of the Honourable General Wellesley, it was my positive determination to march hence early this morning; but Captain Lyons, the commanding officer of my escort, having represented to me that the roads were impassable for guns, on account of the heavy rains, I am necessarily obliged to halt here to-day. It is my chief wish to preserve the relations of friendship which have so long subsisted between the two states; and this accident affords me an opportunity of complying with your desire of meeting me at the tent of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah this afternoon, at three o'clock.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.'

'J. COLLINS.'

N. B.—A note nearly to the same purport was likewise written to Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah by Colonel Collins.

provisions which it will be necessary to place in Songhur for the use of the descriptions and number of troops, for any given number of months; and long before the meeting of the 15th instant the provisions for those small bodies might have been sent off.

‘5. I also observe, that the Committee are disposed to attend to the report upon the state of the ordnance and ammunition at Songhur, although they have taken no measures to remedy the inconveniences reported.

‘6. They ought, at all events, to have taken measures to supply the deficiencies of musket ammunition and ordnance carriages, which they believed existed; and it might be proper to send an officer of the engineers or artillery, or any one who might be supposed to be qualified to give an opinion, to examine this fort, and to report particularly on its state.

‘7. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it is my opinion that the fort of Songhur is most important for the defence of the Attavesy, and for the security of Surat itself.

‘8. I have also to observe upon the minute of Lieut. Colonel Callander, upon the subject of the retreat of Captain Bates. I am not certain in what part of the country that officer was stationed; or whether he falls under my command, according to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General: if he should be so, I request to have all the documents upon the subject, and if I find there are grounds for it, I shall order a General Court Martial to inquire into Captain Bates’s conduct.

‘9. If you should be of opinion that he is not under my command, I beg leave to recommend to you to have an inquiry into his conduct.

‘10. I advert to this circumstance particularly, because it has been reported in a manner very disadvantageous to the credit and honor of the British arms in this country; and I considered it of so much importance, that I took the trouble of tracing the report to its source, and was on the point of bringing to trial the officer who had reported, as I supposed, without foundation, so disgraceful an occurrence.

‘11. I have perused the letter from the killadar of Loghur of the 19th instant, and I beg you to inform him, that provided he and the family of Nana Furnavees give no assistance to the enemies of the Peshwah or of the British Government, and he pays the accustomed obedience to the Peshwah’s orders, they shall receive no molestation.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘Some days ago, Salabut Khan asked whether there was any objection to his writing to, and receiving letters from, Ragojee Bhoonslah? to which question I answered that I had none, as it was very clear that even if I should object to this correspondence, I could not prevent it, if the parties should choose to carry it on. Salabut Khan said that he thought that Ragojee wished to commence a correspondence with him, in order to try if he could preserve peace; and I desired Colonel Stevenson to tell Salabut Khan that if Ragojee Bhoonslah wished for peace, there was one mode, and but one mode, of insuring it, and that was for him to return with his troops to Nagpoor; and that if he did not return to that place he would certainly be attacked.

‘The enclosed paper is probably an answer to that letter, written by Salabut Khan, and what I have above stated will account for part of its contents. But that is not the most material part; for it likewise contains intelligence that the Peshwah is treating with the enemy. I should pass unnoticed this intelligence, if I had not observed that Salabut Khan’s correspondent in Ragojee Bhoonslah’s camp is far more intelligent than the general run of these news writers; and I know that he writes accounts of almost every thing that passes in the durbar of that chief.

‘But whether the intelligence is true or false, it is very certain that we have not the smallest knowledge of the nature or the objects of the communications between the Peshwah and Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar; notwithstanding the obvious necessity that we should have that knowledge, as well as the stipulations of the treaty which provide for it. Indeed, the Peshwah’s ministers in Scindiah’s durbar, instead of acting in co-operation or communication with the British Resident, have recommended to Colonel Collins a line of conduct which, in the opinion of all the persons employed by the British Government, must lead to a war, to be carried on under very disadvantageous circumstances.

‘I most earnestly request you to adopt all means in your power to find out what passes in the Peshwah’s durbar; and particularly the nature and objects of his communications with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. If representations founded on the treaty will not produce the effect of disclosing what we must know, let other means be adopted; let expense be incurred to gain the necessary intelligence; and if you should find that Ragonaut Rao will not disclose to you all that he knows, it is my opinion that you ought to hold no further communication with him, as it is very obvious that he has no influence over his employer. If he does not disclose all, he is not honest to the British cause; and his communications have uniformly been found to be false.

‘I am aware that although you may make a friend of Ragonaut Rao, and even of Suddasheo Munkaiseer you will not be able to guide the Peshwah’s councils; because in fact he is guided by nothing, excepting his own caprice and resentment. But you will have intelligence of what is passing in the durbar, upon which we can rely, instead of groping our way in the dark as we do at present. If the Peshwah should be really carrying on a correspondence with Scindiah, in breach of the treaty, we may in this manner have

it in our power to lay hold of it, and thus have a ground for making a solid arrangement of the Poonah government.

‘Goklah has approached me; but a carkoon, whom he sent to me this morning, says that Suddasheo Munkaiseer reproaches him, in a letter written four days ago, for not advancing; and says that he has had two months’ pay, and now wants a third, for which he has done nothing. Goklah, however, says that he will not move unless I shall desire it; and I have taken the most effectual steps to prevent his moving, as I have told him that if he does march upon Sungumnair, Amrut Rao, who is stronger than him, will beat him back.

‘The object of the expedition against Amrut Rao is not to prevent the plunder of the Peshwah’s countries by that chief, but to seize Sungumnair.

‘A letter came in from Amrut Rao’s camp this morning, (the vakeel writes it,) and says that his master is under some apprehension in consequence of the approach of Gopal Bhow towards Nassuck. This chief, however, has probably gone that way only to avoid Colonel Stevenson. If he is gone to attack Amrut Rao, there is strong ground to suspect the Peshwah of communicating with Scindiah on subjects of which we are not aware.

‘I intend to write to Amrut Rao to desire him to come to my camp if he should have reason to fear Gopal Bhow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 1st August, 1803.

‘From the copies of the correspondence between the Resident in the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and myself, which will have been sent to you, you will have observed that the question, whether there will be peace or war, will be decided in a few days. I think that there is some reason to hope that we may have peace, but we may also be obliged to commence hostilities: even in this event some time will elapse before any impression can be made on the Nizam’s territories; but as I observe that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar are sending away their infantry to Hindustan, and retaining, with their camps, only their cavalry and some of their guns, it is probable that, if there should be a war, they will carry on their operations with those troops only.

‘ Even if this should be their plan, I have no apprehensions for the result of the contest ; but it becomes more necessary to guard against all sudden attacks on points of importance. Notwithstanding the best intelligence of the enemy’s designs, and the best arrangements, it is obvious that a body of cavalry may pass one of our armies, and that much mischief may be done before a remedy can be applied, unless every point of importance is in some degree guarded. If places of this description should be guarded and prepared for their defence at all, this mode of operation, which I have supposed that the confederates have in their contemplation, cannot have any permanent effect, and will do but little temporary injury to the country.

‘ I therefore most earnestly recommend that garrisons, even of peons, should be placed in all the principal posts and forts in the Nizam’s territories, particularly Aurungabad, Moongy Puttun, Kurdlah, Bheer, Perinda, Beeder, &c. &c., and that a body of troops should be collected at Hyderabad.

‘ Even if the enemy should be able to pass our armies, the adoption of these means will prevent them from gaining any thing by this invasion ; the village peons alone will render their subsistence difficult and precarious, and they will be obliged to retire.

‘ But I recommend these measures not only with a view to the defeat of the enemy’s designs, but to insure the tranquillity of the country in the event of the Nizam’s death. The establishment of the British troops at Hyderabad has been the cause of a great diminution of the numbers of his Highness’s army, and many, who subsisted on the pay they received in his Highness’s service, have been obliged to look for subsistence in other employments not so agreeable to them. There must be many discontented people in those countries, all of whom would be ready to join the standard of any chief who might be desirous to take advantage of the weakness of the new government, and of the moment in which the British troops and those of his Highness should be employed against the enemy upon the frontier, to assume independence. Considering the ambition of the natives in general, it will not be denied that there may be chiefs disposed to adopt this line of conduct ; but the measures of precaution which I have recommended will give employment to a great proportion of the military classes of the community, and will prevent such chiefs from finding instruments to carry their purposes into execution.

‘ General Stuart will have informed you, that a reserve,

under the command of Major General Campbell, has been left in the Dooab of the Kistna and Toombuddra, the object of which is in some degree to check the designs of the discontented chiefs, in the event of the Nizam's death; but still no measure can check them with so much certainty as to deprive them of the instrument which they could use to carry them into execution.

'I observe, that the fort of Perinda is still held by Nizam Nawaz Jung's killadar, and he refuses to give it up to the persons sent there by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to take possession of it. In case Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should retire, according to my requisition, and we should consequently have peace, I have reason to believe that it will not be inconvenient to me to send a detachment to assist Rajah Mohiput Ram's killadar, and if possible put him in possession of that fort.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

'Camp at Walkee, 2nd August, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 31st.

'The rice is not yet come in, but if we should find it damaged, we must call for an additional quantity. In the mean time, however, I requested you in my letter of the 24th of July, to take measures to keep the depôt at Poonah full.

'You will receive by this day's post orders to carry into execution the sentence of the General Court Martial on the two sepoys.

'Lieut. Burnes' letter is a curious production; and I beg that you will do me the favor to inform him, that for reasons which I thought valid, but which I do not think it necessary to communicate to him, I thought it proper to bring the prisoners, Hurry Sing and Hurry Rao, to trial for the crime of desertion only; and that, in future, I beg that he will do me the favor to confine his attention to his own business, and leave my duty to be done by myself and the officers appointed to assist me.

'I omitted to inform you that I had written to Mr. Duncan, to request that the dollars which he has, of the value of nearly twenty lacs of rupees, might be sent to Poonah, in order to be coined into rupees for your use.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

‘P.S.—Let your communication with Lieut. Burnes be verbal, as I wish to avoid all future correspondence upon this subject. Indeed, that mode of communication is to be preferred on all occasions.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘Camp, 2nd August, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th July, in which you have enclosed the copy of a letter of the 1st of July from his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon, in which his Excellency desires to have from Surat the assistance of a regiment of European infantry.

‘You will have observed from my late correspondence with Colonel Collins, copies of which have been transmitted to you, that the question of peace or war with the northern Marhatta chiefs is not yet decided ; if there should be a war there are not more troops in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, than are absolutely necessary for their defence ; and if there should be peace, as some time will elapse before the large Marhatta armies which are now collected upon the frontier will disperse, and as, in obedience to the order of his Excellency the Governor General, it will be necessary to observe the designs of the French upon Damaun, and to have the means of preventing them from carrying them into execution, I conceive that you ought not to weaken your forces in that quarter.

‘I am very sensible of the importance of Trincomalee, and regret the misfortunes which have endangered the safety of that place ; but I observe, that a very large detachment of the Royal Artillery had arrived there, with which event it is probable that his Excellency the Governor of Ceylon had not been acquainted when he wrote to you on the 1st of July, as that reinforcement, in fact, makes the garrison stronger in European troops than it was before the detachment of the 19th regiment marched upon the expedition to Kandi. I have also heard through private channels, that the Malay troops did not desert to the enemy as was first reported ; but that, finding the officer determined to lay down his arms, and being aware of the treachery and cruelty of the Kandians, they expected the disastrous consequences which followed, and fled to the jungles, and that several of them had since arrived with their arms at Trincomalee. If this account should be true, that garrison, reinforced as it has been by the detachment of the Royal Artillery, will be in no danger.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

The Governor of Bombay. ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR, ‘Camp at Walkee, 2nd August, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd July; and having taken into consideration the measures to be adopted for the defence of Guzerat, and of the districts depending upon Surat, I proceed to detail my ideas upon that subject.

‘2. The line for which a defence is to be provided extends from the marsh which divides Cutch from Guzerat to Parneira, across several large rivers; and the countries which it is to cover are liable to be attacked by different enemies, operating at the same time from different quarters.

‘3. The forces allotted for the defence of these countries, are,—

			<i>European</i>	<i>Native</i>
Artillery	Surat		78	
	Guzerat		110	
			<hr/>	188
Gun Lascars	Surat		139	
	Guzerat		200	
			<hr/>	339
H.M.'s 61st Regiment	Surat		45	
	Guzerat		109	
— 65th	Surat		763	
— 75th	Surat		573	
— 84th	Surat		272	
— 86th	Guzerat		815	
— 88th	Surat		148	
			<hr/>	2725
1st Batt. 1st Regt. N.I.	Guzerat		625	
2d Batt. 1st Regt. do.	Guzerat		697	
1st Batt. 6th Regt. do.	Surat		1218	
	Guzerat		101	
2d Batt. 6th Regt. do.	Guzerat		763	
2d Batt. 7th Regt. do.	Guzerat		696	
			<hr/>	4100
			2913	4439

making a total of rank and file, including sick, of 2913 Europeans, and 4439 Natives.

‘4. Besides these troops, Rajah Anund Rao, I conclude, has a body of cavalry, with the number of which I am unacquainted, and possibly some infantry.

‘5. It appears by a paper drawn up by Colonel Reynolds, which I have received from Lieut. Colonel Close, that the districts depending upon Surat can be entered by an army from the eastward only by the road which leads by Songhur.

‘6. There are other ghauts, but they are not practicable for wheel-carriages; and the whole range of mountains is in the possession of Bheels, whose exertions would prevent the invasion of any party of marauding horse.

‘ 7. This fact points out the necessity of cultivating a good understanding with and encouraging the Bheels, so as to attach them to our cause.

‘ 8. When that object shall have been attended to, there will remain to provide for the roads into the districts depending upon Surat, from the Peshwah’s district to the southward, and from the eastward by Songhur.

9. It appears by the papers transmitted by Colonel Reynolds, that there is no passage for an army coming from the eastward through the Shatpoor hills, between the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, excepting by skirting the province of Malwa ; but, as far as I can learn, the country is open north of the river Nerbudda.

‘ 10. Besides these principal passages into these districts, which are to be defended, it appears that the following objects are to be provided for,—

- 1st. The security of Surat.
- 2nd. A garrison for Baroda.
- 3rd. A garrison for Cambay.
- 4th. A garrison for Kairah.
- 5th. A garrison for Kurrah.
- 6th. Eventually a garrison for Baroach.

‘ Garrisons are also required for Songhur on the eastern frontier, and Parneira on the southern, in order to guard those inlets into the districts south of the Taptee.

‘ 11. It is my opinion that the troops in the districts under Surat, and those in the districts under Anund Rao, ought to be placed under one commanding officer, whose head quarters ought to be at Surat ; they ought all to be liable to be moved from one district to the other, according as he might find it necessary for the security of any part from impending invasion.

‘ 12. From the topographical description of the country received from Colonel Reynolds, to which I have above alluded, it is obvious that the armies which may invade Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, can penetrate either from the northward of the Nerbudda, or the southward of the Taptee, by Songhur only. It is very improbable that a serious invasion will be made from both quarters at the same time. The chief most likely to invade those territories has not forces sufficient to form two armies, either of them capable of meeting the disposable force in the

districts, when joined by Rajah Anund Rao's cavalry. Whenever a serious invasion therefore is made, it will be by a large army in one quarter, and by light plundering parties in the other. But if there is one commanding authority in the districts, he cannot be without intelligence of the force and disposition of the enemy's troops; and before the enemy can pass round the Shatpoor hills, he can make a disposition of all the troops to repel the northern or the southern invasion, according to his intelligence of the enemy's disposition.

'13. In my opinion, therefore, the following arrangement ought to be made,—

'1st. One officer of rank ought to be appointed to command in the Attavesy and Guzerat. Lieut. Colonel Woodington may still command the troops immediately north of the Nerbudda, under such officer.

'2ndly. The works of the castle of Surat ought to be put in a state of repair. If the castle of Surat is in such a position as that it is commanded by the neighboring grounds, it ought to be destroyed; and field works to be erected in a commanding situation, without loss of time, for the defence of the troops allotted for the security of that important city:

Detachment of Artillery	30
H. M.'s 75th Regiment	573
1st. Batt. 6th Regiment N.I.	500
			— 1103

ought to be the troops allotted for the security of Surat.

'3rdly. The garrison of Baroda ought to be,

Artillery	20
Detachment of H. M.'s 61st Regiment	154
Detachment of H. M.'s 88th Regiment	100
2nd Batt. 7th Regiment N.I.	696
				— 970

giving detachments as hereafter stated to other garrisons, and leaving 411 native infantry in Baroda.

'4th. The garrison of Cambay ought to be, as at present, 25 rank and file, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

'5th. The garrison at Kairah ought to be 3 artillerymen and 100 rank and file, as at present, from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

' 6th. The garrison at Kurrah, 60 rank and file, as at present from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

7th. The garrison for Baroach, eventually 48 rank and file of the 88th, 12 artillery, and 100 rank and file from the 2nd of the 7th at Baroda.

' 8th. The garrison of Songhur ought to be 12 rank and file, artillery; 100 rank and file of the 84th; and 100 rank and file of the 1st battalion 6th regiment.

' 9th. The garrison of Parneira ought to be 12 rank and file, artillery; 172 rank and file of the 84th; and 200 rank and file 1st battalion of the 6th.

' 14. I do not see the advantage of the posts in Dholuah and Gogo, or at Rampore, or of the small detachments, according to the returns, situated in any of the places in the districts ceded by the Peshwah. The officer appointed to command will, however be the best judge upon this subject, and will post detachments in those places, if he should think it proper; these small detachments are ruinous to the discipline and spirit of the troops; they weaken the corps to such a degree, that they are unfit for service in the field, and they answer no adequate purpose. In my opinion, in time of war, and particularly in such a war as one with the Marhattas, it would be best to authorize the collectors to raise sebandy troops for these services: the expenses would be but trifling, and in fact cannot bear a comparison with the benefit which must be derived from the measure.

15. In all parts of India, particularly in those territories which have belonged to the Marhattas, there is a numerous class of people, whose only occupation and only mode of procuring subsistence has been the military service. This class is usually entirely deprived of subsistence by the transfer of the government of those countries to the Company; and they are driven to seek for it either in rebellion at those moments when the British troops are engaged in foreign wars, or in the armies of our enemies; these they are ready to lead into our districts, with all the knowledge derived from long residence and service within them, and they become in fact our most dangerous enemies.

' 16. The employment of these people, therefore, at such time as sebandy is advantageous, not only as it saves the regular troops, and gives a larger body of troops for field service, and prevents the loss of their discipline, but because it lessens the number of idle and discontented at the time of general invasion and confusion, and that of our most dangerous enemies.

‘17. Having thus provided for the principal garrisons and stations in Guzerat, and the districts depending upon Surat, there will remain for service in the field:—

Artillery	.	.	99
H. M's. 65th Regt.	.	.	763
—— 86th Regt.	.	.	815
1st Batt. 1st Regt. N.I.	.	.	625
2nd do. do.	.	.	697
1st 6th Regt. do.	.	.	519
2nd do. do.	.	.	763

‘18. These corps ought to be divided into two detachments, one consisting of 50 artillery, the 86th regiment, and two native battalions, to be stationed in a convenient situation north of the Nerbudda, and in front of Baroda: the other consisting of 49 artillery, the 65th regiment, and two native battalions, at another south of the Taptee, between Surat and Songhur.

‘19. In the cantonments with these two detachments ought to be the necessary proportion of ordnance and stores; namely, two six-pounders for each corps and two twelve-pounders, and two five and half-inch howitzers, for each detachment. Camp equipage for these detachments ought to be in readiness at Baroda and Surat.

‘20. In case the commanding officer should receive intelligence that an invasion was threatened to the northward, he should move the southern detachment across the rivers Taptee and Nerbudda, and collect all his troops in that quarter; excepting one battalion, which he might leave at Songhur to operate upon the enemy's marauding parties, if the Bheels should be friendly, and should have engaged to stop the passages by the other ghauts; or to be thrown into Surat, to reinforce that garrison, if they should not.

‘21. On the other hand, if he should be obliged from circumstances to bring the northern detachment to the southward, he might leave one battalion to reinforce the garrison of Baroda, and to operate, with Rajah Anund Rao's horse, upon the enemy's marauding parties who might attempt to penetrate in the absence of the detachment.

‘22. In this manner, and by bringing forward Rajah Anund Rao's horse and infantry, there would be a disposable force for the field purposes in those districts, which in the most essential parts of a British army, namely, British soldiers, would be stronger than at present under my imme-

diate command ; and, with the aid of Anund Rao's horse, and supported by the strong places, they would in that country be equal to any thing that could be brought against them.

‘ 23. I have also to observe that, under this arrangement, all the principal points in the country are secured.

‘ 24. It is true, that in the absence of the detachment from either the northern or the southern division, that in which there are no troops is in some degree liable to be injured by marauding horse. That is an evil which cannot be entirely avoided so long as the British armies are composed entirely of infantry, and those of the enemy of cavalry ; but if the forts in the country are kept up, and in times of war the sebandy of the country are hired and paid, even that evil must be of short duration ; as it is well known that no number of horse can find their way into a fort without the assistance of guns.

‘ 25. Having thus considered the disposition and distribution of the troops in these districts, it is proper that I should advert to their means of subsistence,

‘ 26. It is my opinion, that when the commanding officer shall have reason to believe that he may have occasion to employ these troops in the field, sufficient carriage for one month's provisions ought immediately to be provided for them. Besides this carriage, magazines ought to be formed, and always ready, at Parneira, Songhur, Surat, Cambay, Baroach, Baroda, Kairah, and Kurrah, of all those species of provisions and stores required for the troops, which might be scarce in the country in case of invasion ; particularly arrack and biscuit for the Europeans, and rice for the natives.

‘ 27. These would be necessary even for defensive operations : those of an offensive nature would require different measures, and more extensive arrangement, which must be ordered at the time when those operations are in contemplation.

‘ 28. This arrangement, when carried into execution, will be applicable to all purposes, will put the troops in the Guzerat and Attavesy in a state and shape for service, and I shall know how to avail myself of their services in the course of the campaign ; accordingly I request, if you should approve of it, that you will give orders that it may be carried into execution as soon as possible.

‘ 29. As his Excellency the Governor General has been pleased to give orders in his letter to you of the 9th July,

that the troops in those districts should be placed under my command, I imagine that Major General Jones will return to Bombay; and as it will be necessary that the officer who will have that extensive charge should be one of character, capacity, and rank, upon reference to the list of the Bombay army, I should think that Sir William Clarke and Colonel Murray are the most fit for such an employment.

‘ 30. The former already fills a situation from which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to relieve him immediately; and if you approve of the latter, I should recommend him.

‘ 31. When he may undertake this important charge, it will be necessary that he should have the full confidence of government, all the military power that they can give him, for the exercise of which he should be responsible to them and the Commander-in-chief, and therein supported on all occasions.

‘ 32. He ought to be desired to attend to the requisition of the Resident at Baroda, and of the civil authority of Surat, as far as circumstances will permit him; but as his attention will be entirely engrossed by his military duties, and by the defence of the countries committed to his charge, it does not appear to me to be necessary that he should belong to the committee or commission at Surat, or that he should be troubled with their civil duties or arrangements.

‘ 33. On the other hand, they all have nothing to do with his duties excepting to make requisitions upon him for military assistance when they may require it.

‘ 34. I cannot conclude this letter without requesting that you will urge the gentlemen at Surat to keep on terms with the Bheels: these appear to be a race of the same description with those who inhabit the hills in all parts of India. By conciliation, and refraining from an interference with their concerns, they will prove our best friends, and a contrary line of conduct will make them our worst enemies: it must not be expected that we should involve ourselves in the affairs of these Bheels, or press them for tribute. The number of troops I have above detailed will be sufficient for the protection of the valuable territory of which you have got possession: they will not be sufficient for the subjection even of one of their rajahs; and from what I have seen of the service in other parts of India, I have no hesitation in declaring my opinion, that, as a measure of economy, it would be better to give up all claims of tribute than the

Company might have upon any of these rajahs, than to receive it at the risk of the expense of being obliged to enforce its payment at some future day.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To the Governor General.

‘ *MY LORD,* Camp at Walkee, 3rd August, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch dated the 30th July, and copies of its enclosures which I received this day from Colonel Collins.

‘ I am at present encamped within six miles of the fort of Ahmednuggur, which place I am fully prepared to attack as soon as I shall learn that Colonel Collins has quitted the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’ ‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Ramchunder Purskeram.

‘ 3rd August, 1803.

‘ I am concerned to find that, notwithstanding you were satisfied on all the points which you referred to me at different times, in your march in company with the troops under my command, from the river Kistna to Poonah; and your repeated promises to Major Malcolm, conveyed to me from time to time, stating that you would march from Poonah to join me, you have hitherto remained behind; and at last you have moved to the southward to a greater distance from the city; and in disobedience of the orders of his Highness the Peshwah, in breach of your promises to me, and in opposition to the remonstrances of Lieut. Colonel Close, you intend to return to your residence in the neighborhood of the river Kistna. You know well that there is no occasion for your presence in that quarter; because since I have interfered between you and the Rajah of Kolapoor, all matters there have been in a state of greater tranquillity than has been known for years; your presence in that quarter, therefore, may be more hurtful than beneficial to your own interests.

‘ But that consideration is trifling in comparison with the evils which your interests must sustain from a breach of the solemn promises you have made to me. A performance of

these would insure to you, at all times, the powerful protection of the Company's Government: your interests would always be considered as their own, and as their friend in this state, you must have risen to the honors which your ancestors enjoyed. But the crooked policy which you appear disposed to adopt must preclude all hope of those advantages; and on the other hand, you are much mistaken if you suppose that it can lead to your advantage, under any contingency.

'Therefore for your own sake, I most anxiously entreat you to review your situation; to consider well your own interests and future prospects; and adopt at once a decided line of conduct and join this army.

'I write to you as a friend who knows your interests well, and also has an anxious desire to see your affairs prosper.

'*Ramchunder Pursheram.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 3rd August, 1803

'I enclose a packet for Mr. Duncan, which I request you to peruse and forward; likewise one containing a dispatch from Colonel Collins of the 30th; from the perusal of which there appears a probability that the Colonel quitted the camp on the 31st. Have a copy taken of that dispatch, and send it to Mr. Duncan.

'We must take a convenient opportunity of bringing Appah Saheb to his senses: in the mean time, if the Peshwah admits his objection to be valid, he ought to take some other mode of producing his sixteen thousand men according to the treaty. The question about Buiwunt Rao Nagonath's claim of choute is still in obscurity. Is it a claim which has always been admitted, or one which is disputed, and liable to arbitration?

'In respect to the choute paid to Amrut Rao during his usurpation, the Peshwah must stand to the loss of that revenue, as well as to that of every other seized by force in the same manner. He cannot have a right to two choutes, any more than two revenues from any village in the same year; and as choute is a claim which, above all others, depends upon the sword, I do not think that it would be reasonable to demand a second payment of it, in favor of a man who appears incapable of using one.

'You will observe by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I propose to take Colonel Murray away from Poonah: Co-

lonel Coleman will command there for the present, and I think that he will conduct the business well. However, I shall keep up a constant correspondence with him, and will keep him right.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 5th August, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 3rd. It is very desirable that we should have the Governor General’s opinion on the proposition which I made to you; but time must elapse before we can receive it, and the critical moment will pass by, in which we should derive all the benefits that I expect from the adoption of the measure. You have stated two objections to it: one that Ragonaut Rao has never made any advances, since you informed him that the British Government would reward his services; the other, that the ministers at the Nizam’s durbar were pensioned, with the knowledge of his Highness, from which I conclude that you are of opinion that the same course ought to be adopted in respect to the rewards to be given to those of the Peshwah.

‘In respect to the first objection, I have to observe that Ragonaut Rao has lately urged a request that he might be considered by the British Government, in case his enemies should prevail, and should drive him from the situation which he at present fills; but supposing that he had not urged this request, it is not possible that a better opportunity should offer of bringing this subject forward, than that which suggested it to me some days ago.

‘You might, in my opinion, communicate to Ragonaut Rao the ackbar from Scindiah’s camp, which states that the Peshwah had written a letter to that chief, and that which I sent to you, which states that he was dissatisfied with his alliance with the British Government; the uneasiness which I and every person concerned on the part of the British Government felt upon this subject; particularly as we all observe that there was a constant, nay, a daily intercourse between the Peshwah and the northern chiefs; and that notwithstanding the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, not only we were unacquainted with the nature and objects of these communications, but we could get no account whatever of them from the Peshwah or his ministers. On these grounds, in my opinion, you might urge Ragonaut Rao to a

disclosure of the objects of this correspondence ; and might tell him that you should reward him if you found that he was so far a friend to the alliance, as to make you acquainted with all that passed at the Peshwah's durbar, of which you ought to have a knowledge.

‘ It will not be objected to this measure, that a Marhatta, bred at Madras, particularly after he has solicited the rewards of the British Government, will be hurt or offended at this proposition : but you may be of opinion, that as he knows that you have promised him a reward, and that he must be equally satisfied with that engagement as he would be with the possession of the reward, to give it is attended with risk, and may produce no benefit.

‘ In answer, I have to observe that no native ever trusts to a promise ; and as the bribery of the ministers of a native durbar is so very common, it is astonishing that you should have been able to transact any business at the Peshwah's durbar to this moment, without having had recourse to it.

‘ In respect to the example of the Nizam's durbar, it is my opinion, that in the whole of the transactions at Poonah, we have adhered too closely to what has been done at Hyderabad.

‘ The constitution and customs of two governments cannot be more different than those of Poonah and Hyderabad are ; and they differ materially in the circumstances which ought to guide our decision upon this question.

‘ In the Nizam's durbar, the minister has all the power ; and it must be a matter of indifference to us what passes in the interior, provided the result of the exercise of that power is favorable to our views. The minister is pensioned to produce that result ; and the Nizam has been told that that pension is the sum which the minister would have received from the southern districts, if they had not been ceded to the Company.

‘ The Nizam also, it is to be supposed, is so well satisfied with the administration of the government by his minister, and with the tranquillity which it enjoys, that he entertains no jealousy on account of the receipt of this pension.

‘ But how is it with the Peshwah ? He has no minister ; no person has influence over him, and he is only guided by his own caprices. He cannot be paid in order that he may conduct his government according to our views ; and it would be useless to pay his ministers for that object, because they can render no corresponding service. But although

they cannot conduct him and his government, they can let you know in what manner he conducts it, and for that they ought to be paid. That for which they ought to be paid, is for making you acquainted with every thing that passes that comes to their knowledge; in order that you may have an opportunity of forming a judgment whether the Peshwah adheres to the alliance or not, and of checking him by remonstrances, if his actions should tend to a breach of its stipulations. But, if they are to be paid with his knowledge, it is obvious that he will keep secret from them all that he wishes you should not know; and that he will in fact have two sets of ministers, one set to deceive the British Resident, and another to conduct the real business of his government.

‘Upon the whole, I am convinced that it is absolutely necessary that you should have an accurate knowledge of all that passes in the Peshwah’s durbar; that it is not possible that you should have that knowledge without paying for it; that you will not obtain it if you pay for it with the consent of the Peshwah; and that you ought forthwith to pay Ragonaut Rao.

‘In my last, I believe I told you the reason for which I attended to the news sent by Salabut Khan’s writer. He has always given accurate reports of what passed in Colonel Collins’s conferences with the northern chiefs, and of other matters which I knew to be true; I therefore conclude that he has some good source of intelligence. I do not think it possible to find out the foundation he has for writing the story.

‘If you should send this letter to the Governor General, I recommend that it should be by a private channel, as the subject to which it relates is not a very proper one to meet the public eye, however necessary it may be to consider it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘**ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**’

To Dowlut Rao-Scindiah.

‘6th August, 1803.

I have received your letter. [Here the contents are recapitulated.] You will recollect that the British Government did not threaten to commence hostilities against you, but you threatened to commence hostilities against the British Government and its allies; and when called upon to explain your intentions, you declared that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; and in conformity

with your threats, and your declared doubts, you assembled a large army in a station contiguous to the Nizam's frontier.

'On this ground I called upon you to withdraw that army to its usual stations, if your subsequent pacific declarations were sincere; but instead of complying with this reasonable requisition, you have proposed that I should withdraw the troops which are intended to defend the territories of the allies against your designs, and that you and the Rajah of Berar should be suffered to remain with your troops assembled, in readiness to take advantage of their absence.

This proposition is unreasonable and inadmissible, and you must stand the consequences of the measures which I find myself obliged to adopt, in order to repel your aggressions.

'I offered you peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: you have chosen war, and are responsible for all consequences.

'*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Walkee, 6th August, 1803

'I have the honor to enclose copies of a letter and its enclosures, dated the 1st instant, which I received last night from Colonel Collins, and the copy of a letter dated the 3rd instant, which I have received this day.

'I likewise enclosed a translation of the letter I received yesterday from the Rajah of Berar, and the translation of one which I have written this day to that chief and Dowlut Rao Scindiah. The letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is written in the same terms as that received from the Rajah of Berar.

'Colonel Stevenson has already got orders to move forward, and I have received a letter from him, by which I learn that he proposes to march from Aurungabad on this day. I have sent orders to the officer in command of the troops in the territories of Anund Rao Guickwar, to commence his operations against Baroach, and not to suffer them to be interrupted by any negotiations.

'It has rained violently in this part of the country the last three days, and the roads from this place to Ahmednuggur are at present impracticable. But if the weather should become more favourable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

'I have written to the Right Hon. the Governor of Fort St. George to suggest that the officer in command of the troops of the Ganjam district should receive orders, if possible, to commence his operations against Cuttack.'

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor General.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'SIR,

'Camp at Walkee, 6th August 1803.

'The perusal of the papers received from Colonel Collins, which I enclosed to you this day, will have shown you that it is impossible to delay any longer the commencement of hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, without sacrificing the public interests; and that I have given orders that hostilities may be commenced against those chiefs, and I propose to attack Ahmednuggur as soon as circumstances will permit.

'It is proper that the Peshwah should be apprized of this state of affairs, that you should communicate to his Highness what has passed lately in Scindiah's camp, the moderate proposition made by me, the adoption of which would have produced peace, and the answers given by Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, notwithstanding that they declared themselves satisfied with the assurances which I gave them, and that the former considered my requisition, that he should withdraw, reasonable.

'Under the stipulations of the treaty of Bassein, it is necessary that his Highness the Peshwah should now consider Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar as his enemies, and that he should cease to hold any communication with those chiefs. His Highness will also observe how necessary it is that he should complete the quota of troops which he is bound by that treaty to furnish, and that he should adopt every measure that is practicable to forward the success of the operations against the common enemy.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

MEMORANDUM.

'6th August, 1803.

'His Highness the Peshwah, Bajee Rao, having been obliged to quit his capital, concluded at Bassein with the Honorable Company a treaty, by which the British Government bound itself to defend his Highness, his rights and interests, against all who should attack him.

‘The contracting parties had a full right to enter into this treaty, which is purely defensive; and it contains an express stipulation that the British troops shall not be employed to attack the great Marhatta jaghiredars, unless they should first commit hostilities against the allies.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah called upon the British Government to give assistance to the Peshwah to recover his musnud: subsequently, when informed that the relations between the Honorable Company and Pundit Purdhaun had been improved, he expressed his satisfaction at that event; and he declared, on the 2nd March, to the British Resident in his camp, in his public durbar, in the most formal manner, that he had no intention to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, or to commit hostilities against the British Government or its allies.

‘Notwithstanding this declaration, accounts reached the British Government, from various quarters, stating that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had combined with the Rajah of Berar, and with other chiefs, for the purpose of hostility against the British Government and its allies.

The treaty of Bassein was communicated to Dowlut Rao Scindiah on the 27th of May; and that chief was called upon to state his objections to it, if he had any. He was also desired to make known the object of his negotiations with the Rajah of Berar and other chiefs; and was called upon to retire with his troops to their usual stations, if his designs were not hostile to the British Government or its allies.

‘In answer, Dowlut Rao Scindiah declared to the British Resident, that until he had a meeting with the Rajah of Berar, he could not decide whether there should be “peace or war;” but that the British Resident should be made acquainted with the determination of the united chiefs, as soon as their meeting should take place.

‘The chiefs met in the neighborhood of Mulcapoor on the 3rd of June: and from that day, notwithstanding that the defensive and innocent nature of the treaty of Bassein was repeatedly explained to them, and that they had never stated the smallest objection to it, they evaded to give any answer to the just demands of the British Government till the 8th of July.

‘Both Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar then declared, that they had no intentions to attack the Company or their allies; or to obstruct the execution of the treaty of Bassein, provided the Honorable Company would not pre-

vent the execution of the treaties subsisting between his Highness the Peshwah and those chiefs: they still, however, manifested an intention of advancing towards the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, and of remaining with their troops in a station contiguous to his Highness's boundary.

‘Major General Wellesley, therefore, on the 14th of July, wrote a letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in which he apprized that chief, that he could not consider his actions to be consistent with his declarations, if he did not separate his troops from those of the Rajah of Berar, and if both chiefs did not retire with their troops to the stations they usually occupied. He promised that the British troops should also retire to their usual stations, when the united chiefs should have retired: but he informed them, that if Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should remain with their troops in the neighborhood of the Nizam's frontier, Major General Wellesley would be obliged to take advantage of the positions which the British troops had taken up, to attack their possessions; an event which he most anxiously deprecated.

‘Major General Wellesley at the same time declared to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, “that it was not consistent with the treaty of Bassein, or the principles of the British Government, to support any power in the breach of a treaty;” and therefore, he might be satisfied regarding the treaties between the Peshwah and his Government.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have declared themselves to be satisfied with this declaration; and the former acquiesced in the justice of the demand of Major General Wellesley, that he should retire with his troops to the stations which they usually occupy; but instead of retiring with their troops, these chiefs have persevered to retain the position which they took up for the purposes of hostility against the British Government and their allies; and they have written letters to propose to Major General Wellesley that he should withdraw to Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, the troops which had been assembled for the purpose of repelling their aggressions, and of defending the rights and territories of the allies; while they should keep their troops united in the neighborhood of the Nizam's frontier, and in readiness to take advantage of the absence of the troops of the British Government and its allies, to carry into execution their hostile designs.

‘Major General Wellesley offered to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar peace on terms of equality, and honorable to all parties: they have preferred war, and they alone must be considered responsible for the consequences.

violently in this part of the country for the last three days, and the roads from hence to Ahmednuggur are at present impassable; but if the weather should become more favorable in the course of the evening or night, and the roads should be tolerably good in the morning, I propose to move to that place.

‘I beg leave to suggest to your Lordship to order the officer in command of the troops in the Ganjam district now to make his attack upon Cuttack, if it should be practicable.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lord Clive.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

diah would consider themselves at liberty to march their troops in whatever direction they might think proper.

3. Although the weather began to clear up yesterday at noon, and no rain fell during the night, yet I found the road to this place exceedingly deep. It is now one o'clock in the afternoon, and my escort is not yet arrived, though it marched at half past four this morning. I propose ascending the Tondapoor ghaut to-morrow morning, and proceeding as far as the town of Adjunttee, provided the gun bullocks are in a condition to perform the journey.

‘1. I have apprized Colonel Stevenson that I should this day leave the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in consequence of his refusal to retire from his present position, and of my intention to prosecute my march to Aurnagabad with all practicable expedition.

‘5. Last night at ten o'clock, I received the enclosed kharectah, to your address, from Dowlut Rao Scindiah. No copy of this letter was sent to me but I believe it is to the same purport as that which I had the honor to forward to you on the 1st instant from the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘*J. COLLINS.*’

‘P.S.—You have acknowledged the receipt of my official dispatches under date the 24th and 25th ult. I hope my public letters of the 20th, 21st, and 22nd have not miscarried.’

Rajah Ragoojee Bhoonslah to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

6th August, 1803.

‘I have received your letters [here the contents of the Hon. Major General Wellesley's letters are recapitulated] from Colonel Collins; and, from the Colonel's verbal communication, I have been further assured of your friendship. No doubt, where the foundations of union and amity have so long subsisted, they must be firm and solid; and there can be no apprehension on suspicion admitted between parties so connected. By the blessing of God, both armies are to this moment on their own territory, and no aggression or excesses have been committed on the countries of his Highness the Nizam. However, to satisfy your mind, and to dispel your alarms, it has been resolved upon, in the presence of Colonel Collins, that the armies now

To Major General Campbell.

‘DEAR SIR. ‘Camp at Walkee, 6th August, 1803.

‘As you will by this time have arrived at your station in the neighborhood of Moodgul, you will be desirous of learning from me the state of affairs in this quarter.

‘I am sorry to tell you, that our negotiations with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have not produced the desired effect of inducing those chiefs to withdraw from the position which they had taken contiguous to the Nizam’s frontier.

‘By letters which I have received from Colonel Collins this day, I find that, instead of withdrawing their troops, they have proposed that I should withdraw the British troops, even to Madras; and they propose to remain assembled at Burhampoor, from which place they would have a fine opportunity of plundering the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, as soon as I should have withdrawn. However, that plan will not answer, and I propose to march to the attack of Ahmednuggur as soon as the weather shall clear up a little; and I have given directions that Scindiah’s posts in Guzerat shall be immediately attacked; and I learn from Colonel Stevenson that he has moved forward this day.

encamped here shall retire towards Burhampoor, on condition that the armies now assembled here, and those of the English Government and the Nizam, shall commence their retreat upon the same date, and that each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled; that is, that the army of the English and of the Nizam, now encamped near Aurungabad, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army, shall all march towards their stations on the same date that the armies move from their encampment; and on the same date that all those different armies reach their respective stations at Madras, Seringapatam, and Bombay, Scindiah and myself will reach Burhampoor.

‘In this manner has it been agreed and settled, in presence of Colonel Collins, and I have written it for your information.

‘It was written in your letter, that the English Government and the Peshwah would never destroy the relations and engagements that have long subsisted between the Peshwah, me, Scindiah, and the other sirdars of the Marhatta empire. This assurance has made me most happy, and tends to confirm friendship. Colonel Collins will satisfy you further upon this subject.

‘Continue to write me accounts of your health.’

[The letter from Scindiah is verbatim the same as that from Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah.]

‘ I learn from General Stuart, that one of the objects for which he has posted you at Moodgul, is to keep in check the sirdars who have jaghires in the neighborhood of the river Kistna.

‘ The principal family in that part of the country is that of Pursheram Bhow; and their principal residence and stronghold is at Meritch, about twenty miles from Erroor, on the Kistna, at which place we have a small fort. Appah Saheb, who is at the head of that family, marched to Poonah with me, and is at present at that city with his troops. In my opinion, he wishes well to the British Government; but he is of that wavering disposition which is almost characteristic of the Marhattas, so that he fears to take any part in this contest, till he shall see which side is likely to be successful. He will not join us, but I do not think he will do us any mischief, unless we should meet with some heavy misfortune. There are several chiefs in the neighborhood, and to the southward of the Kistna, who follow the politics of this family; such as Madhoo Rao Rastia, whose possessions are about Beejapoor, Baugracottah, and Badamy; the Goorparah family about the Gutpurba; Gunput Rao Paunseah, and some others, all of whom, in my opinion, will be neutral.

‘ On the other hand, the Rajah of Kolapoor, whose districts lay along the western ghauts, at no great distance from Meritch, is connected by marriage, and by old ties, with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. This chief is independent of the Peshwah, being a descendant from Sevajee, and a Rajah in his own right. He has long been at war with the family of Pursheram Bhow, and he killed that chief in a most barbarous manner, after having taken him prisoner.

‘ The contest between Appah Saheb and the Rajah of Kolapoor was going on, when I passed Meritch in April last; and I prevailed upon the two chiefs to suspend their acts of hostility, which have ceased almost entirely ever since, although their enmity is as great as ever. The Rajah of Kolapoor also knows that the Company have claims upon him, for acts of piracy committed on the seas upon the coast of Malabar; and that his territories in that quarter must always be exposed to their troops; and that the smallest assistance, given by the Company’s government to Appah Saheb, would entirely destroy him. I therefore think it probable that he also will remain neutral: indeed, I am not quite certain that his neutrality would not continue, notwithstanding his connexions with Scindiah, if Appah Saheb should take part against us.

‘There are many polygars in the districts lying between the rivers Kistna, Gutpurba, and Malpoorba, who are in general connected with the Rajah of Kolapoor, all of whom will follow his politics.

‘I shall keep you acquainted with every thing that occurs here deserving of your attention; and I shall always be happy to give you any information which you may think I may have regarding matters in your quarter.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

Major General Campbell.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 7th August, 1803.

‘I have received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 3rd, by which I find that, in consequence of my recommendation, he has sent you 73,000 dollars, and has referred you to me for instructions respecting them. The only instructions I have to give you, are to desire Captain Mathison to make the same bargain with the mints at Poonah and Chincore, for coining these dollars into Chandory rupees, that Captain, Graham made for coining the dollars which I received from Bomhay, when I was at Poonah. I will desire Captain Graham to write to Captain Mathison upon this subject.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

The Governor General to the Secret Committee of the Honorable the Court of Directors. (Extract.)

‘161. The force under the immediate command of Major General Wellesley consists of—

CAVALRY. His Majesty's 19th Light Dragoons . . . 381				} . . . 1731
4th	} Regiments native cavalry . . . 1317			
5th				
7th				
Artillery				173
INFANTRY. His Majesty's 74th regiment	78th do.	{ 1368		} 6909
	1st battalion 2nd regt. native infantry	{ 5631		
	1st do. 3rd do.	{		
	2nd do. 3rd do.	{		
	1st do. 8th do.	{		
	2nd do. 12th do.	{		
	2nd do. 18th do.	{		
				8903

exclusive of European artillerymen, and 653 pioneers of the establishment of Fort St. George, 3400 cavalry, belonging to the Rajah of Mysore, and about 3000 Marhatta horse. Two battalions of sepoys were detached in the month of July, with a large convoy of treasure, bullocks, and grain, from the army under the command of Lieut. General Stuart to the division under Major General Wellesley.

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Walkee, 7th Aug. 1803*.

‘I have received your letters of the 4th. Major Dallas left the Kalachabootra ghaut on the 16th of July, with a

* *Lieut. General Stuart to the Governor General.*

‘MY LORD, ‘Head Quarters, Camp at Cuddapa, 8th Aug., 1803.

‘Considerable changes in the disposition of the army under my immediate command have recently occurred; and although I am sensible that they have been regularly communicated to your Excellency, yet I judge it proper to submit to your Lordship a short detail of the considerations which have produced them, and of the actual state of the army under this government.

‘It became an important question for consideration when the conduct of the principal Marhatta chiefs suggested the probability of a war, whether the forces under the immediate command of Major General the Hon. Arthur Wellesley were equal to the early prosecution of successful operations against the confederates.

‘The capture of Ahmednuggur and the possession of the Adjuttee pass were deemed the first objects of General Wellesley’s proceedings; and to enable him to secure these, and to pursue his subsequent advantages over the confederates with proper celerity, a reinforcement of two battalions appeared to Colonel Close and to Lord Clive to be requisite: and although General Wellesley made no application to me for an augmentation to his strength, yet I judged it advisable to detach two battalions to join his army. Those corps marched at different periods in the month of July, and escorted considerable supplies of treasure, bullocks, and grain, which I forwarded for the use of the troops in advance.

‘The total want of disposable troops in the Carnatic, the ceded districts, and Mysore, the arrival of a French armament in India, and the apparent probability of the renewal of the war with France, excited a great degree of solicitude in the minds of Lord Clive and myself, regarding the means of opposing the designs which might be meditated by that nation. A considerable French force might effect a landing at almost any point of the Carnatic; upwards for six weeks must have elapsed before a detachment could be collected to repel them, and during that time they might accomplish many important purposes, and occasion most serious evils.

‘Those considerations induced Lord Clive, in the latter end of June, to request that the army under my command might recross the Toombuddra, and they have since induced his Lordship, in concurrence with my opinion, to order a division of the army to return to the Carnatic.

‘The remaining part of the army, consisting of one regiment of native cavalry, five companies of European infantry, and three battalions of sepoys, with five brigades of 6 pounders, and their complement of artillerymen, under the orders of Major General Campbell, has been stationed near Moodgul, in the Doab, for the purposes of covering the frontier,

convoy of treasure for you and for me; but I have not heard of him since, although Bistnapah Pundit is looking out for him about Perinda, with the Mysore horse. I am afraid

and ensuring the internal tranquillity of Mysore and the ceded districts, of overawing the southern Marhatta jaghiredars, of supporting the British interests at Hyderabad, and affording every practicable degree of security to the communication with Major General Wellesley's army. Major General Campbell has received explicit instructions for his guidance, and has been directed to detach the force under his command, or a part of it, to join the troops in advance, or to Hyderabad, on receiving an application to that effect from Major General Wellesley, or Major Kirkpatrick; but Major General Campbell is ordered in either of these cases to return himself to the ceded districts, as the priority of his rank to that of Major General Wellesley would render his presence to the northward of the Kistna incompatible with a due exercise of the powers which your Excellency has delegated to the latter officer.

'Those dispositions have produced a separation of the army under my immediate command, and I am authorized by your Lordship's instructions to assume the immediate command of the army in advance. The experience gained by Major General Wellesley during his former operations in the Marhatta territories, the extensive knowledge and influence which he has acquired in the present campaign, and his eminent military talents, enable him better than any other officer to prosecute with success the service which he has hitherto conducted with so much ability; and I have chosen to relinquish the gratification which I should derive from the command of an army, probably destined to undertake very distinguished services, in order to continue that important charge in the hands of the officer best qualified in my judgment to exercise it with advantage to the public.

'The situation of affairs in the Peninsula, and the necessity of providing means to check the progress of the rebellion in Malabar, and repel the attempts of the French, require my presence at the Presidency, and I have accordingly, with the approbation of the Right Hon. Lord Clive, proceeded on my route thither. The troops returning to the Carnatic amount to 400 European, and 400 native cavalry, 1000 European infantry, and 80 artillery.

'In the present state of the army it is nearly impracticable to increase that strength should circumstances require a greater force. In the month of March I suggested the expediency of forming three extra battalions, and raising 200 sepoy to be added to each battalion within the British dominions under the Presidency of Fort St. George; and in the beginning of this month I recommended that those additional sepoys, who increased our battalions to an unwieldy and unmanageable extent, should be formed into four other extra corps. Both these proposals were adopted by Government. They add seven additional battalions to this army: but the great difficulty of procuring recruits on the coast will prevent them from being completed, or applicable to any purpose of the service, for a considerable length of time.

'The force in advance of the Toombuddra from the army of this establish-

that his march is impeded by the badness of the weather, and that he may not arrive at Perinda till the middle of this month. This is very inconvenient, for I shall not have it in my power to assist you with money till he arrives.

ment amounts to seven regiments of cavalry, two and a half regiments of European infantry, and nineteen battalions of sepoy, with their proper equipment of ordnance and artillerymen. One regiment of European infantry and three battalions of sepoy have been detached from the duties of Malabar, for the eventual protection of Goa.

'I have already stated to your Excellency that the troops remaining within the territories dependent on this Government cannot furnish a field detachment, exclusive of the corps on its return from the frontier; and in Malabar the troops find it difficult to prevent the extension of the rebellion. These inconveniences will be alleviated when the seven extra battalions shall be completed; but even this reinforcement will be scarcely sufficient, if a war occurs, to supply the place of the troops removed from the internal defence of this Presidency.

'The Hon. Major General Wellesley has experienced difficulties in supplying his losses of cattle and in procuring treasure for the use of his army. I have judged it an object of the first importance that his troops should be placed on the most efficient footing; and with this view, I have forwarded to the army in advance during the months of June and July, seven lacs of pagodas (exclusive of a lac of pagodas, which Mr. Piele, acting in the absence of the Resident of Mysore, is now forwarding by Purneah's means, and General Wellesley's suggestion, to Poonah,) and 11,000 hired bullocks, with 4000 loads of rice, and 3000 brinjarry bullocks, also carrying rice.

'I have also dispatched 2700 hired bullocks to the Resident at Hyderabad, for the purpose of carrying loads to the army, as Major Kirkpatrick informed me that he was unable to procure cattle of that description in the Nizam's dominions. I trust that those arrangements will obviate for a considerable length of time the want of supplies during the prosecution of the operations which may become necessary against the confederated Marhatta chiefs.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'J. STUART.'

Translation of a letter addressed by his Highness the Nizam Soubahdar of the Deccan to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, communicated to the Resident.

'Hyderabad, 8th August, 1803.

'By the blessing of Providence all the affairs of the two states are perfectly identified, and we, confidently relying on your judgment and ability, have been pleased to address orders to all our military commanders, placing them under your authority, and to obey all your requisitions until the termination of the present service; and we hereby invest you with the authority even of maintaining or displacing any officers of our Government.

'Rajah Mohiput Ram, the Talookdar of Aurungabad, &c., and Rajah

‘You must encourage and urge your brinjarries to fill their bags again with any grain, as soon as possible; for we must all depend upon their exertions.

‘Keep a good look out upon the enemy; and, if possible, do not allow them to enter the Nizam’s territory. They are not in strength, and are sadly equipped.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Proclamation by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘Camp near Ahmednuggur, 7th Aug., 1803.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having threatened with hostilities the British Government and their allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun and the Nabob Nizam Ali; and in pursuance of those threats, having advanced with their large armies to a position contiguous to the frontiers, and having refused to depart from it, notwithstanding the repeated representations and entreaties of Major General Wellesley, as the only mode of preserving peace, he at last finds himself obliged to commence hostilities against those chiefs.

‘He does not, however, intend to make war upon the inhabitants; and, accordingly, all amildars and others are required to remain quietly in their stations, and obey the orders they will receive; and if they do no injury to the British armies, none will be done to them. But notice is

Sookroodoor, the Talookdar of Bheer, Perinda, &c., have also been instructed to consider themselves subject to your authority, and to recollect that your censure or your approbation of their conduct will prove equally efficacious, to the extent even of dismissal from their employments, if you should signify to us your displeasure against them in any instance.

‘You will consider yourself as invested with full authority on all affairs during the continuance of the present service, as we repose in you the most unbounded confidence.

‘What more need be written?’

Translation of Orders issued by Azim ool Omrah to Rajahs Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor.

‘In consideration of the identity of the British Government and that of his Highness the Nizam, his Highness has been pleased to address to the Hon. Major General Wellesley, under his own seal, a letter, of which a copy is enclosed to you. It is requisite that you should display an entire obedience to the tenor of that letter, and that you should direct all the military commanders in the army of his Highness to comply without hesitation or demur with the pleasure of his Highness therein communicated.

‘To inform you was indispensable: what more need be written?’

hereby given, that if any of the inhabitants of the country either abandon their dwellings, or do any injury to the British armies or their followers, they will be treated as enemies, and suffer accordingly.

‘R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen., Mysore.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Ahmednuggur, 12th Aug., 1803.

‘The weather cleared up so much on the 7th instant, as to allow me to march to this place on the 8th. I had in the morning dispatched a messenger to the killadar of Ahmednuggur, to require him to surrender his fort; and, on my arrival in the neighborhood of the pettah, I offered cowle to the inhabitants. This was refused, as the pettah was held by a body of Arabs, who were supported by a battalion of Scindiah’s regular infantry, and a body of horse encamped in an open space between the pettah and the fort.

‘I immediately attacked the pettah with the piquets of the infantry, reinforced by the flank companies of the 78th regiment, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Harness; in another place with the 74th regiment and 1st battalion of the 8th, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Wallace; and in a third with the flank companies of the 74th, and the 1st battalion 3rd regiment, under the command of Captain Vesey. The pettah wall was very lofty, and defended by towers, and had no rampart; so that, when the troops had ascended to the attack, they had no ground on which they could stand; and the Arabs who occupied the towers defended their posts with the utmost obstinacy.

‘At length they were obliged to quit the wall, and fled to the houses, from which they continued a destructive fire upon the troops. Scindiah’s regular infantry also attacked our troops after they had entered the pettah. In a short time, however, after a brisk and gallant contest, we were completely masters of it; but with the loss of some brave officers and soldiers, as your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return. The enemy’s loss was, from the nature of the contest, necessarily much greater than ours; and on the night of the 8th, all that part of their force which was not required for the defence of the fort, went off to the northward; including all the Arabs who survived the contest in the pettah, excepting a small number who attended one of their wounded chiefs, who could not be removed farther than the fort.

‘On the 9th, I reconnoitred the ground in the neighborhood of the fort; and on that evening Lieut. Colonel Wal-

lace, with five companies of the 74th regiment, and the 2nd battalion 12th regiment, seized a position within four hundred yards of it; on which, in the course of that night, a battery was constructed for four guns, to take off the defences on the side on which I proposed to make my attack. This opened at daylight on the 10th; and it was so advantageously placed, and fired with such effect, as to induce the killadar to desire that I should cease firing, in order that he might send a person to treat for his surrender. In my answer I told him, that I should not cease firing till I should have taken the fort, or he should have surrendered it; but that I would listen to whatever he was desirous to communicate.

‘Yesterday morning he sent out two vakeels to propose to surrender the fort, on condition that he should be allowed to depart with his garrison, and that he should have his private property.

‘Although I consented to this proposal, it was five in the evening before the hostages arrived in camp, without whose presence I refused to stop the fire from the British batteries. According to his engagement, however, the killadar marched out of the fort this morning, with a garrison consisting of 1400 men, and the troops under my command took possession of it.

‘In this manner has this fort fallen into our hands: our loss since the 8th has been trifling, which I attribute much to the spirit with which our attacks on that day were carried on.

‘I have to draw your Excellency’s notice towards the conduct of the troops particularly on that occasion, and towards Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, who commanded in the trenches, Captain Beauman commanding the artillery, Captain Johnson of the engineers, and Captain Heitland of the pioneers, in the short subsequent siege.

‘Your Excellency must be well acquainted with the advantageous situation of the fort of Ahmednuggur on the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, covering Poonah, and as an important point of support to all our future operations to the northward. It is considered in this country as one of the strongest forts; and excepting Vellore, in the Carnatic, is the strongest country fort that I have seen. It is in excellent repair, excepting in the part exposed to the fire of the British troops.

‘I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency an account of the ordnance, stores, and grain which it contains.

‘I propose to cross the Godavery immediately, and I shall in a future dispatch lay before your Excellency the measures which I have in contemplation for getting Scindiah’s possessions south of that river, depending upon Ahmednuggur, and for securing their resources for the use of the British troops. ‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Governor General.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘Return of the killed and wounded of his Majesty’s and the Honorable Company’s troops, composing a detachment in advance of the grand army, under the command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in the city of Ahmednuggur, on the 8th of August; and during the Siege of the Fort of Ahmednuggur, on the 9th, 11th, and 11th of August, 1803.

		Captains.	Subalterns.	Serjeants.	Drummers.	Rank and File.
19th Light Dragoons	Europeans	Killed . .	2	2	1	1
Artillery			2	1	1	12
H. M. 74th Regt.		Wounded . .	—	2	1	—
— 78th						
		Soubahdar.	Havildars	Nauks.	Sepoys.	
5th Regiment Cavalry	Natives.	Killed . .	—	1	1	10
1st Bat. 2nd Regt. N. I.			—	1	1	10
1st 3rd do.		Wounded . .	1	7	3	39
1st 8th do.			1	7	3	39
2nd 12th do.						
2nd 18th do.						
1st Pioneers						

‘R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.’*

Proclamation by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘13th August, 1803.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar having manifested an intention of attacking the British Government

* ‘General Orders of his Excellency }
the Most Noble the Governor } ‘Fort William, 8th September, 1803.
General in Council.

‘The Governor General in Council, having received from Major Gen. the Hon. A. Wellesley the official account of the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur, by the forces under the command of that officer,

and its allies, Rao Pundit Purdhaun, and the Nabob Nizam Ali, Major General Wellesley, as a measure of defence, has attacked the fort of Ahmednuggur, and his brave troops have got possession of it.

‘He has appointed Captain Graham to take charge, for the use of the British Government and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, of all the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, depending upon that Fort, and he calls upon all amildars and others to attend to and obey his orders, and those of no other persons, at their peril.

‘Captain Graham will be at Ahmednuggur.

‘R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen., Mysore.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘Camp at Ahmednuggur,
13th August, 1803.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘1. I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 8th instant.

‘2. Upon a perusal of the proceedings of the Committee at Surat, I observe, that even till the 21st of July nothing had been done for the relief of the wants of the troops at Songhur; the subject had been under discussion repeatedly; but, although well canvassed and considered, and the want ascertained, it does not appear that till that day any step had been taken to relieve it.

is pleased to signify the high approbation with which his Excellency in Council has observed the judgment, promptitude, and skill manifested by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, in directing the operations of the forces under his command on that critical occasion.

‘His Excellency in Council is pleased to direct Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to notify to the troops under his command, that the Governor General in Council has derived the most cordial satisfaction from the distinguished alacrity, gallantry, and spirit which they displayed in the attack upon the pettah, and in the subsequent siege of the fort of Ahmednuggur; and the Governor General in Council has remarked, with particular approbation, the conduct of Lieut. Colonels Harness, Wallace, and Maxwell, of Captain Beauman of the artillery, of Captain Johnson of the engineers and of Captain Hentland of the pioneers

‘The Governor in Council deeply laments the loss of Captains Grant and Humberstone, of Lieutenants Anderson and Plenderleath, and of the brave soldiers who fell in the successful contest of the 8th of August. The memory of these gallant officers and soldiers, who have fallen with honor in the public service, will be regarded with affection and respect by their sovereign and their country.

‘By command of his Excellency,

‘L. Hook, Sec. to the Gov. Mil. Dept.’

‘I also observe, that it is proposed that the Quarter Master of the 75th regiment should have a contract for feeding the regiment while detached to Songhur. The Quarter Master is properly an officer of check upon the Commissary, and it is his duty to see that the provisions received for the troops are of a good quality; he therefore, of all other officers, ought not to be the contractor to supply those provisions: but, in my opinion, if it is necessary that there should be a body of European troops in garrison at Songhur, it is necessary that there should be a store of provisions for their supply, and the Quarter Master, or any other private contractor, must be considered incapable of performing the service for which he may contract. If the European troops should be shut up in Songhur, it is my opinion that, under this contract, they will be obliged either to march out, or to surrender for want of provisions.

‘3. In respect to Captain Bates, my reason for wishing that he might be brought to a court martial was, that I wished that the whole case might be made public; for it appeared to me, upon a perusal of the papers, that, although this officer commanded a detachment at some distance from Surat, he was subsisting on provisions brought daily, or every two or three days, from that place; and, if my notion be correct upon this subject, it is probable that he could have been justified for having retired, and that those who sent out a detachment so supplied would have been blamable.

‘4. The service cannot be carried on in this manner; the troops must have regular supplies of provisions at command, or misfortune and disgrace will be the result.

‘5. In consequence of the success of the troops under my command, and as it is my intention to pass the Godavery immediately, by which means I shall check the operations of any enemy by Songhur towards Surat; and as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has passed the Nerbudda, and it being reported that he intends to attack Guzerat, I should wish, if you approve of the plan which I proposed for the organization of the troops, and the defence of those provinces, and the supply for this purpose of the requisite stores and provisions, that you would allow them all, excepting those allotted for the defence of Surat, Songhur, and Parneira, to move towards the river Nerbudda as soon as possible.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

our operations, which I beg you to peruse and forward, sending a copy of it to Mr. Duncan. I also return Mr. Duncan's papers.

'Guzerat is now the point of my greatest anxiety. I wish that the arrangements proposed in my public letter were carried into execution: but I observe that on the 20th of July nothing had been done for Songhur, and it was proposed that the Europeans going there should be fed by contract with their Quarter Master. This man ought to be the check upon the Commissary in the issue of provisions, instead of being the Commissary himself; and, at all events, it is not to be expected that any private contractor of this kind can furnish the provisions for the troops in a garrison which is likely to be attacked.

'I am very anxious that the Peshwah should feel no jealousy about this place. I have, however, taken possession of it in the names of the Company and the Peshwah, and I shall take possession of the country in the same manner. I intend to appoint Captain Graham to manage the latter. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject, point out to him how necessary the place is for us, and that the country should be kept quiet by means of the management of a gentleman in the Company's service. You may also assure him that a faithful account shall be kept of the revenues, and credit given to the Peshwah for his proportion of them. You might take the opportunity of again urging him to bring forward his troops.

'I write to Colonel Murray this day, to desire him to forward certain articles; but in case he should have gone off, I wish you to desire Coleman to open the letter, and act according to the orders which it contains. The cavalry will march to-morrow. 'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Graham.

'SIR,

'Camp, 14th August, 1803.

'You will observe by this day's order, that I have appointed you to act as collector to the districts heretofore belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah south of the river Godavery.

'I have sent directions to Govind Row to give you all the information that he has been able to collect, by my desire, regarding these districts; and I enclose two proclamations, which I recommend that you should transmit to each with

the persons whom you will send to establish in them the Company's authority.

'The officer commanding in Ahmednuggur will have orders to afford you every assistance in his power which you may require; and I have given directions that a body of horse, and a body of peons, shall be raised, who are to be under your orders.

'You have already so much experience in the revenue duties, that I cannot think it necessary to send you any detailed instructions. I should wish that the accounts may be kept according to the forms which are in use with the government of Fort St. George, and have been approved of by Government; and you will transmit them to me at the regular periods, in order that I may lay them before his Excellency the Governor General. I wish, however, that you would bear in mind the fact, that to keep this country in a state of tranquillity, and to secure for the use of the troops under my command its resources, and a free communication through it with Poonah and Bombay, are objects of far greater importance than to collect at present a large revenue from it.

'I wish you therefore to refrain from pressing the country with a view to raising the collections as high as they can go. Indeed, as these districts have been the scene of the operations of the different Marhatta armies for many years, it is probable that they will not be able to pay much revenue.

'You will correspond with me in the performance of the duty now intrusted to you, and I will forward your reports to be laid before his Excellency the Governor General.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Captain Graham.*'

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 14th August, 1803.

'Since writing to you yesterday, it has occurred to me that it would be better not to hold out to the Peshwah any promise or prospect of having half the revenue of Ahmednuggur, but to tell him generally that the revenues shall be applied to pay the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of them shall be communicated to him. One great object, however, is to reconcile his mind to our keeping possession of the country, which is absolutely necessary for our communications with Poonah; and provided that is effected, I think it immaterial whether he has half the revenues or not. It is probable that, if he does not get half, he will not think of

sending his aumils into the country ; and that if he does, he will send them.

‘ I beg you to turn this subject over in your mind, and to act in conformity to the sentiments I have above expressed. I will delay to write you a public letter upon it till I shall receive your answer.

‘ We heard from Major Dallas yesterday. He is by this time at Perinda ; but I am sorry to tell you that he had but three thousand out of five thousand bullocks.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur,
14th August, 1803.

‘ I am much concerned to hear of your losses and want of cattle, particularly as I know not how to relieve them. Major Dallas, on his march from the Kistna, as far only as Toljapoor, had lost 3000 out of 5000 ; and I also have lost many in the late rains. I hope, however, that we shall still do well, and I have ordered forward to Toka, this day, the cavalry and a battalion, and I shall follow with the remainder in a day or two.

‘ What I shall most want is dry grain and flour for the consumption of the bazaars ; and I should be glad to know from you, whether there are any quantities of these articles at Aurungabad, or any places in the neighborhood. At all events, Mohiput Ram ought to be desired to lose no time in collecting quantities of chinna and flour, in every place in which it can be stored with safety.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Collins.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur,
15th August, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th. It is not true that the dawks of Dowlut Rao Scindiah have received the smallest interruption from me, or from any person acting by my orders. But he may depend upon it, that if he should interrupt your dawk, I will not allow his to pass through any part on the Godavery.

‘ Colonel Stevenson has my directions to watch closely the movements of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and attack immediately the troops of either of those chiefs which may

move towards him : he will of course move towards the Badowly ghaut, if he should find that they intend to penetrate by that road.

‘It is impossible for me to say that Holkar is not on his march to join those chiefs ; but if Rajah Mohiput Ram is the soubahdar of Aurungabad, and you have received that intelligence from him, I think it is to be doubted.

‘But even if it should be true, as my cavalry commenced their march from hence yesterday, and the infantry will arrive upon the river before the cavalry will have passed it, I expect that I shall join Colonel Stevenson at least as soon as Holkar will have joined the other chiefs.

‘The Marhattas have long boasted that they would carry on a predatory war against us : they will find that mode of warfare not very practicable at the present moment. At all events, supposing that they can carry their design into execution, unless they find the British officers and soldiers to be in the same corrupted, enervated state in which their predecessors found the Mussulmans in the last century, they cannot expect much success from it. A system of predatory war must have some foundation in strength of some kind or other. But when the chiefs avow that they cannot meet us in the field ; when they are obliged to send the principal strength of their armies, upon which the remainder depend, to a distance, lest it should fall into our hands, they must have little knowledge of human nature if they suppose that their lighter bodies will act ; and still less of the British officers, if they imagine that, with impunity, they can do the smallest injury, provided only that the allies, who are to be first exposed to their attacks, are true to their own interests.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Collins.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp at Ahmednuggur,
15th August, 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have received your letter of the 13th, in which you have enclosed the dispatch to the Governor General of that date. I approve entirely of the proposed change. There is every reason to believe that the people and chiefs of Bundelcund wish to pass under the British Government, and the transfer can be made immediately, without the smallest difficulty. The transfer of the other districts to the southward is very remote, and will be attended with difficulties.

‘I also approve of the proposed mode of raising five thousand Marhatta horse, and I am almost inclined to request you to take measures for raising them immediately. They would be very useful indeed to us.

‘I wrote you a few lines last night respecting money for Goklah. I have given him already 10,000 rupees, and if you will send on the money you have got I will give him 35,000 more. You might give Ballojee Punt an order upon Bombay, Benares, or Hyderabad, for 30,000 more, making the full 75,000 rupees.

‘But I can give no money until I receive some from Poonah; and if you send that, it is obvious that you can give none; but I have no doubt but that Ballojee Punt will find money for one of your bills.

‘I have arranged the garrison for this place. It will consist of a battalion, a detail of artillery, and thirty Europeans, which I have ordered from Poonah. Besides this, I propose to have a large body of peons in the district, and a body of horse under Ghazy Khan's son. These last to be under the direction of the collector, Captain Graham, in order to keep the peace in the district, and the communications free with Poonah.

‘The fort is in a sad dirty state, and in the utmost confusion. It will not be possible, at present, to do more than arrange its contents, and have them in such a style that we may readily command them. Hereafter, if the Company should keep the fort, the works might be re-formed with great advantage, and the inside ought to be cleared of all the old buildings with which it is at present crowded. The quantities of stores here are astonishing; the powder is so good, that I have replaced from the magazines that which I consumed at the siege.

‘I enclose letters from Appah Saheb and Chintomeny Rao, which may have some effect. They contain copies of the memorandum which I sent you. I beg you to transmit them. Malcolm will let you know that we have made an agreement with Amrut Rao. I do not now state the purport of it, as I have not got a translation, but I expect one from Malcolm, when I shall write to you a letter, in which I will tell you what I wish you to communicate to the durbar.

‘I have written letters to Prittee Niddee and Madhoo Rao Rastia, which I will send you if they should be ready by the time the post leaves.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp at Ahmednuggur,
15th Aug., 1803.

‘I received a letter from Colonel Collins last night, in which he tells me that Holkar was on his march to join Scindiah; and that he thought the invasion of the Nizam’s territories would be by the Badowly ghaut.

‘Of course I conclude that you watch all the ghauts as well as you can. I have only to request that you will dash with your cavalry at any party that may come within your reach; do not mind to whom it belongs. I shall soon be with you. The cavalry marched yesterday, and the infantry will be at Toka before they shall have crossed the river.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 16th August, 1803.

‘I enclose the copy of the translation of the engagement made with Amrut Rao, which I received this morning from Malcolm. In my opinion, it will not be proper to communicate this instrument to the Peshwah’s government. The best thing to do will be to inform Ragonaut Rao, that I had reason to expect that Amrut Rao would join the British army, and in that case I was very desirous that the Peshwah should cease all hostility against him; and that I would engage for Amrut Rao’s conduct. If you approve of this plan I request you to adopt it.

‘Appah Dessaye has sent to me this day to inform me that the Peshwah is in negotiation with Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Goorparah to give one of them his place of Manowly and Moorgoor. He likewise has fears that he may be attacked in that quarter by the Rajah of Kolapoor and Succaram Ghautky. I wish that you would speak to Ragonaut Rao upon this subject; but Appah Dessaye is anxious that it should not be known that he has informed me of the above particulars. In respect to the Rajah of Kolapoor, I will send him a letter, which may have the effect of stopping him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Paper referred to in the above.

The particulars of a Treaty between the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Sreemunt Amrut Rao.

‘ Art. 1st. It is agreed, that during the natural life of Amrut Rao, and that of his son Venaik Rao Bappoo Saheb, he Amrut Rao (and his son after his decease) shall be ensured the enjoyment of a revenue of seven lacs of rupees. This shall either be granted in territory or in cash. The English Government considers itself responsible for its payment.

‘ The revenue of all such districts as are at present in Amrut Rao’s possession must be included in the amount of his annual revenue, and he shall receive the difference between their amount and the sum fixed on for his support, of seven lacs of rupees.

‘ Art. 2nd. As a proof that Amrut Rao is sincere in his profession of friendship to the English Government, he must meet the Hon. Major General Wellesley, who means to advance to Aurungabad.

‘ Art. 3rd. Amrut Rao must, on all occasions, exert himself cordially to forward the interests of the Honorable Company and of his Highness the Peshwah.

‘ Art. 4th. Whatever friends and adherents may attend, Amrut Rao may be satisfied of their perfect safety ; and be assured that they shall receive no injury from any quarter whatever, as they will be under the protection of the British Government. After the meeting between the Hon. Major General Wellesley and Amrut Rao shall have taken place, some arrangement will be made for their support.

‘ Note.—This article refers to Moraba Dada, and other Sirdars now with Amrut Rao, who are particularly obnoxious to the Peshwah. It is from delicacy to his Highness, as well as a regard to the interests of the parties, that they are not specified.

‘ Art. 5th. When Amrut Rao joins General Wellesley, the more force both in cavalry and infantry that accompany him the more will be the General’s satisfaction.

‘ Art. 6th. When Amrut Rao proceeds to join General Wellesley’s army, he will send his wife and all his family to the fort of Ahmednuggur, or to Bombay, or Salsette, or to such other place, within the territories of the Honorable

Company, that he may more approve ; and the English Government will adopt the necessary measures for their full protection and efficient security.

‘ Art. 7th. The meeting between the Hon, Major General Wellesley and Amrut Rao must take place nineteen days after this date. ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

‘ If Ragonaut Rao should be satisfied with a general assurance that the conquered territory is to be applied to the benefit of the allies, it will be most convenient, as that assurance leaves the question open for future discussion, and for a decision according to the circumstances of the war. But I consider it to be an object of the utmost importance that the Peshwah’s mind should be satisfied as far as possible, in order that there may appear no wavering in his intention to adhere to the alliance on which the southern jaghiredars might found acts of hostility against the Company.

‘ I know well that the Marhattas have a particular aversion to the Nizam’s government ; and I thought it not improbable but that the Peshwah and all the Marhatta chiefs would feel very uncomfortable under the notion that the Nizam was to get any territory so near to Poonah as Ahmednuggur is ; particularly as this territory is forced from one of their own chiefs by a body of troops acting in the name and on the part of the Peshwah.

‘ Although, therefore, the benefit of the war must be divided, according to certain principles among the allies, and the Nizam will undoubtedly be entitled to a better share of the spoils than the Peshwah, I cannot think that it would be politic or consistent with the attention which we ought to have for the feelings of the Marhattas, to allow the Nizam to have any part of Ahmednuggur. He might have compensation elsewhere, either to the northward or the southward. On this ground it is that I have kept his name out of sight all along in my transactions here ; and on this ground, I should have no objections, if you find it necessary for the satisfaction of the Peshwah’s mind, to assure him that he shall hereafter enjoy a share of this conquest, and that he shall see the account of the manner in which the present profits resulting from it are disposed of.

‘ I shall march to-morrow, and arrive at Toka about the time at which the cavalry will have crossed.

'I have received rather unpleasant accounts from Colonel Stevenson. On the 13th he heard that a party of horse was passing the Adjuttee hills, but, instead of dashing at them, he called in a battalion of infantry and some horse which were in his front: he afterwards, however, countermanded these orders, and sent forward Salabut Khan and Noor ool Oomrah, and intended to move out with the piquets on the 14th.

'He had a variety of plans in contemplation, of none of which I entirely approved, because they led him into a long defensive operation, in which he must be a loser. I have therefore desired him to move forward himself with the Company's and the Nizam's cavalry; to leave the infantry in a central situation for his supplies to collect upon; and to dash at the first party that comes into his neighborhood. In this manner he will, at all events, have his supplies, and if he cuts up, or only drives off, a good body of horse, the campaign is our own.

'We must get the upper hand, and if once we have that, we shall keep it with ease, and shall certainly succeed. But if we begin by a long defensive warfare, and go looking after convoys which are scattered over the face of the earth, and do not attack briskly, we shall soon be in distress.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'P.S.—I send you letters for Prittee Niddee and Mahdoo Rao Rastia, which I wish you to forward.

'I think that it would be advisable to hold out to the killadar of Loghur a prospect that he should be allowed to settle at Bombay, and that his property should be escorted thither for him, provided he remained faithful during the war, and kept the road to Panwell clear for our use. He would make the best check we could have upon Angria and the other blackguards in that quarter. If you should be of opinion that this measure would be of no inconvenience hereafter, I wish that you would send to the Loghur man, and give him a promise in my name accordingly.

To General Lake.

'SIR, 'Camp at Ahmednuggur, 17th Aug., 1803.

'Before you will receive this letter, you will have heard that I took possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur by capitulation on the 12th instant. I did not send you the details of my attack upon the pettah on the 8th, or of the

subsequent operations against the fort, because I feared that the dawk direct through Hindustan would have been stopped, and I knew that the Governor General would send them to you from Calcutta. The same reasons prevent my going into any details upon the subject of my operations at the present moment. I shall only tell you, that I have possession of all Scindiah's territories south of the Godavery; that my troops are in march towards the Godavery, and I expect to cross that river immediately in force.

'I write to recommend to your patronage Mr. Tew*, to whom I understood you did intend to give an ensigncy. He accompanied the 74th regiment on this service, by permission of Lieut. General Stuart, and distinguished himself in the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur on the 8th instant. He has been particularly recommended by Lieut. Colonel Wallace, of the 74th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Harness who commanded the division of which the company he belonged to on that day formed a part.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'General Lake.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'Camp at Ahmednuggur,
17th Aug., 1803.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'I have received your letters of the 13th and 14th, the last of which is more satisfactory than the first.

'In my opinion, the best thing you can do is, to move forward yourself with the Company's cavalry, and all the Nizam's, and a battalion, and dash at the first party that comes into your neighborhood. You will either cut them up or drive them off; and in either case, you will provide more effectually for the security of your convoys, than by detaching your troops to bring them in. Keep the infantry collected in a central situation, and let all your supplies collect upon them.

'If you adopt this plan, and succeed in cutting up, or in driving to a distance, one good party, the campaign will be our own. A long defensive war will ruin us, and will answer no purpose whatever. By any other plan than that above proposed, we shall lose our supplies, do what we will. The cavalry will reach the river this day. I shall march with the infantry to-morrow; and shall be at Toka before they will have crossed, and with you a few days afterwards.

* Afterwards killed at Assaye.

‘I shall order Major Hill’s battalion, which is coming with supplies from the Kistna to Kurdlah, to march upon Moongy Puttun: this will give security to every thing there. They will not be at Moongy Puttun for a fortnight at soonest.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp, north of the Nimderrah ghaut,

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, 18th August, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 16th. I shall give Goklah 35,000 rupees of the 80,000 you have sent off; and I beg you to give Ballojee Punt a draft for the remainder of the money, namely 30,000. If you should not have money to pay the draft in favor of Appah Dessaye, the best thing to do will be to borrow it from Colonel Coleman, who, by the time the draft reaches Poonah, will have received dollars from Bombay.

‘The Peshwah’s feelings respecting the proposed meeting with Amrut Rao are unpleasant; but I do not think that, under present circumstances, the meeting can be avoided. His Highness must recollect that he was repeatedly informed that the British Government would be obliged to adopt the measures which might appear necessary for its own security, unless he should perform his treaty, and this agreement with Amrut Rao is one of those measures.

‘His Highness has no ground on which he can found an objection to this agreement, excepting one sought for in his own implacable resentments. I can never admit these as rational grounds either for the adoption, or for the rejection of any political measure. The benefits or the evils which the public interest will derive or suffer from such a measure, are alone what must decide whether it is to be adopted or rejected.

‘But in his Highness’s conduct respecting Amrut Rao, there appears to be caprice as well as resentment; for it must be recollected, that when his Highness was at Bassein, he offered to be reconciled to his brother. It is true that Amrut Rao then rejected the offer, by which his Highness’s feelings may have been wounded: but considering the reconciliation as a measure of political expediency, and putting private feelings out of the question, I think it full as necessary at this time, as it was when his Highness was at

Bassein; and, excepting that the reconciliation was then refused by Amrut Rao, there is nothing in it more injurious to his feelings at the present moment than there was at that period.

‘However, all that is asked from his Highness is to refrain from hostility against Amrut Rao, and not to increase the number of his or our enemies. I will engage for Amrut Rao’s conduct; and I will take care in my intercourse with that chief to do nothing which is inconsistent with the treaty between the British Government and the Peshwah.

‘I have received from Hyderabad bad accounts of Major Hill: he had lost one third of his bullocks before he had even begun to cross the Kistna. I have got no accounts of Lieut. Griffiths, who is travelling between Major Dallas and Major Hill.

‘If you should buy any bullocks, and they should have no saddles, let them call at Ahmednuggur for them.

‘I have written to Coleman to request that he will endeavor to remove the hospital from Erroor on the Kistna; and in case he should be able to make his arrangements to effect that object, it would be very desirable that a party of about 100 of the Peshwah’s horse should go down with the doolies, and return with the sick. Will you endeavor to arrange that matter with Ragonaut Rao?

‘I am sorry to tell you that the boats at Erroor are in great want of repairs, and I shall be obliged to you if you will send some people there to repair them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P.S.—I have just heard that Major Dallas arrived at Perinda on the 15th.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘Camp, north of the Nimderrah ghaut,
18th August, 1803.

‘SIR,

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 7th, 8th, and 10th instant, and I congratulate you upon the peaceable succession of his Highness Secundar Jar to the musnud of the Deccan. I have given orders, of which I enclose a copy, that a Royal salute may be fired in this camp, and in all detachments and garrisons under my command in the territories of the Honorable Company, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Rajah of Mysore, and the Marhattas, upon this

occasion, excepting in those stations in which salutes may have been fired in honor of this event by orders from other authorities previously received.

‘The powers enclosed in your letter of the 8th are ample; if they were more extensive they would create jealousy, and I should find it inconvenient and difficult to exercise them. The administration of the government now remains in the hands of his Highness’s servants, and I have only to direct their attention to those objects which I may think useful or necessary for the service.

‘The excuses of Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor for not procuring large supplies of rice are well founded. In fact, the country does not produce rice in such quantities as to supply the consumption of one of our armies. That grain is never used in the armies of the Marhattas or of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, excepting by persons of a higher class; although the Company’s sepoys, who are inhabitants of the countries bordering on the sea, in which the general produce and the common consumption is rice, become dissatisfied, and even unhealthy, if they use any other grain. However, I have great hopes that there will be no want of that grain for their consumption, and the Soubahdar’s servants can have no excuse for not bringing forward sufficient quantities of the dry grains, the produce of those countries, for the common consumption of the camps.

‘The Soubahdar’s servants cannot be too frequently urged to provide for the defence of the forts and large cities in his Highness’s territories. I understand that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have sent away their guns, but if his Highness’s places are well guarded, they must starve, even if they should escape from our swords and the effects of our fire.

‘I am now on my march to Toka, on the Godavery, where my cavalry are crossing that river. I shall be at Aurungabad in a few days, and his Highness may depend upon it that I will do all in my power to save his territories from the enemy’s depredations.

‘I should wish to be made acquainted with your sentiments regarding the objects which, in the event of a peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, his Highness would have in view, supposing that the war should be as successful in its progress as it has been in its commencement. I do not mean this is the proper time to consult the ministers upon this question, but I wish you to take it into consideration, and make me acquainted with your sentiments.

‘It appears to me that it would be very desirable for the

Soubahdar of the Deccan to be freed from the interference and participation of the Marhattas in the government and revenues of several districts on his frontiers. I should wish to know the names of the districts under the divided government, and the amount of the claim for the revenue of each party, if it should be practicable to procure such information. I should also wish to know what districts in the territories belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar it would be most convenient for his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan to receive, supposing that the operations of the war should be so successful as to enable us to demand sacrifices as the price of peace.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 19th August, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 17th. I intended that you should debit the paymaster with the sums of which you sent me the account some time ago. I was always of opinion that the Bombay government was not sufficiently strong in troops. In fact, notwithstanding the treaties with the Guickwar and the consequent demands for service, the increase of territory to the northward, the detachment of the Bombay army at Poonah, and the war with the Marhattas, the Bombay army has not been increased one man.

‘But as far as I am concerned, I do not conceive that I want more troops. I only wish that those in Guzerat were complete in numbers, that the army there was properly organized, well equipped, and supplied with provisions in a regular manner from certain sources; and I should feel very easy, not only regarding the fate of that province, but the result of the war itself.

‘Under these circumstances, I can give no opinion respecting the proposed alteration, particularly as the Governor General has positively ordered that the Bombay army should not be increased; and indeed, after all, I do not conceive that the army would gain much in point of numbers by the alteration of the Fencible battalion into a regular one. What we want in Guzerat is organization, equipment, and regular sources of supplies. If we should be able to arrange that, and Holkar should enter into the war, I will lay that corps upon the back of Indore and Ougein, in such a manner as probably will induce the gentry to turn their thoughts to

the defence of their own territories, instead of the annoyance of ours.

'The capture of Ahmednuggur has made an entire alteration in the nature of Scindiah's connexion with the Deccan, of which Mr. Duncan does not appear to be aware. Each of the southern chiefs must now see that he has no power, and no means of bringing an army here, excepting as a free-booter; and they will be less likely to interfere in the war, at least on his side. Angria, in particular, who must know that he is exposed to attack in the manner Mr. Duncan points out, will consider the matter well before he ventures to attack us. Till he shows an inclination to attack us, I am decidedly against interfering with him: first, because the existence of the contest will disturb the communications; secondly, we have not a body of troops for the service on which we can depend; and, thirdly, because without such a body of troops, the success is doubtful.

'Mr. Duncan talks of seamen, artillery, and sepoy. But he has an opinion of Colonel Murray's judgment, and I beg that he may ask that officer what he thinks of Angria's forts, and whether a force so composed could get possession of them. Besides, I do not believe they are upon the sea coast, and there must be an equipment of heavy guns, stores, provisions, &c., &c., not one of which has been contemplated. For my part I will have nothing to do with the expedition, and shall object to all such, for which I do not see sufficient means provided.

'In respect to Scindiah's vakeel at Bombay, it is my opinion that Mr. Duncan ought to write to Angria to inform him that, in consequence of Scindiah's aggression, the Company were at war with that chief, and have already expelled him from the hold he had in the Deccan; that under these circumstances it was not consistent with the established usage that Scindiah should have a vakeel at Bombay; that, however, Mr. Duncan felt uneasy respecting the dismissal of this man, as he was also the vakeel of Angria, and that he requested that Angria would appoint some other person to act at Bombay on his behalf. In this manner Mr. Duncan will get rid of the vakeel, and it will not be necessary to quarrel with Angria.

'I wish you would try to procure for me some accounts of Chandore, in case it should be necessary to attack that place.

Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

' SIR, ' Camp at Kantere, 19th August, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th, and I am happy to find that you approve of my letter to the Governor General of the 24th of July.

‘I informed you in my last, that the cavalry marched from Ahmednuggur on the 14th. I shall join them with the infantry, on the Godavery, to-morrow or the day after, and hope to find the boats at liberty to cross the infantry.’

‘I have taken possession of all Scindiah’s territories south of the Godavery, of which I have appointed Captain Graham to be the collector. I have raised a body of peons to occupy the tannahs; and I have employed one of the sirdars of the Mysore cavalry to raise a body of horse; by means of which I propose to keep the country in tranquillity, and the communication through it open and free.

'I shall send you copies of all the letters, orders, &c., which I have given upon this subject.

I have appointed Lieut. Bellingham to act as Paymaster, and Lieut. Campbell, of the 78th regiment, as my Brigade Major.

I have put the 2nd of the 3rd, with 30 men of the 84th regiment, and artillerymen for a brigade of guns, into the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

‘I have appointed Captain Fisher Commissary of Stores, and Lieut. Carfrae, Deputy Paymaster and Garrison Store-keeper. These two officers are most important to arrange the provisions and military stores already in the garrison, and those which I have ordered up from Bombay. Captain Fisher is well qualified for his office, having been Commissary at Goa, and having lately arranged the stores at Hullihall. Lieut. Carfrae is the fittest for his in his corps: having been heretofore a Staff officer at Chittledroog, he must have some knowledge of the duties required from him; and I thought it better to employ him in the situation, than to take any other officer away from his duty in the field.

‘I have ordered up but a small quantity of military stores, as the garrison appears already well supplied with them; but I have ordered up a large supply of provisions, viz., 10,000 bullock loads of rice, a large quantity of arrack, biscuit, and salt provisions and salt.

‘The repairs of the fort are already commenced; but in the mean time the fort is secure; as before I left it the rubbish was cleared away from the ditch, and I gave particular

orders that it might be done daily, so that even when the wall shall be cut down as low as the place at which our fire damaged it, it will still be so high as to make me free from all apprehension that the place can be insulted.

‘Major Dallas was at Perinda on the 15th. He will be at Ahmednuggur in three or four days. I have not heard of Lieut. Griffiths excepting from Major Dallas, that he was ten days’ march behind him. I have ordered him to march upon Moongy Puttun, on the Godavery, from Kurdlah.

‘I have heard from the Resident at Hyderabad, that Major Hill had not crossed the Kistna on the 6th, and had lost one-third of his bullocks by the effects of the rain. I before informed you that Major Dallas had lost 3000 of the 5000 that he had, by the same rain. This rain appears to have been universal. It detained me in my camp at Walkee till the 8th. It was very violent in Scindiah’s camp, and it destroyed many of Colonel Stevenson’s cattle. I only hope that the enemy has equally suffered. I have since had fine weather, and I hope that this has been equally general.

‘Scindiah moved on the 12th or 13th towards the Adjunttee ghaut; but Colonel Stevenson’s advanced guard was in the neighborhood; and the Colonel writes, on the 15th, that all the troops which have been near Adjunttee, below the ghaut, had moved to the eastward, and that the plan was to enter the Nizam’s territory near Jaffierabad. He intended to move that way.

‘I cannot say yet whether Holkar will join Scindiah.

‘The capture of Ahmednuggur has made a great impression at Poonah and to the southward; and if it should make an equal one on Holkar, he will, at least, be neutral.

‘Amrut Rao’s vakeel has promised that his master shall join me by the end of this month at Aurungabad.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp 20th August, 1803.

‘It is necessary that we should take possession of a village belonging to the Rajah of Berar, by name Nimgaum, about 30 miles south east from Ahmednuggur, and not far from the ground on which we were encamped for a length of time, near Sangwee. This village may be of some strength, and there are some horse in it.

‘I have accordingly desired Captain Lucas to send three companies with the two 6 pounders, and Bistnapah Pundit to

place 600 horse at your disposal; and I recommend that they should be sent off as soon as possible after you receive this letter, as Major Dallas is now upon the road; and his being in the neighborhood with his battalion may have the effect of producing the quiet surrender of the place.

'I enclose herewith a letter to the headman at Nimgaum, which might as well be sent on an hour or two before the party, by a person who could take an opportunity of looking at the gate of the village, and would see whether it could be blown open; likewise proclamations, &c., to the same purport as those issued respecting Scindiah's villages.

'The bearer has likewise a letter for Bistnapah Pundit, to desire him to place 600 horse at your disposal. These are to join me again as soon as they shall have performed this service.

'You will send peons with the party to remain in Nimgaum as the tannah.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Captain Graham.*

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

'P. S. Since writing the above, Bistnapah Pundit has come into camp, but the horse will go off to Ahmednuggur in the morning. Let the infantry commence their march to Nimgaum, and the horse can follow them.

'I wish you would send 100 peons to take post in the Nimderrah pass, through which we marched, in order to keep in check the Bheels in that quarter, and keep the road open for our supplies. They should patrol the road up to the village of Waumborry, belonging to the Peshwah, and six miles from the pass.

To Colonel Stevenson.

'Camp at Carwoondy,
20th August, 1803.

'*MY DEAR COLONEL,*

'I have received your letter of the 17th. There is only one part of your plan which I should wish to see altered; and that is, your intention to retire to Moongy Puttun. Depend upon it, that no pindarries or straggling horse will venture to your rear, so long as you can keep the enemy in check, and your detachment well in advance. Dash at the first fellows that make their appearance, and the campaign will be our own.

'I enclose you an extraordinary letter from Captain Munt. I have written to desire him to forbear from using any force or threats towards the servants of the Nizam's government.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Colonel Stevenson.*

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Senboogaum, 21st August, 1803.

‘Since the capture of Ahmednuggur I have taken possession of the districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in this quarter depending upon that fortress, in the name of the Honorable Company and the Peshwah, and I have appointed Captain Graham, who was heretofore a collector of the revenue under the government of Fort St. George, to manage them.

‘I have the honor to enclose a list of the districts*, and an estimate of their value, upon which, however, little reliance can be placed. I likewise enclose a copy of a letter of instructions which I have written to Captain Graham.

‘The reasons for which I have taken possession of these districts are, that the troops under my command should enjoy their resources ; that they should be speedily transferred from the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; and that they should be kept in a state of tranquillity, while the British troops are in advance. I should have been disappointed in my expectations of enjoying these advantages, if I had delivered the districts to the management of the Peshwah’s amildar.

‘As, however, they are part of the territories of the Peshwah, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah held them only as a chief of the Marhatta empire ; and as the fort of Ahmednuggur is most important for the security of Poonah ; and the districts are intermixed with those belonging to the Peshwah, I thought it probable that his Highness would desire to have them. I therefore requested Lieut. Colonel Close to explain the causes for which I have placed the districts under the

* *Estimate of the Gross Revenue of the conquered Province of Ahmednuggur, late under the dominion of Dowlut Rao Scindiah : taken from the verbal communication of the principal Zemindar, immediately after the Conquest.*

Pergunnahs.		Villages.	Rupees.
South of the Godavery	116	337,000
North of the Godavery	71	297,000
			<hr/> 634,000

‘Much reliance cannot be placed on the accuracy of this statement. I think it probable that the revenues are rather under than overrated. The dispersed state of the late official servants, as well as the records, will, for some time, prevent us from acquiring a correct insight into the actual revenue resources of the province. An account of the number of villages in each pergunnah cannot be immediately obtained.

‘J. G. GRAHAM, Acting Collector.’

management of a British officer, in case he should find that the Peshwah entertained such a wish; and to assure his Highness that their produce should be applied to defray the expenses of the war, and that the accounts of its expenditure should be laid before him.

‘Although his Highness the Nizam, or his representative, the present Soubahdar of the Deccan, would have a better claim, from the exertions which that government has made to produce an army in the field, than the Peshwah, to a share of the benefits to be expected from the successful prosecution of the war, I have not included his name in the proclamation by which I have taken possession of the country: because I was aware of the jealousies of the Marhattas respecting the possession of the fort of Ahmednuggur, and of the countries depending upon it, so immediately in the neighborhood of Poonah, which I was desirous not to excite. And as it will remain in your Excellency’s power to dispose of the fort, the districts, and their revenue, in any manner you may think proper, it is a matter of immaterial importance to the interests of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, whether his Highness’s name is included in the proclamation, although to have inserted it would certainly have excited the jealousy of the Marhattas.

‘Your Excellency will observe, from a perusal of the orders which I have given to Captain Graham, that it is probable that the net produce of these districts will be but trifling; but I imagine that the resources of money which might be derived from their revenue will not be wanting. I have every reason to hope that the measures which I have therein directed will preserve the tranquillity of the country, and secure, during the war, the communication between Poonah and Ahmednuggur, and also forward to Aurungabad, than which the troops cannot enjoy a greater benefit.

‘I have the honor to inform your Excellency that the cavalry of my division have passed the Godavery, and the infantry are now crossing.* The enemy had not entered the Nizam’s territories on the 18th instant. The armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had been in the neighborhood of the Adjuttee ghaut, but had marched to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Colonel Stevenson had intelligence of their movement, and had marched towards Jaffierabad.

* The Godavery was very wide, and the army was passed over it in wicker boats, made by the troops from the jungle, and covered with bullock skins.

‘I have no intelligence that Jeswunt Rao Holkar has recrossed the Nerbudda.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Senboogaum, 21st August, 1803.

‘You will receive from Mr. Duncan a copy of my letter to him of the 2nd instant, detailing my ideas regarding the organization of the troops and the defence of Guzerat: in addition to which, I have but little to say. The calculations of numbers, which I have made in that letter, have included sick, of which, I am sorry to observe, that there are a vast number at Surat. I recommend this point to your attention and inquiry, and if you should have reason to believe that the station in which are the barracks of the European troops is unhealthy, you will recommend to government that it may be altered; and that, in the mean time, the troops may be encamped in a healthy situation. Every attention must be paid to economy, but I consider nothing in this country so valuable as the life and health of the British soldier, and nothing so expensive as soldiers in hospital. On this ground, it is worth while to incur almost any expense to preserve their lives and their health.

‘I also request you to pay particular attention to their discipline and regularity, and to prevent their getting intoxicating liquors, which tend to their destruction.

‘You will observe, in my letter of the 2nd, that I have proposed that two detachments should be formed, one in front of Surat, the other in front of Baroda. The sick of the Southern detachment may be left in Surat, to the strength of which place they will add in time—those of the northern detachment, in Baroda.

‘I have perhaps made Parneira too strong, but I did so because it was near Damaun, upon which place it is supposed that the French have an eye. With a view to the necessity of operations at Damaun, to frustrate the designs of the French, I have proposed that there should be a magazine of provisions at Parneira. In other respects, that post is too far to the southward ever to be of any use.

‘As soon as Baroach shall be taken, I recommend that you should collect your troops in a station in front of Baroda, north of the Nerbudda. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as far as I can learn, is still north of that river, and should he enter

into the war, of which I have no certainty, it is most probable that he will attempt to invade the province of Guzerat from Indore. If he should do that, you must attack him immediately. If he should return to the southward, and cross the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee, you might move your corps across these rivers likewise; and you will certainly be beforehand with him, as you will not have one third of the distance to march.

‘However, this return to the southward must depend upon circumstances. We must recollect, that Canojee and Mulhar Rao, although enemies of an inferior order, will take advantage of the absence of the troops and prosecute their designs from the northward, and that Anund Rao’s troops may not be able to contend with them. It may also happen that although Jeswunt Rao Holkar might return to the southward, he may not intend to enter the Attavesy, and even if he should, he could not do it without my being close behind him. This state of the case may, indeed, entirely prevent the invasion by the Songhur, or road south of the Taptee, and may leave you at liberty to act as you please.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Toka, 22nd August, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th, enclosing two of the 7th instant from Major Walker, I have also received a letter from Mr. Duncan of the 17th; and Lieut. Colonel Close has forwarded to me copies of a correspondence between Mr. Duncan and Major Walker, in which an important question is discussed, respecting the nature of the alliance between the Honorable Company and the Guickwar state, and how far the latter is obliged to enter into the war with Scindiah, with whose government he is in “close alliance.”

‘2. Before I proceed to the consideration of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, it is proper that I should advert to this question; for if it be true that the Guickwar state is not obliged to take part in the war with the Marhatta chiefs, the question respecting the defence of the Guickwar territories is not referable to me.

‘3. I have seen copies of two treaties between the Company and the Guickwar, by which the latter has agreed to subsidize one company of artillery, and two battalions of native infantry: both governments have agreed that there

should be true friendship and good understanding between them; and the British Government have agreed to give Anund Rao countenance and protection in all his public concerns, as may appear for the good of the country.

'4. Although it is not immediately specified, it can never have been intended that the Company should protect the Guickwar state, unless the Guickwar should also assist the Company with its forces against the enemies of the British Government. Indeed, I cannot understand the words "true friendship and good understanding," in any other manner. If it were otherwise, the consequence would be, that the Company would be involved in perpetual war for the protection of the Guickwar state, without any adequate compensation, excepting that of repayment of the expenses incurred; and the connexion between the two governments would be one not very creditable to the Honorable Company. If this doctrine be admitted, it would be such as the petty states in Germany have occasionally had with his Majesty, the foundation of which was the use of their troops for hire, with this additional disadvantage, that the Company is bound to protect the Guickwar state at all risks, for repayment of the expenses incurred.

'5. If the British Government are not to have the assistance of Anund Rao against our enemies, I cannot see what advantage it is to us to support his power against Canojee or any other pretender. It certainly will not be considered as an advantage, when weighed with the inconvenience of allotting to that service a large body of European troops, at a moment when the service of every soldier is required.

'6. But although Major Walker has brought forward this construction upon the treaties, I cannot believe that he thinks it correct. In the 13th and 14th paragraphs of the paper enclosed with your letter of the 16th, he talks of the advantage to which we may still look forward, and he recommends that we should give our military aid "promptly, liberally, and extensively," whenever the necessities of the Guickwar state may require it. He has not stated precisely what the advantages are which may result from giving it; but I conclude that he must expect some other advantage besides the mere payment of the hire of the troops.

'7. He has, indeed, mentioned one consequence of our affording our military aid in the manner he has pointed out, as an advantage, viz., that it will disgust the Guickwar state with their own troops, and render them useless and contemptible; but I can never consider that an advantage. It

is certainly an inconvenient consequence of a subsidiary alliance between the British Government in India and a native power. But whether we consider these alliances as intended to give real strength to the empire ; or, according to the new doctrine, to be only a mode of hiring out our troops, as we are bound by them all to protect the territories of those powers who pay us subsidies, it cannot be good policy to render contemptible, and destroy entirely, their own military resources.

‘8. Indeed, all the subsidiary engagements, excepting that with the Guickwar state, show that the policy is different ; for they all provide that the native governments with which they are contracted shall have a force to act with the British troops.

‘9. Upon the whole, as I cannot conceive that the only object in concluding the treaties with the Guickwar state was to obtain payment for the service of a body of British troops ; as that construction of the treaties would be discreditable to the reputation of the British Government, the treaties affording no advantage adequate to the inconvenience of protecting the government of Anund Rao ; and as Major Walker does not appear to be of opinion that the construction is correct, although he has brought it forward, I am decidedly of opinion that the engagement must be considered to be mutual ; that the enemies of one state are the enemies of the other ; and the Guickwar state is bound to co-operate in a war in which the British Government have been forced in their own defence.

‘10. The next point to consider, is the plan of operations to be carried on in the prosecution of that war. The Governor General has positively ordered, and there is no doubt whatever of the expediency, that operations should be commenced in Guzerat, by the siege of Baroach. This place is of no strength whatever. Major Walker declares that its garrison is weak : if preparations were made as suggested in my letter of the 26th of July to Major Walker, and if the attack has been made as ordered in my letter of the 6th of August, it will certainly be in our possession before any of the particular enemies of the Guickwar state, or Jeswunt Rao Holkar can know of the war.

‘11. After that operation shall have been effected, the orders of the Governor General, as well as expediency point out the necessity of attacking Champaneer, and any other hold that Dowlut Rao Scindiah may have in Guzerat ; and I have to observe, that if the operations against that

place are pushed forward, it is very probable that it will be in our possession before the season will permit the enemy to disturb them.

‘12. On the 2nd instant, I had the honor of addressing the Governor of Bombay; and I proposed a distribution and organization of the troops in Guzerat, and the countries depending on Surat, which in my opinion, were likely to secure the defence of the whole. I again addressed him on the 13th, and urged that the disposable troops in those countries should be posted, as in the case supposed, in my letter of the 2nd, of an invasion, north of the Nerbudda, as soon as possible; as Jeswunt Rao Holkâr was gone to the northward, and there was no immediate prospect of an irruption by the southern road of Songhur.

‘13. I again urged this measure yesterday, in a letter which I wrote to Colonel Murray; and I repeat, that till the troops are regularly disposed of; till it is decided which of them are intended for the field, and which for garrison; till regular and certain means of feeding them are provided in all parts of the country in which their operations can be required, it is impossible to undertake for the defence of Guzerat.

‘14. Major Walker has proposed a variety of operations, viz: 1st. An expedition against Canojee; 2nd. An expedition against Mulhar Rao; 3rd. An expedition into the Kattywar, combined with one against Bhooj and the Dwarka pirates.

‘15. I cannot enter into these operations; 1st. Because the Governor General has given orders, and it is expedient that Scindiah's fort of Baroach should be attacked, and that he should be deprived of his possessions in that quarter. 2nd. Because I do not see adequate resources of men or means for any of these operations. 3rd. Because it is by no means certain that Holkar will not join the confederates; and if the troops should be employed against Canojee, or Mulhar Rao, or in Kattywar, the whole province will be left defenceless to his ravages.

‘16. Upon a perusal of the paper B, enclosed in your letter of the 16th, I observe, that after provision shall be made for the carriage of the tents which are in store, and which will be required if the troops take the field, there will not remain three hundred bullocks for the carriage of the provisions and military stores: with such an equipment, the troops, so far from being prepared for the offensive operations proposed by Major Walker, could not, if opposed by an enemy, make even one march from their magazine.

‘17. The plan of operations which I should prefer in Guzerat, would be to collect the troops, as proposed in my letter of the 2nd instant, with a view to an invasion from the northward, as soon as they should have taken Baroach, and Scindiah’s other possessions; that the magazines should be prepared and collected for them in the different parts of the country in which they might be called upon to act; that they should have with them the means of moving one month’s provisions and a good proportion of stores: that those troops, so collected, should fall at once with their whole strength upon the strongest of the parties expected to invade Guzerat, whenever the invasion should take place.

‘18. When employed in this service, some of the weaker enemies may invade the country and may do some mischief; but that is a temporary evil, one trifling in its nature, and which, at all events, cannot be prevented.

‘19. To disperse the troops in three different divisions, to make head against the three expected attacks, will not answer. None of the divisions can be strong enough to act with vigour: the consequence must be, that the whole country will be plundered, and very possibly some misfortune may happen to one of the divisions, which might give the enemy a permanent settlement within it.

‘20. Under the plan which I proposed, no permanent settlement can be made by an enemy in any part of the country; and if the collected force should be so fortunate as to beat and drive out Jeswunt Rao Holkar, Canojee and Mulhar Rao will certainly not remain in the country; the consequence may be, the possibility of attacking Indore or Ougein; or if Jeswunt Rao Holkar should not enter Guzerat, and the efforts of our collected force should be directed against Canojee and Mulhar Rao, it will be sufficiently large to make such an impression upon them, as entirely to put an end to all apprehensions of future invasions by those enemies.

‘21. These are my sentiments upon the plan of operations for Guzerat. I can have but little local knowledge of that country, and Major Walker must have much; but I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our small forces in that quarter, and to undertaking many distinct operations with inadequate means. If the Honorable the Governor in Council should think it proper to adopt the suggestions of Major Walker, they must be carried into execution, and I hope that I shall not be considered responsible for the consequences.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

officers during the continuance of the war, I have written to Rajah Mohiput Ram to request that he will produce the authority of Colonel Stevenson for seizing the districts in question, and I propose hereafter to desire him to give them up.

'In my opinion, you will find it necessary to make an advance of money to the Nabob of Kurnool, to enable him to take the field; and if he should demand it, I recommend that it should be made, as the services of his troops will be very useful.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'Camp at Toka, North bank of the Godavery,
24th August, 1803.

'MY LORD,

'I have the honor to enclose the translation of an agreement* into which I have entered with Amrut Rao's vakeel, to which I have every reason to believe that chief will give his consent.

'Amrut Rao had formerly, under the Peshwah's government, lands in jaghire which produced between six and seven lacs of rupees per annum; of these part have been ceded to the Company in Guzerat, under the treaty of Bassein; and two districts to the southward of the Malpoorba have been given to Appah Dessaye, a chief who is serving with the British troops under my command. The remainder of the lands about Sungum-nair, and bordering on the Godavery, to the amount of about four lacs of rupees per annum, are still in Amrut Rao's hands, although the Peshwah has given orders that they may be seized.

'I have requested Lieut. Colonel Close to inform the Peshwah, that I have made an agreement with Amrut Rao, and expected that chief would join me at Aurungabad; and that, under these circumstances, I requested his Highness to suspend all hostilities against his brother. I did not deem it expedient to apprise his Highness of the particulars of the agreement which I have made with Amrut Rao, at least till I should know whether he would comply with my request to suspend his hostilities.

'If he should comply with my request, the deficiency of revenue to be made up for Amrut Rao will be about three lacs of rupees per annum, respecting which I hope there will

* See page 191.

be no difficulty hereafter : in the mean time Amrut Rao's jaghire on the Godavery connects well with the districts under Ahmednuggur, and being in the hands of a friendly chief, adds much to the security of Poonah.

' I am concerned to have to inform your Excellency that Major Malcolm has been obliged to quit camp and go to Bombay on account of his health; he has hopes that he will be able to rejoin me in the course of a month; but in the interval I shall suffer some inconvenience from the want of information and assistance, which he is so capable of affording me.

' The troops under my command have passed the Godavery.

' Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajar of Berar had not entered the Nizam's territories on the 20th : they have moved from the Adjuttee ghaut to the eastward, towards the Badowly ghaut. Colonel Stevenson was at Jaffierabad, at no great distance from them.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor General.*'

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Shawe.

' Camp at Toka, North of the Godavery,
24th August, 1803.

' MY DEAR SIR,

' I have had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 2nd and 3rd.

' Adverting to the Governor General's instructions to Mr. Mercer, and the plan of the campaign, and observing from Colonel Close's dispatch to the Governor General, that he had referred to my opinion, and that of Mr. Duncan, the Peshwah's proposal to cede lands in Bundelcund in lieu of those in Savanore, I have to tell you, that I approve much of that plan. As, according to the plan of the campaign, the Governor General intends to take Bundelcund, it may be supposed that we shall lose, by the adoption of it, all that we should have gained in Savanore and Bancapoor. But I think that the Governor General would alter his plan respecting Bundelcund, as soon as he should find that it belonged to the Peshwah; and that in fact, if we should take Savanore and Guzerat, it is almost the only resource of his Highness's government.

' The question, then, respecting Bundelcund, and the whole of the proposition from the Peshwah, contained in Colonel Close's dispatch, will stand exactly as it would if

the Governor General had not determined on the seizure of that province, as a part of the plan of the campaign.

‘In my opinion, it would have been inconvenient to take Savanore. The southern chiefs, most of whom are at this moment in a state of neutrality, have all an interest in that province; it would require a large body of troops to take possession of it, and as none can be allotted for that service at present, it must be delayed, at least, till the conclusion of the war.

‘The resources of the Peshwah’s government are but very small indeed. His sersoubah cannot venture to go into Savanore to take possession of those countries which remain to his Highness, until the Company’s troops can be spared to take possession of those which have been ceded; the Peshwah’s lands about Poonah are waste, and he has only what remains to him of Guzerat, and a part of the Konkan. The addition to his revenues of sixteen lacs of rupees from Savanore, which he has never enjoyed, will attach him to the Company’s government.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close has explained the situation of the Vinchoor jaghiredar in his public dispatch, and has stated the strong desire of the Peshwah, that he should retain his jaghire of Oolpar, near Surat. In fact, this chief is the only one in the empire, who has been from the commencement faithful to the cause of the Peshwah. While fighting in this cause against Holkar, his troops were entirely cut to pieces, he and his son were wounded, his jaghire of Vinchoor was destroyed, and Oolpar alone remained of all that he possessed, and this was ceded to the Company. I certainly think it desirable that this chief should get back that district. But Mr. Duncan contends, that to return it will be inconvenient to Surat, and that it would be better to provide for Vittell Seo Deo elsewhere.

‘This chief declares that he never will consent to relinquish his jaghire, and gives several reasons for this determination, referable to his family, his honor, &c. &c. The fact is, that he sees that this district is likely to be in tranquillity, and to be productive, from its neighborhood to Surat, and the Company’s districts in the Attavesy, and from the connexion between the Company and the Guickwar, and, therefore, he is desirous to keep it. I acknowledge, that I think it would be preferable to suffer a little inconvenience at Surat, and to attach to the British Government’s connexion such a servant as Vittell Seo Deo, and to gain the credit in the Marhatta empire of rewarding his

services and fidelity to his master, to keeping the district only for the convenience of the city of Surat.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the proposal of the Peshwah respecting Bundelcund ought to be accepted.

‘I come now to consider the memoranda included in your letter of the 3rd.

‘In case I should have an opportunity of negotiating a peace, I will attend to the first two articles.

‘In respect to the third, I have no idea that the Peshwah will attempt to fly from Poonah; or that if he should be so inclined, he could carry his plan into execution without the knowledge of his ministers. You will have observed from my letters to Colonel Close, that I have urged him to pay the ministers, in order to have accurate information of what passes.

‘We cannot contrive to settle the government at Poonah till the conclusion of the war. Bad as the situation of the government is, it must be allowed to continue. If we were to attempt to alter it now, we should have a contest in our rear, which would be ruinous.

‘It is impossible to foresee exactly in what situation the conclusion of the war will leave us, or what the settlement at Poonah ought to be. The Governor General knows, however, that I have concluded an arrangement with Amrut Rao, and I have opened a negotiation with Holkar, in which I have proposed that he should combine his interests with those of the British Government. I have not yet had an answer to my first letter to that chief; but a hircarrah, come from Amrut Rao’s camp this morning, says that it was reported there, that Holkar had gone to Indore; and if that be the case, it is probable that he proposes to remain neutral till he shall see which party is most likely to be successful. This hircarrah also reported that Amrut Rao was coming to join me at Aurungabad.

‘In respect to the 4th article, before you have received this, the Governor General will have heard that the southern chiefs have kept aloof; and that all that we can expect from them, is their neutrality during the war. I have written to them since the fall of Ahmednuggur, but I have, as yet, received no answer. If I should find them disposed to join, upon condition that their possessions shall be confirmed and guaranteed to them, I will enter into engagements accordingly.

‘Mr. Duncan has been particularly anxious to seize

Angria's possessions; a measure which I have vehemently opposed, and in which I have declared that I will not cooperate, for the following reasons:—

‘First, till we establish a plentiful depôt at Ahmednugur, it is absolutely necessary that we should keep up our communication with Panwell and Bombay, and it would be desirable to keep it up at all events. The road passes through Angria's country, and he has hitherto suffered the communication to be carried on undisturbed. He will not resign his possessions without a contest; during the existence of which, the road would be interrupted, and he might continue to make it inconvenient, even after he should be driven out.

‘Secondly, Mr. Duncan has no means of carrying on this expedition: he talks of seamen, artillerymen, and 300 or 400 sepoy, but Angria has two or three very strong hill forts in the Konkan, not immediately on the sea-coast; these must be regularly attacked, heavy equipments must be formed for these attacks, and there must be something better to carry them on, than the troops proposed by Mr. Duncan.

‘Thirdly, the situation of Scindiah, relatively to Angria and all the southern chiefs, has been materially altered by the fall of Ahmednuggur. They must now see that he has no means of moving a regular army into the Deccan; he may come in with a few horse as a freebooter, and he will be driven out again, but he can do them no harm. On the other hand, they must also perceive that there is no fort so strong, as that the British troops cannot get into it; they are all much attached to, and place great reliance on, their forts; and Angria in particular, who must, from his situation, feel himself exposed to the constant attacks of the British Government, will not like to venture to offend us, by taking advantage of his situation, to cut off our communication with Bombay.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, I am decidedly of opinion, that Angria ought not to be touched; and indeed, generally, I am induced to oppose these little expeditions of Mr. Duncan, for the success of which I never see adequate means provided.

‘I will write to Colonel Close respecting the sixth article in the memoranda.

‘With respect to the seventh article, I have to tell you, that the confederates have moved to the eastward, and Colonel Stevenson has moved in a parallel line with them, and he will fall upon them as soon as he can. He will con-

tinue that course even to Nagpoor, if it should be necessary ; and I shall be able to move in a day or two, which will probably induce Scindiah at least to return. The confederates cannot make any serious impression upon the Nizam's territories, till the middle of October, when it may be expected that the river Godavery will fall ; and I have strongly recommended to the Resident at Hyderabad, that a corps should be collected at that city, to protect it effectually, in case the enemy should contrive to pass round us. If they should go to the northward to invade Bengal, some of us must follow them.

‘ In case of peace, I will attend to the eighth article.

‘ Twelve days have elapsed since I took Ahmednuggur ; and in that time I have marched nearly fifty miles, and have crossed the river Godavery : having settled our conquests south of that river, I hope to get on equally well in future ; but I tremble for the want of the common country grains for the followers and cattle. The country is completely exhausted, the villages depopulated, and large tracts of excellent land uncultivated. Indeed, I believe that these facts are the principal causes of Holkar's keeping aloof from the confederates. We have lost such numbers of cattle by the length of our march and starvation, that we have none to carry grain for our followers ; and I learn that we have lost vast numbers of those coming from General Stuart's army ; I believe nearly one half of the whole number.

‘ However, large numbers of dealers attend the camp, who came with me from Mysore ; and if the Nizam's servants afford us any supplies, we shall still do tolerably well. I have plenty for the troops, and it may be depended upon, that I will do every thing in my power to procure what is wanted for the followers.

‘ I do not like our situation in Guzerat : we have plenty of troops for the defence of that province, but they are not organized or commanded, one party being under the command of a committee, consisting of a collector, a judge, and Colonel Callandar, and the other, under that of Major Walker : they are not equipped or provided. I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan for the organization and equipment of the troops, and for the general defence of Guzerat. But although he cannot disapprove of it, it interferes with all his little prejudices, plans of operation, Mooluck-geery, conquests in Kattywar, &c., &c., and I see plainly that it never will be carried into execution, as it ought ; and that, in fact, it will be thwarted. Under these circumstances, I had

serious thoughts of writing to the Governor General, to request him to relieve me from the command in Guzerat; but I have refrained from doing so, and shall persevere as long as I can.

‘What do you think of Mr. Duncan and Major Walker doubting whether Anund Rao’s troops, and even the subsidiary force, should go on the expedition to Baroach (which, by the by, after all I believe they have not sent), as the Guickwar government was in “close alliance” with Dowlut Rao Scindiah? Then they have their troops scattered in companies in ten thousand different directions. They have three complete regiments of Europeans, and parts of three others in those countries, but none collected; and they have neither provisions, ammunition, cattle, magazines, nor any one equipment that the troops want.

‘The fort of Songhur, an important post for the security of Surat, was attacked by a banditti in the beginning of July: there were 100 sepoys and an officer in it. After the attack, the committee of Surat found out that the officer had neither ammunition nor provisions. They deliberated upon the subject, considered it well, referred it to Colonel Callandar, to Bombay, and to the officer at Songhur; but as late as the 21st July, they had not sent off the provisions or ammunition; and, as far as I know, they may not yet have been sent. Every thing is to be apprehended from such people.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘Camp at Toka, North of the Godavery,

24th August, 1803.

‘SIR,

‘I have the honor to enclose herewith a letter for Lord Clive, which contains a dispatch for the Governor General. An hircarra came in from Amrut Rao’s camp this morning, who declares that after the receipt of my agreement, of which the enclosed contains a translation, he determined upon marching to join me as proposed. This same hircarra also tells me that Holkar had gone to Indore.

‘Major Dallas will be here to-morrow. Lieut. Griffiths was 30 miles south of Culburga on the 8th; and Major Hill did not expect to march from the Kistna till the 13th.

‘We find the country much destroyed and exhausted; but I hope that we shall get on well, if the Nizam’s servants supply us at all.

'Before we left Ahmednuggur, some looking glasses, swords, pistols, fowling pieces, &c., belonging to Scindiah, were found in the fort. The place, in which these articles were, was wanted; and I ordered that they might be sold. As soon as I shall have ascertained what there was, and what grain and stores there are, I proposed to recommend to the Governor General that the value of them should be given to the troops as prize. The expense will be trifling, and they certainly deserve this encouragement.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. General Stuart.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 25th August, 1803.

'Goklah received 45,000 rupees a few days ago, and now he wants 75,000 more. He says that this sum was due eight days, and that it ought to have been paid on the 16th of this month. I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire at the durbar upon this subject, and let me know whether Goklah is to have this money.

'I have desired Bellingham to write to you, to request that 25,000 rupees, for which I signed a bill yesterday, might be sent to Ahmednuggur, to Lieut. Carfrae, the paymaster at that place. If Goklah is to have these 75,000 rupees, it will be necessary that you should send me on as much money as you can conveniently get, besides that sum which is still to go to Ahmednuggur.

'Major Dallas is come in, but I have not yet seen him, or learnt the number of cattle he has brought with him. On the 22nd, the enemy marched from the neighborhood of the Badowly ghaut, back towards Goonipeepre, between Adjunttee and Burhampore, and about ten coss from the former: Colonel Stevenson was at Dewal ghaut, about ten miles from the Badowly ghaut.

'I hear that Gopal Bhow went off from the Casserbarry ghaut on the 23rd, but of this I am not certain: a hircarrah, who came yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, and left Amrut Rao's camp on the 22nd, reported that Amrut Rao intended to come to join me. He also said, that Amrut Rao had received accounts that Holkar had gone to Indore; this last report is confirmed by one of a similar purport from Chandore.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 26th August, 1803.

‘I enclose papers which I have received from Appah Dessaye, regarding the difficulties of his situation. I have sent him word that I have crossed the river, and am about to advance, and that, until he joins, I can do nothing for him. It is really necessary that something should be determined about the payment of these two parties.

‘My whole time and attention, which are required by many other objects, are taken up in disputing with Goklah and Appah Dessaye, about their pay. The latter swears that he cannot get possession of his jaghires, and that, till he does get them, his troops must have money; and certainly, what he says upon this subject appears reasonable. But if they must have money, how much are they to have, and who is to pay them? If the Company are to pay them, it would be better for me to hire an equal number of troops at the same expense, than to have these fellows, whom we must always suspect of sending intelligence to the enemy, and from whom I doubt that we shall have but little service; or at once to take them into the Company’s service at certain rates of pay.

‘At all events, if we are to pay them, (and I do not see how they can keep the field unless we do,) we must either have some assistance from the Peshwah of money, or of influence in procuring it from the soucars for our drafts. We ought also to have a small detachment of his cavalry to accompany the escort, which will march occasionally with the treasure from Poonah. Only conceive what a drain upon my resources of money, 75,000 rupees monthly to Goklah, and 60,000 monthly to Appah Dessaye, will be; besides the force collecting at Ahmednuggur, for which provision must be made, as the collection cannot be expected for many months, and two additional battalions coming from the frontier.

‘I wish you to turn these points over in your mind. It is useless to say that Goklah ought to serve for his jaghire in Savanore, and Appah Dessaye for his in various other places; for they neither can, nor will, serve at such a distance from those places, particularly the latter, who has never got possession of the lands allotted to him. Either they must have money, or they must be sent back; and I wish to have the question decided, as I cannot give up my

time daily to argue with these chiefs, and their carkoons, upon these points, with which, after all, I ought to have nothing to do.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp, North of the Godavery,

26th August, 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have received your letter of the 23rd. Gopal Bhow is certainly gone off. I have a letter from Colonel Stevenson, in which he informs me that the enemy had returned to Goompeepre on the 22nd. He had sent a detachment down the ghaut to ascertain the fact, and it cut off some of the enemy’s supplies. He intended to move on the night of the 23rd, upon a detachment of Ragojee Bhoonslah, gone to the eastward; and at the same time he sent a body of infantry to Jaffierabad to keep in check the enemy in case they should design to come up by Adjuntee or Ferdapoor. I think it is capital that we should have begun to play the Marhatta game upon themselves; and that, at all events, Colonel Stevenson alone should have contrived to have kept them out of the Nizam’s territories, and in their own exhausted countries, for above a fortnight since the commencement of hostilities.

‘Major Walker’s intelligence is much exaggerated, much of it false, and in many instances contradictory. He knows that well, and argues frequently against the probability of the story which he transmits to Bombay. Yet he continues to send out these same hircarrahs, and it does not appear that they are punished for bringing false intelligence, or rewarded for telling the truth. I will give Colonel Murray a hint upon the subject of the nature of this intelligence.

‘Upon the whole, I think it will be best that the bullocks you may send should have saddles, and should bring two hundred of the loads of arrack and the remainder loads of rice from Poonah. They must also have drivers. I am, however, concerned to observe that the drivers we get in the country are very bad, and desert constantly.

‘Captain Graham has informed me that the Peshwah’s vakeel, young Rastia, has ordered some of the head men of villages in our districts to attend him. He must have done this by order from the durbar. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention this circumstance to the ministers, and tell

them that, if the Peshwah is satisfied with the arrangement which has been made at Ahmednuggur, he ought not to interfere in the arrangement of the country in any manner, as a double local authority will never answer. If he is not satisfied, let him state his wishes, and I will let him know whether I can comply with them. But if there should be any more of this underhand opposition to the management after it had been approved, I shall be obliged to alter my proclamation, and to take possession of the country solely in the name of the Company. 'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

Camp, North of the Godavery,
26th August, 1803.

'SIR,

'I wish to warn you particularly against the volumes of false intelligence which you will receive when you go into Guzerat. Major Walker sends out hircarrahs, who return and tell him what they please; he writes the whole down, and sends it off to Mr. Duncan, by whom it is circulated. In frequent instances, Major Walker discovers that his hircarrahs have told him falsehoods; but I doubt whether they are punished when they bring intelligence which is false, or rewarded when they bring that which is true, or consistent with other facts or intelligence.

'Very lately, an instance has occurred, in which two cossids relate that they had been to Holkar's camp, on the Taptee, and he was positively at Myhissur on the day that they said they saw his camp. They also swore that he had 160,000 horse, and vast quantities of guns and military equipments; yet there is no fact better established than that Holkar's losses of cattle had been so great, that he was obliged to leave behind and bury his guns and military equipment; and as for his horse, I know that his principal partisans, Meer Khan and Nago Jewajee, are gone into Malwa, probably to take possession of the countries allotted for the subsistence of their troops.

'I mention these circumstances only to show you how little dependence is to be placed upon these stories, when the people who tell them have no fear of punishment, nor hope of reward; and I am going to mention another fact, to show you what can be done by activity.

'Since the beginning of the war, Colonel Stevenson has been exposed, single handed, to the united armies of Scin-

diah and the Rajah of Berar, which I dare say have been reported to Major Walker to consist of 200,000 men. Not a Marhatta horseman has been able to show himself in the Nizam's territories; and Colonel Stevenson, on the 23rd, played the Marhatta trick upon them, by cutting off some of their supplies.

'Colonel Murray.'

'I have the honor to be, &c.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR, 'Camp, North of the Godavery, 26th Aug., 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose to you a return of the bullocks taken at muster this morning, which arrived yesterday with Major Dallas. Captain Mackay tells me that they are Carnatic maistries, so that I imagine the Werdy cattle are coming with Lieut. Griffiths.

'Colonel Stevenson followed the enemy to the Badowly ghaut, as I before informed you. They fell back to Goompeepre, half way between Burhampoor and Adjuntee, on the 22nd; and on the 23rd Colonel Stevenson, having sent a detachment down the ghaut to examine the road, and find out whether the intelligence he had received of their movement was correct, took some horses and bullocks loaded with supplies which were following the enemy's army. On the 23rd, at night, he was to march with a body of cavalry to endeavor to surprise a small body of the enemy who were upon his right towards Berar.

'Gopal Bhow, who was in my front with a body called 10,000 horse, has gone off to the northward to join Scindiah. Not a man has yet entered the Nizam's territories; and I believe, from the Godavery to the Toombuddra, that the Marhatta territory was never in such tranquillity.

'I have the honor to be, &c.'

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Graham.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Camp at Toka, 26th August, 1803.

'I received yesterday your letters of the 23rd and 24th, and I congratulate you upon the success at Nimgaum.

'You shall have 100 horse besides the party with Hyder Khan, for the present; but he should recruit quickly and make them active, as I find that there are parties of horse prowling about in different directions, who may be very inconvenient hereafter. There is one party in particular, in the neighborhood of Sieugaum, respecting which Govind Rao wrote to you the other day.

'I approve of the pay and establishment for the peons, but I think the horse expensive. The pay of the jemidars and duffadars is very proper, but that for the horsemen ought not to exceed 25 rupees; indeed, that for the duffadars ought not to exceed 35 rupees. However, upon this point we must trust, in a great measure, to Hyder Khan; but I beg of you to communicate to him my sentiments, and try to get the horse at the price above stated.

'The 1500 peons will possibly be sufficient; however, I do not wish to stint the service: 1000 horse also will be as much as can be required.

'I have requested Colonel Close to keep Mr. Carfrae supplied with money, and you will indent upon him for such sums as you may want, until your own collections shall commence. In the mean time, Mr. Carfrae may want some of the money, to make his payments, of what you have already; and if that be the case, I request you to let him have some.

'I shall write to Appah Dessaye upon the subject which you have mentioned. I wish that you had stated the names of the villages from which he carried off the people, and that you would attend to this circumstance in future.

'Rastia is the Peshwah's vakeel with me. It is not improbable that he has been desired to act as he has done; but I shall write to Colonel Close upon that subject.

'The Nizam's officers have seized some of the districts north of the Godavery; but I shall settle that matter with them when I go to Aurungabad.

'I should willingly give you an assistant; and shall do so hereafter, as your business may increase; but at present our districts are so little extensive, that I doubt whether such an addition to our revenue establishment would be approved of.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Captain Graham.*'

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 26th August, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 23rd.

'Nothing can have been more satisfactory than the result of your operations; and I think it capital that you should have played their own game upon the Marhattas, and should have been the first to cut off the supplies going to their camp. As they are now gone to the westward, I think you will do well to turn your attention to that quarter likewise. But I also shall march on the day after to-morrow.

'Gopal Blhow has gone off to the northward, it is said to join Scindiah, near Adjunttee.

'We must now try whether we cannot drive these fellows into the Taptee, you by one road, I by another. I should wish to hear from you any account you may have of the Ferdapoor, Adjunttee, Badowly, or other ghauts, through the hills which bound the Nizam's territories to the northward. I am well supplied and equipped with every thing, excepting dry grain for the followers and cattle; but I have an excellent bazaar, and many cattle attached to it. How are your brinjaries supplied with dry grain? Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR,

'Camp, 27th August, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 21st instant.

'2. It is to be hoped, that the orders which I have already given, and the measures which you have adopted, will have put the Honorable Company's troops in possession of the fort of Baroach before this time. It will remain with you to appoint a person to manage and collect the revenues of the districts depending upon Baroach; and I recommend that a body of peons should be raised to take possession of the different tannahs in behalf of the Honorable Company.

'In respect to the fort of Powanghur, I will send directions that it may be attacked as soon as I shall find that the troops are assembled north of the river Nerbudda, and in a state of equipment fit to undertake that operation.

'4. It does not appear that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has any territories south of the Nerbudda, bordering upon the sea coast, which would become the object of the operations of the troops in Guzerat.

'In respect to the Patans, said to be in the neighborhood of Songhur, I have strong reasons to doubt their being in that quarter at all, and certainly not in the numbers stated by the hircarrahs employed by Major Walker.

'6. It is by no means certain, though very possible, that Jeswunt Rao Holkar will become a party in the war; and for that reason I am desirous not to attack or molest any of the troops supposed to belong to that chief, at least for a short time.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor of Bombay.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I have the honor to send herewith the plan of Surat, which you were so kind as to send me some time ago.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

' SIR, ' Camp at Julgaon, 28th August, 1803.

'I have received intelligence that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar ascended the Adjutee ghaut on the 24th, and that those chiefs are now within the Nizam's territories. I think it probable, however, that Colonel Stevenson will have returned to Jaffierabad on the 25th; and as he will then be at no great distance from them, and as they must have received intelligence of my having crossed the river, it is possible they may retire.

'I shall be at Aurungabad to-morrow.

'I also received yesterday a report from one of my hircarrahs come in from Holkar's camp, stating that that chief had made a march from the neighborhood of Myhissur to join Scindiah. He was one march beyond the Dowhote ghaut, on the road from Hindustan to Burhampoor, on the 18th.

‘ This account does not agree with that which I received some days ago from Amrut Rao’s camp, (which I mentioned to you in one of my late letters,) that Holkar had gone to Indore, which was also confirmed by the report of an hircarrah come from Chandore. But whether he is coming or not to join Scindiah, it is possible that part of the army may be coming.

' We never were in better marching trim, notwithstanding all our losses by rain, &c. The horses of the cavalry and the cattle in general are in excellent condition.

‘I shall endeavor immediately to strike a blow on one of these parties of horse; and I acknowledge that I do not think it is to be regretted that they have come near us; as, in the exhausted state of the country, it would have been very difficult for us to go near them.

‘Major Dallas’s corps is in fine order, and I intend to keep it in the field ; and I believe I shall do the like with Major Hill’s. I must, however, send a battalion to Poonah, and I am rather at a loss to determine which it shall be. The men of the 2nd of the 18th have deserted in vast numbers, and I am really apprehensive that when they shall be at all involved in difficulties this evil will increase, and this ought to be the corps in the fixed station at Poonah. But Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, who commands the 18th, is senior to Lieut. Colonel Coleman, who, since he has commanded at Poonah, has managed all the concerns there in a very satis-

factory manner; and it would be a great inconvenience to replace him by Colonel Chalmers.

'I am very badly off for officers to command corps; excepting Colonel M'Leod and Major Dallas lately arrived, there is not one upon whom I can depend. Colonel Griffin, of the 1st of the 2nd, is entirely unfit for the service from incapacity and sickness, and he would be the most proper person to send to Poonah, with the 2nd of the 18th. I think it probable that I shall receive your answer to this letter, before I shall send any corps to Poonah, as it will not be necessary to reinforce that station till the middle of October, when the rivers will fall; and I do not think of doing it till Major Hill shall join. I shall be obliged to you, therefore, if you will let me know whether you have any objection to my removing Colonel Chalmers to the 1st of the 2nd, and Colonel Griffin to the 2nd of the 18th.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major General Campbell.

'DEAR SIR, 'Camp at Julgaon, 28th August, 1803.

'I had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 16th this morning, for which I am much obliged to you.

'I have received intelligence that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam's territories by the Adjunttee ghaut on the 24th instant.

'Colonel Stevenson was likely to return to Jaffierabad on the 25th, from an excursion which he made on the night of the 23rd, to the eastward, to surprise a detachment from the Rajah of Berar's army, under his nephew. My division has crossed the Godavery, and will be at Aurungabad to-morrow; so that I think it probable the enemy will not deem their position very secure, and will retire.

'It is reported that Jeswunt Rao Holkar is on his march for Myhissur on the Nerbudda, to join Scindiah; but there are some grounds for believing this report to be at least premature.

'I have no intelligence of any movement to the southward; on the contrary, the communication is open, and my brinjaries are travelling in all parts of the road between Poonah and Hurryhur.

'I shall keep you apprized of every thing interesting that may occur.

'Believe, me, &c.

'Major General Campbell.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR, 'Camp, 29th August, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

2. When I proposed for your consideration a plan for the military organization of the troops in Guzerat proper, and the Attavesy, and for the defence of those provinces, I did not intend to lessen the authority of, or the respect due to, the Resident at Baroda; and I proposed the plan for the subsidiary force in Guzerat such as at this moment is in force in respect to the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam.

'3. It appeared to me, from your letter of the 12th, that you approved of that plan; and you desired that I would recommend Colonel Murray for the situation which I proposed he should fill, if you should adopt it; but I learn, by your letter of the 23rd, that you disapprove of it, and you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution.

‘ 4. I certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public service. But the measures in question are of a general nature, and have been recommended as being applicable to our military situation in the Attavesy and Guzerat. You, who must have a better knowledge of the local circumstances of those districts, are of opinion that they are not, and you object to them in principle as well as in detail. I should be presumptuous, indeed, if, after such an opinion, I were to persist in ordering the adoption of these measures, and I should well deserve to incur the severest responsibility for any misfortune that might happen.

‘5. At the same time I have to observe to you, that the communication between me and the troops in those provinces is necessarily very long; that circumstances may render it longer, and may prevent it entirely; and therefore I request that you will be so kind as to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act for the public service, without any reference to me.

' 6. In case the circumstances of the war should hereafter enable me to approach nearer those provinces, I shall apprise the authorities there of the manner in which I may be of opinion that they can co-operate with me in forwarding the public service.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor of Bombay.'

bay.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR; 'Camp at Aurungabad, 29th August, 1803.

'I have received your two letters of the 23rd. Mr. Duncan's objection to the proposed arrangement in Guzerat and the Attavesy has surprised me as much as it has you. You probably saw only his private letter to me of the 23rd; had you seen the public letter of that date, you would have been better acquainted with his sentiments.

'With the knowledge that you had, I am not astonished that you should have consented to act under the arrangement, and I am convinced that you would have done every thing in your power to carry it into execution. But you will be surprised when I tell you that part of that arrangement is to keep General Jones at Surat, and Major Walker in the command of the troops in Guzerat, and the two commands separate.

'It is my decided opinion that Guzerat, and even Surat itself, cannot be saved, unless there is an efficient military organization of the troops in those districts,—unless there is one general authority to control the whole, and combine the movements of all the troops to one object,—and unless regular and substantial means of supply are established. Mr. Duncan talks highly of the merits of the committee of Surat, because they have taken possession of a province ceded to them by treaty without opposition. I hope he will allow equal merit to my peons, who have taken possession of all Scindiah's and Ragojee Bhoonslah's territories south of, and bordering on, the Godavery.

'After having objected to my plan, in principle as well as in detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. I am not afraid of responsibility, God knows! and I am ready to incur any personal risk for the public service; but, under such circumstances, I should be mad if I were to order this plan to be carried into execution. I have therefore requested Mr. Duncan to desire the public authorities in Guzerat and Attavesy to act as they may think best for the public service, without reference to me, and I propose not to have any thing to do with the troops in those provinces.

'I am concerned that you should have been disappointed, particularly after having gone from Poonah, to which situation you will probably wish to return. But I am convinced you will agree in opinion with me that, under all the circum-

stances of this case, I could not order the execution of my plans; and that, at this distance from the scene of action, and under the difficulties of the communication, I could not pretend to conduct so disjointed a piece of machinery as the military duties at Guzerat and the Attavesy.

‘I have no objection to your seeing all the correspondence upon this subject if you can; and if you do not see it at Bombay, I will take an opportunity of shewing it to you, but it is very voluminous, and too troublesome to copy in these busy times.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Bulgaum, 30th Aug., 1803.

‘I have just received yours of the 27th. There appears a mistake at Poonah respecting the coolies you mention to have been forced to go on to the army. Not one cooley has come in from Poonah since we quitted Ahmednuggur. The rice brought in has come upon asses. The coolies who were paid and intended for the army stopped at Ahmednuggur, and threw down their loads; and these the brinjaries, whom I left behind to bring on six hundred other loads, are now bringing on.

‘I have a good opinion of Goklah, but it will not answer to increase his party. The effect will be to increase the sum to be paid to him monthly, not the number of our force for service. You shall have blank bills for the shroffs, and I request you to send copies of them as you may grant them, in order that the sums received may be carried regularly to account. Jadoon Rao and all Scindiah’s dependents ought to be deprived of their jaghires forthwith, otherwise we ought not to have taken Ahmednuggur or the countries dependent upon that place, all of which were in jaghire to somebody. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the Nizam’s territories, as I before informed you, on the 24th, with their horse only. I do not believe they have done much harm, but they are advancing by long stages towards the Godavery, with an intention to cross that river. They took advantage of Colonel Stevenson’s absence to the eastward to enter the country. The Godavery filled again before I left it, but it may have become fordable, and, if that is the case, they declare it to be their intention to go to Hyderabad.

‘I have passed to the eastward of Aurungabad, and shall

make a march to-morrow to the southward, and I think it probable that I shall reach the Godavery with the cavalry. If the river be not fallen, they will move off either to the northward or eastward, which will afford time to secure our convoys travelling up from the Kistna. I think they will not attempt to cross the river by boats (indeed they are all secured) while I am at all near them. Colonel Stevenson is at Jaffierabad, and I am afraid that he has been deceived by the Mussulmann.

‘I have not heard of anything in my rear or at all near me yet. Flour in Scindiah’s camp is at two seers and a half for a rupee, so that we have still the most plentiful supplies of the two armies. We must complete the storing of Ahmed-nuggur as expeditiously as possible. If the river falls, which certainly would be very extraordinary at this season of the year, that operation may be attended with difficulty.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

‘P.S. It is reported that Holkar is coming forward, but I think that the report wants confirmation. Will you send this letter, with the enclosed, to Malcolm? Mr. Duncan, after having acquiesced in the plan suggested by me for the organization of the troops, and the plan of operations in Guzerat, has informed me that “acquiescence” did not mean “approbation;” and he has detailed his objections to the general system, as well as to the particulars of the plan, which go to fundamentals. He has, however, informed me that I may take upon myself to order its execution, if I think proper. I cannot understand the nice distinction between the acquiescence of a Governor in a plan for the defence of the provinces under his government, and his approbation of that plan. However, be that as it may, I cannot take upon myself to order the execution of measures which circumstances may render unfortunate, even if they should be regulated as I wish, but to which I am certain that every opposition in the power of every officer in the Government will be given, particularly after I have been informed that those measures are decidedly disapproved of by the Governor. Neither can I, at this distance, undertake to conduct the details of a piece of machinery so disjointed as would be the military duties in Guzerat and the Attavesy under the separated authorities of the Resident at Baroda and the Committee of Surat; I have therefore requested to be relieved from all interference in those concerns.’

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.

‘Camp, 20 miles East of Aurungabad,

‘MY DEAR MUNRO, 30th August, 1803.

‘Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have entered the Nizam’s territories, have passed Colonel Stevenson with an army of horse only, and propose to be upon the river Godavery this day. If the river should be fordable, they may be able to get to the southward; and I give you notice, that you may have your tannahs prepared in your villages, and desire them to defend them. They are starving; already flour and grain sell two and a half seers for a rupee in their camp, because the inhabitants, finding that they have no guns, and that the horse cannot get over their walls, do not choose to give up their property upon the first requisition, and they have no leisure to wait long in any particular place.

‘I have received intelligence that a fellow, by name Mah-tab Khan, who was formerly in Tippoo’s service, is employed by the Rajah of Berar to raise horse at Cuddapa: you may probably find this fellow out; and I recommend that he be treated as he deserves.

‘I beg you to keep the Werdy bullocks in the service. I shall write to General Campbell regarding them.

‘I hope to be able to strike a blow against their myriads of horse in a few days, if I should not be so unlucky as to have the Godavery become fordable about six weeks sooner than usual.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Munro.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Balgaum 30 Aug., 1803.

‘I have received your letters of the 28th and 29th. I am glad to inform you that your treasure is safe at Aurungabad, being three lacs of rupees from Hyderabad, and one lac of pagodas from General Stuart.

‘I marched this morning from Aurungabad to the eastward, and intend to turn towards the Godavery to-morrow, in order to cover the advance of the supplies from Hyderabad and the Kistna.

‘It is said that the enemy intend to cross the Godavery; but, as the river filled again before I quitted it, I imagine that they will not attempt that operation while I am so near them.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

' Since I wrote to you last the enemy have taken advantage of Colonel Stevenson's march to the eastward, of which I

apprized you : they returned suddenly to the westward, and entered the Nizam's territories by the ghaut of Adjutee on the 24th, with horse only ; they advanced with some rapidity from thence, I conclude, in order to avoid Colonel Stevenson, who returned to Jaffierabad, I believe, on the 25th ; and they have been for the last two days in the neighborhood of Jaulna, a fort in the district of Jalnapoor, which belongs to Scindiah.

‘The pindarries have been spread as usual to plunder ; but, as far as I can learn, they have done but little mischief, and in many instances (particularly at a place called Budnapoor) they have been beaten off by the inhabitants.

‘Grain is consequently very dear in their army, being at the rate of two seers and a half for a rupee.

‘I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th ; I marched from thence to the eastward yesterday, and have to-day come down towards the Godavery, as it was reported that the enemy had made a march to the southward, and intended to cross that river, to go towards Hyderabad. The Godavery, which had fallen so much as to be fordable on the 26th for a day or two, has risen again, so that I conclude that plan is laid aside for the present, as the passage of the river, unless it can be forded, would be a dangerous experiment. But I conclude that it will be resumed hereafter ; and, if they attempt to put it in execution, I shall move there likewise, taking care to detach to Poonah a force which will secure every thing in that quarter. At the same time I have in contemplation an expedition into Berar, which will give the Rajah something to do in his own country ; and this shall be carried into execution as soon as we have sufficient supplies collected to ensure the subsistence of the troops on this service.

‘Colonel Stevenson is at present at a place called Donegaum, about twenty coss north-east from Aurungabad. I have desired him to move with expedition upon the enemy ; and I shall do the same, as soon as I have secured my baggage at this place.

‘I saw Colonel Collins at Aurungabad, and had a long conversation with him ; from which it appears clearly that the war was inevitable, and that the Rajah of Berar urged it on, in order to find a place for the subsistence of Scindiah's and Holkar's troops, which must otherwise have entered his countries. The state of Hindustan, and indeed of all the countries in which Holkar and Scindiah have carried on their operations, is shocking.

‘I have a report that Holkar is coming to join the

enemy ; but it is not confirmed, although it may possibly be true.

‘ I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relinquish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had acquiesced in my plan for the organization of the troops, and the system to be adopted for the defence of those territories, he has written to me to say that acquiescence is not approbation ; and he had objected to the principle, as well as to the detail, of the measures which I had recommended. But he says that, if I choose to be responsible for the consequences, they shall be carried into execution. I do not exactly see the distinction between the acquiescence in, and approbation of, a system for the defence of the provinces under his government by a governor.

‘ I should have no objection to taking upon myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recommended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into execution. But I know that these would be impeded ; and I should doubly incur blame when I should not deserve it : first, on account of the failure of a system not properly carried into execution ; and, secondly, for persisting in ordering the adoption of that system, when I knew that it was contrary to the sentiments and inclinations of the governor. I have therefore thought it best to request Mr. Duncan to desire the military authorities in Guzerat and the Attavasy to act as they might think best for the public service, without reference to me ; and I have had less scruple in taking this step, because, at this distance from the scene of action, and under all the difficulties of the communications, I am entirely incapable of directing the operations of a piece of machinery so disjointed as the separate commands of the Committee of Surat and the Resident at Baroda.

‘ I should send you all the papers upon this subject, only that they are very voluminous ; and I know that the Governor General will receive a letter from Mr. Duncan, with numerous accompaniments regarding it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Showe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp near Unterwarry, 31st August, 1803.

‘ Since I wrote to you last, Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have entered the Nizam’s territories with a body of

horse only, by the Adjunttee ghaut. These have not yet done much mischief; indeed, they have been principally in a district belonging to Scindiah, called Jalnapoor. The inhabitants of some of the villages which their pindarries have attacked have defended themselves and their property. The consequence is, that rice in their army is at two and a half seers for a rupee.

‘The enemy entered the country on the 24th, when Colonel Stevenson was in pursuit of a party which had come in by one of the eastern ghauts. Colonel Stevenson marched yesterday from Jaffierabad to Donegaum, to favor the junction of a detachment from Aurungabad with treasure; and I marched from Aurungabad yesterday and this day to the southward towards the Godavery, having received intelligence that the enemy intended to march in that direction, to cross the river and proceed to Hyderabad. The river was fordable for a day or two before I quitted Toka, but it rose again. It is probable the intelligence that it had fallen occasioned the plan and report that they intended to cross; and the intelligence that it had risen again has been the cause of the plan being laid aside, for they have certainly not moved this way. I have ordered Colonel Stevenson to move upon them quickly, which I shall do also as soon as I shall have made some arrangements for the security of my baggage.

‘I do not believe that any of the pindarries have crossed the Godavery. If they attempt to cross the river before it falls, they will lose a great part of their army, as one of our divisions will be close to them; and if they should attempt this expedition to Hyderabad, after the rivers shall fall, I propose to follow them, detaching a sufficient force to Poonah, to secure every thing there; and as soon as Colonel Stevenson shall have collected his treasure and some brinjaries still in his rear, I propose to send him to attack a fort in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, where he keeps his treasures, by which operation I hope to make a powerful diversion in favor of the Nizam.

‘This invasion by horse is unpleasant, and will become more so, as these bodies shall increase. But if the people of the country will defend their villages and property, I hope yet that we shall be able to drive them out. I have no intelligence of Holkar.

‘I have the honor to be. &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘Camp near Unterwarry,

31st August, 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I marched here this morning, with a view to check the operations of the enemy to the southward. I rather believe that he was encamped yesterday at Caulaygaum, to the east of Jaulna. He did not march before twelve. I have not heard from his camp since. We must endeavor to drive him out of the Nizam’s country, or he will certainly oblige us to draw nearer to our supplies. More pindarries will follow those already come in. They will penetrate to the south of the river; and then I, at least, must recross to subsist.

‘I do not expect that we shall be able to bring the enemy to an action, but we must try to keep him in movement, and tire him out.

‘I cannot permanently move to the eastward at present, for several reasons; one of the most pressing is, that I am obliged to look out for a battalion marching from the Kistna with bullocks, treasures, &c. &c. Besides, I do not think it impossible but that Holkar may come down and increase the number of our enemies; and I must return to impede his progress. I propose therefore to leave my baggage and heavy stores here in an intrenched camp, with a battalion, and to move forward with a light army. I shall march upon this plan on the day after to-morrow; and I shall keep as nearly as I can in a due east direction from hence between Jaulna and the river.

‘I recommend that you also should march with your cavalry only, if you think yourself sufficiently strong in that description of troops, and a battalion with its guns, on the same plan, on the day after to-morrow. You might direct your march immediately upon the enemy; we shall frighten him at least, if we do not hurt him; we shall drive him from the territories of the Nabob, and oblige him to retire into those of the Rajah of Berar. If we succeed in this plan, the parties will possibly become tired of the game; and, at all events, we shall have gained time by it for my supplies to come up.

‘Your infantry might remain in your camp at Donegaum, for your treasures, &c., to collect upon; and they would be a check upon the return of the enemy to this quarter.

‘Keep your intentions secret. None of the natives can be trusted with the secrets of our plans in this war, till our success is decided.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Unterwarry, 1st September, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd August, in which you have enclosed the copy of a dispatch from the envoy at Goa. In my opinion, none of the troops in this part of India can be spared to add to the means of defence of Goa, and particularly not the 84th regiment; unless the detachments of that corps, stationed at Poonah and at Parneira, can be replaced by similar detachments of European troops.

‘2. I observe that Sir William Clarke, in calculating his means of defence for Goa, has not included either the fleet under Admiral Rainier, or the Portuguese troops. It is not very probable that an attack can be made by such a force as will render necessary the extensive defensive operations for which such a large body of European troops is required, without the knowledge of Admiral Rainier, and his proceeding with his fleet in the direction of Goa. However bad the Portuguese troops may be, they cannot be entirely useless in forts which must be garrisoned, particularly if mixed with the British troops, and if the supposed attack should not be made by a force so large as to attract the notice and consequent co-operation of Admiral Rainier.

‘I have the honor to enclose further indents for medical stores from the corps forming the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam. You will observe that two corps have not yet indented; but I request that the articles for which I now transmit indents may be prepared and packed up for each corps separately, and that preparations may be made to send the whole off to Ahmednuggur as soon as possible, in charge of a medical gentleman. They might leave Panwell immediately, and the stores for the corps which have not yet indented might follow when their indents shall be sent.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.‘Camp at Unterwarry,
1st Sept., 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have just received your letter of the 29th August.

‘It is certainly true that I do not expect much service from Goklah or Appah Dessaye. Indeed, I have received some extraordinary messages from the former within these few days, pressing me for further advances of money, in such

a manner that I was obliged to alter an intention I had formed to go out with the cavalry alone; and instead thereof to make preparations for moving with a light force of infantry, as well as cavalry. This I shall carry into execution to-morrow morning, if I should find, by my intelligence of this day, that the enemy had not moved off to a very great distance. Appah Dessaye is arrived in camp.

‘The circumstances mentioned by you are very unpleasant; and, most undoubtedly, if I knew how to dispense with the services of Goklah and Appah Dessaye, I would forthwith send them about their business. But, bad as they are, and weak as my expectations are from them, I must determine upon keeping them, at least for the present, even at the large expense stated. If they were to go, we should be surrounded in our camp and on our marches by pindaries, and we should lose even the name of a body of cavalry. I shall therefore pay Goklah this month, and give Appah Dessaye some money; and I shall continue the payment as long as I can, which must be on account, to be settled hereafter with the Peshwah.

‘The only difficulty I have upon this subject is the money. However, the blank bills have been sent to you, and I hope that you will be able to feed our wants in some degree. I intend also to write to the Governor General to send a supply of money; and to General Stuart to arrange that the revenues of Canara, which I know are generally paid in gold, and will soon be paid, may be applicable to the service of this body of troops. I think that I have now, and I expect soon to have, as much as will keep me going till these resources come in. I recommend that the money from Poonah should not be sent farther than Ahmednuggur at present. We do not know exactly whether there are many pindaries south of the Godavery; and, at all events, it may be inconvenient to look out for it north of the river.

‘In respect to Appah Dessaye’s demands, the pretence of the Peshwah’s government, that he ought to serve for his *serinjaumy*, is too ridiculous. The fact is, that the man cannot get possession of his lands, and either some other mode of paying his troops must be adopted, or they must be disbanded. The question is, upon whom ought this expense to fall? Certainly upon the Peshwah; and it would be a great improvement to the new treaty with him, if it were to contain a clause that he would make a forfeit monthly of thirty rupees for every horseman deficient of the number which he has engaged to supply.

‘Upon the whole, I cannot well do without Goklah¹ and Appah Dessaye. I have not time to argue and dispute with the latter, whether he ought to serve for the rent of lands of which he has never got possession. I must therefore determine to pay these chiefs myself.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘Camp at Rackisbaum,
3rd Sept., 1803.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘The enemy, having found it impossible to seize any of the districts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan, or to plunder them to any extent, have seized the persons of some of the principal inhabitants of the towns near which they have passed, and have detained them as securities for the payment of certain sums which they have required from the districts.

‘In order to put a stop to this practice it is necessary to retaliate upon them; accordingly, I request you will be so kind as to give directions that the mother and relations of Jadoon Rao Bhow may be seized, and that they may be informed that they will be detained as securities for the persons of the hostages seized in this unjustifiable manner by Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘In case there should be at Baroach, or in Guzerat, or the Attavesy, or in any of the countries which may come into the hands of the Honorable Company’s troops, any other persons of consequence or respectability, related to or connected with Scindiah’s ministers, or belonging to that chief, I request that they may be also seized and detained for the same reasons.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Governor of Bombay.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp at Rackisbaum,
3rd Sept., 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Duncan, in which I have requested that certain persons belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and residing in Guzerat, the Attavesy, and at Baroach, may be seized and detained in retaliation of injuries of a similar nature done to persons residing in the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘As there may be some persons of riches and respectability belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar

residing at Poonah, I request you to urge the Peshwah to have their persons secured, and delivered over to the officer commanding the British troops.

'This mode of warfare is most unjustifiable. In passing through the country as a freebooter, Dowlut Rao Scindiah may seize the property he can find, and take it away ; but he has no right to seize the persons of the inhabitants, in order thereby to secure the property which he cannot otherwise touch. There is no mode of guarding against this evil, or of relieving the Soubah's government from its consequences, except by retaliating upon persons connected with his government.

'On this ground I request, that, if there should be any such persons at Poonah, you will urge the Peshwah that they may be delivered up.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR, 'Camp at Rackisbaum, 3rd September, 1803.

'Since my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon Ahmednuggur, and was surrounded by districts belonging to his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan, with which it connected better than with those under Ahmednuggur, I thought it proper to give it in charge to his Highness's officers ; and accordingly I have requested Rajah Mohiput Ram to take possession.

'Although the enemy have not been able to do much mischief to his Highness's territories, and their bodies of horse have been in general beat off by the peons in the villages which they have attacked, yet they have contrived to seize some principal inhabitants as hostages for the payment of sums of money by the districts through which they have passed.

'This mode of warfare is entirely unjustifiable ; they have no right to the resources of the country which they are not able to seize and secure ; and it can be resisted, and its evils compensated to the Soubahdar's government, only by a system of retaliation. Accordingly, I have written letters to Mr. Duncan and Colonel Close, of which I enclose copies, in order that persons belonging to the enemy residing in Poonah, and in the territories to the westward, may be seized.

'I request you to take an opportunity of informing the Soubahdar's ministers of the circumstances above mentioned.

'Upon hearing of my arrival at Aurungabad, the enemy

moved a considerable distance to the eastward of Jalnapoor, to a place called Ambergaum. They halted there the day before yesterday. Colonel Stevenson was yesterday at Jalnapoor, and I believe took that place. The enemy have nothing but cavalry, and I am informed are considerably distressed. They have been kept out of the fortified villages by the peons; and I have circulated letters to the different amildars, in which I have promised rewards to those jemidars who oppose them.

‘I marched to the river yesterday, and I propose to remain on its bank. By this position I hope to secure the junction of all the supplies, to check the incursions of the enemy into the southern countries, and, as I shall have my boats upon the river, it will be in my power either to fall upon the enemy’s troops as they are crossing, if they should attempt to cross it in boats; or to cross it myself, if they should be able to ford it. At the same time, I shall draw near to them, and if an opportunity of striking a blow should offer, I shall seize it.

‘Colonel Stevenson is well placed at Jalnapoor to impede the junction of some of their troops, particularly of their infantry and guns. But I cannot hope to remove this body of horse from the Nizam’s territories, till either Colonel Stevenson or I am enabled to commence an offensive operation against the territories of the Rajah of Berar, by the junction of our supplies.

‘These have been much delayed, indeed I may add almost destroyed, by the badness of the weather; but still I hope that some of them may soon arrive.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 3rd September, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 30th of August.

‘The distribution of peons appears to be very proper. I hope that Hyder Khan is getting on with his horse. You must keep him actively employed, and drive all the rascals to a distance from you. Take care that the peons in all the tannahs are supplied with ammunition. Tell them that the enemy have no guns; that they must not admit him into their tannahs.

‘I find that some of the people in our districts keep up a correspondence with others in the enemy’s camp. I sent you

a proclamation, which I wish to have published in Ahmednuggur and other places. This correspondence must be stopped.

'You must beat up the Bheels and destroy them. Money will be sent to Lieut. Carfrae by Lieut. Colonel Close. He will have orders to supply your wants. The necessity of your supplying him is only momentary.

'I find the district of Jalnapoor to be so much surrounded by the Nizam's districts, and so little connected with Ahmednuggur, to which place, in fact, it never belonged, that I have determined to give it over to the Nizam's servant; you will therefore not interfere with it. I shall report this determination to the Governor General.

'I have given orders for running our tappal to this place instead of to Toka.

'I wish that you would endeavor to find out where is the late killadar of Ahmednuggur.

'Believe me, &c.

'Captain Graham.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR, 'Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th September, 1803.

'I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Stevenson took the fort of Jalnapoor on the 2nd. I have not received from him the details of the affair, therefore I cannot tell you what loss he has sustained.

'The enemy are to the eastward at Purtoor. They still talk of crossing the Godavery and of marching upon Hyderabad; and although the river is fordable in many places, which was never known before at this season of the year, they see, by my position upon it, that I shall cross it likewise; and they are apprehensive of the consequences of being cut off from their own territories, and exposed alone to my attacks when the river shall rise again, of which there are no doubts.

'Begum Sumroo's campoo has come up the ghauts, and I am afraid, has passed the Soubah's camp and joined Scindiah yesterday. Two deserters from it, who went into Aungabad on the 2nd, declared that Pohlman's campoo was following it, and two days' march in its rear; but I doubt this, as I believe that Pohlman's campoo was sent to Hindustan.

'The arrival of these campoos will retard the enemy's movements, and give us something more solid than cavalry

to operate upon ; but I think we shall not be able effectually to relieve the Soubah's country till we can invade Berar ; and I am endeavoring to arrange an expedition into that country. Whether I shall be able to effect it or not will depend much upon the state of Colonel Stevenson's equipments, and upon the assistance of grain and provisions which he is to receive from Salabut Khan, the jaghiredar of Ellichpoor.

'I have the pleasure to inform you that Holkar has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to his camp ; I have, therefore, some hopes that he does not propose to join the confederates.

'I request you to mention to the Governor, that in case the revenues of Canara, which will soon come in, are not wanted for the payment of the troops at Goa and in Malabar, it would be very desirable that the money should be packed in strong bags and sent to Bombay, for the use of this body of troops.

'Besides our former expenses, two battalions have been added to our force, and I have been obliged to advance money to the parties of the Peshwah's troops under Goklah and Appah Dessaye, and I shall be obliged to make advances to them monthly. This will cost about a lac of rupees monthly.

'I rather believe also, that the lac of pagodas which you sent to Colonel Stevenson, and three lacs of rupees which have been sent from Hyderabad, will do no more than pay his troops for July and August what is due to them ; and I do not think that I can send the Colonel upon the expedition into Berar without two months' pay in hand. I wrote to the Governor General to request him to send some Bengal gold mohurs to Bombay for my use.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Lieut. General Stuart.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th Sept., 1803.

'I received last night your letter of the 2nd, informing me of your success at Jalnapoor, upon which I congratulate you. We heard the firing in the morning while on our march.

'I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram to place the Soubah's tannahs in the forts and districts of Jalnapoor ; and I request you to give them over to him.

'I hear that the enemy have moved towards the Goda-

very, although they are somewhat annoyed at my having come upon that river likewise. They know that it must rise again, and that it probably will continue full till towards the end of October; and they do not relish the thoughts of being entirely cut off from their own countries.

‘It is certain that Begum Sumroo’s campoo is above the ghauts; two deserters from it have come in to Aurungabad, and I think it probable that this body will have joined Scindiah’s cavalry yesterday. The deserters say likewise, that Colonel Pohlman’s campoo followed that of Begum Sumroo, and was at the distance of two marches in its rear. I do not know whether that is true. I thought that Pohlman’s campoo had gone to Hindustan.

‘The arrival of these campoos will give us something more solid than we have hitherto had to operate upon, and they will retard the enemy’s motions.

‘I am afraid, however, that we shall not be able to make any effectual impression upon them till we can arrange an offensive expedition into Berar. The Rajah of Berar is at the head of the confederacy. An invasion of his country would, at all events, make a seasonable diversion in favor of the Soubah of the Deccan; and might eventually bring about peace.

‘In my opinion your corps is the best situated and best equipped for this service, particularly after you shall be joined by your brinjarries from Bussmunt. However, in order to decide this question, I request to have from you information upon the following points:—

‘1st, What quantity of ammunition have you got for the heavy guns belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan?

‘2nd, Can Salabut Khan collect grain for you at Ellichpoor to serve for a depôt for his expedition?

‘3rd, Your troops are now two months in arrears of pay; for what length of time beyond those two months will the six and a half lacs of rupees (which Colonel Desse will take of you) pay them?

‘My idea is, to attack the fort of Gowilghur, which appears in the maps a short distance north of Ellichpoor, in which place I am told that the Rajah of Berar keeps his treasures, and then to proceed to Nagpoor.

‘If your heavy guns are not sufficiently supplied with ammunition, or if you should want money, you must send a battalion to me as an escort to four iron twelves, with their ammunition, and money which I will send you. I wish you to send for these articles, because I may be obliged to move

to the southward, if the enemy do so ; and in that case I must make a large detachment to Poonah. If we should undertake this expedition, some events will happen, for which, in the mean time, we may as well be prepared.

‘ One of these is the loss of Aurungabad. I consider that event to be certain, unless you can afford to reinforce that place with a battalion of the Company’s infantry ; and march on the expedition with five instead of six battalions. Even if you can do so, its security may be doubtful ; but upon this point you must be the best judge.

‘ If you should be of opinion that you cannot secure Aurungabad, it would be proper to remove the hospital, &c., &c., from that place to Jaulna, which I take to be one of greater security.

‘ Till you shall have been joined by my heavy ordnance and money, if you should require them, you may as well turn your mind to these points, and make your arrangements, either for the further security of Aurungabad, or for the removal from thence of the sick, &c.

‘ You must decide whether the Soubah’s infantry ought to be withdrawn from the place, if you should determine not to give it further security. In the decision upon this point you must be guided by your knowledge of the importance of which they consider it ; and whether it is true that many of the females of the Soubah’s family really reside there.

‘ Till you shall be prepared to set out upon the proposed expedition, I do not think that you can be in a better situation than at Jalnapoor. You are just between the enemy and the ghauts ; and you will take every opportunity of falling upon any of the parties coming to join him, particularly any of his campoos.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Shawe.

‘ Camp at Rackisbaum,
4th Sept., 1803.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,
‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that Colonel Stevenson took the fort of Jalnapoor on the 2nd. I have not received the details of the affair, and therefore I cannot tell you whether he sustained any loss.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 31st, I have received intelligence that the enemy have moved to a still greater distance to the southward and eastward. I therefore relinquished the plan which I had formed of moving upon them with a light army : and I came down to the Godavery, although they

still talk of marching to Hyderabad. This movement has disconcerted their measures in some degree; and as they see that I intend to pass the Godavery likewise, they fear to cross it, being certain that the river will rise again, that they may be cut off from their own countries, and liable to my attacks. The river is now fordable in many places, a circumstance which has never been known before at this season of the year: but I hope by my position to check the proposed expedition to Hyderabad; and, at all events, it will not have any very bad effects.

‘Two deserters came in to Aurungabad from Begum Sumroo’s campoo, on the 2nd; and, from their story, I am afraid that that campoo will have passed the Soubah’s camp, and will have joined Scindiah, either yesterday or this day. They say likewise, that Colonel Pohlman’s campoo was following them at the distance of two days’ march; but I doubt it, as I believe it was sent to Hindustan.

‘If these campoos should join Scindiah in safety, they will retard his movements, and give us something more substantial to operate upon, than the cavalry which we have had hitherto; and we may by good luck bring them to an action.

‘Holkar has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting in Amrut Rao’s camp ever since for his passports. It appears, by the papers which have been sent to me, that Holkar has been very anxious that this man should reach him in safety. He wrote them after he had heard that Colonel Collins had quitted Scindiah’s camp.

‘I have heard nothing of the movements of Holkar’s army since I last wrote to you. I shall be obliged to you if you will mention to the Governor General, that I think it will be very desirable that he should send round to Bombay, for the use of this body of troops, as soon as may be possible, seven lacs of rupees, at least, in gold mohurs. Our expenses increase, and I am obliged to find means of paying the Peshwah’s troops serving with me as well as my own.

‘Since my arrival in this part of the country, I have found the district of Jalnapoor to be surrounded by others belonging to the Soubar of the Deccan, and to be at a great distance from, and entirely independent of, Ahmednuggur. I have therefore desired the Soubah’s servants to take possession of it and manage it. I shall report this arrangement to the Governor General.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawc.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘ I still intend to carry on the expedition into Berar, if Colonel Stevenson’s corps can be sufficiently equipped ; or if Sulabut Khan, the jaghiredar of Ellichpoor, will give us any assistance of grain.

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Rackisbaum, 4th Sept., 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th instant.

‘ 2. I am happy to find that the servants of Anund Rao Guickwar did not bring forward the claim that he should be neutral in the existing war between the Company and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which was anticipated by Major Walker. It appears that they consider his engagements with the Company in the same light as I do ; and I have no doubt but that, when all the engagements between the Company and that Chieftain shall be consolidated in one treaty, there will be no objection on the part of his government to bind himself in terms in the manner in which his servants and I consider him to be bound by his present engagements.

‘ 3. If it should be thought material, I beg to observe, that I never doubted the policy of the treaties with the Guickwar state, provided the engagements were considered to be mutual ; my doubts upon the subject were grounded upon those of the Resident, whether the Rajah Anund Rao would take part in the existing war.

‘ 4. The letter which I had the honor of addressing to the Governor on the 29th, contains an answer to the 7th paragraph of your letter of the 28th. The Governor in Council has disapproved of the plans which I proposed to him on the 2nd of August for the defence of Guzerat and the Attavesy, and I cannot think that it would be proper for me to order that those plans should be carried into execution, in contradiction to his declared opinion. If I were in Guzerat, or at Surat, and could be in constant communication with the Resident at Baroda, or the Committee, I should most willingly endeavor to carry on the military duties in the manner preferred by the Governor : but as I am at a great distance, and as the communication may be impeded, it is best for the public service that I should not undertake to conduct business of which it is not possible I should have any knowledge.

‘ 5. Upon a perusal of Major Walker’s paper upon the subject of Guzerat, I observed that the operations recommended therein were connected with the prospect of a war

with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and that the siege of Baroach is particularly adverted to.

'6. I objected to those operations on the grounds stated in my letter of the 22nd.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 4th September, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 31st of August, which contains news that is very satisfactory.

'I have promised Appah Dessaye to give him 25,000 rupees, and I shall repeat the same every month. I will write you a public letter upon the subject, and I request that you will make some arrangement with the durbar for the repayment of this sum, as well as of 75,000 rupees to be paid to Goklah.

'I have not yet got a return of the ordnance of Ahmednuggur; but, although there are above sixty pieces at that place, I believe that there are not many serviceable. I therefore recommend that you should make an application to Bombay for ordnance as well as gunpowder, although I know that there are large quantities of the latter at Ahmednuggur, and some of it very good.

'If I could give guns to the Peshwah, I could not give him carriages to remove them; for Captain Browne will tell you that he is now employed in the construction of carriages for the guns on the works at Ahmednuggur.

'Colonel Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd. The enemy are at Purtoor, and, it is said, design to cross the Godavery, and to march upon Hyderabad. Begum Sumroo's campoo have come up the ghauts, and I am afraid have passed by the Nizam's camp at Jalnapoor, and joined the enemy yesterday. They are much annoyed by my position on the Godavery, as, although the river is now fordable in many places, which was never known before at this season of the year, they are certain that it will rise again, and they do not relish being entirely cut off from their own countries and exposed alone to me.

'I am endeavouring to arrange an expedition into Berar, which will succeed if Salabut Khan is honest. This will create a diversion in favor of the Soubah, and will possibly draw at least Ragojee Bhoonslah to his own territories.

'If I can arrange that expedition, I propose to reinforce Poonah with three battalions and five companies of the 84th

regiment, and to march myself with the remainder of the force towards Hyderabad.

‘If I cannot arrange that expedition, we must go on as we are doing now, and I shall send Colonel Stevenson towards Hyderabad. Nothing but an expedition into Berar will save the Soubah’s country.

‘Lieut. Griffiths is coming on remarkably well, and is by this time at Kurdlah. Major Hill is also about Toljapoor. The former has all his cattle, having replaced his casualties; the latter has lost many.

‘Mr. Duncan has made a curious kind of half-arrangement respecting the command in Guzerat, and I am convinced that the consequence of it will be that we shall lose all that we have got in that province. However, he is decidedly against my plan, and I shall have nothing to say to the province.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 6th September, 1803.

‘I received this morning, on the march, your letter of the 5th.

‘Before I send you my 12 pounders, or the money, I wish to know from you what quantity of ammunition you have for the Soubah’s 18 pounders. I should also wish you to ascertain from Salabut Khan, whether he can give you any assistance in 18 pound shot, or in gunpowder, at Ellichpoor; as, although you must have my guns, if your own should not be sufficiently equipped, or if you should not be able to get any assistance at Ellichpoor, to part with them will certainly cripple my force materially, and may have unpleasant consequences in the course of the campaign. I therefore wish to have the most complete information regarding the equipments of your own ordnance, before I send them away.

‘In respect to money, I wish to know how much you will have in hand after paying your troops for July and August, which I understand to be due to them; and how long that sum will last you? I understand that your expenses are about fifty thousand pagodas per mensem; if that be the case, you ought still to have enough to pay the troops for September and October.

‘Your brinjaries have not joined me; and by a letter from Major Kirkpatrick, I learn that some of them went to load in the countries in which he was purchasing rice for you, in the neighborhood of Hyderabad. Some rice for you,

however, crossed the river at Puttun, and some other at Shaghur, a day or two before I arrived at it, and went on to join you.

‘In respect to pay for Soubahan Khan, I have to observe that no provision whatever has been made for a demand of this kind; and I cannot comply with it, at all events, unless it comes from Hyderabad: but even in that case, I shall experience some difficulty in doing so, as I am obliged to pay the few Marhatta horse who are serving with me, besides my own troops. If you are of opinion that Soubahan Khan is really distressed, it will be best to represent his case to the durbar; and if he is so much so as to be unable to accompany you, you might send him to join me.

‘I hear that Scindiah marched yesterday upon Jalnapoor, and left the Rajah of Berar at Caulaygaum. I fancy that this march must have been intended to facilitate the junction of Begum Sumroo’s infantry and guns.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM.

‘Camp, 6th Sept., 1803.

‘I have not written to you for some time, but I have had much to do, and I knew that you would see the letters which I have written to Colonel Close and Mr. Duncan. I shall, however, endeavor to give you, in this letter, an idea of our situation.

‘The enemy deceived Colonel Stevenson in the march they made to the eastward on the 20th and 21st of last month; and finding that they had induced him to pass Jaffierabad, they returned to the westward on the 22nd, and ascended the Adjuntee ghaut on the 23rd and 24th. On the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson sent a patrol down the Badowly ghaut, which picked up some bullocks and horses loaded with grain; and on the 23rd, at night, he had intended to go still farther to the eastward in quest of a detachment under a relation of the Rajah of Berar, which had gone that route. I did not receive his letters written about that time; and I cannot say exactly what he was doing between the 23rd and 29th; but the enemy penetrated into the country, and passed between him and Jalnapoor; and I have seen letters from his camp, which say that one of the brigades lost its baggage on the march to Jaffierabad; that the pindarry horse were very troublesome, and that the Moguls did not

behave as they ought. This is probably true ; otherwise the pindarries would not have come near the troops a second time.

‘ On the 28th, a party of pindarries came to Aurungabad, but were driven off by the Nizam’s infantry stationed there ; and on the 29th, I arrived at Aurungabad. Scindiah was at that time at Jalnapoor, a fort and district belonging to himself, about forty miles east from Aurungabad ; and he tried whilst there to plunder Budnapoor, a fortified village of the Nizam, from which he was beaten off. As soon as he heard of my arrival at Aurungabad, he marched off still farther to the eastward and southward, and went to the neighborhood of a place called Purtoor, belonging to Soubahan Khan. Colonel Stevenson moved down to Jalnapoor on the 1st, and took it on the 2nd ; and I moved to the southward, towards the Godavery, on the road to Hyderabad, having found that, contrary to all former experience, at this season of the year, the river had fallen, and was fordable in many places.

‘ We were all stationary on the 3rd and 4th. Scindiah has evidently been waiting for Begum Sumroo’s infantry, and they say the brigade under Pohlman ; the former of which has certainly come up the ghaut, and, it is supposed, the latter. He has made various detachments towards this body, and at last moved himself yesterday towards Jalnapoor, leaving Ragojee about five coss in his rear, with the little baggage they have, and a body of horse.

‘ Colonel Stevenson moved yesterday also towards Aurungabad, as he tells me, in order to meet Rajah Mohiput Ram ; but it is either to be hoped or feared that this movement may be considered as a retreat, and will encourage the enemy to come to an action. At all events, it ensures the secure junction of the campos.

‘ I made a march yesterday, and another this day, to the eastward from Rackisbaum ; and I am now about six miles north of the Godavery, and shall have a fair start with the enemy for Hyderabad.

‘ The enemy have done but little mischief hitherto to the country. The pindarries have been driven away from many villages ; grain is very dear in their army, which is a certain sign that they get but little plunder ; they are terribly alarmed, and I am told, much dissatisfied. They certainly intend to avoid an action with either of us, if they can ; unless Colonel Stevenson’s movement of yesterday towards Aurungabad should encourage them to come to blows with

him ; and I believe it is their intention to cross the Godavary, now that the river is fordable, and to make a dash to the southward, although it is certain that they do not like my position upon that river, and my readiness to cross with them. They know that the river must rise again, and they do not like to be cut off from their own countries and all assistance.

‘ Whether they go to Hyderabad or not, I have determined to commence an offensive operation against Berar ; and I have accordingly arranged that Colonel Stevenson shall march with his corps towards Ellichpoor, and thence to attack the Rajah’s fort of Gawile, or Gawilghur, and possibly plunder Nagpoor. If they should march upon Hyderabad, I intend to reinforce Poonah with three battalions, and move to Hyderabad with the remainder of my corps. If they do not, I shall endeavor to bring them to an action on this side of the river ; and if I find that they lead me far to the eastward, I shall still detach to Poonah.

‘ Holkar has not yet come down, and you will observe that he has called Kawder Nawaz Khan to him ; and that he wrote him the letter about the 7th or 8th of August, after he must have heard that Collins had come away from Scindiah’s camp. It is impossible to be certain what a fellow of this kind will do, but I augur well from this circumstance ; and I met this morning the Nizam’s vakeel returning to Hyderabad from Ragojee Bhoonslah, (from his conversation, I suspect him to have been Major Kirkpatrick’s intelligencer,) who told Govind Rao that Scindiah had not yet settled his affairs with Holkar.

‘ If Holkar joins, Poonah will be safe with four battalions and five companies of Europeans ; but the countries thereabouts will be exposed to his ravages, while I am engaged with Scindiah and Ragojee towards Hyderabad. But I think it better to risk that, than to remove General Campbell’s corps from Moodgul towards Hyderabad.

‘ The consequence of that would be the invasion of the Ceded districts, and probably Mysore, by the Putwurduns and Holkar, who we must expect would be able to pass by me, notwithstanding all my efforts to prevent it.

‘ By keeping General Campbell at Moodgul, we certainly have a check upon the Putwurduns ; and it is possible that Holkar would not much like to leave behind him the force at Poonah, and move down upon General Campbell.

‘ I have some hopes, however, that the invasion of Berar will check the expedition to Hyderabad. Collins, whom I

saw at Aurungabad, declares that Ragojee is the only one of the three who cares one pin about his country, or who has any thing to lose by an invasion of it: and I declare that, from what Collins told me, I am of opinion that we are involved in this war because Ragojee saw plainly, that, if the Marhatta armies did not subsist this year in the Nizam's country, they must have subsisted in his.

'As I have before me such active operations, you will be glad to hear that I never was in such marching trim. I marched the other day twenty-three miles in seven hours and a half; and all our marches are now made at the rate of three miles an hour.

'You will have seen by my letter to Mr. Duncan, that I have relinquished the command in Guzerat. Mr. Duncan *acquiesced* in my arrangement, and although he stated some objections to it in his private letters, I concluded that he *approved* of it; for it never occurred to me that it was possible for a Governor to *acquiesce* in a proposed system of military operations, for the defence of provinces under his government, of which he did not *approve*. However, he afterwards informed me that he did not approve of my propositions, and he entered into detailed arguments against the principle, as well as the execution of them; but he told me that I might order that they might be carried into execution if I should think proper.

'Without flying in his face, and being guilty of the greatest presumption, I could not give such orders; and at this distance from Guzerat, and with such imperfect, and so long a communication, I could not take upon me to conduct a machine so complicated and disjointed as the military commands of the Committee of Surat, and the Resident of Baroda, and I therefore resigned the whole concern.

'I was much annoyed, for several reasons, at finding myself obliged to take this step; but I found that to keep the command would have involved me in constant hot water, would have taken my attention away from other objects here, and would have answered no good public end whatever.

'I have received the copy of a public letter from the Governor General to General Lake, from the tenor of which, I fear that he does not approve of my letter to him of the 24th of July. I wish that you would let me know what Shawe says about that letter.

'I hope that you are getting better, and that you will soon come back. If Holkar negotiates, I should wish to send you to him with *carte blanche*.

'We are again unlucky in the early fall of the Godavery, and in the enemy having contrived to pass to the southward and eastward of Colonel Stevenson; particularly if it be true that the Moguls have not behaved well. Otherwise our affairs are in a good state.

'I have Appah Dessaye and Goklah with me, and have promised to pay them. This will be one lac of rupees per mensem. Amrut Rao and followers will probably cost half a lac more. Besides these heavy drains, Colonel Stevenson has no money, and the Nizam's troops begin to call out for pay. All this is bad; but I have taken measures to increase our supplies of cash from Poonah, and I have written both to Madras and Calcutta for supplies.

'Griffiths and Hill are getting on well, and will be in safety at Dharore in a few days.

'Amrut Rao is not come yet, but you will observe what his vakeel and Kawder Nawaz Khan said about his troops.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Malcolm.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'SIR,

'Camp, 7th September, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant, in which you have enclosed the copy of one of the 27th of August, from the Military Board.

'I am apprehensive that my letter to the Honorable the Governor in Council, of the 2nd of August, has not been understood as I intended it should, in respect to the provisions for the troops. My idea was, that the troops should have with them in the field, at all times, one month's provisions: but as it was possible that the country might be overrun by a body of horse; and consequently, as it might become difficult, if not impossible, to procure, in those parts in which the troops might be called upon to act, additional and sufficient supplies, I proposed that magazines should be formed, at several stations in different parts, of all those species of provision stores required for the troops, which might be scarce in the country in case of invasion.

'I observe, however, upon a perusal of the letter from the Military Board, of the 27th of August, that the magazines at the several stations, mentioned in my letter of the 2nd of August, will contain provisions for the garrisons which will occupy them, only for one month. The sufficiency of this supply might be doubted, even for these bodies of troops;

as in the case of an extensive invasion of Guzerat, it must be expected that more time than a month will elapse before relief can be afforded to any station that may be attacked ; and at all events, when the relief might arrive, it may be doubtful whether it would be practicable to throw in additional supplies of provisions. But as you will observe, upon a reference to my letter of the 2nd of August, I wished to provide for much more than the garrison at each of the places mentioned ; and as I know that want of supplies is that which is most to be dreaded in the existing war, I wished to provide effectually against it by the formation of plentiful magazines (not for the garrisons, but for the troops in the field,) in the forts situated in the different parts of the country in which the troops might be called upon to act.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Kurcah, 7th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th of August, and I shall bear in mind the information it contains, to be applied in due time.

‘ Since I wrote to you on the 3rd, the enemy have made a movement to the northward, with a view, I imagine, of effecting a junction with Begum Sumroo’s camp, who has certainly ascended the Adjuntée ghaut, followed, as it is reported, by the brigade under Colonel Pohlman. My division is to the southward of the enemy ; but although their movements will certainly be retarded by their infantry and guns, I cannot be certain that they will not be able to pass to the southward of my division.

‘ The river Godavery is fordable, at present, in many places, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year ; but it is certain that it will rise again. I have no doubt but that the enemy, at first, intended to cross the river with their cavalry, and that they were prevented from carrying this intention into execution by my march to the river, the certainty that I should pass it at the same time, and the probability that they would be exposed to my attacks unsupported, during the period that the river Godavery would remain full. They are now bringing on their infantry and their guns, and it is possible that they may attempt to carry the same plan into execution. But if they

do, it may be depended upon that I shall not be very distant from them, that they will not have it in their power to undertake any enterprise of importance, and that I shall attack them whenever I may have an opportunity.

‘I recommend that the two battalions stationed at Hyderabad should be encamped in a commanding situation, and the camp should be entrenched. It would be very desirable that the Soubah should go into his tents; and as there are strange reports in Scindiah’s camp, respecting the communications between the enemy and some of the Soubah’s brothers, which I doubt not are unfounded, it might, perhaps, be proper that these Princes should reside for a time in the fortress of Golcondah, as a security for their persons. However, you must be the best judge of the necessity of this measure, as well as of the propriety of urging it at the present moment.

‘I recommend that a small store of rice should be prepared for the two battalions; and as it is possible that the enemy may endeavor to impede the arrival of the supplies at the city of Hyderabad, it would be proper that the public granaries, if there be any, should be filled. If, however, the Soubah’s cavalry will lay out and attack the pindarries wherever they find them at a distance from their camp, the supplies for the city of Hyderabad will continue to be as plentiful as they have been heretofore.

‘I have determined to send Colonel Stevenson to attack the Rajah of Berar’s fort of Gawilghur, and eventually Nagpoor. This attack will be a diversion in favor of the Soubah’s country, and I think may induce the Rajah of Berar, at least, to return to the northward.

‘Colonel Stevenson has informed me, that Soubahan Khan’s troops are in great distress for want of pay. I have desired him to mention the subject to you, and if he should find that they are so much distressed as that they cannot accompany him upon the expedition into Berar, to send Soubahan Khan and his troops to join me.

‘I recommend that orders should be given to the amildars, killadars, &c., generally throughout the country, to lay in store as much grain as they can procure. It will be of use to the British troops, if it is not so to those in the Soubah’s service; it will save the grain and distress the enemy; and at all events, the loss to the Soubah’s government will be but trifling.

‘I have written to the amildars and killadars of some of the western districts and forts, to request that they would

collect, and keep in them, certain quantities of grain for the use of the troops under my command. The quantities which I have thus required are not very large, as I had no mode of sending them money; and I wish to ascertain their inclination to take any trouble on my behalf, before I give orders that the magazines which I may want might be collected.

'They will certainly be more likely to obey the orders of the Soubah's government, and I shall be glad to hear that they are issued upon this subject.'

'I have the honor to be, &c.'

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, Kurcah, 7th Sept., 1803.

'In my letter of the 4th, I informed you that I intended to watch the enemy's movements to the southward. It is not possible for me, therefore, to send the guns to Moongy Puttun. Indeed, as I am not more than twenty miles from Budnapoor, and about forty from Moongy Puttun, it would be more convenient to me to send the guns to the former than to the latter.

'But, under present circumstances, it would not answer for me to be delayed by having any detachment out.

'Surely the battalion had better be directed to come to me for the guns; and you might send some of your horse for the articles you expect to find at Moongy Puttun.

'You have not told me what your monthly expenses are. Inquire from Salabut Khan whether he can give you 12 pound shot, as well as 18 pound.

'Believe me, &c. •

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Kurcah, 7th Sept., 1803.

'Since I wrote to you this morning, I have received your letter (without a date, but which I understand left your camp yesterday morning).

'Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah left their camp in the neighborhood of Purtoor last night, as soon as they heard of my arrival, and went to a place called Sindkerah, sup-

posed to be to the northward and eastward of Jaulna, distant about nine coss. They have a body of horse, however, at Jaulna.

‘It appears to me that they press upon your corps too closely; and I am much afraid that you will find them inconvenient neighbours, unless you force them to keep at a greater distance. I am very anxious, therefore, that you should move out of your camp, and give them an alert; and to tell you the truth, I am of opinion that if you do not take this step, you will be attacked in your camp.

‘The Mogul horse do not appear very active; otherwise they ought certainly to keep the pindarries at a greater distance. I wish you would move out to attack those at Jaulna. It is almost immaterial whether you find them or not. If you do, you will beat them; if you do not, they will see that they cannot lie so close to you.

‘If you think that you are not so strong as you should wish, let me know it, and I will go to your assistance; but if you are sufficiently strong, I am desirous to remain in this quarter, to cover the advance of Major Hill, with money and a large convoy of bullocks, and to check the operations of the enemy towards Hyderabad. However, I consider it to be so important that the enemy should be kept at a distance from you, that if you require my assistance to attack them, I will sacrifice every thing else to that object.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*
To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Kurcah, 8th September, 1803.

‘I have received a letter from Lieut. Colonel Woodington, commanding the troops in the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao Guickwar, in which he informs me that the fort of Baroach was taken by storm on the 29th of August, with little loss.

‘I have not yet received a detailed account of the attack upon Baroach, but Lieut. Colonel Woodington mentions that the troops behaved with great gallantry.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan on the 24th of August, by the ghaut of Adjunttee, with a large body of horse only. They passed between Colonel Stevenson’s corps, which had moved to the eastward towards Badowly ghaut

and Aurungabad, and they came to the neighborhood of Jalnapoor, a small fort, the capital of a district of the same name, about forty miles east from Aurungabad.

‘I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. As soon as the enemy heard of my arrival they moved farther off to the southward and eastward, with an intention, as it was reported, to cross the Godavery and march upon Hyderabad. I continued my march back to that river, and have since marched to the eastward along its left bank. The river is at present fordable every where, a circumstance never before known at this season of the year. By these movements I have checked the enemy’s operations to the southward, and they have returned again to the northward of Jalnapoor; and, by the position which I occupy at present, I give protection to two important convoys on their march to join me from the river Kistna.

‘Colonel Stevenson took Jalnapoor on the 2nd of September; he is at present between that place and Aurungabad.

‘The brigade of infantry belonging to Begum Sumroo has ascended the Adjuntee ghaut, and it is supposed that another under the command of Colonel Pohlman has followed it; but neither of them had joined the enemy’s head quarters on the night of the 6th. The junction of their troops will considerably retard their movements, and I hope that I shall find an opportunity of bringing them to a general action; but, at all events, I am apprehensive that I shall not be able to relieve the Soubah’s territories entirely from their invasion, unless I can send an expedition into Berar. I am making preparations for this expedition, and I propose to send it as soon as possible.

‘I do not find that the enemy’s pindarries have done much mischief to the country; the villages have, in many instances, been defended by the peons stationed in them and the inhabitants; and grain has sold at a very high price in their camp.

‘Upon my arrival in this part of the country, having found that the district of Jalnapoor did not depend upon the fort of Ahmednuggur, and that it was entirely surrounded by districts belonging to the Soubahdah of the Deccan, I gave it over to the management of his Highness’s servants. Your Excellency will see the value of this district stated in the paper which I enclosed with my letter of the 21st of August.

‘Amrut Rao has not yet joined me; it appears that his march has been delayed by certain ceremonies to be per-

formed on the occasion of the recent death of Moraba Furnavees.

'Jeswunt Rao Holkar encamped, on the 2nd instant, in a situation between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee. He has sent for the vakeel whom I dispatched to him in the month of July, and who has been waiting for his passports in Amrut Rao's camp ever since that time. From the tenor of the passports, it appears that Jeswunt Rao Holkar was very anxious that this person should reach his camp in safety, and that he sent for him at a time when he must have known that Colonel Collins had quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah's camp.

'I understand that Baba Phurkia has joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor General.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp at Kurcah, 8th September, 1803.

'I enclose a letter for Lord Clive, which contains a copy of my dispatch of this date to the Governor General. It has no news which I have not before written to you, excepting that of the fall of Baroach, and of the enemy returning to the northward of Jalnapoor. They appear to be much afraid of this division, and very little so of Colonel Stevenson's. They will not allow me to come within forty miles of them, and I have not yet seen one pindarry. They have been very near to Colonel Stevenson, and their pindarries very troublesome to him. It is fortunate that they have chosen his division, as he is better supplied with brinjarries than I am, and depends less upon the country. But I imagine that the Soubah's horse, although very fine, are inactive, and difficult to be moved out of camp; whereas, I believe the few Marhattas I have, are, or have the reputation of being, very active.

'I am sorry to tell you, also, that it is reported and generally believed in the enemy's camp, that the Soubah's horse are not true to the cause, or to be depended upon by us. I think this may be one cause of their giving Colonel Stevenson so much trouble. I have apprized him of the report, and have desired him to bring the matter speedily to a test, if he can.

'It is impossible for troops to be in better order than

those under my command. My marches are made at the rate of three miles in an hour ; and a few days ago I marched twenty-two miles and a half in seven hours and a half ; and I want only to be joined by Major Hill's and Lieut. Griffiths' companies. These, I hope, are now at no great distance from the fort of Dharore, to which I have ordered them.

' I have preferred returning with my division to the northward of the Godavery, in case of the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, to bringing-up General Campbell ; because it is possible that Holkar may come across the Taptee, and pass the force at Poonah, and, in communication with the Putwurduns, invade the territories of the Company or of the Rajah of Mysore, which in that case would be exposed without defence.

' The invasion of Berar by Colonel Stevenson may possibly bring back the Rajah. I say possibly, because the principle and cause of the war are, the fact that the countries of the confederated Marhattas are in such a state that they are not worth having ; and that the Rajah of Berar has forced it on, because he saw clearly that if the armies of Scindiah and Holkar did not subsist in the Nizam's territories during the next season, they must have subsisted in his. If the Rajah of Berar should be induced to go back to defend his capital, Scindiah will not remain alone in the Nizam's territories. He has but few horse, and they are very bad, and he will follow the Rajah. In that case Holkar may remain neutral.

' But if they should persevere in their advance upon Hyderabad, notwithstanding the invasion of Berar, we must expect and provide for an attack upon the Company's territories ; and I see no way of doing that, excepting to leave General Campbell's corps applicable to that service. I shall have at Poonah a sufficient force for its defence. The Peshwah's country will be overrun, it is true, but it cannot be worse than it is ; and as Holkar would hurry through it if he should come, he would not be able to do it material injury.

' If, instead of this course of operation, I were to make a requisition upon General Campbell to come to the assistance of Hyderabad, I should be obliged to go down to the southward with Holkar ; I could not expect to move as fast as he would, and the country would be exposed, at all events, till my arrival. In this hypothesis I have not considered the Putwurduns. If they should enter into the confederacy, the Company's territories would be exposed to their attacks, from the moment that General Campbell should commence his march to Hyderabad, till I could reach them.

‘ Upon considering the state of the ordnance and ammunition with both divisions, I have determined not to send you my guns. I have only 1350 shot ; you have 300, and a field equipment for your 12 pounders, which I suppose to be 100 for each, making in the whole 2050 shot. If you had no equipment whatever for your 18 pounders, my 12 pounders would be necessary for battering ; but as it is, you will have

a breaching battery of two 18 pounders and one 12 pounder, tolerably supplied with ammunition, which is certainly better than four 12 pounders. The only advantage, then, that you would derive from getting my guns, would be, that you would have iron guns instead of brass for your enfilade. This advantage is not of importance; and when compared with the additional weight which it will throw upon you, and with the inconvenience which it may be to me to part with the guns, which I cannot replace, although I can the ammunition, it may not be deemed one: I have therefore determined to keep the guns.

‘I send you, however some ammunition, together with one lac of pagodas. The convoy leaves camp this evening, to meet Captain Maitland’s battalion, either at Rackisbaum or Moongy Puttun.

‘Colebrook goes with it. I do not think that it will be necessary for you to be in a hurry to march upon this expedition. You had better wait till you are joined by your arrack and every thing you want.

‘If you used your 18 pounders at Jalnapoor, you might be able to pick the shot out of the breached wall. I was obliged to do this at Ahmednuggur; otherwise I should not have had even the equipment that I have at present, as the stores were in confusion and concealed in extraordinary places, and could not be readily found.

‘Lieut. Palmer has not joined me; when he comes he shall be sent to join his company.

‘Repeat your attacks upon the pindarries; they must not be allowed to remain near your camp.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.

‘MY DEAR MUNRO,

‘Camp, 10th Sept., 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 28th of August. I have arranged the conquest of Ahmednuggur exactly as you have suggested. I have appointed Captain Graham to be collector, and I have given him a large body of peons and of horse to forward supplies and preserve tranquillity in my rear. I should have wished to have you in that situation, but you were not on the spot; and it is not impossible but your services will be required in your own districts. I have already put you on your guard.

‘ Since I wrote to you last I have given the enemy a turn. By a few rapid marches to the southward, I have shown them that they could not go alone to Hyderabad ; and I have consequently forced them to return to the northward.

‘ I do not know whether they will come back again, but it is reported that they are going back to Burhampoor ; that the silladars are much discontented, and swear that they will not serve unless supported by the infantry and guns.

‘ It cannot be expected, however, that I shall be able to march with celerity equal to that of an army of horse only ; and some of these may enter your districts. But, on the other hand, it is probable that I may stop them.

‘ The Bengal army has commenced offensive operations. and will cross the Jumna. The troops in Guzerat took Baroach by storm on the 29th of August. Colonel Stevenson beat up a horse camp on the night of the 6th ; and he tells me that he proposed to repeat the attack upon another last night. I have not yet heard whether he did so or not. No enemy has elsewhere come within forty miles of him.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Munro.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘ HONORABLE SIR, ‘ Camp, 12th Sept., 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th instant, in which you have enclosed the draft of the instructions which you have given to Colonel Murray.

‘ 2. It appears to me that these instructions provide for every thing. Colonel Murray will be intrusted with sufficient military authority to enable him to conduct the military duties in the territories which he will have to defend ; and the Resident at Baroda will continue to exercise as much military authority as is necessary under present circumstances, and as will ensure the continuance of the respect of the Natives for the person filling his office.

‘ 3. I shall be happy to contribute every thing in my power to forward this system, and I will correspond constantly with Colonel Murray, and suggest to him whatever may occur to me for the public benefit. At this distance from the Colonel, however, I cannot take upon me to do more than give him a general outline ; and I must refer him to my letter to you of the 2nd of August, and others of a more recent date.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor of Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 12th Sept., 1803.

‘ I find that the enemy have moved off from Jaulna, and are now to the northward of Budnapoor. Some of my light troops fell in with some of theirs on the night before last; in consequence of which I imagine that they found out my intended march and went off. I doubt, however, whether my movement will have been of any benefit to you, as they appear equally near to you, only to the northward.

‘ The doubt expressed in the latter part of your letter of yesterday has annoyed me a good deal, as I am afraid that it will oblige me to alter my plan, at least till we shall have brought the enemy to an action. The fact is, if you are not sufficiently strong for them, when they have neither their infantry nor their guns, and when they have not been joined by Holkar, I cannot expect that you will be able to undertake a siege while they can keep the field against you.

' It is true that your movement towards the territories of the Rajah of Berar will create a diversion in favor of those of the Soubah of the Deccan; but if you are not strong enough it may be one which will cost us an army. I wish to have your sentiments upon this subject.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 12th Sept., 1803.

' I have the honor to enclose copies of the papers which contain a detailed account of the attack upon, and capture of Baroach*. I beg to draw your Excellency's notice to the

* *Lieut. Colonel Woodington to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

' SIR,

' Camp before Baroach, 25th Aug., 1803.

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you, that I have this morning attacked and taken possession of the pettah, on the western face of the fort of Baroach. The battery for two eighteen pounders I hope to have finished in the course of the night, and that I shall be able to begin to batter to-morrow morning, when I flatter myself a speedy reduction of the fort will ensue.

Agreeably to my communication to you, I marched from Baroda on the 21st and encamped within two coss of Baroach on the 23rd. It was my intention to have attacked the pettah (on the outside of which I was informed they had brought their whole force) on the morning of the 24th, expecting to have found the Fury schooner, with the two eighteen pounders, at anchor

conduct of the troops employed on this service ; particularly to that of Lieut. Colonel Woodington who commanded, to

about a coss from the fort, agreeably to the intimation I had received ; but early in the morning of the 24th, one of my cossids, who had been dispatched to Lieut. Hewitson, the commander of the vessel, to give him notice of my approach, brought me the information from him that, on account of the shallowness of the water, it would be utterly impracticable to get his vessel to Baroach until the springs, and that he was at anchor at Bargood, five coss off.

‘ On this intelligence I marched to Bargood on the 24th, and made an arrangement to bring the eighteen pounders and stores up in boats, and I am happy to acquaint you they are just arrived.

‘ We found the enemy in front of the pettah, as I expected, to receive us, and with great ease forced them to a precipitate retreat into the fort.

‘ Our loss in killed and wounded is not great ; no European officer is hurt. I should have the honor of sending a return of the killed and wounded, but have not had time yet to collect them, from the troops being so much employed. The loss of the enemy I have not yet ascertained.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ H. WOODINGTON, Lieut. Colonel.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ P.S. My detachment consists of 500 rank and file of Europeans, and about the same number of the grenadier battalion of native infantry ; two howitzers, two 6 pounders, and the two 18 pounders brought in the Fury. I marched from Baroda with two 12 pounders, but I left them behind after the first day’s march, on receiving certain intelligence of the Fury’s arrival in Baroach river, as our march would have been very considerably delayed by bringing them on.’

Lieut. Colonel Woodington to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Baroach, 29th Aug., 1803.

‘ I have the honor to acquaint you, that at three o’clock, P. M., I stormed the fort of Baroach, and carried it with little loss, although the Arabs made considerable resistance, particularly on our entering the breach. The Arabs have suffered very considerably, and we have taken a great many stand of colors. A more steep ascent to the breach, and of such length, is seldom seen. I cannot express myself in sufficient terms on the gallantry of the officers and men I have the honor to command. I shall have the honor to address you more fully to-morrow. I write this for your early information, immediately after we got possession of the place, which will, I hope, be an excuse for haste.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘ H. WOODINGTON.’

Lieut. Colonel Woodington to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ SIR,

‘ Baroach, 30th August, 1803.

‘ I wrote to you yesterday evening, after we had stormed and taken possession of the fort of Baroach. I have now the honor of acquainting you more fully on the subject.

that of Major Cuyler and Captain Richardson of the 86th regiment, and of Captain Cliffe of the Bombay engineers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘The breach was reported practicable by the engineer at eleven, A.M., when I determined to storm; but delayed it until three o’clock, not only that I might benefit by the assistance of the *Fury* and an armed boat, which I expected would arrive in time to take their stations opposite the fort, but as I thought that a very likely hour to find the enemy off their guard. The vessel and armed boat, however, did not arrive in time to afford any assistance.

‘The enclosed orders for the storm will inform you of the disposition I made, as will the accompanying profile and elevation of the western front of the fort. The enemy made a desperate attack in opposing our entrance into the breach; but, by the valor and spirit of the troops, were speedily repulsed, and my orders were carried into full execution. After Captain Richardson had obtained possession of the first gate, Major Cuyler pushed on so rapidly, that he overtook the Arabs before the greatest part, both horse and foot, could get out of the gate, and put to death about 200 of them. Many horses were also killed.

‘I beg leave to submit to your notice the ready co-operation of Major Cuyler throughout every part of the service, his gallantry and conduct in the command of the storm, as also of Captain Richardson who led.

‘The whole of the officers and men employed on this service have conducted themselves so much to my satisfaction, that I cannot express myself too strongly in their commendation.

‘I am now employed in establishing some order in the fort, in getting the eighteen pounders, and every thing we do not want to move with, into it; also in burying the enemy’s dead, amounting to about 250.

‘I have great pleasure in informing you that our loss is small. Captain M’Laurin, of his Majesty’s 86th, is the only officer wounded, and not badly. I enclose a return of the killed and wounded in the storm, as also a general return of the killed and wounded during the siege.

‘We have taken at least twenty stand of colors from the Arabs and Scindians. I have only been able to collect ten, at present, which, together with the colors of the fort, I shall have the pleasure to send to the Presidency by the earliest opportunity.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*’

‘H. WOODINGTON.’

‘P.S.—Since writing the above, I have three more stand of Arab colors brought to me; besides which, I have at Major Cuyler’s particular request, permitted the 86th regiment to keep two, making in all fifteen’

‘Field Orders by Lieut. Colonel }
Woodington. }

‘Baroach, 29th Aug., 1803.

‘The breach being reported practicable, the fort will be stormed at three o’clock.

‘Storming party under the command of Major Cuyler.

To Major Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

Camp, 13th September, 1803.

'I have just received your letter of the 2nd instant. From the length of time which has elapsed since you wrote it, I

'FORLORN HOPE. A sergeant and 12 volunteers of his Majesty's 86th regiment.

'1st PARTY TO LEAD UNDER CAPTAIN RICHARDSON.—100 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, including one flank company; and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company.

'2nd PARTY UNDER MAJOR CLYLER.—150 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, including one flank company; and 150 rank and file of the grenadier battalion, including one flank company; each party to have hoes, pickaxes, and crows with them, carried by soldiers: the scaling ladders (to be used if necessary) to be also carried by soldiers.

'RESERVE UNDER CAPTAIN BETHUNE.—100 rank and file of his Majesty's 86th regiment, and 100 rank and file of the grenadier battalion.

'These parties will parade and be formed in the streets the troops occupy at two o'clock, and then be completed to thirty-six rounds and well flinted, after which they will be marched up to the rear of the battery under cover from the view of the fort, and wait in the utmost silence until the signal from two six pounders, fired quick one after the other, direct their advance to storm the breach. The reserve will follow the storming party; and after having entered the breach, Captain Bethune will immediately form his men and wait to act as circumstances may direct. Twenty boxes of musket ammunition to be taken in with Captain Bethune's party.

'On entering the breach, Captain Richardson will turn to the left, and march by the works to take possession of the Cuttoo poor gate. Major Cuyler's party will follow, and push on also by the works to take possession of the Jarraseer gate. When these gates are obtained, the works are to be cleared of any parties of the enemy in their vicinity, and the men to be kept under arms ready to act at a moment's warning.

'H. WOODINGTON.'

'Return of the killed and wounded in the Pettah, and during the siege and storm of Baroach on the 29th of August, under the command of Lieut. Colonel Woodington.

		Capt.		Serj.	Rank and File.
‘ Artillery . . . H. M’s. 61st reg. —— 86th do. }	Europeans. {	Killed ..	1	2	4
		Wounded .	2	1	12
				Havil.	Sepoys.
‘ Grenadier, batt.	Natives. {	Killed . .	-	3	8
		Wounded .	-	3	36

'J. BEBIE, Brigade Major.'

apprehend that there is some irregularity in the dawk, and, indeed, that some of your letters have missed me entirely. I set down in the margin the dates of all those which I have received from you since the 1st of August.

‘Whatever may be the state of the Soubahdar’s treasury, I hope that he will not omit to collect a force at Hyderabad

‘General Orders of his Excellency
the Most Noble the Governor
General in Council.

‘Fort William, 14th Oct., 1803.

‘The Governor General in Council derives great satisfaction from the intelligence which he has received of the reduction of the fort and city of Baroach, on the 29th of August; and of the ability, promptitude, and gallantry with which that important service was accomplished by the brave officers and troops under the command of Lieut. Colonel Woodington of the establishment of Bombay.

‘His Excellency in Council highly approves the conduct of Lieut. Colonel Woodington, in his judicious and spirited exertions for the early reduction of the place; in directing the operations of the siege; in his seasonable determination to assault the fort; and in the disposition which he made of the troops under his command, with a view to secure the rapid success of that gallant attack.

‘The Governor General in Council signifies his particular approbation of the valor and judgment manifested by Major Cuyler of his Majesty’s 86th regiment, throughout the service at Baroach, and in commanding the storm of the fort; and by Captain Richardson of the same corps in leading the assault. His Excellency in Council also observes with particular satisfaction the conduct of Captain Cliffe of the engineers of Bombay.

‘To all the officers and troops, European and native employed on this honorable occasion, his Excellency in Council signifies his high commendation.

‘The Governor General in Council laments the loss of Captain W. Semple of his Majesty’s 86th regiment, killed on the 25th of August, and of the few brave men who fell before Baroach. It is a great satisfaction, however, to observe that an acquisition so important should have been secured with the loss of only one officer, and of so few soldiers.

‘In bearing a due testimony to the merits of the officers and troops employed in the reduction of Baroach on the 29th of August, the Governor General in Council remarks, that on the same day, distinguished by the commencement of the victorious career of the army of Bengal under the personal command of his Excellency General Lake, upon the frontier of Oude, the army of Bombay at the Western extremity of the peninsula of India effected a service of the most arduous nature, with a similar spirit of alacrity and courage.

‘In the course of an extensive and complicated system of military operations, the glorious success of our arms since the commencement of this war has been uniform in every part of India. The able and gallant officers and troops of his Majesty’s service, and of the several establishments of the three Presidencies, have been actuated by equal sentiments of public spirit and honor, and have co-operated with equal ardor and success, in an united

for the protection of that city. If its defence should not be better provided for than I imagine it is at present, I apprehend that some misfortune may happen to it.

‘I am happy to observe that you have noticed to the Soubah’s servants the want of boats at the Kalachabootra ghaut, I feel the consequences of the deficiency of their numbers at this moment, as I am obliged to wait for the supplies on their march to join me, instead of being employed in an offensive operation against the enemy. If there had been on the river Kistna even one third of the number of boats which the Nizam’s amildars gave General Stuart reason to believe that they had provided, the supplies would have joined me many days ago.

‘I have, however, the pleasure to inform you, that the enemy are gone off to the northward, and that they are in considerable alarm; the camps of detachments which they had sent to the neighborhood of the division under the command of Colonel Stevenson having been attacked by the Colonel twice in the night, and the enemy having lost, upon those occasions, many men and horses.

‘Although it is necessary that there should be boats on the Kistna, and that General Campbell’s troops should be prepared to cross that river if it should be necessary, I do not think that it will be proper to call them across the Kistna under present circumstances. I conceive that the two battalions already at Hyderabad, with the force which the Soubahdar’s ministers proposed to collect at that city, would ensure its security, till assistance would be sent to it from hence.

‘If General Campbell’s corps should move up to Hyderabad, the territories of the Company, and of the Rajah of Mysore, will be left without defence. They are liable to the same predatory attacks as those of the Soubah of the

effort to accomplish the just objects of the allies. ‘The Governor General in Council confides in the justice of our cause, in the unanimous zeal of the three Presidencies, and in the continued co-operation of their respective resources and power, that the views of the confederate Chieftains will be speedily frustrated by the complete restoration of peace and tranquillity to the provinces of Hindustan and the Deccan, which have been disturbed by the ambition and violence of the enemy.

‘The Governor General in Council directs that Copies of this Order be transmitted to the Right Honorable the Governor in Council at Fort St. George, and to the Honorable the Governor in Council at Bombay, to be published to the army of those Presidencies respectively.

‘By command of his Excellency, &c.

‘L. Hook, Sec. to the Gov., Mil. Dep.’

Deccan, and, in that case, can be relieved only by the march of a division from this quarter. It is obvious that our troops cannot march with so much celerity as the enemy's horse; and much mischief would be done before our troops would arrive. The same reasoning does not apply to Hyderabad. The security of that place is, in some degree provided for. At all events, the enemy cannot do much mischief without the assistance of artillery; and if accompanied by guns, their arrival will not precede that of a division of British troops.

'I am also of opinion, that if General Campbell's corps should be drawn off from its present position, before a decided advantage will be gained over the enemy, the southern jaghiredars will be inclined to join the confederates.

'In case you should send forward either money or grain, I request you to let me know when the convoy will leave Hyderabad, and to desire the officer in charge of it to direct his march either upon Bheer or Dharore, giving me notice, from time to time, of his progress, and not to quit either of those places till he receive orders from me. I request that orders may be sent to the killadars of those forts to give protection to any of our convoys that may go near them.

'I have ordered Lieut. Browne of the 2nd battalion of the 10th regiment to return to Hyderabad with the detachment under his command without loss of time

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 13th Sept., 1803.

'It is very true that it is unfortunate that we should be obliged to look after our convoys and supplies, instead of following up the enemy; but so it is. However, I expect immediately to be joined by Major Hill, with money; and when that shall arrive, I do not care how far I go to the northward. I shall take my chance for the dry grains.

'The enemy have not yet got up all their guns, and are badly supplied with cattle. I do not think that it is to be regretted that they have brought them up, as it gives us a better chance of coming up with them, and of bringing affairs to a decision.

'I recommend that you should not fall back. Let Captain Maitland collect your supplies and bring them up to you. I have made an arrangement of this kind for those which I shall receive hereafter.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

Meer Khan is among them, or that he has, since I wrote, returned from Hindustan. There is still, therefore, but little reason to hope for success from a negotiation with Meer Khan.

‘I am decidedly of opinion, that the services of Meer Khan would be more useful than those of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry which have been offered by the Soubahdar’s government, and this defection from the enemy would distress them considerably. But I acknowledge that I have some doubts whether Meer Khan was ever serious in his intention to enter the Nizam’s service; and even supposing that he was so formerly, whether he would quit the service of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, having received from that chief the reward of his services, and a jaghire for the maintenance of his troops within the Holkar territories.

‘Therefore, although the services of Meer Khan would be very desirable, he is at such distance as to render it almost impossible to open a negotiation to obtain them, and if such negotiation could be opened, its success is doubtful. I have no doubt, therefore, of the propriety of accepting the services of the 6000 cavalry and 2000 infantry.

‘I conceive that the acceptance of their services will not necessarily prevent you from urging the Soubahdar’s servants to bear a part of the expense of entertaining Meer Khan. The measure will certainly be desirable, and may have the effect of shortening the duration of the war, even although the Soubahdar should furnish these additional men.

‘The question whether you ought to press the Soubahdar to bear part of the expense will, in my opinion, depend upon the state of his finances. Under the treaty he is obliged to make every exertion in his power; and the knowledge of the state of his finances alone can enable you to decide how far the British Government can press him to make additional efforts in the common cause.

‘If the Soubahdar’s government should be found to be incapable of making further exertions, we are not precluded from negotiating with Meer Khan, or from taking him into the British service during the war. But I should hope that his Highness will be able to allot lands for the support of his troops hereafter, when the war shall be concluded.

‘In my opinion, the Nabob of Kurnool’s horse ought to be sent and join General Campbell. The duty of conveying our supplies of grain and treasure is the most delicate in which the troops can be employed. The safe arrival of a convoy will frequently depend on the celerity and secrecy of the march; and no troops ought to be employed on that duty excepting those on which we can place the fullest reliance.

'I beg that you will be so kind as to inform the Soubahdar's government that I have never interfered, in any way whatever with the brinjarries attached to his Highness's troops, or with those belonging to Colonel Stevenson. I have not at this moment a single brinjarry in my camp, excepting a few hundred who came with me from Mysore.

'I cannot conceive what the ground of complaint can be; but I suspect it is that the Soubahdar's officer used the grain with which the brinjarries were laden during the time the troops were stationed on the frontier, and that they have neglected to replenish the loads, and that they make these complaints to cover their own omission. However, I will make inquiries on the subject.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will send forward four lacs of rupees of the eight lacs which you report that you have in your treasury, in your letter to his Excellency the Governor General of the 5th instant.

'The sum of money might come forward in charge of an officer's party as far as Bheer or Dharore, according to the intelligence of the enemy's movements which the officer may receive. I will send for it to one of those places. He might bring with him a convoy of grain at the same time. He ought to be directed to consider the measure particularly the object of his care, to march with all practicable celerity, to take post every night, if possible, in a walled village, and to conceal, if possible, the fact that he has treasure under his charge.

'I request to be apprized when he will quit Hyderabad, and, as often as circumstances will permit, of his further progress.

'I do not comprehend the object of Sirjee Rao Ghautky's proposal, or what he proposes to effect for the large sums of money which he has required.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Woodington.

'SIR,

'Camp, 14th September, 1803.

'I have received your letters of the 29th and 30th of August, and I have already expressed in the General Orders my sense of your conduct and that of the troops under your command in the attack of Baroach.

'I wish to have from you, as soon as possible, a return of the stores, provisions, &c., which were found in that fort when captured.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Woodington.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

‘The other charge, founded upon Colonel W——’s levy of taxes from the bazaar may, I am afraid, be traced to the same source. It appears by the letters of Colonel W——, upon the subject of these charges, that he had long levied these taxes with the knowledge of the government of Bombay. If he has levied them for a length of time, Captain H—— must have known it; but he never thought of bringing forward the subject till he was relieved from the state of suspension in which he has been placed by the sentence of a General Court-Martial. I am afraid, therefore, that this charge also may be attributed to private pique.

‘I have long observed that the subjects which have come under the consideration of General Courts Martial in this country are in general referrible to private quarrels and differences, with which the public have no concern whatever. The character of the officers of the army is undoubtedly a public concern; but in many instances it would be much more proper, and more creditable for both parties to settle these differences by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the public by making them the subject of investigation before a General Court Martial.

‘This period appears to me to be one in which it is probable that the exertions and abilities of every officer in the army will be required for the protection of the rights and interests of their country; and I cannot think it will be the most proper time to take up the attention of officers with the investigation and discussion of subjects which have been submitted to, and have been decided upon by a General Court Martial, or for the gratification of any private pique.

‘I therefore most anxiously deprecate this trial; and I beg you to inform Captain H——, that I recommend him to withdraw his letters and his charges against Lieut. Colonel W——, and make that officer such an apology as will induce him to consent to his being released from arrest. I enclose you all the papers which I have received upon this subject.

‘I likewise enclose copies of charges brought against Lieut. M—— and Lieut. P——, by Colonel C——. The original crimes must be sent before I can order these officers to be brought to trial.

‘The articles of war require that when a charge of ungentlemanlike conduct is brought against an officer, the fact on which it is grounded shall be specified. This has been omitted in the crime against Lieut. M——, and it must be amended.

‘I observe that these officers are in arrest for conduct referrible to their private life, rather than to their duty as

officers of the army; and the observations on the arrest of Captain H—— are applicable, in a great degree, to them. I therefore recommend that Lieut. P——, in particular, should be desired to make such an apology to Lieut. Colonel C—— as to induce that officer to apply that he may be released from his arrest; and that the same desire should be communicated to Lieut. M——; if, upon inquiry, you should find that the fact of which he is supposed to have been guilty is of a nature to allow of its being thus passed over.

‘If these gentlemen should insist upon being brought to trial, you will be so kind as to send them away from the detachment in the field, and from Surat, Baroda, or any other garrison or post which may be liable to be attacked by the enemy; and they are to remain at the place at which you will order them, till it shall suit the public convenience to assemble a General Court Martial for their trial.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 15th September, 1803.

‘Since I wrote to you yesterday, there has been some appearance of a recommencement of the rain, and there is consequently reason to believe that the river Godavery will rise again. If it should rise, I should wish to take advantage of the security which it will afford, to bring on to Dharore as much of the treasure now at Hyderabad as can be spared from your treasury. Although, therefore, I do not wish at present to have a larger sum on the road than four lacs of rupees, I shall be obliged to you if you will have preparations made to send as much more as the state of your treasury can afford, as soon as I shall give you notice that the river has risen.

‘Advantage might be taken of the same security to forward on as much of the grain as for which carriage may have been provided.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 15th September, 1803.

‘Matters remain nearly as they were when I wrote to you last. I hear that the enemy are bringing their infantry up the ghaut, and I am waiting only for Major Hill, to move upon them.

‘Colonel Stevenson made two attempts upon their camps at night, by which they have been much alarmed; but they still remain in the neighborhood of his camp in the daytime. Some of the pindarries have also appeared in my neighborhood, but they have done us but little mischief.

‘The Nizam’s horse are very useless, which annoys me a good deal, and creates a doubt of the propriety of sending Colonel Stevenson on the proposed expedition into Berar; at least till we shall have beaten the enemy in the field. If they were all to follow Colonel Stevenson into Berar, we should effectually relieve the Nizam’s territories; but we might meet with a misfortune, of which there could not be a chance if the cavalry were worth any thing.

‘They are bringing their infantry up the ghauts, in what numbers I do not know.

‘Holkar’s army is in the neighborhood of the river Taptee, but he is gone to Myhissur on account of some feast. It appears to be generally doubted now whether he will join the other confederates.

‘I enclose you the copy of a letter which I have received from Colonel Harness, which will show you his opinion of Colonel Griffin. It relates to a complaint which Colonel Griffin sent to me of Colonel Harness, for having given orders that the corps under his command should parade regularly.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘Camp, 15th September, 1803.

‘It occurs to me that it might be possible to make some arrangement with Canojee in Guzerat. I wish that you would turn your mind to that subject, and see if something cannot be done to relieve our troops in that country from a domestic war. If we cannot succeed in doing so, we really lose by our situation in Guzerat all the advantage which we should gain by having the troops, now employed in that country, employed in an offensive operation against the enemy in another quarter.

‘We might possibly gain over Canojee by giving him a pension out of the Baroach lands, or those about Powanghur. I would give him neither land nor fort.

‘If we could do that, and bring Colonel Murray upon Ougein, we should soon put an end to the war. It is really worth trial.

‘The Nizam’s troops behave so ill, and the enemy appear to be so little afraid of Colonel Stevenson’s corps, that I almost doubt the propriety of sending him into Berar. However, they are now bringing up their infantry; in consequence of which, we may have an opportunity of striking a blow before it will be necessary to detach him.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 16th September, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 5th. Before you will receive this you will have got Mr. Duncan’s further instructions, which will have settled all matters.

‘If you find Surat too weak in Europeans, I recommend that you should draw the European part of the garrison from Parneira; that fort is out of the way at present, and is not likely to be attacked. I approve of your suggestion to raise a local battalion for Surat, which I have seen in one of your public letters to Mr. Duncan, but not instead of sebundies. Let the sebundies be raised for the purpose of taking care of the country tannahs, and of collecting the revenue, as well as the local battalion to increase the garrison of Surat. In short, every thing must be done to increase our force at all points, and to render most efficient that part of it in the field.

‘You will now be able to alter Colonel Woodington’s Baroach arrangement. I recommend it to you not to leave there the native garrison which he has allotted to that place. I have no doubt but that force is necessary for the defence of Baroach; but the question is, is Baroach likely to be attacked, and are not the men required in another place, viz., the field? As soon, therefore, as the conquest is settled, and every thing in tranquillity, you might reduce the garrison to the number stated in my letter of the 2nd of August; and if the collector and magistrate of the town and district want more troops, desire them to raise sebundies.

‘Major Walker’s plan to get possession of Futtý Sing’s person, before paying his ransom, I consider, between ourselves, to be one of the most unfortunate that has occurred. It may be called what they please; but as the Patans must have brought Futtý Sing to Berar with a small escort, with the hope of receiving the ransom, and in the certainty that they would not be attacked; it is, in fact, a breach of faith than which nothing can be more unfortunate and injurious

to us at the present moment. Besides, the consequence of it will most probably be, that Hurky Khan, and a parcel of blackguards who are hanging upon the ghauts, and waiting only for Holkar's signal to begin their operations, will enter the Attavey upon the excellent pretence of punishing this act of perfidy of the English, and of collecting the ransom which had been promised to them. Thus they will find us unprepared; and whatever may be the result of our negotiations with Holkar, we shall be engaged with some of his chiefs.

'I do not impute any blame to you or Colonel Watson; you acted with propriety in complying with the Resident's requisition, but I tremble for the result. Make friends of the Bheels by all means.

'These Courts Martial are distressing indeed at present. I wrote you a long letter upon the subject the other day, and I shall not repeat now what I said then. We must endeavor to stop these trifling disputes, and turn the attention of the officers of the army to public matters, rather than to their private concerns.

'It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in your quarter; this must be put an end to. And there is only one mode of effecting this, and that is for the Commanding Officer to be of no side excepting that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can best serve the public, be they who they may, or in whatever service. The consequence will be that the service will go on; all parties will join in forwarding it, and in respecting him; there will be an end to their petty disputes about trifles; and the Commanding Officer will be at the head of an army instead of a party. I heard yesterday that Holkar had crossed the Nerbudda, five days ago, at Myhissur, but my vakeel is with him; there has not yet been any act of hostilities between him and me, and I am by no means certain that he will join the other confederates.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR,

'Camp, 16th Sept., 1803.

'I have received a letter from Major Hill, by which I learn that the killadar of Dharore would not allow him to encamp in the neighborhood of that fort, so as to derive any protection from it for his convoy. This conduct is of little consequence at present, as the enemy have been obliged to

draw off to the northward; but it might have had consequences hereafter, particularly if it should be imitated by the killadars of other forts.

‘I have written a letter to the killadar of Dharore, in which I have enclosed a copy of the Soubahdar’s letter to me, by which his Highness has given me authority to issue orders to the civil and military officers in his service, and I have desired the killadar to allow the British troops to encamp near his fort, and to give every protection and assistance in his power to the convoys of which they will have charge. But as no attention has been paid, indeed no answer has been returned to letters which I addressed above a fortnight ago to this and other killadars, in which I desired them to store grain for the use of the troops, I suspect that no attention will be paid to this letter, and I therefore request you to apprize the durbar of the conduct of the killadar of Dharore towards Major Hill, and urge the Soubahdar’s ministers to send positive orders to the killadars of all his Highness’s forts, and the commanding officers and heads of all his walled towns and villages, to give all the protection and assistance in their power to the Company’s troops and their convoys passing in their neighborhood, and to communicate, to the officer commanding a detachment, any intelligence they may have of the enemy’s motions.

‘If we are not considered and treated as friends in the Soubahdar’s territories, we shall find it very difficult, if not impossible, to bring up any important convoy, and his Highness’s interests must suffer materially.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 16th September, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 5th of September, enclosing an extract of one from the Military Board, upon the subject of Captain Mackay’s accounts. I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to me the objections made by the Auditor to Captain Mackay’s accounts, in order that I may see them rectified according to the regulations of Government.

‘If, however, the objection to these accounts is the want of a muster roll of the drivers of the cattle, I have to tell you, that I fear it is impossible to furnish it, as prescribed by the regulations. Of all the drivers sent from Bombay, who marched from Poonah with this division of the army, or

who have joined it since, I believe not one remains at this moment. It has more than once happened that soubahdars and muccludums, and between 60 and 100 drivers, have deserted in one night; and there is scarcely a night in which nine or ten do not desert. They have been replaced regularly, by hiring other persons from the country, or from the bazaar in camp. But it must be obvious that it would not be possible to make out a muster roll in which the names of all these casualties could be entered; and to send a muster roll containing the names of a certain number of soubahdars, muccludums, and drivers, would only be deceiving Government, and would answer none of the purposes expected to be derived from the detailed muster roll containing the names of the drivers.

‘The same facts and reasoning apply to every description of public followers received from Bombay. The dooly bearers with the 78th regiment have been frequently replaced.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 16th Sept., 1803.

‘I have received your letters of the 13th and 15th. I rejoice to find that you approve of the conduct of Captain Dickson. He has been particularly recommended to me, and I have more than once had opportunities of forwarding his views in the service. I doubt, however, whether you will derive any advantage from the appointment which you propose to give him, at all adequate to its expense.

‘I rather believe that your Quarter Masters have 1000 bullocks for each regiment, and if that is the case, the system is a better one than that proposed. If you wish to increase the quantity of gram to be carried with your cavalry, the best way of doing it would be to increase the number of bullocks attached to the regiments under the Quarter Masters. By this mode you will have the advantage of having two purchasers instead of one, which is not small.

‘I have here a Deputy Gram Agent General. My corps of cavalry, which in point of number of horses does not, I believe, exceed yours, has cost in some months 50,000 pagodas. The Quarter Masters have a bullock for each horse, and the Gram Agent General has a large number besides; and the state of my gram in camp, at this moment, is seven days’ feed. Besides this, there is the old scramble

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th. I agree entirely in opinion with you, that the Nabob of Kurnool's infantry will be useless: and I recommend

that they should not be employed, excepting it should be to increase the force at Hyderabad. I am still of opinion that it would be most advisable to send the cavalry to join General Campbell.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Goondy, 17th Sept., 1803.

‘In my letter of yesterday, in which I proposed that you should send to my camp for money and heavy artillery, if you should want them for the expedition into Berar, I omitted to tell you where the detachment coming for these articles would find me.

‘I am still encamped upon the Godavery, and am marching to the eastward. I am this day at Goondy, at the junction of the Godavery and Galatty; and purpose to move on daily to the eastward, till the enemy shall cross the river, when I shall cross likewise. It is obvious that I cannot tell you at what place. But if you direct the march of the detachment from your corps on this place, or on Ramesgaum on the Godavery, it will certainly find me. Let me know by what route your detachment will march.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Hon. Henry Wellesley.

‘Camp, 20 miles North of the river Godavery.
17th September, 1803.

‘I have not written to you since I was at Poonah, in the month of May, because, in fact, till I took Ahmednuggur in the last month, I had nothing to tell you at all deserving your attention. As you will see the Governor General’s dispatches, it is useless to enter much into detail of the course of events which ended in Colonel Collins’s withdrawing from Scindiah’s camp in the beginning of August. But I shall give you an outline of them.

‘When I wrote to you in May, Holkar had withdrawn from Aurungabad, in compliance with my request; he drew off gradually to the northward, crossed the river Taptee in the beginning of June, when it filled, and was a sufficient barrier between his army and Scindiah’s; and he has remained between the rivers Nerbudda and Taptee ever since, having detached across the Nerbudda and Taptee the troops which were necessary to take possession of the territories belonging to his family.

‘Scindiah marched from Burhampoor on the Taptee in the beginning of May, and he joined the Rajah of Berar towards the end of that month, at Mulcapoor, a place not far from the Nizam’s frontier, about forty miles south of the Taptee. The object of the junction of the armies of those chiefs, as declared by their friends and adherents in all parts of India, and by the ministers at the Nizam’s durbar, was to attack the British Government and its allies. But it was first necessary to reconcile the differences existing between Holkar and Scindiah; and in order to obtain time to effect this object, it was necessary to conceal their hostile intentions, by pacific and amicable declarations, and by every species of dissimulation, at the same time that large armies were assembled in the neighborhood of the frontier of our ally the Nizam.

‘In the end of May, Colonel Collins received the Governor General’s order to demand an explanation of the views and intentions of Scindiah in assembling his army and joining with the Rajah of Berar, in the neighborhood of the Nizam’s frontier; and to require him to retire with his troops across the Nerbudda, if his intentions were pacific. At first Scindiah told him that it was doubtful whether there would be peace or war; afterwards he and the Rajah of Berar found it probable that Collins would quit Scindiah’s camp, and that we should attack them, at a season at which they could not escape, and before they should have made their peace with Holkar; and they wrote a letter to the Governor General, on the 8th of July, in which they declared they had no intentions to attack the British Government or their allies, or to impede the treaty of Bassein, provided the British Government did not interfere with their treaties with the Peshwah.

‘The object of this letter was to gain six weeks’ more time; they imagined that it would have been referred to the Governor General, and that that time would have elapsed before his answers could have arrived. In the mean time, however, I received full powers and instructions from the Governor General to bring the negotiation to a conclusion. I wrote letters to Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, in which I pointed out to those chiefs the necessity there was that they should withdraw their armies from the neighborhood of the Nizam’s frontier, if they were sincere in their pacific declarations, contained in their letter to the Governor General of the 8th of July; and I promised that I would withdraw the British troops, as soon as I should find that they had commenced to withdraw their troops. In answer

to this letter, after much delay and evasion, they made an impudent proposition that I should withdraw first, and fix the day on which the British troops should arrive at Seringapatam, Madras, and Bombay; and they promised that they would arrive at Burhampoor, forty miles from their stations, on the same day. I then commenced hostilities.

‘ Their object throughout the negotiation was to gain time to negotiate the peace between Scindiah and Holkar, and to pass over the rainy season, which was the least favorable for the commencement of their operations. Our object ought to have been to press them to a decision, whether they would retire or not, at a period when they had not had time to make peace with Holkar, and in the commencement of the rainy season, in the course of which we should have made ourselves masters of almost all their valuable posts. A perusal of the correspondence will show you which party succeeded best in the negotiation, and I now proceed to give you an account of our military operations.

‘ On the 4th of June, I marched from Poonah towards the Nizam’s frontier; on the same day Colonel Stevenson crossed the Godavery, and proceeded towards Aurungabad. I remained on the Nizam’s frontier, south of the Godavery, waiting the result of Colonel Collins’s negotiations, till the beginning of August.

‘ On the 8th I attacked and carried by storm the Pettah of Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s fort of Ahmednuggur. On the 9th, at night, I broke ground before the fort, and on the 12th got possession of it by capitulation. This is a place of great note, had been frequently attacked, but never taken. It is, in fact, the strongest country fort I have ever seen, excepting Vellore in the Carnatic, has an excellent ditch, and cannot be surprised. It covers Poonah and the Nizam’s western frontier south of the Godavery: the possession of it gives us an excellent depôt, cuts Scindiah off from all connexion with the southern chiefs, and has given us all his territories south of the Godavery.

‘ Colonel Stevenson prevented Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar from entering the Nizam’s territories till the 24th of August; they entered on that day, however, with large bodies of horse, and marched to the south eastward, apparently with an intention of crossing the Godavery, and of proceeding towards Hyderabad. I crossed the Godavery on the 24th, after taking possession of the Ahmednuggur territories, and stopped their progress to the southward; and since that they have retired gradually towards the ghauts by which they entered. They have kept at a distance from me, but Colonel

Stevenson has had two or three skirmishes with them. I shall move forward to attack them in a day or two, as soon as I have been joined by my supplies of money and provisions coming from the southward.

‘The troops in Guzerat took the fort of Baroach, on the 29th of August. A detachment marched against Cuttack from Ganjam on the 1st of September; and General Lake was likely to attack Mons. Peron, at Coel, about the end of August.

‘I have made a treaty with Amrut Rao, by which I have engaged that he shall have seven lacs of rupees per annum from the Peshwah, provided he joins me.

‘I also think it possible that Holkar will not join the other confederates, as it is certain that he has no confidence in Scindiah; and since he has known that Colonel Collins has withdrawn from Scindiah’s camp, he has sent for an agent of mine, who had been waiting in Amrut Rao’s camp for passports to go to him. This man had not joined him a week ago. None of his troops had joined Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have not with me any of the great southern Marhatta chiefs, and only about 4000 of the Peshwah’s troops, under two sirdars of no very great note. But the greater chiefs are neutral in the contest, and if we continue to be as successful as we have been hitherto, they will continue neutral, if they do not join me. Every thing in my rear is in tranquillity. Indeed, the loss of Ahmednuggur has cut Scindiah off from the Deccan, and has entirely altered his relations with the southern chiefs.

‘The weakness of the Peshwah’s character, and of his government, are partly the causes through which I have not been supported by the southern chiefs. But I think I may attribute the want of their services in some degree also to their desire to see which party will be the strongest, before they join either. They have a high idea of Scindiah’s strength, and they will hardly believe that we are equal to him. If they should remain quiet if, General Lake should be tolerably successful, or if I can bring the enemy opposed to me to a general action, the war will be of short duration.

‘The rains have been very severe, and I have lost large numbers of cattle; but I am well equipped at present, and the troops are in high health and spirits.

‘Ever yours, &c.

‘*The Hon. Henry Wellesley.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 19th September, 1803.

‘Major Hill is arrived with my money, &c., and I intend to make a movement to the northward to-morrow. I shall encamp at Golah Pangree on the Doodna. I shall continue my march to the northward on the following day; but I cannot yet say whether I shall pass to the eastward or westward of Jaulna.

‘On the 21st you might begin to move upon the enemy, and push them towards Adjutee, while I march towards the eastern passes of Badowly and Laakenwarra, by Jaffierabad. If I should find that they collect to the westward, about the Adjutee pass, I shall go nearer to you. If they move towards the latter passes, you might approach me.

‘We must take care that they do not pass to the southward between us.

‘It is said that Holkar’s troops will enter the Nizam’s territories by the Casserbarry ghaut, which during this movement, will be on our left and rear. But provided there is a good garrison in Moongy Puttun, that is of little consequence.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp, 19th September, 1803.

‘Major Hill arrived yesterday, and has brought 2405 bullocks, of which 2277 are serviceable, and 128 unserviceable. I have not yet got an account of the brinjarries with him; but those which left our camp with Lieut. Griffiths joined him, and I believe that altogether he has about 2800.

‘Lieut. Griffiths brought 2887 serviceable bullocks, and 57 unserviceable. 138 cows are included in the serviceable. I shall send off two corps to Poonah to-morrow.

‘The enemy have kept to the northward, in the neighborhood of the Adjutee pass. I have not got a clear account of their infantry, but I believe it is above the ghauts. I shall march towards them to-morrow; and Colonel Stevenson and I will move upon them in separate divisions, in hopes either to bring them to an action, or to drive them out of the country.

‘I have got plenty of provisions for the fighting men, and have made arrangements for having dry grains for the followers, horses, and cattle. The Nizam’s country is fertile, and I hope that I may succeed. But it is but little better

than an enemy's country. We get every thing with the greatest difficulty, and the magazines which, by treaty, ought to be full, are, I believe, empty. At all events they will not allow us to see them, much less to have the use of them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 19th September, 1803.

‘I enclose some papers which Goklah sent me yesterday. They contain orders to employ his troops in seizing villages in the districts of Gundapoor and Byzapoor. I shall be obliged to you if you will make arrangements with the Peshwah's government that the few troops (of the number specified in the treaty) which he has furnished, and which we pay, may not be employed otherwise than as the exigencies of the war may require, and that they may not be diverted from this service by the orders from Poonah.

‘To-morrow morning two corps go from hence on their road to Poonah with their field pieces. They will arrive at Poonah in the first days in October.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘Camp at Golah Pangree,
20th Sept., 1803.

‘MY LORD,
‘I received last night your Excellency's orders of the 30th of August, and I have now the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have written this day to Major General Campbell.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major General Campbell.

‘SIR, ‘Golah Pangree, 20th Sept., 1803.

‘1. I have received a dispatch from His Excellency the Governor General, in which His Excellency has ordered me to convey to you my sentiments upon the object and expediency of reducing the number of the troops under your command at the present moment; in order to do this, it will be necessary to review our situation in this country.

‘2. The Company are involved in a war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; Holkar's troops have not yet committed hostilities against the Company or their allies, but the confederated Marhattas declare that that chief will

join them, and from the difficulty of communicating with him, I cannot say what line of conduct he will adopt.

‘3. When the enemy first entered the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, they appeared disposed to carry on a predatory war; their movements were checked; and they have been since joined by a body of infantry, with artillery; it is to be hoped, therefore, that this plan has been relinquished, and it is probable that it will be in our power to conduct our operations in such a manner as to make some impression upon the enemy in a short space of time. If Holkar should co-operate in the war, I think it most probable he will not join his troops with those commanded by Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; he will probably carry on a distinct operation, and keep at a distance from our troops; he is most likely to carry on a predatory war.

‘5. In my opinion, he will move to the southward, keeping as far to the westward from my corps as he can; with a view to this operation, I have reinforced Poonah, which place will be quite secure; but there is nothing to prevent him from passing on to the southward of the Kistna, and invading the Company’s territories, excepting the division under your command. I am, therefore, decidedly of opinion, that that division ought to retain its position, at least till it shall be seen what part Holkar takes in the contest, and what plan of operations he will adopt, if he should be an enemy.

‘6. Supposing that, under present circumstances, we might be able to make any important impression on the other two members of the confederacy, it would still be necessary to guard against this supposed operation of Holkar. If he should enter into the war at all, he would be more likely to carry it into execution.

‘7. Success against the other confederates would certainly leave more troops, of those now in this quarter, at our disposal to watch and check Holkar’s operations; but still, as his movements would be much more rapid than those of the Company’s troops, the Company’s territories would be exposed to his depredations, if your corps were withdrawn.

‘8. All the southern chiefs have written me friendly letters in answer to those that I wrote, in which I informed them of the commencement of the war with Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and of its causes. Their situation in relation to Dowlut Rao Scindiah is much altered since the fall of Ahmednuggur, and at all events, I believe they are aware that they have no chance of retaining their possessions, excepting under the English protection. Their actions have hitherto been in conformity with their professions, as supplies

for my camp have been suffered to pass through their countries since the commencement of the war.

‘9. These chiefs, however, are all either declared or concealed enemies of the Peshwah. I know, also, that they have been strongly urged by the confederates to join in the contest. We cannot conceal from ourselves, that our cause in this war is very unpopular among those who generally guide the councils and conduct of these chiefs; and that each individual of them is strongly urged by every motive of national and family pride, to oppose the British Government in a war which will certainly destroy the national power of the Marhattas.

‘10. These facts and arguments are laid before them upon all occasions; and although they see that their personal interest depends in a great measure upon the success of the British Government, and they are aware that there is every reason to believe that the British Government will be successful in this contest, I doubt much whether they would not enter into the war, if they did not see your corps encamped at their gates ready to fall upon and destroy them the moment they should appear as enemies; at all events, supposing that their hatred of the Peshwah, the solicitations of the confederates, and their notions of family and national honor, which I have above noticed, should have no effect upon their minds, and that they are sensible that their interests are involved in the success of the British Government, the position of your corps at least affords them a plausible excuse for declining to join their countrymen in the war.

‘11. The greatest difficulties with which we shall have to contend throughout this war, will be the want of power and authority by the allied governments of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan. Every killadar, and the head of almost every village and district, acts as he thinks proper, and this conduct may have very unpleasant consequences: your division, the position of which is well known, tends to check this disposition.

‘12. Upon the whole, I am decidedly of opinion, that a body of troops in the position occupied by the division under your command is absolutely necessary for the security of the Company’s territories; that they render probable the continuance of the neutrality of a class of people who might do us much mischief, and that they check the dispositions of the officers of the government of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan to assume independence.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major General Campbell.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

' MY DEAR SIR, ' Camp, 21st September, 1803.

'I am happy to hear of Lieut. Lister's success, as reported in your letter of the 18th.

‘ You must urge Hyder Khan to make haste and raise his horse, and as soon as they are raised they must keep the country quiet in the neighborhood of Nimgaum. It will not answer to have the Company’s troops in a place of that kind hereafter, particularly if there is any probability of being attacked with cannon.

‘The killadar of Ahmednuggur is in Scindiah’s camp, and not at Haskin. But at all events that fort is too strong for us at present, and I want the troops and guns to escort grain from Ahmednuggur to the Godavery, as you will hear from Captain Lucas.

'I do not believe that Haskin belongs to the Company, but to the Nizam. If that be the case we ought not to meddle with it, but keep the people who are in the place in check, by means of Hyder Khan's cavalry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Captain Graham.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'SIR, 'Camp at Saalgaum, 21st September, 1803.'

‘1. I have perused the papers sent from the Resident, enclosed with your letter of the 14th instant, and I beg leave to offer the following suggestions upon the subject of Futty Sing Rao and his mother, to which they relate. They may be of service, if not received at too late a period. If the question should be decided before this letter should be received, they will not be worthy the consideration of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

‘2. It is my decided opinion, that the offer of Futty Sing Rao and his mother to come to Baroda, provided a ransom is paid for their release, is sincere. I formed this opinion upon the fact that they have entered the Company’s territories attended but by a small party of horse. If their intentions were hostile, or if they had any intention excepting that of being released from the hands of the Patans, they would have brought with them a much larger body of troops, and the conduct of this body of troops would have been very different from that observed by those troops at present with Futty Sing Rao.

'3. Upon a perusal of the papers transmitted by Major Walker, I do not see the slightest ground for a belief that the intentions of Futtty Sing and his mother are different from those which they have declared that they entertain.

'4. But whether it be true or not that Futtty Sing Rao and his mother have evil intentions, in my opinion, it is necessary first to determine whether it is worth fifty thousand rupees to have possession of their persons. If that should be determined in the negative, those persons and the Patans ought to be desired forthwith to withdraw from the Company's territories; and they ought to be driven out, if they should refuse to comply with this desire.

'5. If it should be determined that the ransom ought to be paid, respecting which, in my opinion, there can be no doubt, the money ought to be prepared without loss of time, and sent in charge of a sufficient body of troops to meet the Patans. Futtty Sing Rao and his mother should then be called upon to deliver themselves over to the British troops, and the money ought to be paid upon their arrival in the British camp. If they should decline to deliver themselves over, or there should be any difficulties on the part of the Patans, or if they should refuse to retire after having delivered over the persons of Futtty Sing Rao and his mother, they ought to be attacked and driven out.

'6. In my opinion, however, every attempt to procure the release of Futtty Sing Rao and his mother, without paying the demanded ransom, or after paying a part of it, is inconsistent with the scrupulous good faith which ought to direct all our transactions with the natives. It is true that the Guickwar government did not consent in terms to pay the fifty thousand rupees for the release of Futtty Sing Rao and his mother: but when that ransom was demanded, and the government were informed that these persons were coming down the ghauts with five hundred Patans, and the government admitted them into the country, they virtually consented to pay the ransom for which they came; and every attempt to get possession of the persons of Futtty Sing Rao and his mother, without paying any ransom, or after paying only a part, is a direct breach of faith. If the government did not intend to pay the ransom, they ought not to have admitted the Patans into the country.

'7. While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid expressing my approbation of the prudent conduct of Lieut. Colonel Watson at Barreah.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

‘ I was joined by Major Hill with the last of the convoys expected from the river Kistna on the 18th; and on the 20th was enabled to move forwards towards the enemy, who had been joined in the course of the last seven or eight days by the infantry under Colonel Pohlman, by that belonging to Begum Sumroo, and by another brigade of infantry, the name of whose commander* I have not ascertained. The enemy’s army was collected about Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffierabad,

‘ I was near Colonel Stevenson’s corps on the 21st, and had a conference with that officer, in which we concerted a plan to attack the enemy’s army with the divisions under our command on the 24th in the morning; and we marched on the 22nd, Colonel Stevenson by the western route, and I by the eastern route, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna.

‘ On the 23rd I arrived at Naulniah, and there received a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had moved off in the morning with their cavalry, and that the infantry were about to follow, but were still in camp at the distance of about six miles from the ground on which I had intended to encamp. It was obvious that the attack was no longer to be delayed; and, having provided for the security of my baggage and stores at Naulniah, I marched on to attack the enemy.

‘ I found the whole combined army of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar encamped on the bank of the Kaitna river, nearly on the ground which I had been informed that they occupied. Their right, which consisted entirely of cavalry, was about Bokerdun, and extended to their corps of infantry, which were encamped in the neighborhood of Assye. Although I came first in front of their right, I determined to attack their left, as the defeat of their corps of infantry was most likely to be effectual; accordingly I marched round to their left flank, covering the march of the column of infantry by the British cavalry in the rear, and by the Marhatta and Mysore cavalry on the right flank.

‘ We passed the river Kaitna at a ford beyond the enemy’s left flank, and I formed the infantry immediately in two lines, with the British cavalry as a reserve in a third, in an open space between that river and a nullah running parallel

* M. Dupont.

to it. The Marhatta and Mysore cavalry occupied the ground beyond the Kaitna on our left flank, and kept in check a large body of the enemy's cavalry which had followed our march from the right of their own position.

'The enemy had altered the position of their infantry previous to our attack; it was no longer, as at first, along the Kaitna; but extended from that river across to the village of Assye upon the nullah, which was upon our right. We attacked them immediately, and the troops advanced under a very hot fire from cannon, the execution of which was terrible. The piquets of the infantry and the 74th regiment, which were on the right of the first and second lines, suffered particularly, from the fire of the guns on the left of the enemy's position near Assye. The enemy's cavalry also made an attempt to charge the 74th regiment at the moment when they were most exposed to this fire, but they were cut up by the British cavalry, which moved on at that moment. At length the enemy's line gave way in all directions, and the British cavalry cut in among their broken infantry; but some of their corps went off in good order, and a fire was kept up on our troops from many of the guns from which the enemy had been first driven, by individuals who had been passed by the line under the supposition that they were dead.

'Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, with the British cavalry, charged one large body of infantry, which had retired and was formed again, in which operation he was killed; and some time elapsed before we could put an end to the straggling fire, which was kept up by individuals from the guns from which the enemy were driven. The enemy's cavalry also, which had been hovering round us throughout the action, were still near us. At length, when the last formed body of infantry gave way, the whole went off, and left in our hands ninety pieces of cannon.

'The victory, which was certainly complete, has, however, cost us dear. Your Excellency will perceive by the enclosed return*, that our loss in officers and men has been very great,

* *A Return of the Killed, Wounded, and Missing of the Detachment of the Army under the command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley at the Battle of Assye, against the Army of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the 23rd September, 1803.*

H. M's. 19th Lt. D. 1st. bat. Madras Art. 2nd do. do. Det. Bombay do. H. M's. 74th regt. —— 78th do.	Europeans.						R. & F. Horses.
	F. O.	Cap.	Sub.	Serj.	Drum.		
}	Killed	1	6	7	9	—	141
	Wounded	3	6	20	33	6	343
	Missing	—	—	—	—	—	8
							77
							3
							—

copy of the report which I have made on the subject to his Excellency the Governor General.

'I have desired the Commanding Officers of regiments to recommend officers to your notice for promotion, in consequence of the vacancies which have occurred; and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity to recommend to your favor Major Kennedy, of the 19th light dragoons, who commanded the regiment during the action; as also the officers of the 74th regiment, the majority of whom I am sorry to say are wounded.

'Lieut. Colonel Wallace, who is also Major of the 74th regiment, has applied to me to request that I would recommend him to you to obtain one of the vacant Lieut. Colonels in the 19th dragoons; as it is understood that the establishment of that regiment is now two Lieut. Colonels. I have requested the Colonel to give me a memorandum of his services, which I have now the honor to enclose; and I have only to add thereto the testimony of my perfect approbation of Colonel Wallace's conduct since he has been detached with me, and of my knowledge that the facts alluded to in the enclosed memorandum are true.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'General Lake.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

'I marched on the 20th from the ground which I had occupied in the neighborhood, waiting for the junction of Major Hill; and on the 21st I was near to, and had a conference with, Colonel Stevenson, in which I arranged that we should attack the enemy this day. But on my arrival on my ground yesterday, I received accounts that the enemy's cavalry had marched off, that their infantry were preparing to follow, and that the latter were only six miles from my proposed camp.

'It was so important to our interests at this moment to strike a blow, that I thought there was no time to be lost: accordingly, I determined to march on to attack them, and I sent notice of this determination to Colonel Stevenson.

'I found the whole army encamped, and made my arrangements to attack their infantry, which was upon their left flank. The fire from their cannon was the hottest that has been known in this country, and we lost a great number of officers and men in advancing to the attack; Colonel Max-

well, among others, killed. At length we drove them off, and have taken about 60 pieces of cannon, nearly all brass, of the largest calibres. Their infantry, of which there were three campoos, fought well, and stood by their guns to the last. Their execution, however, was principally by their cannon. Colonel Wallace, Colonel Harness, and I, had horses killed under us. I lost two horses, one shot and the other piked; and the staff officers have lost one or two each.

‘I believe the enemy did not get away more than two guns, and I am doubtful whether they even have that number, as the number that we have taken agrees with that which my hircarrahs have reported that they had previous to the action.

‘ Their cavalry did us but little mischief. A body made an attempt to charge the 74th, and were cut up by the 19th dragoons. As soon as I can get accurate accounts of the killed and wounded, I shall send you all the details of the action.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

' SIR, ' Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

'I have just time to inform you that I attacked the enemy's army with my division yesterday, the result of which was, that I took about sixty pieces of cannon and defeated them. I have lost many men.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkputrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

' SIR, ' Camp at Assye, 24th September, 1803.

'I have now the honor to enclose my report to the Governor General, of the details of the action of the 23rd instant.

‘ It is my opinion that there will be no occasion for Major Irton to entrench his camp; but I acknowledge that I am very desirous that the Soubahdar of the Deccan should take the field; as, independently of the effect which this measure will have upon our foreign enemies, it will tend materially to preserve the tranquillity of his Highness’s territories. ’

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Shawe.

' MY DEAR SIR, ' Camp at Assye, 24th Sept., 1803.

'I attacked the united armies of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday with my division, and the result is, that I have taken about sixty pieces of cannon. The action was very brisk indeed, the fire from the enemy's cannon the hottest that has been known in this country for some time; and our loss in officers and men has been very great. Among others, your brother in the 74th is wounded; Colonel Maxwell was killed; Colonel Harness, Colonel Wallace, and I, and I believe every officer of the staff, had horses shot under us.

‘ Scindiah’s infantry behaved remarkably well, and stood to their guns to the last ; but their execution was with them only. I do not believe that they carried away more than two, and I doubt whether they have got even that number.

‘I will write to the Governor General in detail upon the subject of this action, as soon as I can get accurate returns of the killed and wounded, and of the ordnance taken.

' Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

‘The enemy fled towards the Adjutee ghaut, and I believe have descended it.

MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF ASSYE.

Subsequently transmitted.

‘1. The information which we obtain regarding the position of an enemy whom we intend to attack, is in general very imperfect. We cannot send out natives in the Company’s service, who, from long habit, might be able to give an accurate account, because they, being inhabitants of the Carnatic, or Mysore, are as well known in this part of the country as if they were Europeans; and we cannot view their positions ourselves, till we can bring up the main body of our armies, because the enemy are always surrounded by immense bodies of horse. The consequence, is, that we are obliged to employ, as hircarrahs, the natives of the country, and to trust to their reports.

‘2. All the hircarrahs reported, that the enemy’s camp, which I had concerted with Colonel Stevenson to attack, was at Bokerdun.

‘I was to attack their left, where we knew the infantry was posted ; and Colonel Stevenson their right.

‘Their camp, however, instead of being at Bokerdun, had its right to that village, and extended above six miles to Assye, where was its left ; it was all in the district of Bokerdun, which was the cause of the mistake.

‘3. My march of the 23rd was so directed, as that I should be within twelve or fourteen miles of the enemy’s camp on that day, which I supposed to be at Bokerdun. Instead of that, by the extension of their line to the eastward, I found myself within six miles of them. I there received intelligence that they were going off ; at all events, whether they were about to go or to stay, I must have reconnoitred. I could not have reconnoitred without taking the whole of my small force ; and when I got near them, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to retire in front of their numerous cavalry. But I determined to attack them, as I really believed the intelligence I received at Naulniah to be true.

‘4. When I found the intelligence I received at Naulniah was false, that I had their whole army in my front, and that they had a most formidable position, three or four times my number of infantry only, and a vast quantity of cannon, I deliberated whether I should withdraw, and attack on the following morning according to the plan.

‘5. The consequence of my withdrawing would have been, that I should have been followed to Naulniah by their cavalry, and possibly should have found it difficult to get there. They would have harassed me all that day ; and as I had only ground fortified by myself to secure my baggage in, it was ten to one whether I should not have lost a part of it during the attack on the following morning ; and, at all events, I should have been obliged to leave more than one battalion to secure it.

‘During the attack of the 23rd, the enemy did not know where the baggage was ; and, although it was so close to them, they never went near it.

‘6. Besides this, on the other hand, there was a chance, indeed a certainty, that the enemy would hear that Colonel Stevenson also would move upon them on the 24th, and would withdraw their infantry and guns in the night.

‘I therefore determined to make the attack.

‘7. The plan concerted, you will observe, failed, from the deficiency of our information regarding the enemy’s position, and, consequently, my coming too near them on the 23rd with my camp, baggage, &c.

‘8. The enemy’s first position was as shown in the plan.

‘The Kaitna is a river with steep banks, impassable for carriages everywhere, excepting at Peepulgaon and Warsor. I determined, from the ground on which the cavalry was first formed, to attack the enemy’s left flank and rear, and to cross the river at Peepulgaon.

‘I intended at that time to throw my right up to Assye.

‘9. For a length of time they did not see my infantry, or discover my design. When they did discover it, they altered their position, and threw their left up to Assye, and formed across the ground between the Kaitna and Assye: but in more than one line. Luckily, they did not occupy the ford at Peepulgaon: if they had, I must have gone lower down; and possibly I should have been obliged to make a road across the river, which would have taken so much time, that I should not have had day enough for the attack.

‘10. When I saw that they had got their left to Assye, I altered my plan; and determined to manœuvre by my left, and push the enemy upon the nullah, knowing that the village of Assye must fall when the right should be beat.

‘Orders were given accordingly.

‘11. However, by one of those unlucky accidents which frequently happen, the officer commanding the piquets, which were upon the right, led immediately up to the village of Assye; the 74th regiment, which was on the right of the second line, and was ordered to support the piquets, followed them.

‘There was a large break in our line between these corps and those on the left. They were exposed to a most terrible cannonade from Assye, and were charged by the cavalry belonging to the campoos; consequently, in the piquets and the 74th regiment we sustained the greatest part of our loss.

‘One company of the piquets, of one officer and fifty rank and file, lost one officer and 44 rank and file. This company belonged to the battalion left at Naulniah.

‘12. Another bad consequence resulting from this mistake was, the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the action at too early a period. I had ordered it to watch the motions of the enemy’s cavalry hanging upon our right; and luckily, it charged in time to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets. It was thus brought into the cannonade; horses and men were lost: it charged among broken infantry, and separated; the unity of the body was lost, and it was no longer possible to use it, as I had intended when I

placed it in the third line, to pursue and cut up the defeated and broken enemy, and thus make the victory still more complete than it was.

‘13th. As I had foreseen, the corps at Assye was not defeated till worked upon by the centre and left of our line, notwithstanding the movement of the piquets, the 74th, and the cavalry; and then it went off directly, and was cut up.

‘14. The annexed plan* is correct, excepting in the following instances: 1st, we came upon the enemy farther to the westward—it ought to be where I have marked in pencil. 2ndly, the formation of the Marhatta and Mysore horse ought to be as I have marked in pencil. 3rdly, our left, when we formed and advanced, was nearer the Kaitna; and the 74th was not in an echelon, as represented in the plan. 4thly, the enemy had more than one line of infantry.

‘N. B. The Juah river, or nullah, has steep banks, impassable for carriages, scarcely passable for horses.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Shawe.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 25th September, 1803.

‘You will be surprised to see, in my report to the Governor General, that we have taken ninety pieces of cannon, instead of sixty, as I told you. The fact is, that I counted sixty-seven myself, on the morning of the 24th; I was not certain that I was correct; but now I believe that we have taken nearer one hundred than ninety pieces. I know that we have got seventy brass guns and howitzers, and above twenty iron. I intend to destroy the latter, and to send the former first to Dowlutabad, and then to Ahmednuggur.

‘The enemy are down the ghauts in great consternation. Colonel Stevenson follows them to-morrow. I must halt till I can get back my doolies, after placing the sick in Dowlutabad.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘Your brother’s wound is doing well. He will not be obliged to quit the army.’

* The plan, corrected agreeably to this suggestion, is to be found in the Appendix to the Marhatta War.

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp, 30th September, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose an account of the ordnance taken from the enemy in the action of the 23rd inst*. I

** A Return of Ordnance of different calibres, taken from the enemy in the Battle of the 23rd of September, 1803.*

		‘Camp, 29th September, 1803.	
Brass howitzers.	Brass guns.	Iron guns.	Total.
7	69	22	98

‘The number of tumbrils, and quantity of ammunition and stores, taken, cannot be ascertained, as after the action, and during the night, a great number of the tumbrils were blown up.

‘M. BEAUMAN, Cap. Com. Artillery.’

General Orders of his Excellency
the Most Noble the Governor
General in Council.

} ‘Fort William, 30th October, 1803.

‘The Governor General in Council has this day received from Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley the official report of the signal and splendid victory obtained by the troops under the personal command of that distinguished officer, on the 23rd of September, at Assye in the Deccan, over the combined armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar.

‘At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory in every quarter of India, this transcendent victory demands a testimony of public honor, equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

‘The Governor General in Council highly approves the skilful plan formed by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the 21st of September for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

‘His Excellency in Council also signifies his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment with which Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd of September.

‘During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled and never surpassed.

‘The Governor General in Council signifies his warmest applause of the exemplary order and steadiness with which the troops advanced, under a most destructive fire, against a body of the enemy’s infantry considerably superior in number, and determined to oppose a vigorous resistance to our attack. The numerous infantry of the enemy were driven from their powerful artillery at the point of the bayonet, with an alacrity and resolution truly worthy of British soldiers; and the firmness and discipline manifested by our brave infantry, in repelling the great body of the enemy’s cavalry, merit the highest commendation.

have reason to believe that there are still four more guns, which were thrown into the river by the enemy in their retreat.

‘We have taken seven stand of colors, and the enemy lost all their ammunition, although, the tumbrils having blown up, some during the preceding night, we have got nothing but

‘The Governor General in Council has remarked, with great satisfaction, the gallant and skilful conduct of the cavalry, commanded by Lieut. Colonel Maxwell, and particularly of his Majesty’s 19th regiment of light dragoons, a corps distinguished by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service, and of progressive honor.

‘His Excellency in Council directs Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to signify to all the officers and troops employed on this glorious occasion, and especially to Lieut. Colonel Harness and to Lieut. Colonel Wallace, who commanded brigades, and to the Officers of the staff, the high sense entertained by the Governor General in Council of their eminent and honorable services.

‘The important benefits arising from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a hostile and predatory army from the territory of our ally the Soubahdar of the Deccan; and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the enemy.

‘The prosperous result of these advantages must be accelerated by the auspicious progress of our arms in other provinces of India, and it may reasonably be expected that the decisive victories gained at Delhi and Assye, on the 11th and 23rd of September, will speedily compel the enemy to restore peace to Hindustan and to the Deccan.

‘The achievements of our commanders, officers, and troops, during this campaign, and especially in the signal victories of Delhi and of Assye, must inspire a general sentiment of just confidence in the vigor of our military resources, and in the stability of our dominion and power. Our uniform success in frustrating every advantage of superior numbers, of powerful artillery, and even of obstinate resistance opposed by the enemy, constitutes a satisfactory proof of the established superiority of British discipline, experience, and valor; and demonstrates that the glorious progress of our arms is not the accidental result of a temporary or transient advantage, but the natural and certain effect of a permanent cause.

‘From these reflections, consolation is to be derived for the loss of those lamented and honored officers and soldiers, who, animated by the gallant spirit of their General, and emulating the noble example of his zeal and courage, sacrificed their lives to the honor and interests of their country.

‘The Governor General in Council greatly regrets the loss of Lieut. Co-

the shot. The ordnance is very fine; but I have destroyed the iron guns, and shall put the brass guns in a place of security

‘The enemy lost 1200 men killed in the field of battle,

lonel Maxwell, of his Majesty’s 19th dragoons, who fell at the head of the British cavalry, bravely charging a large body of the enemy’s infantry. With the utmost concern his Excellency in Council records the names of the valuable and excellent officers who have fallen with glory at the battle of Assye, in achieving the complete defeat of the enemy, and in establishing the triumph of the British arms in the Deccan—Lieut. Colonel Maxwell; Captains R. Boyle, H. Mackay, D. Aytone, A. Dyce, R. Macleod, and T. Maxwell; Captain-Lieuts. Steele and Fowler; Lieuts. Bonomi, Griffith, J. Campbell, J. M. Campbell, J. Grant, R. Neilson, L. Campbell, M. Morris, and J. Douglas; Lieuts. Brown, Mavor, Perrie, and Volunteer Tew (a).

‘In testimony of the high honor acquired by the army under the personal command of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, at the battle of Assye, the Governor General in Council is pleased to order, that honorary colors, with a device properly suited to commemorate that signal and splendid victory, be presented to the corps of cavalry and infantry employed on that glorious occasion. The names of the brave officers and men who fell at the battle of Assye will be commemorated, together with the circumstances of the action, upon the public monument to be erected at Fort William, to the memory of those who have fallen in the public service during the present campaign.

‘The honorary colors granted by these orders to his Majesty’s 19th regiment of dragoons, and to the 71th and 78th regiments of foot, are to be used by those corps while they shall continue in India, or until his Majesty’s most gracious pleasure be signified through his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

‘His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, Captain General and Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces serving in the East Indies, is pleased to direct, that these orders be publicly read to troops under arms, at every station of the land forces in the East Indies, and that the European officers of the native corps do cause the same to be explained to the native officers and troops. ‘By command of his Excellency, &c.

‘L. Hook, Sec. to Gov., Mil. Dept.’

*The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the
Hon. the Court of Directors (Extracts.)*

‘HONORABLE SIRS,

‘Fort William, 31st October, 1803.

‘52. A copy of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley’s dispatch, containing the details of the most brilliant and important victory of Assye, is

(a) Mr. Tew had been recommended by Major General Wellesley to the Commander-in-Chief, for his conduct at Ahmednuggur.—See Letter to General Lake, 17th Aug. 1803.

and their wounded are scattered in all parts of the country. It is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's principal minister, received a wound, of which he died the day before yesterday. Their army is in the greatest confusion, and retiring to Burhampoor. Colonel Stevenson has followed them down

enclosed for your Honorable Committee's information, together with a copy of the General Orders issued by the Governor General in Council on that memorable occasion. The Governor General in Council solicits the particular notice of your Honorable Committee, and of the Honorable Court of Directors, to the distinguished merits of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and of the officers and troops under his command, in that extraordinary exertion of British discipline, valor, and skill.

'53. The satisfaction with which the Governor General in Council contemplates the late rapid and glorious success of the British arms in every direction in which they have been opposed to the enemy's forces, is augmented by the reflection, that, under the pressure of accumulated defeat, with aggravated loss of resources, power, reputation, military strength, and dominion, in every quarter of India, the confederate chieftains must speedily be compelled to accede to such reasonable terms of pacification as shall sufficiently provide for the safety of our allies, for the future security of the Honorable Company's possessions and for the permanent establishment of tranquillity in Hindustan and the Deccan.

'56. The public duty of the Governor General in Council also demands a testimony of justice to the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley. The attention of your Honorable Committee has already been solicited to the merits of Major General Wellesley, in conducting the British troops from the frontier of Mysore to Poonah; in establishing his Highness the Peshwah upon the musnud; and in the reduction of the important fortress of Ahmednuggur. The conduct of Major General Wellesley, in the exercise of the extensive political and military powers vested in him by the Governor General in Council, also deserves the highest approbation of your Honorable Committee and of the Honorable Court of Directors.

'57. At the close of a campaign of the most brilliant success and glory in every quarter of India, the transcendent victory obtained at Assye, in the Deccan, on the 23rd of September, appeared to the Governor General in Council to demand a testimony of public honor equal to any which the justice of the British Government in India has ever conferred on the conduct of our officers and troops in the most distinguished period of our military history.

'58. The Governor General in Council highly approved the skilful plan formed by Major General Wellesley on the 21st of September, for precluding the escape of the enemy, and for reducing their combined army to the necessity of hazarding a general action.

'59. His Excellency in Council also signified his most cordial approbation of the magnanimity, promptitude, and judgment, with which Major

the Adjuttee ghaut, and I propose to descend the ghauts, as soon as I shall have placed the wounded soldiers in security.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 25th September, 1803.

‘You will readily believe that I have much to do at present, and therefore I hope you will pardon the liberty I take in sending you the copy of my report to the Governor General, containing the details of the action of the 23rd, instead of writing a particular one through the Adjutant General of the army. The wounded are, in general, doing well. Many soldiers will, I am afraid, be disabled; but, on the other hand, many will immediately be again fit for service.

‘I have appointed Captain Young to Captain Mackay’s office; and I propose to appoint Major Robertson to Captain Young’s. In the mean time, I shall put some steady officer in charge of Major Robertson’s department. I shall be much obliged to you if you will desire Major Robertson to join me as soon as he can.

General Wellesley determined upon the instantaneous attack of the enemy on the 23rd of September.

‘60. During the severe action which ensued, the conduct of Major General Wellesley united a degree of ability, of prudence, and of dauntless spirit, seldom equalled, and never surpassed.

‘61. The important benefits resulting from the triumph of our arms in the battle of Assye are not inferior to the splendor of the action. The immediate consequences derived from the exertions of that day have been the complete defeat of the combined army of the confederate chieftains; an irreparable blow to the strength and efficiency of their military resources, especially of their artillery, in the Deccan; the expulsion of a predatory and hostile army from the territory of our ally, the Soubadar of the Deccan, and a seasonable and effectual check to the ambition, pride, rapacity of the enemy.

‘62. Under these circumstances, the Governor General in Council is induced to recommend the conduct of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to the particular approbation of the Honorable Court of Directors, and to the gracious notice of his Majesty.

‘We have the honor to be, &c.

‘WELLESLEY,

(and other Members of the Council).’

‘*The Secret Committee.*’

‘I hope I shall be able to purchase horses to remount the cavalry.

‘Colonel Stevenson has joined me in order to assist in placing my wounded and the captured ordnance in a place of security.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P.S. I find that we have got 90 guns instead of 60, as I imagined when I wrote to you yesterday: 67 of them are brass, the remainder iron.

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp at Assye, 25th September, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a packet of papers which I have received from Lieut. Procter, the Fort Adjutant of Surat. I beg that you will let him know that I cannot receive any letter from him, unless sent through his Commanding Officer; and, at all events, I cannot order a Court Martial to assemble for the trial of an officer for conduct at his (Lieut. Procter’s) trial, the proceedings of which have been approved of by the Commander-in-Chief at Bombay.

‘It appears to me that Lieut. Procter is of a very litigious disposition, and a very improper person to fill the situation of Fort Adjutant at Surat. If you should be of this opinion, I request you to report it to the Government of Bombay, and recommend that another officer may be appointed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Colonel Murray.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.*

‘MY DEAR MUNRO, ‘Camp at Cheesekair, 1st Nov., 1803.

‘As you are a judge of a military operation, and as I am desirous of having your opinion on my side, I am about to give you an account of the battle of Assye, in answer to your letter of the 19th October, in which I think I shall solve all the doubts which must naturally occur to any man who looks at that transaction without a sufficient knowledge of the facts.

‘Before you will receive this, you will most probably have seen my public letter to the Governor General regarding

* This letter is inserted out of order of date, as relating chiefly to the battle of Assye.

the action, a copy of which was sent to General Campbell. That letter will give you a general outline of the facts. Your principal objection to the action is, that I detached Colonel Stevenson. The fact is, I did not detach Colonel Stevenson. His was a separate corps, equally strong, if not stronger than mine. We were desirous to engage the enemy at the same time, and settled a plan accordingly for an attack on the morning of the 24th. We separated on the 22nd, he to march by the western, I by the eastern road, round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna: and I have to observe, that this separation was necessary,—first, because both corps could not pass through the same defiles in one day: secondly, because it was to be apprehended, that, if we left open one of the roads through these hills, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward, and then the action would have been delayed, or probably avoided altogether. Colonel Stevenson and I were never more than twelve miles distant from each other; and when I moved forward to the action of the 23rd, we were not much more than eight miles.

‘As usual, we depended for our intelligence of the enemy’s position on the common hircarrahs of the country. Their horse were so numerous, that without an army their position could not be reconnoitred by an European officer; and even the hircarrahs in our own service, who were accustomed to examine and report positions, cannot be employed here, as, being natives of the Carnatic, they are as well known as an European.

‘The hircarrahs reported the enemy to be at Bokerdun. Their right was at Bokerdun, which was the principal place in their position, and gave the name to the district in which they were encamped; but their left, in which was their infantry, which I was to attack, was at Assye, about six or eight miles from Bokerdun.

‘I directed my march so as to be within twelve or fourteen miles of their army at Bokerdun, as I thought, on the 23rd. But when I arrived at the ground of encampment, I found that I was not more than five or six miles from it.

‘I was then informed that the cavalry had marched, and the infantry were about to follow, but were still on the ground: at all events, it was necessary to ascertain these points; and I could not venture to reconnoitre without my whole force. But I believed the report to be true, and I determined to attack the infantry, if they remained still upon the ground. I apprized Colonel Stevenson of this determination, and desired him to move forward. Upon marching on,

I found not only their infantry, but their cavalry, encamped in a most formidable position, which, by the by, it would have been impossible for me to attack, if, when the infantry changed their front, they had taken care to occupy the only passage there was across the Kaitna.

‘ When I found their whole army, and contemplated their position, of course I considered whether I should attack immediately, or should delay till the following morning. I determined upon the immediate attack, because I saw clearly, that, if I attempted to return to my camp at Naulniah, I should have been followed thither by the whole of the enemy’s cavalry, and I might have suffered some loss ; instead of attacking, I might have been attacked there in the morning ; and, at all events, I should have found it very difficult to secure my baggage, as I did, in any place so near the enemy’s camp, in which they should know it was : I therefore determined upon the attack immediately.

‘ It was certainly a most desperate one, but our guns were not silenced. Our bullocks, and the people who were employed to draw them, were shot, and they could not all be drawn on ; but some were ; and all continued to fire as long as the fire could be of any use.

‘ Desperate as the action was, our loss would not have exceeded one half of its present amount if it had not been for a mistake in the officer who led the piquets which were on the right of the first line.

‘ When the enemy changed their position, they threw their left to Assye, in which village they had some infantry, and it was surrounded by cannon. As soon as I saw that, I directed the officer commanding the piquets to keep out of shot from that village ; instead of that, he led directly upon it : the 74th, which were on the right of the first line, followed the piquets, and the great loss we sustained was in these two bodies.

‘ Another evil which resulted from this mistake was the necessity of introducing the cavalry into the cannonade and the action long before it was time ; by which that corps lost many men, and its unity and efficiency, that I intended to bring forward in a close pursuit at the heel of the day. But it was necessary to bring forward the cavalry to save the remains of the 74th, and the piquets, which would otherwise have been destroyed. Another evil resulting from it was, that we had then no reserve left, and a parcel of stragglers cut up our wounded ; and straggling infantry, who had pretended to be dead, turned their guns upon our backs.

‘ After all, notwithstanding this attack upon Assye by our

right and the cavalry, no impression was made upon the corps collected there, till I made a movement upon it with some troops taken from our left, after the enemy's right had been defeated; and it would have been as well to have left it alone entirely till that movement was made.

'However, I do not wish to cast any reflection upon the officer who led the piquets. I lament the consequences of his mistake, but I must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the piquets on that day against Assye.

'After the action there was no pursuit, because our cavalry was not then in a state to pursue. It was near dark when the action was over, and we passed the night on the field of battle.

'Colonel Stevenson marched with part of his troops as soon as he heard that I was about to move forward, and he also moved upon Bokerdun. He did not receive my letter till evening. He got entangled in a nullah in the night, and arrived at Bokerdun, about eight miles from me to the westward, at eight in the morning of the 24th.

'The enemy passed the night of the 23rd at about twelve miles from the field of battle, twelve from the Adjuntee ghaut, and eight from Bokerdun. As soon as they heard that Colonel Stevenson was advancing to the latter place, they set off and never stopped till they had got down the ghaut, where they arrived in the course of the night of the 24th. After his difficulties of the night of the 23rd, Colonel Stevenson was in no state to follow them, and did not do so until the 26th. The reason for which he was detained till that day was, that I might have the benefit of the assistance of his surgeons to dress my wounded soldiers, many of whom, after all, were not dressed for nearly a week, for want of the necessary number of medical men.

'I had also a long and difficult negotiation with the Nizam's sirdars, to induce them to admit my wounded into any of the Nizam's forts; and I could not allow them to depart until I had settled that point. Besides, I knew that the enemy had passed the ghaut, and that to pursue them a day sooner, or a day later, could make no difference.

'Since the battle, Stevenson has taken Burhampoor and Asseerghur. I have defended the Nizam's territories. They first threatened them through the Casserbarry ghaut, and I moved to the southward, to the neighborhood of Aurungabad; I then saw clearly that they intended to attempt the siege of Asseerghur, and I moved up to the northward, and descended the Adjuntee ghaut, and stopped Scindiah.

‘Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st; I heard the intelligence on the 24th, and that the Rajah of Berar had come to the south with an army.

‘I ascended the ghaut on the 25th, and have marched a hundred and twenty miles since, in eight days, by which I have saved all our convoys and the Nizam’s territories. I have been near the Rajah of Berar two days, in the course of which he has marched five times; and I suspect that he is now off to his own country, finding that he can do nothing in this. If this is the case, I shall soon begin an offensive operation there.

‘But these exertions, I fear, cannot last; and yet, if they are relaxed, such is the total absence of all government and means of defence in this country, that it must fall. It makes me sick to have any thing to do with them; and it is impossible to describe their state. Pray exert yourself for Bist-napah Pundit.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Munro.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Assye, 26th Sept., 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th, so that the missing tappall is come in.

‘In consequence of what you say respecting your strength at Poonah, and of Scindiah’s defeat, I shall call back one of the battalions which I had sent away. You will therefore have only one.

‘I do not think any thing with cannon will venture near us again. I believe we have taken one hundred pieces of ordnance; they have gone down the ghauts. Jadoon Rao is said to be missing.

‘I shall be obliged to send my wounded and the capture guns to Dowlutabad. I have got about a thousand of the enemy’s draft bullocks, by means of which I hope to be able to move all the latter to Ahmednuggur. I intend to destroy all the iron guns.

‘I enclose the account of the capture of Baroach. Colonel Stevenson follows the enemy, while I remain here waiting for the return of the doolies and bullocks from Aurungabad.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Memorandum in answer to Queries from Captain Marriott, at Mysore.

‘ Assye, 26th September, 1803.

‘ 1. It is my opinion that the pensions allotted to the Princes ought to be continued to their families in the following manner :—

‘ One half of the pension of each ought to be allotted to the support of his mahal ; and this half ought to fall to the Company as soon as there should be no longer any woman in the mahal to be supported ; in the same manner as the sum now allotted to the support of Tippoo’s mahal will fall to the Company.

‘ Care ought to be taken that, after the death of any of the Princes, no woman should be introduced into his mahal. The other half of the pension ought to be allotted to his children, to be divided among them in equal proportions, according to the Mussulmann law.

‘ The children ought to remain in the mahal to be supported and educated at the expense of the Company, till fifteen years of age, at which period they ought to be removed from it, and their share of the father’s pension allotted to them, together with a sum of money to set them out.

‘ 2. There ought to be no restriction whatever upon the Princes to take as many women, either as wives or concubines, as they may think proper. They cannot employ their money in a more harmless way ; and the consideration of the future expense of the support of a few more women, after their death, is trifling.

‘ Let them marry whom they please. Their marriages with Mussulman families only create an additional number of dependents and poor connexions, and additional modes of spending their money.

‘ 3. It would be very proper to adopt this proposition.

‘ 4. The Princesses ought not to be allowed to marry. A Mussulmann would found a pretension either to a large pension, or even to the government of Mysore, upon his connexion with one of Tippoo’s daughters. It is as well to avoid this, and therefore these ladies must continue in their present state. They ought, however, to have any additional comfort or allowance which can make them happy, and reconcile them to their fate. I do not think the same objection will exist hereafter to allowing the Princes to marry their daughters to whomsoever they please.

‘ 5. In respect to the women of the mahals of Hyder Ally

‘I have also with me above seventy picces of brass ordnance, having destroyed the iron ordnance captured. These must likewise be sent to Ahmednuggur, or I must leave them exposed to be retaken in Aurungabad.

‘While writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should inform you that I am by no means satisfied with Rajah Sookroodoor. He throws all kinds of difficulties in the way of my people sent into the districts under his management to purchase supplies of dry grain; he has not yet taken any steps whatever to collect the magazines which I requested him to prepare in different situations in the end of last month; and when I spoke to him upon the subject, he sent me a paper which contains an account of the value of grain which he says the Soubahdar’s government have laid in at different forts, no part of which, however, can be got for the service of the troops.

‘I have also to mention to you, that there is a man in charge of this part of the country, on the part of Rajah Ragotim Rao, by name, I believe, Anund Rao, whose conduct, if it were guided by Scindiah’s ministers, could not be more inimical to us than his has been. It is reported that this man has fled with the enemy’s army; and I sincerely hope that he will not return.

‘We may win battles, and may drive the enemy before us; but all that I can do will not save the Soubah’s country from destruction, if his servants are not true to his cause, if they do not exert themselves in his service, if the British troops are not treated with confidence as friends, and if they do not enjoy the resources which the country can afford.

I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

Camp, 27th Sept., 1803.

‘1. As nearly all the men who were wounded in the action between the British troops and the united armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Raja of Berar, on the 23rd instant, were struck by cannon shot, and it is probable that some of them will be disabled entirely, it will be a great convenience if an early opportunity is taken of removing those of this description from the field hospital to Bombay. From hence the Europeans may be sent to England, and the natives to the coast of Coromandel, as opportunities may offer.

‘2. I cannot at present say the number of cases of this description which there will be, but I think it almost certain that there will not be less than one hundred; neither can I state exactly the place at which I shall establish the hospital, on account of the difficulty of prevailing upon the killadars of the forts belonging to the Soubah of the Deccan to re-

ceive our wounded soldiers, or the time at which the men will be sufficiently recovered to be moved without injury.

'3. But I request you to have one hundred doolies prepared to be sent off to such place as I may hereafter point out; and to have all the arrangements made for procuring bearers for those doolies, so that no time may be lost in sending them from Bombay, when I may find it necessary to call for them.

'4. I am greatly in want of medical assistants, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will give orders that six assistant surgeons may be sent to Ahmednuggur without loss of time, to place themselves under my orders.

'5. The cavalry lost many horses in the late action, and I shall be obliged to you if you will give orders that as many as four hundred may be purchased at Bombay to remount the cavalry. When purchased, I request that they may be sent under charge of a careful officer, and provided with proper attendants, to Ahmednuggur, where the officer will receive further orders from me.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor of Bombay.*' '*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To Major Shawe.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Camp, 28th September, 1803.

'I have received a letter from Mr. Thomas Pakenham, a writer on the Bengal establishment, respecting whom I am particularly interested. He is the son of Admiral Pakenham, a very old friend of Lord Wellesley and of me. I believe him to be very young and inexperienced; I therefore most anxiously recommend him to your care and attention. I have also given him a letter of recommendation to my friend Mr. Ross, whom I have requested to have an eye upon his conduct, and, above all things, to prevent him from keeping bad company.

'Should the college last, of course he will attend that institution; if not, I have desired him to acquire a knowledge of the country languages. I request you to urge him particularly upon this point, and do not allow him to be idle. Desire him to show you the letter which I have written to him.

'Do not allow him to run in debt; if he should want money, I have desired him to apply to David Ross or you. Pray supply his wants, if he should require it, and apply to David Ross for any sums you may give him.

‘I have nothing new to tell you. The destruction of the enemy’s army was almost complete. It is now said that they had in their camp one hundred and twenty eight guns, of which number a few were at Scindiah’s quarters, which, being in the cavalry camp, were not attacked. These few were taken off: they have lost the remainder, amounting to one hundred and twenty. Of these we have got about one hundred. The remainder are thrown into nullahs, and scattered along the road between this place and Adjunttee; and they will be destroyed by Colonel Stevenson on his march in pursuit of the enemy.

‘Their cavalry are dispersed in different directions, plundering each other and their own bazaar. There were not more than two hundred of their infantry collected in their camp below the ghauts yesterday morning when they marched towards Burhampoor.

‘It is said that they lost one thousand two hundred men killed; the wounded and dying are scattered throughout the country in all directions.

‘I give you the hircarra reports. God knows whether they are true, but I believe they are.

‘The Nizam’s servants are behaving ill, and I cannot get a place of security for my wounded soldiers. This delays my advance; but Colonel Stevenson has gone after the enemy, and will push them with activity as far as possible.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major Shawe.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 28th September, 1803.

‘I enclose a letter which I have received from the killadar of Dharore, in answer to one which I wrote to him, in which I remonstrated against his conduct to Major Hill, and requested that, when any of my troops or convoys should go near his fort, he would give them the protection they might require.

‘Since I wrote to you yesterday to complain of the conduct of the Soubahdar’s servants, another instance of their hostility has been communicated to me. The killadar or amildar of Budnapoor fired upon a detachment of British troops under Captain Baynes, on his march to join me with a convoy.

‘I attribute these repeated instances of hostility to a disaffection to the cause, and to our own forbearance. But

they certainly require the notice of the Soubahdar's government; and if they are continued, I shall be reduced to the necessity of treating the country as an enemy's, or of withdrawing from it altogether.

'At this moment I am in the greatest distress for the want of dry grain, because Rajah Sookroodoor will not permit the people in his districts to sell what they have got.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Major Kirkpatrick.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Assye, 28th Sept., 1803.

'I have received your letters of the 21st and 23rd. In my opinion, the best arrangement will be to get the Ahmedabad farm into our hands, if we can defray the expense incurred for Goklah and Appah Dessaye; if we cannot do that, we must endeavor to get a mortgage upon it from the Peshwah, and to get the payments regularly from the Guickwar government; if that cannot be done, and the expenses of Goklah and Appah Dessaye are to fall eventually upon the Company, we must reckon their numbers among the five thousand.

'In the mean time, you will do well to begin to raise men, but I must have plenty of money to pay them.

'I think that Oolpar must be given to Vittell Seo Deo; it might be well in so doing to take from him an engagement that he would exchange it for an equivalent at the peace, if one could be found which would suit him. I doubt, however, whether he would enter into this engagement; if he would, I recommend that he should have the district at all events.

'Lord Wellesley has taken up the question of paying the Peshwah's ministers upon a great scale. The Peshwah is certainly sincere in his intentions to adhere to the alliance; but there is a crookedness in his policy, and the feelings of his mind are so far different from those which guide our conduct, that with the best intentions it must be expected we shall frequently clash. Besides, under the instructions from the Governor General, we have adopted measures in respect to Amrut Rao and Holkar, which must be highly disagreeable to him, and might occasion a desire to alter the alliance.

'The Peshwah has no ministers. He is every thing himself, and every thing is little. In my opinion, therefore, we

ought to pay those who are supposed to be and are called his ministers, not to keep the machine of government in motion, in consistence with the objects of the alliance, as we do at Hyderabad, but to have intelligence of what passes in the Peshwah's secret councils, in order that we may check him in time when it may be necessary.

'The defeat of the enemy is most complete. Not half of their army is yet collected. They had not above two hundred infantry when they marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor. They had twelve hundred men killed here, and the wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. I have one hundred guns, and many more are on the road between this and Adjuntée, which I have ordered Colonel Stevenson to destroy.

'I am still much distressed for dry grains. The Nizam's annuities behave very ill, and his killadar of Dowlutabad refuses to receive our wounded; so that I have been obliged either to leave my brave fellows exposed in an open town, or to send them to Ahmednuggur, and to wait till I can get my doolies, &c., back again. Thus are all our best plans thwarted, and yet these are the best of our allies!!!

'Amrut Rao's vakeel is here. I have not yet conversed with him, but I will do so this day: I shall speak to him upon the subject of his troops in the Konkan.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'Sir,

'Camp, 28th September, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th instant, in which you have enclosed certain papers regarding property captured at Baroach, upon which the Honorable the Governor in Council has desired to receive any observations that I may have to make.

'As the commanding officer of the troops employed at the siege of Baroach acted upon that occasion under my immediate orders, I consider that I have a claim to a proportion of any benefit that may accrue to those troops from the capture of that place. As a party in the case, therefore, my opinion can have little weight, and I beg leave to decline giving it.

'The Governor General is the superior power in this country on the part of the King and the Honorable Company; and I beg leave to recommend to the Honorable the

Governor in Council, that he should require from Lieut. Colonel Woodington such further information regarding the property in question as may appear to be necessary; particularly whether any steps had been taken by the enemy to secure it, or whether it was in such a situation with respect to Baroach, as that it could not be brought away by the British merchants, so long as the fort remained in the hands of the enemy; and that he should then refer the case for the opinion of his Excellency.

‘In the mean time the property ought to be disposed of, in such a manner as that the supposed owners, or the captors, supposing that the law shall allow the Governor General to give it to them, will not be losers.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Camp at Assye, 28th September, 1803.

‘I wish that the troops may not be sent out of the garrison of Ahmednuggur, excepting in a case of emergency, such as if one of the tannahs should be attacked by a force which your horse are not equal to; or if one of the convoys coming from Poonah, or going to the army, should be pressed. Lieut. Lister’s retreat has not been very handsome, and might have been fatal.

‘The peace of your districts must be kept by your horse and peons. Let the former be raised as soon as possible, and you will then be secure. These rascals will be quiet enough, now that we have settled their principles in this quarter.

‘Our victory has been very complete, and the enemy are all gone to Burhampoor.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Captain Graham.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘Camp, 28th Sept., 1803.

‘I return your letters, and send you a letter from Webbe.

‘Our victory of the 23rd has been very complete. The enemy lost 1200 men killed, and their wounded and dying are on all parts of the road from hence to Adjunttee. They marched yesterday morning from the bottom of the ghaut towards Burhampoor; and they had not then 200 infantry in camp, and their cavalry is dispersed over the country.

They have plundered their own baggage and bazaars; and the Bheels in the ghaut have cut up vast numbers of them. Colonel Stevenson is gone after them.

‘I am tied by the heels by the necessity of sending away my doolies with my wounded men. The Nizam’s killadar would not allow me to put the wounded into Dowlutabad; and the consequence will be, that I shall be obliged to send them to Ahmednuggur, and wait a month for the return of the doolies; or to leave them in the almost open town of Aurungabad. The Nizam’s people have behaved very ill in every respect; there is nothing but counteraction on their part.

‘As the enemy have still several brigades undefeated, I almost doubt the propriety of the expedition into Berar, by one of our divisions only.

‘Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own; and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo’s. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably; the sepoy astonished me.

‘These circumstances, and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer an equality of numbers.

‘However the expedition into Berar may go on; but I must keep up with it, in order to cover the siege of Gawilghur; and that both our divisions may join, in case they should bring down another corps of infantry.

‘I have called back the 1st of the 3rd. Poonah is now in no danger. I hope that you are getting well, and that I shall soon see you. There are strong reports in the enemy’s camp that they are disposed to make peace.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 28th September, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 22nd instant, with which you have enclosed the copy of one from Major Walker, upon the subject of the mode in which he proposes to take possession of, and manage the districts belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Guzerat.

‘That mode appears to me to be very judicious; and I am decidedly of opinion that it is of much more importance

to secure the tranquillity of the country, and its resources, for the use of the troops in the field at this moment, by increasing the sebandy, than to attempt to draw a large revenue from the districts.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.
‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 29th September, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a list of officers, whose horses have been killed under them in the action of the 23rd September, exclusive of those of the cavalry, respecting whom there is a regulation.

‘ Upon this subject I have to observe, that Lord Cornwallis paid the officers commanding brigades and regiments, and the general, brigade, and regimental staff, for their horses when lost in his battles; and it appears reasonable that those officers should be paid for their horses who were obliged to be mounted under the regulations of the service, and who, indeed, cannot otherwise do their duty.

‘ The case of Lieut. Fraser, of the 2nd of the 10th, is very particular. The Adjutant of that corps was Adjutant of the day, and on duty with the advanced piquets, with which he lost his horse. Lieut. Fraser was officer of the day, and did the duty of Adjutant with the battalion, according to the rules of the service, and was mounted, and he lost his horse. Upon the whole, considering the precedent in Lord Cornwallis’s war, that, in fact, the rules of the service and their duty require that certain officers should be mounted, as well as those of the cavalry; and that no body of troops, or of officers, can deserve the favor of Government more than those for their gallantry in this last action, I hope that you will be so kind as to recommend that they may be paid for their lost horses, in the same manner as the officers of the cavalry.

‘ Our victory has been very complete. The enemy have gone down the ghauts. The troops plundered their own baggage and bazaar, and have dispersed in different directions. They had twelve hundred men killed in the action; and their wounded and dying are in all parts of the country. We have got seventy-six brass guns, and have burst twenty-six iron, making in all, one hundred and two. I believe their loss amounts to one hundred and twenty, which they have left in different parts of the road, and all their ammunition tumbrils.

‘ I really believe it was one of the most furious battles that has ever been fought in the country.

‘We have taken seven stands of colors, which I have sent off to Ahmednuggur.

‘I shall have to send seven hundred men to the hospital which I must establish at Adjunttee, upon the extreme frontier, as the Nizam’s killadar of Dowlutabad will not admit one sick or wounded into that place; and I must either put them into Adjunttee, or send them to Ahmednuggur, which will delay my operations at least for a month.

‘At the same time, to place the sick at Adjunttee is very inconvenient. Colonel Stevenson, who is gone down the Adjunttee ghaut, says, that it is a place of security: but I am much afraid that, if we should move to a distance from it, the wounded may be exposed. But owing to the obstinacy of the killadar of Dowlutabad, I can do nothing better for them without great inconvenience.

‘I hope I shall be able to send some of the captured guns to Ahmednuggur, as I have got a great number of the enemy’s bullocks. The carriages of a few are so much destroyed by our shot, as to render it necessary to move them upon our own to Adjunttee; and carriages must be sent for them from Ahmednuggur to bring them down.

‘I have brought some horses to remount the cavalry, and I hope to get more. But considering that we want money, that we have the campaign before us, and that six regiments are to be supplied, I have written to Mr. Duncan to request that he would give orders that four hundred horses might be purchased and sent to Ahmednuggur.

‘I have ordered the 1st of the 3rd to join the army, which will make up my losses of native infantry. I wish I could say as much for my Europeans. However, they are in general doing well, and I hope still that some of them will be fit for service.

‘As the disabled men recover, whether natives or Europeans, I intend to send them down to Bombay; and to request Mr. Duncan to send them to the coast of Coromandel by sea, as opportunities may offer. I have already arranged to have doolies sent from Bombay to receive them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Lieut. General Stuart.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 29th September, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 28th.

‘2. Since the commencement of the war with the northern Marhatta chiefs, every hircarra who has come in from the

enemy's camp, every intelligencer who has written news, has stated that Rajah Sookroodoor was in communication with the enemy, and the vakeels and Mysore and Marhatta chiefs not connected with that person, (for many of the latter are connected with him,) have repeatedly advised me to put Colonel Stevenson on his guard, in order that the public interests might not suffer from his defection.

' 3. Although there was no proof of Rajah Sookroodoor's treachery, I did apprise Colonel Stevenson of the reports, and desired him to watch Rajah Sookroodoor closely; and I am clearly of opinion that Colonel Stevenson would not have done his duty, if he had suffered him to quit his camp with his troops at that moment, under the pretence of escorting grain, particularly as those troops, having been in the service of Nizam Nawaz Jung, are by no means free from suspicion of being disaffected towards the government of his Highness the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

' 4. I have besides to observe, that although there is no positive proof that Rajah Sookroodoor was in correspondence with the enemy, there are unanswerable proofs, not only that he has omitted to supply the British armies with the resources of the country, but that he has taken measures to prevent them from procuring them. In which he has done, and may do, more mischief than if he were to go off to the enemy with his troops.

' 5. Notwithstanding these reports, and this conduct I do not believe that Colonel Stevenson put any restraint on the person of Rajah Sookroodoor. Colonel Stevenson and I having resided together for some years, and having been in habits of intimacy, our communication is generally, carried on by private notes or letters, in none of which he ever mentioned that circumstance. I reviewed his division at Budnapoor on the 21st, and on that day I recollect he told me that he had detained Rajah Sookroodoor, contrary to his inclination, when his troops had gone for the grain, and that he had pitched a small tent for him in the neighborhood of his own; he added, that had been strongly inclined to place a guard over him, but he had refrained from that measure, not to create fears and jealousies among the troops. I am, therefore, induced to believe that the story told by Rajah Sookroodoor's brother is at least considerably exaggerated.

' 6. While writing upon this subject, it is necessary that I should advert to the situation of Colonel Stevenson and myself in respect to the sirdars in the service of the Soubahdar of the Deccan.

‘7. It would be very agreeable to me, and would be by far the best arrangement, if a person were appointed by the Soubahdar, and vested with full powers to control all his killadars, amildars, sirdars, &c. He might reside either with Colonel Stevenson or me, as might be most convenient ; but if his Highness cannot find a subject whom he can trust with such power, or if he will not move up to the army himself, he must expect either that Colonel Stevenson or I will use the military power with which we are entrusted by the Company’s government, to secure the public interests, or that they should suffer by the delay which must attend a reference to Hyderabad upon every subject of complaint.

‘8. The powers which I hold from the Nizam’s government are entirely nugatory ; not a man in the country pays the smallest attention to them. The letter which I sent you yesterday from the killadar of Dharore, shows that it is thought necessary by that person to make a reference to Hyderabad before he will comply with my request to give an asylum under the guns of his fort to a convey coming up to the army notwithstanding that with the request I sent him a copy of the Soubahdar’s letter. The killadar of Dowlatabad also has refused to receive our sick and wounded into that fort

‘9. Under these circumstances, I earnestly entreat that a native, with full powers over every body, may be appointed by the Soubahdar’s government to reside in the army ; and if that is objected to, I beg that you will apprise the Soubahdar’s ministers, that in cases which, from their urgency, cannot wait for a reference to Hyderabad, they must expect that Colonel Stevenson and I will use the power which we have in our hands for the security of the public interests.

‘10. I observe in the 6th paragraph of your dispatch to his Excellency the Governor General, that the Soubahdar’s minister complains of the loss of revenue by this Marhatta warfare. In case this complaint should be brought forward again, it may be proper to inform them, that, in fact, the enemy have not been with the main body of their troops at all in the Soubahdar’s country, excepting for a few days at Purtoor, in the jaghire of Soubahan Khan, and their pindaries have done but little mischief. Since they ascended the ghauts, they have been generally in Jalnapoor, or other districts to the northward, belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘11. They may possibly allude to the loss sustained by the plunder of Aurungabad in April last, by Jeswunt Rao Holkar. But I cannot think that that loss can be attributed

to the war, particularly as I believe it is strongly suspected it was occasioned by the treachery and misconduct of the person in charge of the city and district.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

SIR,

‘ Camp, 30th September, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd instant.

‘ 2. The enemy appear to be much alarmed, and are gone towards Burhampoor. It is probable that sometime will elapse before they can equip another army for the invasion of the territories of the Soubahdar of the Deccan, and indeed, that they will not be able to do so at all, if I can establish my wounded soldiers in a place of security at an early period. I therefore think that it would be advisable to send off the remaining four lacs of repees to Dharore as soon as may be convenient.

‘ 3. I have perused your letter of the 21st August, and its enclosures. The hircarrahs from the enemy’s camp report, and I believe it to be true, that Jadoon Rao died on the day before yesterday, of a wound that he received in the action of the 23rd. I had before heard that he was missing, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had sent persons to seek for his body in the field of battle.

‘ 4. If it be true that this man is dead, it is probable that Sirjee Rao Ghautky may regain his lost influence in Scindiah’s durbar. At all events, it is very desirable that you should keep up a communication with him, not only with a view to that event, but because Sirjee Rao Ghautky has considerable influence over the Rajah of Sholapoor.

‘ 5. The territories of this chief are upon the Kistna, and the road by which I communicate with Mysore, leads through them. It is therefore of importance to me, that he should remain at least in a state of neutrality. I have some means of controlling his actions, and I have but little doubt that he will not interfere in this contest, but it is as well to add to those means by keeping up our communication with Sirjee Rao Ghautky.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To General Lake.

'SIR, 'Camp, 30th September, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a letter which has been put into my hands by Lieut. Campbell,* of his Majesty's 78th regiment. This officer is already known to you, and his claims upon the service, in consequence of the misfortunes of his family, have been acknowledged. I am concerned to say, that another instance of this misfortune occurred in the action of the 23rd instant.

'From the conduct of Lieut. Campbell at the attack of the pettah of Ahmednuggur, I was induced to appoint him to act as my Brigade Major; and since that time, and particularly in the action of the 23rd, he has conducted himself much to my satisfaction. He had two horses killed under him, and was struck himself in that action; I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor.

'Since I last addressed you, the enemy has continued their retreat in confusion and disorder towards Burhampoor, on the Taptee. Their loss has been very considerable in men, as well as in ordnance and ammunition. Among others, it is reported that Jadoon Rao, Scindiah's prime minister, and the principal negotiator and cement of the confederacy, died on the 28th, of wounds he received on the 23rd. Colonel Stevenson has pursued them with his division. I am still detained by the difficulty of finding a place of security for my wounded soldiers.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'General Lake.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Munro.

'MY DEAR MUNRO, 'Camp, 1st October, 1803.

'I enclose a memorandum which I have received from Bistnapah Pundit, the commander of the Rajah of Mysore's horse, serving with me, relative to a claim which he has upon the Rajah of Harponelly. It appears that the Rajah gave him a village in enaum, which he has now taken from him; Mr. Cochrane knew that the grant had been made, and confirmed it; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will inquire into the circumstances, and let Bistnapah keep his village, if possible.

'I entirely agree in the opinions expressed in your letter, upon the subject of offensive and defensive war; however, I think that you are mistaken respecting the possibility of checking, by defensive measures, a predatory war, carried, on by horse only; indeed, I have done it already in this campaign. The fact is, that a predatory war is not to be

* Major General Sir Colin Campbell, K.C.B., &c.

carried on now as it was formerly. All the principal villages in the country are fortified (excepting in our happy country, in which our wise men have found out that fortifications are of no use); a few peons keep the horse out; and it is consequently necessary that they should have a camp and a bazaar to resort to for subsistence, in which every thing they got is very dear; besides, this necessity of seeking subsistence in the camp prevents them from extending their excursions so far as they ought, to do any material injury.

'The camp, on the resources of which an army of this kind must subsist, must be rather heavy; besides, there are great personages in it. They must have tents, elephants, and other sewary; and must have with them a sufficient body of troops to guard their persons. The number of cavalry retained in such a camp must consequently be very large.

'Large bodies move slowly, and it is not difficult to gain intelligence of their motions. A few rapid and well-contrived movements, made not directly upon them, but with a view to prevent the execution of any favorite design, or its mischievous consequences, soon bring them to their bearings; they stop, look about them, begin to feel restless, and are obliged to go off.

.' 'In this manner I lately stopped the march of the enemy upon Hyderabad, which they certainly intended; they were obliged to return, and bring up and join their infantry: and you will have heard that, in a most furious action which I had with their whole army, with one division only, on the 23rd of September, I completely defeated them, taking about one hundred pieces of cannon, all their ammunition, &c. They fled in the greatest confusion to Burhampoor. Take my word for it, that a body of light troops will not act, unless supported by a heavy body that will fight; and what is more, they cannot act, because they cannot subsist in the greater part of India at the present day.

'It is reported that General Lake has defeated Perron. After that, he will of course open a communication with the Rajpoot chiefs, and will move into Berar. I have designs upon that quarter also. The only difficulty I feel now is the entire want of magazines in the Rajah's territories, but I shall surmount that difficulty.

'I wish that I could have you with me; but I see no mode of effecting that object. 'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Munro.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'We have taken Powanghur, a strong hill fort belonging to Scindiah, in Guzerat.'

The truth is that Amrut Rao has not half 10,000 men ; but he wishes to be paid for that number without producing them at muster, and put the money in his pocket.

‘Supposing that I were inclined to gratify him in this respect, (and, in fact, provided I have the reputation of having 10,000 men, I think it but little important whether I have 5000 or 10,000) I really have not, and do not know how I can procure, the means, of paying the money required. I have therefore written the memorandum of which I enclose a copy, which contains the arguments, demands, and answers brought forward on both sides on this question ; and you will observe in this paper, that although Amrut Rao is deprived of all hope of touching more money, which is evidently his object, I have promised to take into pay the troops he has with him, without specifying numbers at all.

‘I have called upon the vakeel to give me the names of the sirdars, and the number of troops with each. I have told him that I shall muster them, and pay them according to the muster ; and I intend that these 2000 or 3000 horse (and they are not more) shall be carried to account, as part of the 5000 to be paid by the British Government, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein.

‘I shall thus have 10,000 horse for the expense of paying 3000. As for Amrut Rao, it is certain that a great part of the object we had in view in bringing him in will fail, by his going away again to reside at Surat, or any other place excepting my camp. However, I do not think it will be any reason for breaking with him, or for resuming his allowance. In fact, under the present arrangement of the Poonah government, the country will never settle, and we shall never have peace, till Amrut Rao and his party in the state are conciliated, and in some degree provided for. By the pension to him, and by taking his followers into the Company’s pay at present, we shall make a good stride towards a settlement.

‘I think, however, that it would be better if I could keep Amrut Rao in camp, and I shall firmly resist the construction which he has put upon that article of the agreement ; and before I allow him to depart, I shall insist upon our coming to a distinct understanding upon some points, on which there may be a difference.

‘The first of them is to know what country he does and what he does not possess. I shall insist upon reckoning among his possessions, and carrying to account, the revenues

of all the districts of which he keeps the tannahs. If he chooses to give up the tannahs to the Peshwah, the revenues of such districts will be made good to him.

‘ The next is his forwarding the interests of the Company and the Peshwah. Upon this point I shall give in a memorial, in which I shall detail the particulars of his conduct towards the Peshwah, since he promised me that he would cease all acts of hostility against him, and all communication with his enemies. I shall point out to him the relative situation between him and his brother; and I shall inform him that a repetition of the acts carried on in his name, for the last six months, notwithstanding his promise in that letter, will be considered a breach of the engagement, and will absolve us from the necessity of performing our parts of it. After that I shall allow him to depart, with a stipulation, however, that he is to take into the Company’s territories only a certain number of men, and that he is to conform to the laws of the place in which he may reside.

‘ You will have observed by my subsequent letters, that I doubted the practicability of doing any thing with Canojee. But it would be very desirable to relieve the troops in Guzerat from the local war, and to carry them forward to offensive operations; particularly now that the enemy appear to intend to turn all their force upon Bengal.

‘ My accounts are, that Holkar and all his army are north of the Nerbudda,—(they were so on the 22nd and 23rd)—and that after the Dussurah he intended to move to the Rajpoot countries. Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have gone off in the greatest hurry and confusion to Burhampoor. Colonel Harcourt writes to me on the 15th, that he expected to leave Jaggernaut on the 17th, and to be at Cuttack on the 24th or 25th.

‘ I have sent off one detachment of sick and wounded, and I shall send another on the day after to-morrow, when the doolies return. ‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Believe me, &c.

Major Malcolm.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 3rd October, 1803.

'I have just received your letter of the 30th of September, and I proceed to give answers to the several points to which it relates.

1st. I do not see any reason why the British Government should not assist the Peshwah in taking possession of

Savanore, and this service shall certainly be performed at some time or other. General Campbell's corps will be the proper body of troops to be employed upon it, and when the proper time comes, I will write a suggestion to General Campbell upon the subject. But you know that this is the time when all the Marhatta armies take the field, and before I suggest to General Campbell to move from his present position, or to occupy his attention with any local subjects, I should wish to see what effect the victory of the '23rd of September will have upon the southern chiefs, what will be their probable occupation during the campaign, and particularly what line Holkar will take.

'In the mean time, the Peshwah may prepare for us a memorandum, stating what he wishes to have done, of what places he wishes to have possession, whom he wishes to appoint his soubah or amildar, and he might collect the troops necessary to take and keep possession of the districts for him.

'I beg, however, that he may be informed, that I hope he will not forget Goklah's claim upon Noulgoond, &c., or Appah Dessaye's, upon the two places granted him as serinjaumy.

'2ndly, I will not mention to any body, that Savanore is restored to the Peshwah's government.

'3rdly, I wrote a letter to Malcolm the other day, that I sent to you, in which I stated an intention to entertain the horse now in Amrut Rao's service, as part of the five thousand horse to be paid by the Company. I conceive that the Peshwah can make no objection to this arrangement, as one horseman must be the same to him as another. I have no objection to Vittell Seo Deo being the commander of this body of horse; but I conclude that he is to join this camp; I imagined it was the Peshwah's intention that that chief should command a body of horse, to be stationed in the neighborhood of Poonah.

'4thly, You are already in possession of my opinion respecting Oolpar. Vittell Seo Deo must have that district, and that immediately; but I think it would be very desirable to prevail upon him to engage to treat for an equivalent to be given to him at the end of the war; or at least to enter into such engagements regarding the communication through his district, the passage of provisions, &c., to the town of Surat, as will make the cession as little inconvenient as possible to that town.

'I think that Mr. Duncan's proposal respecting the pos-

session of Panwell or Bassein ought not to be made at present; it would only tend to create jealousy; and as Mr. Duncan would insist upon taking immediate possession, the cession would create a breeze in the Konkan, which would be very unpleasant at the present moment.

‘I enclose the list of the killed and wounded, which was forgotten.

‘While talking with the Peshwah and his ministers, about the four points contained in your letter, it might be proper to take that opportunity of pointing out to them the position in which his Highness has found himself from the exertions of the British troops, and the readiness which he saw we all had to improve his interests, and to forward them whenever it was consistent with other public objects. You might then throw in a word respecting Amrut Rao, and say how anxious I am respecting his reconciliation with his brother; from a thorough conviction, that, till they should be reconciled, the Peshwah’s government will not settle, and he will still be liable to be disturbed by the intrigues of the disaffected.

‘I mention this subject now, because, in a conversation I had yesterday with Amrut Rao’s vakeel, he mentioned that Amrut Rao had possession of Poonadur, (the first time, by the bye, that he ever acknowledged that he had it,) and in discoursing upon the advantages of the reconciliation to all parties, he pointed out the great one it would be to the Peshwah, to get this fort immediately, which, he remarked, I could take from him whenever I pleased. He said that Amrut Rao would give up this fort if I wished it, provided the Peshwah would desist from his attacks upon Sungumnair, and would make some arrangement respecting a fort in the ghauts to which they both have a claim.

‘It occurred to me, that the object of the discourse was to find out whether I would assist the Peshwah in taking Poonadur; and as Amrut Rao is not yet come in, I thought it best to conceal my intentions on this subject. I therefore answered generally, that I must consider Amrut Rao in the light of a subject, and the Peshwah as his sovereign; that there were so many points of dispute between them, it was impossible for me to pretend to settle them, unless both parties were cordially inclined to be reconciled, that it was necessary that Amrut Rao, as the subject, should begin to show his dutiful inclinations by coming into the British camp, and by conducting himself in the manner he had engaged to do by treaty; that, after a time, I might possibly

be able to reconcile the Peshwah, and that then all these questions would be easily decided and settled for ever, under the guarantee of the British Government. I think, however, that I shall be able to get the fort of Poonadur from Amrut Rao when he comes in. Indeed, I shall oblige him to give it up, now his vakeel has acknowledged that he has possession of it. But I think that the Peshwah might be induced to make some concession, in order to obtain immediately so great an object.

‘I wish that you would sound the ministers upon this point. I believe I omitted to mention to you that it is reported in the enemy’s camp, that Jadoon Rao is dead of the wounds he received in the action of the 23rd of September. He was missing for two or three days, was then brought in wounded, and is now reported to be dead.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P. S. I am tolerably supplied, although in a desert in which the enemy have been so long. Some of Ragojee Bhoonslah’s brinjarries have joined me, to the number of fifteen hundred bullocks; one thousand more will be in tomorrow, and I have given cowle to six thousand who have promised to come in—they are at a distance of about twenty coss from hence. If I get them, I shall indeed be in very great style.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 3rd October, 1803.

‘I enclose a certificate of another horse lost by an officer acting as Adjutant of the 1st of the 8th. The Adjutant of this corps was sick absent. I have also to mention that Lieut. Davie was wounded.

‘The enemy have continued their retreat. It is reported that they have separated; but I am not quite certain that this report is well founded. If they have really separated, it is in consequence of some political difference; as, if their object had been to carry on distinct operations, they would have remained together, and would have detached forces to carry them into execution.

‘The first division of wounded are lodged in safety in the fort of Adjunttee. I wish that I had been able to have put them in a better place; but I can do nothing with the Nizam’s killadars.

‘ I have been lately well supplied, although in this desert and exhausted country. Some of Ragojee Bhoonslah’s brinjaries, to the amount of 1500, have come in and sold their loads in camp; 1000 more are coming in to-morrow; and I have given cowles to 6000 more, who say they are only twenty coss distant. If I get these in, I shall be very easy about my supplies of dry grain; indeed, at all events, a detachment which I have formed under Captain Baynes, and which plies between the Godavery and camp, will keep me free from want.

‘ Captain Beuman has applied to me to receive Brigadier’s allowances, as commanding officer of artillery. Captain Tomkins drew this allowance before; and I acknowledge that I am very anxious to give it to Captain Beuman, as it is impossible for any officer to have done his duty better than he has. I shall be obliged to you if you will let me know whether you have any objection.

‘ I also hope to receive your orders respecting the increase of the allowances of the officers in charge of departments with me, as they have now all the responsibility.

‘ You will have observed that we have sustained a great loss in artillery as well as in every other species of troops and they cannot be so easily replaced. It occurs to me that the best mode of re-inforcing us will be to order forward immediately the detachment of artillery at Hyderabad; and to order those at Hyderabad to be relieved as soon as possible from the Mount, where I am happy to see that you have got a numerous body of artillery. It is true, that in the intermediate time between the march of the detachment from Hyderabad, and the arrival of the detachment from the Mount, the corps at Hyderabad will be without artillerymen. But I acknowledge that I think, under present circumstances, the corps at Hyderabad are not likely to want artillerymen for some time. If you should approve of this plan, may I request you will order that it may be carried into execution; and that the artillerymen who are at Hyderabad may march to Dharore, reporting their progress occasionally to me? ‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ *MY DEAR COLONEL,*

‘ *Camp, 3rd October, 1803.*

‘ I have received your letter of the 2nd; the intelligence it conveys is very interesting, but it is impossible at present to find out the real intentions of the chiefs. I suspect that

they are only laying out to forage in front of Burhampoor, while they shall re-equip their infantry. I was afraid at one time that they were all going with Holkar towards Bengal.

‘Holkar is, I understand, with his whole army, north of the Nerbudda, and was on the point of marching towards the Rajpoot countries. It is possible that the two parties may have separated, either upon a difference of opinion or in consequence of an intention to carry on operations separately.

‘At all events, you have done right to halt, till we see what their intentions are, and till my wounded are in security. Colonel Lang lodged the first party of wounded in Adjuttee yesterday, and the second party will go off on the day after to-morrow. After that I shall march. Cattle are more convenient and better food for the Europeans than sheep; and I recommend that you should have as many as you can get. I do not want any at present.

‘I enclose a piece of news which I have received, respecting which I have no doubt, although I have received no official confirmation of it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Hon. H. Wellesley.

‘Camp, 50 miles North of Aurungabad,
3rd October, 1803.

‘MY DEAR HENRY,
‘I wrote to you on the 17th of September, and since that time I have completely defeated the enemy, and have taken from them ninety-eight pieces of cannon, with their ammunition, &c. I enclose a copy of my letter to the Governor General on this subject, which will give you an idea of the action.

‘I have little to add thereto, excepting to tell you, that Scindiah’s French infantry were far better than Tippoo’s, his artillery excellent, and his ordnance so good, and so well equipped, that it answers for our service. We never could use Tippoo’s. Our loss is great, but the action, I believe, was the most severe that ever was fought in this country; and I believe such a quantity of cannon and such advantages have seldom been gained by any single victory in any part of the world.

‘The enemy had twelve hundred men killed on the field of battle, and I suppose about four times that number

wounded. They plundered one another after the action, and many of their troops have deserted—the whole have fled to Burhampoor, about eighty miles from hence, in the greatest confusion.

‘I lost two horses. Diomed (Colonel Aston’s horse, who has carried me in so many campaigns,) piked, and another horse shot under me. Almost all the staff had their horses either killed or wounded, or were struck in some place or other.

‘In the enclosed letter, I only report ninety pieces of cannon taken; but when I dispatched it, I did not know the extent of our gains. In fact, I believe we took one hundred and two, but we destroyed some, and there is a mistake respecting the number; I know there are ninety-eight.

‘Holkar has hitherto taken no part in the war, and I fancy that he will now remain neutral.

‘I intend to move forward immediately. I have been detained hitherto by the difficulty of providing a secure place for my wounded soldiers; but I have got one at last. Colonel Stevenson, with the Nizam’s army, is pushing the enemy forward.

‘I am well supplied with every thing. I have already got some of the enemy’s supplies, and I have great hopes that I shall get more*.

‘Ever yours affectionately,

‘*The Hon. H. Wellesley.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

* ‘Within these two days we have been joined by another convoy of 2000 or 3000 bullocks loaded with grain, which supply was not expected or known of: they are a brinjarry tribe, who say they collected the grain to the eastward and southward, and were looking out for one of the armies, where they would be sure of a market; it is most likely that they were going to Scindiah or the Rajah of Berar, as they rarely put themselves to much trouble on speculation. The cutwahl, or head native civil magistrate in camp, heard of their approach when at a distance, and by his dexterity induced them to come to this army—a step which it might not have been convenient or politic, anticipating its effects on other brinjarry communities, to have forced them to take.

General Wellesley has always made it a point to encourage these people, by promises, kindnesses, presents, indeed, by every kind of liberality of which he possesses the means, to attend our camp, and collect grain for the army. He advances them money; takes their grain when not immediately wanted; gets the duties on its transport remitted; procures permits to collect it in our allies’ territory; gives or orders escorts; provides guards in camp or whenever required; whenever they meet extraordinary losses he balances them by the price: and not seldom has he ordered two or

‘I have sent five companies of Colonel Lang’s corps to the Godavery with forty of the captured guns. They will be back, I imagine, about the 7th.

‘In respect to the prize agency, I rather wish not at all to interfere in that matter, as I saw General Harris in such a scrape with Government formerly upon the subject of prize money, principally because he had authorised the appointment of prize agents, who, after all, have done more harm than good; and I know that Government are punctilious, and very properly so, upon this subject of prize money.

‘When we took Ahmednuggur there was some property of which it was necessary to order the immediate disposal; and I ordered that Captain Frazer of the 8th, and Captain Fowler of the artillery, whom I understood that the officers intended to elect as their prize agents, should take charge and dispose of it. Captain Fowler is dead, and Captain Frazer is the only person now in charge.

‘I have referred the question regarding this property to the Governor General; and I have recommended that he should take upon himself to give it to the troops as prize, as he did in the case of Seringapatam. I should conceive that the subsidiary force are as well entitled to share in the prize of Ahmednuggur, and in the guns taken at Assye, as the troops who were actually present; and I think that the Governor General will be of the same opinion. I do not think that their right can be made better by the appointment of prize agents, or that they will get any thing by paying those agents a part of their prize. It is my opinion; therefore, and also my wish, that no agent should be appointed by the subsidiary force until something is taken of which an agent can take charge; and then it will be easy to give orders that officers may state whom they wish to be appointed to take charge of any of the enemy’s property that may be taken.

‘In the mean time I shall most probably receive the Governor General’s orders, regulating the whole question.

‘I think you have made a mistake respecting your star pagodas. In every place there must be some standard coin which regulates all others, the nominal value of which must be fixed, and which in fact regulates all payments, &c. The star pagoda is a coin of the government of Fort St. George, and accordingly the pay of every individual under that government is regulated and counted by the number of star pagodas he receives.

‘It frequently happens that in the bazaar, the star pagoda

exchanges for four rupees, and at other times for not more than three, and in my camp at present not three. But when I have issued star pagodas as pay to the army, I have issued them uniformly as the Company's money, at the Company's rate of exchange. The rates of exchange of other coins may indeed be altered according to circumstances and situation; but I conceive that when we pay the troops in star pagodas, which is the Company's coin, we must give them no more than the number of star pagodas to which they are entitled by the orders of Government, be the exchange what it may.

'This rule may appear hard upon some occasions, it is true; but the adherence to it is not half so inconvenient under any difficulties, as the departure from it would be in many instances which I could point out.

'I wish you not to go too far forward. Your news about Holkar is very good, and I hope it is true.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major General Campbell.

'DEAR SIR,

'Camp, 5th October, 1803.

'Colonel Close has forwarded to me a copy of your letter to him of the 21st of September, in which I observe that you are about to move towards the Kalachabootra ghaut. Long before this time you will have learned that the Nizam's territories are in no danger; the enemy who threatened them are entirely defeated, and have fled to the river Taptee.

'It is possible also that Mr. Piele may have apprized you that the dewan of Mysore has received intelligence that the Putwurdun sirdars are collecting troops, and you may have been induced to return to the westward.

'Even if Purneah's intelligence be correct, which I am inclined to doubt, I do not think that those sirdars are collecting troops with a view to disturb the Company's possessions. However, in my opinion, the western countries are more likely to be disturbed than the eastern; and accordingly I take the liberty of recommending that you should resume your position about Moodgul.

'I have this day received a letter from General Stuart, dated 22nd September, in answer to one which I wrote to him on the 8th; in which he states that he has reconsidered the question of the propriety of drawing your corps to Hyderabad, and he is entirely of opinion that it ought to make the western frontier its more immediate object. He will be

more certain of this opinion when he shall hear that the enemy's army, which threatened the Nizam's territories, was beaten on the 23rd of September.

'It is scarcely necessary that I should apologize for making this suggestion, and I am sure that you will attribute it to my wish for the general good; and you may be certain that I should not presume to make it, if I did not possess information of the enemy's movements which it is not possible that you can have.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General Campbell.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Lieut. Browne.

'MY DEAR BROWNE,

'5th October, 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 29th of September, and I would with pleasure consent to your joining the army; but I wish that you would first complete all the carriages for the garrison of Ahmednuggur, and any other work that you may have in hand. I think it will also be desirable that the wheels which you have made for the carriages in this division should be forwarded to Ahmednuggur, where Captain Fisher must keep them under cover from the effects of the sun.

'After that you might move to Ahmednuggur, and take the opportunity of the first convoy going to the Godavery, to proceed to Goondy, where there is a company of the 2nd of the 3rd; and thence you will have frequent opportunities of coming on with Captain Baynes's detachment, which goes backwards and forwards with supplies between Goondy and the army.

'All our platform carts and bullocks ought to be brought away from Poonah to Ahmednuggur.

'Believe me, &c.

'Captain Lieut. Browne.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD,

'Camp, 5th October, 1803.

'I have the honor to inform you, that Amrut Rao's vakeel arrived in camp, some days ago, bringing with him his employer's consent to abide by the treaty which I have made with him; at the same time, he brought forward a demand, that measures should be adopted to provide funds for the payment of ten thousand men, who were with Amrut Rao;

and he intimated that Amrut Rao could not remain in camp, unless in the command of that number of men, to be paid by the British Government.

‘I at first explained to the vakeel, that Amrut Rao, having omitted to join me according to the stipulation of the treaty, inserted at his (the vakeel’s) express desire, the treaty might now be considered void; and at all events, that the British Government must be considered at liberty to execute it, or not, as they might think proper; and that I was astonished that, instead of giving any reason for the breach of the principal stipulation, they should come forward with a fresh demand, which could be supposed to be founded on the treaty, only by forcing the construction of the fourth and fifth articles.

‘The vakeel then explained, that the reason for which Amrut Rao had omitted to join, was, that Moraba Furnavees had died at the moment at which he ought to have marched; the ceremonies usual upon such occasions had detained him for some time, that he had then heard I had not halted at Aurungabad, and that the enemy’s pindarries were in that country.

‘An argument then ensued upon the subject of the demand of payment for ten thousand horse, the detail of which your Excellency will find in the enclosed translation of a memorandum upon the subject, which I delivered to the vakeel on the following day.

‘In respect to the excuse made by Amrut Rao’s vakeel for not joining, it is certainly true that Moraba Furnavees died at the period stated, and that I did not halt at Aurungabad. But I do not attribute Amrut Rao’s omission to join to these events: it is to be attributed to the usual shuffling and timid conduct of a Marhatta, in every important transaction of his life.

‘The demand for the pay for ten thousand men is only an attempt to get more money. Amrut Rao has not really three thousand men in his service; but he has made the demand for ten thousand, under the fifth article of the treaty, and a notion that I should not order that the men might be mustered. To pay Amrut Rao in this manner would be ridiculous; but supposing it were necessary, I have not the means.

‘Considering the success which has attended the British arms in this quarter lately, I rather imagine that Amrut Rao will be satisfied with the proposition contained in the enclosed memorandum, and that he will join; but if he should persis-

in expressing his desire to quit camp, and proceed to Surat, I propose to consent to that step.

‘In consequence of it, we shall fail in obtaining some of the advantages which I had in view when I made the treaty; but I conceive, that, till some settlement is made with Amrut Rao, the government of the Peshwah will not gain strength; and, therefore, I am of opinion, that the degree of security for his conduct which will be derived from his residence within the Company’s territories is an object; and preferable to his living, as at present, in rebellion against the Peshwah’s government, and giving encouragement to his Highness’s discontented subjects.

‘I propose that the troops which I have consented to take into the Company’s service shall be considered as part of the five thousand to be paid by the Company, under the modification of the treaty of Bassein.’ As Amrut Rao will have nothing to do with them, the Peshwah can have no objection to this measure.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM.

‘30th September, 1803.

‘An engagement was made by Major General Wellesley, to Amrut Rao, under which Amrut Rao was to enjoy a revenue of seven lacs of rupees per annum, and he was to join Major General Wellesley’s army. Amrut Rao has consented to the arrangements contained in the engagement.

‘His vakeel, Prubbaukur Bellall, has, however, come forward with a proposition, that means should be provided for the payment of an army of ten thousand men, which Amrut Rao has with him, which proposition it is now necessary to discuss.

‘It is founded upon the fourth and fifth articles of the treaty; by the first of which, an engagement is entered into, that a provision shall be made for the adherents of Amrut Rao; and in the last, it is expressed, that the greater the number of troops Amrut Rao shall bring with him to Major General Wellesley’s camp, the better.

‘The intention of the fourth article was to secure a provision for Moraba Furnavees, and other persons of that description, adherents of Amrut Rao; and that engagement will be strictly fulfilled.

‘In respect to the fifth article, Prubbaukur Bellall must recollect, that in the last year Amrut Rao had no troops

whatever; that lately, when Major General Wellesley arrived at Poonah, Amrut Rao had but a small party, less than two thousand men; and that upon more than one occasion, Major General Wellesley has pointed out to Prubbaukur Bellall the inconsistency of Amrut Rao's increasing the number of his troops, when he was not able to pay those troops already in his service.

'The fifth article of the treaty, therefore, cannot be construed to apply to more than two thousand men at most.

'But Prubbaukur Bellall contends that these men are old adherents of Amrut Rao's and he is obliged to see that they are provided for. Adherents, none of which are more than of a year's standing, and some of which are not of six months' standing, cannot be considered as ancient servants; but at all events, under the notion that they are the old servants of the Peshwah's family and government, and that they are now desirous to serve their master with fidelity, Major General Wellesley is willing to take them into the service, to give them their monthly pay during the war, and to endeavor to prevail upon the Peshwah to receive them into favor, and to restore to them their lands as soon as it shall be concluded; and in order to carry this proposition into effect, he has called upon Prubbaukur Bellall to produce a list of the names of the sirdars, with accounts of the number of their troops.

'Prubbaukur Bellall objects to this proposition, on the ground that it is necessary that Amrut Rao, who is a man of high rank, should have with him a considerable body of men, under his immediate command, who are always to remain with him, although to serve with the British army and to be paid by the British Government.

'Major General Wellesley cannot discern the necessity that Amrut Rao should have two thousand men as an appendage to his rank.

'At all events, the General is sensible that the British Government would never consent to incur the expense of maintaining ten thousand men as an appendage to the rank of any man, although they are willing to entertain men for service.

'It is also to be observed, that the seven lacs of rupees agreed to be given to Amrut Rao by the first article, are for the support of his rank, and for the payment of his personal expenses; the demand of the support of ten thousand men for the same purpose is, therefore, entirely inadmissible.

'Major General Wellesley, therefore, cannot consent to

adopt this proposition, although he is willing to entertain in the service, and pay the troops of any sirdar attached to Amrut Rao ; and when the war is concluded, he will recommend to the Peshwah that such sirdar may be restored to his lost lands, under the Poonah governor.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 6th October, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose translations of papers received yesterday from the enemy’s camp, and translations of my answers to them. I likewise enclose translations of papers received by Rajah Mohiput Ram, to which reference is made in those addressed to Colonel Stevenson and myself. Colonel Stevenson wrote an answer to those which he received, that he had referred them to me, and that he had no authority to correspond with any body. I have not learnt whether Rajah Mohiput Ram has returned any answer to those letters addressed to him.

‘It is impossible to say whether the object in making the proposition contained in the enclosed papers was really to commence a negotiation for peace ; or to raise the spirits of the enemy’s troops, by showing a British officer in his camp, respecting whom, it would be industriously reported that he had come to sue for peace. I rather believe that they had both objects in view, as Captain Johnson, the Persian interpreter to the commanding officer of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, whom they have expressed a wish to see, is an officer much respected by the natives, particularly by Salabut Khan, who has been heretofore connected in friendship with the Rajah of Berar ; and it is probable that the enemy would not have particularly desired his attendance, if they had not intended to commence a negotiation for peace.

‘However, the desire that he should go there is expressed in so extraordinary a manner, and as there is no mention made of the authority of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, or the Rajah of Berar for writing at all ; and above all, as I am convinced that the presence of a British officer in the enemy’s camp at the present moment would tend to raise the spirits of their troops, and to keep their army together, I have thought it proper to decline to send one.

‘In my answer to Ballojee Koonger, I have thought it necessary to explain once more the cause for which Colonel Collins quitted Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s camp, as your Excel-

lency will observe, that he alludes to the manner in which he quitted it, in his letter to me; and I know that the enemy have been very busy in circulating reports on that subject among the servants of the allied governments, equally distant from the truth, and prejudicial to the British Government.

‘In refusing to send a British officer to the enemy’s camp, I have deemed it proper to point out the mode in which they might open a negotiation for peace, if they wished it; upon which I have only to observe, that if they should send here a sirdar, the exertions of their troops hereafter will be but trifling.

‘By the last accounts I had of the enemy’s movements, they had left the remains of their infantry brigades in the neighborhood of Burhampoor, and had marched with cavalry only, or, if accompanied by infantry, by only a small body, to the westward, and with an intention of passing through the Casserbarry ghaut.

‘They were in great distress, and the price of grain in their camp one seer for a rupee. Their situation will not be improved by proceeding in that direction; and I rather suspect that this movement has been made with a view to divert our attention from Burhampoor and the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Ballojee Koonger.

‘5th October, 1803.

‘I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated). When Colonel Collins was the British Resident in the camp of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you were there in the character of vakeel on the part of the Peshwah: it is probable, therefore, that you were not so well acquainted with what passed at the durbar of that chief as you are at present, when you write in the character of one of the Maharajah’s ministers;* if you had been, you would not

* Ballojee Koonger was originally dispatched by his Highness the Peshwah from Bassein to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for the purpose of explaining to that Chieftain the nature of the engagements concluded between the Peshwah and the British Government; but, with the accustomed versatility and treachery of a Marhatta politician, Ballojee Koonger has subsequently attached himself to the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.—*Postscript of the Governor General’s Dispatch to the Secret Committee, dated 1st November, 1803.*

have written that Colonel Collins had quitted the camp without apprizing the Maharajah of his intentions, or going through the customary forms.

‘For above two months, Colonel Collins was employed in vain endeavors to induce the Maharajah to comply with the just requisitions of the British Government; and he repeatedly, both verbally and in writing, apprised the Maharajah and his ministers, and the Rajah of Berar, that he should be obliged to quit the camp if they did not comply with those just requisitions.

‘The object of those requisitions was, that the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should separate and should withdraw from the frontier of his Highness the Nabob Nizam the large armies which they had assembled avowedly for the purpose of invading his Highness’s territory, after they had declared their intentions were pacific.

‘But supposing that there might have been a mistake respecting the verbal communication of Colonel Collins, which is very improbable, there could have been none respecting those in writing, or respecting my letters to the Maharajah and the Rajah of Berar, in which, in the most friendly terms, I urged the adoption of a measure which would have been honorable to all parties, and which would have ensured the peace of India.

‘I refer you to the papers upon this subject, which you will doubtless find in the dufter. You now desire that I should send Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to the camp of the Maharajah, agreeably to the desire of the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, who says, that, by God’s grace, every thing between the governments may be settled. I am not acquainted with the Nabob Moein ool Moolk, or in what character, or by whose authority he writes: nor does it appear that these gentlemen would be received by the Maharajah, even if I had any propositions to make, and should be inclined to send them: but I have no proposition to make to the Maharajah, and therefore must decline to send Captain Johnson and the Rajah Mohiput Ram, as you have desired.

‘The Maharajah has many sirdars in his service, and if he or the Rajah of Berar has any proposition to make to me, he may select one of them to convey it. Any person whom the Maharajah may think proper to send shall be treated with the respect and attention due to his rank; and I shall lose no time in taking into consideration the wishes of the Maharajah, which he may communicate.

‘*Balloejee Koonger.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Nabob Moein ool Moolk.

‘ 5th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated) ; you do not inform me by authority from whom, or at whose desire you have written to me, nor do I recollect to have heard your name among those of the confidential servants of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; you will therefore excuse my declining to give any answer whatever to the proposition which you have thought proper to write to me.

‘ Ballojee Koonger is, I know, an old servant of the Maharajah, and is, I am informed, at present one of his ministers : I have therefore written him a full answer to the proposition which is contained in your letter and his ; and I must refer you, and those who employed you to write to me, to the letters which I have written to Ballojee Koonger.

‘ *The Nabob Moein ool Moolk.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 5th October, 1803.

‘ I have received yours of the 1st instant. The Peshwah shall have six guns. Forty are gone to Ahmednuggur, and I shall order six 6 pounders to be sent to the Peshwah, which I will request you to present to him. It will be some time, however, before they arrive at Poonah, and in the mean while you will do well to keep the Bombay guns.

‘ I enclose a letter which I have written to General Campbell, which may probably bring him back to the westward. I propose also to write to Piele to quiet Purneah’s apprehensions.

‘ I shall give orders that all parties may in future march by Poonah. It was an unfortunate business at Ahmednuggur.

‘ A proposition has come in from Ballojee Koonger, that I should send Captain Johnson and Rajah Mohiput Ram to hear certain propositions* tending to establish peace. The

* *The Governor General in Council to the Secret Committee of the Honorable Court of Directors. (Extracts.)*

‘ HONORABLE SIRS,

‘ 1st November, 1803.

‘ The Governor General in Council entirely approves the judgment and prudence manifested by Major General Wellesley, in refusing to comply with the request of the enemy, as announced in his dispatch of the 6th October, and is satisfied that the duplicity and debased art of the Marhatta

object of this proposition is probably to revive the spirits of the enemy's army, by showing that we have an agent in their camp, and are desirous of peace. I propose, therefore, to decline sending those persons to their camp, on the ground that I have no proposition to make to them; but shall intimate, that if they have any propositions to make to me, they may send a sirdar, who shall be treated with due respect and attention.

'Thus, I shall turn the tables upon them—and it may be depended upon, that when once their army shall know that they have begun to treat for peace, they will not be very ready to fight.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To General Lake.

'SIR, 'Camp at Waukory, 7th October, 1803.

'I take the liberty of addressing you again in favor of an officer belonging to a regiment in the division of the army under my command. In case you should think it proper to promote Major Kennedy to the Lieut. Colonelcy of the 19th dragoons, you may be induced to promote the eldest Captain, Fortnam, to the majority of that corps. Captain Cathcart, who is the next captain, was wounded in the last action. He has served in the 19th for many years, in the first and second Mysore wars, and upon all the different occasions in which the 19th dragoons have distinguished themselves since the year 1799. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your favor for the second majority of the regiment, which is still vacant.

councils would have perverted the acquiescence of Major General Wellesley, in this insidious proposition, to the purpose of impairing the reputation of our arms and power.

'The Governor General in Council, however, is inclined to believe that the ambition, pride, and rapacity of the confederate Chieftains have received such a check, as must compel them to abstain from the prosecution of their inordinate designs; and we therefore expect to receive early intelligence of the disposition of the confederate Chieftains to dispatch directly from their respective authorities, to the British camp, an embassy duly authorized to negotiate the terms of peace, conformably to Major General Wellesley's proposition.

'We have the honor to be, &c.

'WELLESLEY

'The Secret Committee.'

(and other Members of the Council).

‘Since the action of the 23rd, the enemy have retired in much confusion to the Taptee. The infantry corps went to Burhampoor, and the cavalry made one or two marches to the westward ; with an intention, as it was stated, of entering again the Nizam’s territories by the Casserbarry ghaut, near Aurungabad. I suspect that this report has been circulated with a view to draw away our attention from Burhampoor and the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have been much embarrassed by the difficulties of establishing an hospital for my wounded men. The Nizam’s officers will not admit us into the forts which have any strength ; and at last I have been obliged to place them at Adjunttee, a place of inferior strength, and upon the extreme frontier. However, I think they will be in security ; the last of them have gone in this day, and I am now at liberty to resume my operations.

‘I beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the success of your campaign, and the prosperous state of affairs to the northward. I have seen official accounts of your operations only as far as the 30th of August, but the private accounts of soucars of Jynaghur have been sent to me from Surat, of as late a date as the 19th of September.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘General Lake.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 7th October, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a memorandum I have received from Captain Baynes, who is employed in the command of a detachment giving convoy to bullocks carrying grain from the countries south of the river Godavery to camp, and back again empty, in which he details the names of some places in the Nizam’s territories, where duties were levied upon grain for the army, on the passage through them.

‘I imagine that the levy of those duties is contrary to treaty ; at all events, it is a great impediment to the service, and I suspect from the exorbitancy of that in particular levied at Collum, which in ordinary times must amount to one eighth of the value of the article carried, they have been laid on only to derive an advantage from the consumption of the British troops in this quarter.

‘I am concerned to be under the necessity of troubling you so often with complaints of the conduct of the servants

of the Soubah of the Deccan ; and I shall be obliged to you if you will take measures for remedying the evil to which I have above alluded.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Shawe.

‘ **MY DEAR SIR,** ‘ Camp at Adjunttee, 8th October, 1803.

‘ I have just returned from seeing my wounded men ; they are tolerably comfortable, and I hope safe in the fort ; but I wish they were at a greater distance from the frontier, instead of being upon the boundary, and on the high road by which every body enters the Nizam’s territories from Hindustan. However, I have done the best I can for them, and have secured them as far as is in my power.

‘ You will see by my correspondence with Major Kirkpatrick, that the Soubah’s killadars have behaved shamefully ill.

‘ Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, after making two marches to the westward along the Taptee, have turned to the southward, and, it is said, intend to pass the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greatest part of their horse, some infantry, and some guns, which they got out of Burhampoor. They have sent into that place the remains of the campoos.

‘ It is possible that this movement may be intended to draw my attention away from Burhampoor and Asseerghur ; and they may return to the northward upon finding that I do not follow them. On the other hand, these things called allied governments, are in such a state of deplorable weakness, they depend so entirely on us for the defence of their territories, and their power is so feeble over their own servants, who have so much connexion with and even dependence on the enemy, that I have not means to move forward, at once, upon Asseerghur with my whole force ; although I know that if I could take that step with safety, it would put an end to the war.

‘ But not one of the Soubah’s forts is sufficiently garrisoned. He has not a soldier in the country, excepting those belonging to the Company ; and his killadars and amildars would readily pay the money they may have, just to be allowed to sit quietly in their forts and towns. As for the Peshwah, he has possession of his palace at Poonah, and nothing more, and he spends the little money he receives, either upon the Brahmins or upon women, rather than give any to his troops, or even to his menial servants.

‘The consequence, then, of my proceeding to the northward with my whole force might be, that the enemy would get possession, or levy contributions upon some important place belonging to the Nizam; or they might move down upon Poonah itself. They would certainly stop our supplies, and the consequence of such a movement might thus be fatal to us. In this manner does the radical weakness of these governments operate against us.

‘I have therefore determined to return to the southward, and to send Colonel Stevenson to Burhampoor. No accident can happen to his corps, as two out of three of the campoos are, I am told, entirely destroyed; such of the men as were not either killed or wounded in the action, having thrown away their arms in the retreat and disbanded. It is said that there remain two battalions of Begum Sumroo’s campoo, which were not engaged, having been on guard at the quarters of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. However, supposing that there should be more than are supposed to remain, still no accident can happen to Colonel Stevenson; and if Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar should return to the northward, I shall follow them.

‘Colonel Stevenson is already equipped for a siege. I have had proposals from Cashee Rao Holkar; but as Jeswunt Rao Holkar is, I am told, most laudably employed in levying a contribution upon Ougein, I do not think it prudent to have any thing to do with Cashee Rao.

‘I wish you would let me know, at an early period, what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. This is important, because our engagements with them must have a great effect on the negotiations for peace.

‘By the by, does the Governor General know that the peshcush, paid by the Rajpoots, does not belong to Scindiah only, but to the Peshwah and the Holkar family? Of every rupee paid, six annas belonging to the Peshwah, five to the Scindiah, and five to Holkar. It is true, that, for these many years past, Scindiah has collected and applied the whole to his own use; but he has lately consented to allow Holkar to collect his own share and half the Peshwah’s; and I understand that the dispute between these chiefs, and the cause of Holkar not joining the confederates, is that Holkar claimed the right to collect all the peshcush for the number of years that Scindiah had received the whole. He refused to join, unless Scindiah acquiesced in the exercise of this right, or paid him the sum of money which he ought to have received, as peshcush, from the Rajpoots, for the number of years that Scindiah had collected the whole.

‘If this story be true, and I believe it is, the protection that we shall afford to the Rajpoots may involve us’ with Holkar. However, on the other hand, should Holkar be really inclined to remain at peace with the English, which I think he is, we may be able to satisfy him upon that point.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Shawe,’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Adjunttee, 8th Oct., 1803.

‘Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have made one or two long stretches to the southward, and it is said intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them the greater part of their horse, some infantry and guns, but how much of the latter I cannot tell.

‘Our allies are deplorably weak on every point; and as we depend for our supplies on the security of the countries south of the Godavery, it will not answer even to risk that security by throwing my whole force forward in an offensive operation against Burhampoor and Asseerghur; I therefore propose to return to the southward myself, and to send Colonel Stevenson forward upon the Taptee.

‘If our allies were in any degree of strength, a movement of our whole force upon Asseerghur, and then upon Gawilghur and Nagpoor, would put an end to the war; but under the present circumstances I must be satisfied with something less brilliant.

‘Colonel Stevenson will be in no danger at Burhampoor, as it is said that two of the campoos are entirely destroyed. Two battalions of the Begum’s campoo escaped; they were not engaged, having been on guard at Scindiah’s and the Rajah of Berar’s quarters. However, supposing that there are more even than is reported, no accident can happen to Colonel Stevenson.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Adjunttee, 8th October, 1803.

‘I have the honor to transmit the copy of a letter and its enclosure which I have written to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘My wounded are all lodged here. They are comfortably

situated, and I hope will be safe ; but I acknowledge that I wish they were farther removed from the extreme frontier, and from the high road from Hindustan.

‘ Scindiah and the Rajah have made two long marches to the southward, and, it is said, intend to pass through the Casserbarry ghaut. They have with them almost all their horse and some infantry, with guns, which they brought out of Burhampoor, but I cannot say how much of the latter.

‘ I intend to move to the southward myself, as I cannot trust to chance all the Nizam’s weak posts, our supplies, &c. Colonel Stevenson will move upon Burhampoor.

‘ I do not think that his corps will run any risk forwards, as all the horse is down to the southward, and, it is said, that the defeated campoos have disbanded. There are only two or about three battalions remaining, which were not in the engagement, having been on guard at Scindiah’s and the Rajah of Berar’s quarters.

‘ Colonel Stevenson is equipped for a siege. The wounded are doing well. I think about half of the men in the 74th will be fit for service again. They have 200 rank and file now in the ranks.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Adjuttee, 8th Oct., 1803.

‘ That plan which, in my opinion, promises the greatest and most speedy success, is to carry on offensive operations against the enemy’s territories ; and it would certainly produce a peace, if the things called governments, which depend upon us, would do any thing for themselves, or were not in a state of most deplorable weakness. But it is well known that they depend entirely upon us, and yet they thwart us in every instance.

‘ Not one of the Nizam’s places is sufficiently garrisoned ; and as for the Peshwah, he possesses his palace at Poonah, and no more. While we should be carrying on our operations at Asseerghur, it would not be very pleasant to have the enemy levying contributions on the Nizam’s places, or sitting down before Poonah itself. I am therefore decidedly of opinion, that we must guard against these plans, as well as move upon Burhampoor. Accordingly I shall go to the southward, and I shall beg of you to move upon Burhampoor.

‘ You are aware of the result of my action with the enemy,

and I have only to warn you against having any thing to do with them, if you should find them very strong in guns.

‘Colonel Lang, with five companies of his corps, will leave this on his return to you to-morrow; the other five companies are gone to the Godavery, with forty of the captured guns, and will not be here for two or three days. Lieut. Colonel Lang will take with him 2000 of your brinjarries, who came up yesterday with Captain Baynes.

‘I shall leave 1000 bullocks’ load of rice for you in the fort of Adjunttee. I would send bullocks with them, only that I want cattle, and it appears that you do not.

‘I recommend the following objects to your attention.

‘1st, Either to beat or drive back any infantry that may be at or near Burhampoor.

‘2nd, Levy a contribution on Burhampoor.

‘3rd, Reconnoitre Asseerghur, and if it holds out any prospect of success, lay siege to it; if it does not, move to your right upon Gawilghur, and lay siege to that place.

‘4th, Levy a contribution upon Nagpoor.

‘If you should be able to raise any contributions, put their amount into the treasury; and I shall recommend to Government that they may be given to the troops as prize money. The same must be done with any property found in Asseerghur or Gawilghur.

‘It is probable that some of the officers (the British officers in particular) in Scindiah’s service may be induced to quit it. I shall, this evening, (if I can get it copied, if not, to-morrow morning,) send you the copies of a proclamation, which offers to them a provision under the British Government, on quitting the service.

‘The same is likewise offered in another proclamation, of which I will send you a copy, to the natives of the Company’s territories in Scindiah’s service. I shall add to the whole a proclamation from myself; and I request you to take an opportunity of conveying these papers, or copies of them, to the officers at Burhampoor.

‘In case Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar return to the northward, depend upon it that I shall follow them closely.

‘In my opinion, no plan will succeed entirely, excepting that which I have above sketched out. It is possible that your march to Burhampoor may induce them to return; but I am convinced that the march of both of us to the northward would have very bad consequences, and possibly might be fatal to us. Each of our corps, as now composed, is strong enough for the enemy, when their force is divided. To

take away the cavalry from both, and join the infantry of both together, would expose that infantry to be insulted by a few pindarries, and would be the cause of much distress.

‘The plan which I had thought of would have answered, if they had had horse only. The corps which I proposed to equip would have been able to prevent the execution of any enterprise of importance by horse. But as they have infantry and guns, and we do not know how much, there must be something stronger for the defensive; and if any thing stronger, than what I proposed, be sent, it must be a complete division.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major General Campbell.

‘Camp, 30 miles North of Aurungabad,
10th October, 1803.

‘DEAR SIR,

‘Siddajee Rao Nimbilkar (commonly called Appah Dessaye) has mentioned to me that the Jalloor polygar has seized the district of Moorgoor, and others belonging to him, which are situated between the rivers Malpoorba and Gutpurba, to the westward of Manowly; and that he has even threatened the fort of Manowly itself. Appah Dessaye is apprehensive that he may succeed against this fort, as the son of the killadar is in the polygar’s possession, having been taken at Moorgoor. I have written to the polygar to request him to desist from his operations against Appah Dessaye, who is with this division; and I have told him that you would fall on him if he did not attend to what I said.

‘I shall be very much obliged to you, if you will be so kind as to make inquiries regarding the transactions of this man, and write to him to desist from his operations against Appah Dessaye. If it should not interfere with other objects, you might possibly find it convenient to cut up this fellow’s force, in case he should not do as you desire him. However, this is a case of extremity which it is very desirable to avoid, even at the expense of some loss to Appah Dessaye; as the consequence would certainly be, that my communications with the southern countries would be stopped.

‘I have made some marches to the southward, as Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have shown an intention of entering the Nizam’s territories by the Casserbarry ghaut; but I think that this movement of mine, and that of Colonel Stevenson to the northward, will induce them to return.

‘I have just received your public letter of the 30th of September. I concluded that you had a key to the cipher, and I now suppose that you have applied to General Stuart for one. It would be attended with too much risk for me to attempt to send the cipher by the tappall.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major General Campbell.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P.S. I have given Appah Dessaye a note to you on the same subject as this letter.

To the Governor General.

‘Camp, 30 miles North of Aurungabad,

‘MY LORD,

10th October, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter which I have received from Captain O'Donnell of the 1st regiment of cavalry, in which he gives a detailed account of an affair of no very great importance; but in which he and the detachment of troops under his command appear to have conducted themselves in an exemplary manner.

‘I likewise enclose the copy of an order, which I have issued to the troops under my command upon this occasion.

‘The party that attacked Captain O'Donnell are a banditti, which infest the frontiers of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of his Highness the Peshwah; and are formidable from their number and boldness. It does not appear that they belong to any particular chief, although it is said that they belong to the late killadar of Ahmednuggur; but I have reason to believe that this person discharged all his troops, and that he joined Dowlut Rao Scindiah in camp.

‘As there is no established authority, or even an acknowledged boundary on any part of the frontier, and the killadars and other officers on both sides have been in the habit of carrying on private wars against each other, I am induced to believe that they have encouraged this banditti for the purposes of their own wars. While I was on the frontier of course their operations ceased; but they have now recommenced them, and I suspect that they are too strong for their former employers.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have continued to march to the southward towards the Casserbarry ghaut, with nearly all their cavalry, and a small body of infantry with guns, which joined them from Burhampoor. It is reported in camp that they intend to pass through the

Casserbarry ghaut to the southward, as there is nothing to oppose them in the territories of the Peshwah, and but little in those of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I have thought it proper to move to the southward with my division*, and I am now at no great distance from Aurnagabad. Colonel Stevenson, with his division, will march to the northward, and I think it probable that when the confederates learn the direction of his march, and that I have come to the southward,† which may prevent the execution of any design they may have formed, they will return again towards the Taptee.

‘It is unfortunate that I should have been obliged to return to the southward, as I think that by carrying our whole force to the Taptee we should bring about a peace on advantageous terms. But there are many weak points in the territories of the Peshwah and the Soubah of the Deccan, all of which would be exposed to risk, and we might lose by this operation more than we should gain.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘General Orders by Major General }
the Hon. A. Wellesley. ’

‘Camp at Binkenholey,
10th October, 1803.’

‘Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley has received a report from Captain O’Donnell of the 1st regiment of cavalry,

* ‘The generale was beat at half-past four, the assembly at half-past five, and we marched immediately after. Since the 8th of last month, General Wellesley has left off the usual mode of announcing the march or halt of the army, in order “to prevent the enemy from having intelligence of the intended marches of this division.” At present, no person can with certainty foretel whether the army is to move or not, except when the General has positively determined that he will not, and then he acquaints the heads of departments, that they may profit of the time.’—*Extract from the Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicholls, K.C.B., written in the field.* Dated 8th October, 1803.

† ‘Marched by the left in the following order, which is the usual one. A body of Mysore horse, about four hundred, leads the column of march; this, at some distance, is followed by the cavalry; the new piquets of infantry march in their rear, then the line of infantry, followed by the park, store, and provision carts; the guns of the allies close the line of carriages, the ammunition and park bullocks follow them, and the rear guard, consisting of the old piquets; a squadron of cavalry, which moves on the reverse flank, and another body of four hundred Mysoreans close the line. Detachments of pioneers attend the leading divisions of the cavalry, advanced guard, the line, and the park. Guides are sent every morning before the assembly beating to the heads of the cavalry advanced and rear guard. The baggage

from which it appears that being on his march from Ahmednuggur to join the division of the army under the command of Major General Campbell, with a company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment, under Lieut. Morgan and the supernumerary native non-commissioned officers, heretofore belonging to the corps in camp, and lately drafted into the extra battalions, he was attacked by a body of horse and of peons, of such numbers as to induce Captain O'Donnell to think it necessary to take post in the village of Korget Coraygaum.

'Here the attack was renewed upon this party with additional violence, and Captain O'Donnell finding that his post was a bad one, and at all events too large for his party, barricaded and otherwise strengthened such parts of it as he was of opinion he could defend. He there remained with his small party without throwing away his ammunition, excepting when he could do it with effect in judicious sallies, in three of which he killed a number of the enemy, far exceeding that of his party, which remained in security till it was relieved from Ahmednuggur, at the distance of about forty miles.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley returns his thanks to Captain O'Donnell and Lieut. Bryant of the 1st regiment of cavalry, and to Lieut. Morgan and the company of the 1st battalion 12th regiment under his command, for their conduct upon this occasion.

'He has been particular in detailing the circumstances of this affair in General Orders, in order that all officers may know the advantage which, with a small party of men, they may take, even of the most ruinous village, to protect themselves and the parties of troops under their command.

'To the divisions of the army under his command it was scarcely necessary for Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley to point out, that a small body of infantry that keeps its order, and reserves its fire, has but little to fear from cavalry. But in case any Officer, in charge of a party, should be

is ordered to be kept on the reverse flank entirely and in a great measure it is so. The horsemen, &c., of the allies march on either flank, as most agreeable to their leaders. The Brigadier of Cavalry is ordered to halt whenever he may exceed the distance of three quarters of a mile in front of the infantry; the long roll for a halt is to be beat by any corps the march of which may by any accident be so long stopped as to occasion a break of one hundred yards: this to be repeated from front to rear by every corps; and when ready to move again, the taps are passed, as before, along the line, which proceeds.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicholls, K.C.B.*

obliged from circumstances to take post, he may see, in the example set by Captain O'Donnell, the advantages he can take of the numerous fortified villages in this country, the credit he can gain, and the service he can render, by thus defending himself.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley will not fail to report to the Commander-in-Chief his sense of the conduct of Captain O'Donnell, and of the party under his command.

'R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen.'

To the Governor General.

'Camp, 30 miles North of Aurungabad,
10th October, 1803.

'MY LORD,

'I have the honor to enclose translations of letters which I have received from Cashee Rao Holkar, and the translation of my answer to one of Cashee Rao's agents. Koosh Haul, the Arab, did not come on farther than Colonel Stevenson's camp; and Dogul Sing, the other agent, had but little to say, except that Cashee Rao Holkar was in great distress at Jehanabad, near Burhampoor, and was apprehensive that Dowlut Rao Scindiah intended to shut him up in the fort of Asseerghur.

'This man had so little to urge in favour of Cashee Rao Holkar, that I am inclined to suspect that he is not his agent, but one employed by some other person, possibly Jeswunt Rao Holkar, to discover whether the British Government had any intention to interfere in the concerns of the Holkar family.

'As Jeswunt Rao Holkar has hitherto kept aloof from the other confederated Marhatta chiefs; and as, at all events, I doubt whether we should derive any advantage from the assistance of Cashee Rao Holkar, which I imagine that we can command at any time, I have thought it best to decline to have any thing to do with him at present.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Cashee Rao Holkar.

'As Colonel Collins is gone to Hyderabad, and as I am charged by his Excellency the Governor General with the direction of the affairs of the British Government in this quarter, I have opened your letter, and have listened to the verbal communications of Dogul Sing.

‘ The British Government is not at war with the branches of your family with whom you are at variance ; and that being the case, it is inconsistent with the principles by which its conduct is always guided, to interfere in the concerns of your family.

'When attacked, the British Government adopts every method allowed by the law of nations to defend itself and annoy its enemies; but till it is attacked it does not interfere in the concerns of others.

'Cashee Rao Holkar.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

' HONORABLE SIR, ' Camp, 11th October, 1803.

1. I have received letters from Lieut. Colonel Coleman, by which I learn that we are not to expect any further supply of grain from Panwell.

‘2. I had the honor of addressing you on the 20th of January last, and requested that six hundred garces of rice might be collected at Bombay for the use of the army, then about to march to Poonah under the command of General Stuart; and I have reason to believe that General Stuart requested that even a larger quantity of rice might be prepared.

‘3. Since that time, owing to a variety of causes, but principally on account of the great mortality among the cattle which accompanied me from Mysore, I have not been able to take away the quantity of rice which I requested you to have prepared; and some of it has, with my knowledge, been issued to the troops forming part of the garrison of Bombay: still, however, I had hoped that I might find a supply of rice at Bombay, to the full amount of the six hundred garces.

‘4. I have now to inform you, that there is every reason to apprehend a great scarcity of all kinds of grain in this country in the next season, if there should not be a famine. Whatever may be the result of the military operations, therefore, it is certain that the troops which will be stationed in this country will require grain from Bombay.

‘ 5. On this ground, I most anxiously recommend that a communication should be opened immediately between the government of Bombay and the collectors in Canara upon this subject, in order that early measures may be adopted to secure, for the consumption of the troops, the surplus produce of that fertile province. The quantity which ought to

be provided for this purpose only ought to be six hundred garces.

‘6. I wrote to the collectors in Canara upon the subject, and as I have several memorandums upon the mode in which the rice countries in Mysore, those of Bullum particularly, influenced the state of the markets in Canara, I wrote to the assistant with the Resident at Mysore to request him to correspond with the collectors in Canara, and so to arrange with the government of Mysore as that the market in Canara may be kept full, at the same time that the supplies for the army, which still come from Mysore, may not be discontinued. ‘I have the honor to be, &c.
‘*The Governor of Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp at Phoolmurry,
11th Oct. 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I return the letter from Major Shawe, which contains some very interesting intelligence. I think the attack of Allyghur the most dashing service that has been performed for sometime.

‘I hope that General Lake will not stay long at Delhi. You will have heard that a body of Perron’s horse have struck an unpleasant blow at Shekohabad in the Dooab, and as I have lost sight of Holkar, I am much afraid that he also is gone towards the Bengal territories. He and all his troops are certainly on the other side of the Nerbudda: the last accounts I had of him stated that he was plundering Ougein, which is hardly credible. It is now said that he is gone far to the northward.

‘I am within one march of Aourungabad. The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut. The majority of my intelligence hircarrahs have either deserted or have been taken, and four days have elapsed since I heard from their camp; but they were then on their road to that ghaut, and, as far as I can learn, forty miles from it.

‘The stoppage of the supplies from Bombay is very unpleasant. I wrote to Mr. Duncan upon the subject. Indeed, our prospect, if the war continues, is not very favorable. The crops have failed every where, and there will certainly be a famine in this country next year. I learn from the intercepted letters from Hindustan, that their prospects are even worse than ours.

‘Goklah is coming here this evening; I understand, to complain that the pay his men receive is not sufficient. How-

ever, I have sent him a message to inform him that if he mentions to me one syllable about pay or money in his proposed visit, I shall quit the tent; as I before informed him that I had, and would have nothing to do with his pay, excepting to give him regularly the money which the Peshwah had desired he should have.

‘I wish that the Peshwah would settle with his own sirdar, and take this trouble off my hands, in which I have certainly as much business already as I can well manage. I think that Goklah has no reason to complain: he gets his money regularly, which does not happen to any other Marhatta party in India: he has nothing to do, forage is plentiful, and he does not pay for it; and grain is at this moment, and, with very few exceptions, has always been, at the price which it bore at Poonah when we were there. I understand that he has already discharged five hundred of his people, and he talks of discharging more. I wish that you would let me know how many he ought to have; and I shall inform him that I propose to recommend to the Peshwah that a proportionate reduction should be made from his pay for every man he discharges.

‘But not only does the Peshwah throw upon me a business with which I ought to have no concern whatever, but he counteracts the execution of that business as much as he can. Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, notwithstanding his insolence to me, which is perfectly well known to all their chiefs, has been sent to the southern countries by the Peshwah, to take possession of certain districts, among others of Nurgood and Nulgoond from Goklah.

‘A letter has been written by Sirjee Rao Ghautky, who is now, I see by the ackbar, in high favor and great confidence, to Appah Dessaye, to communicate to him the Peshwah’s orders that he should relinquish possession of Manowly and Anantapoor, a district which he holds near the Kistna. These districts are to be given to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur.

‘I should not care one pin about all these transactions, of which, from your situation at the durbar, you must have a knowledge, if they were not the cause of immediate complaints and reference to me, from the sirdars serving with the British troops under a treaty, and who the Peshwah most solemnly promised should be satisfied in every respect.

‘I attribute the Peshwah’s conduct in regard to Ball Kischen Gungurdhur to something worse than ignorance. Considering the manner in which that chief behaved to me,

and his being employed again to seize the districts belonging to the chiefs serving with his army, it cannot tend to secure the credit of the British Government in the Peshwah's durbar.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will send me six pairs of intelligence hircarrahs, besides those sent lately to Mr. Elphinstone.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'Camp at Phoolmurry,

11th Oct., 1803.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'I arrived here this morning, and I do not hear that the enemy have come through the ghaut. I think it most probable that they have returned to the northward; and if that should be the case, I shall also return immediately. If you find that they do return, and the whole of their cavalry and infantry join, you will do well to refrain from attacking them till I shall reinforce you.

'I enclose another proclamation, and news from Bengal, I recommend that you should at once send copies of these proclamations, and of this news, to be delivered into the hands of one of the English officers. It is impossible for them to leave their camp, till you shall come very near them. Send them particularly the order about Mr. Lucan.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Colonel Stevenson.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Malcolm.

'Camp at Phoolmurry, 16 miles North of

'MY DEAR MALCOLM, Aurungabad, 11th October, 1803.

'I agree in opinion with you regarding our defensive operations. But none of that kind will answer long, unless mixed with a little offensive.

'I have made a dash down here upon a defensive principle; the enemy, with all their horse, and some infantry and guns, which they have drawn out of Burhampoor, having threatened to pass the southward, by the Casserbarry ghaut. But it is only a threat, and I believe I have stopped them already. At the same time, I have taken advantage of the terror created by our late success, to push forward Colonel Stevenson upon Burhampoor, and even Asseerghur, if the beaten campoos, which are refitting there, should retreat to

the Nerbudda, which I think they will. These two movements must relieve the Peshwah and the Nizam from the invasion; and I think it possible that they may bring propositions for peace.

‘I do not understand, and do not much like General Lake’s march to Delhi: after taking Allyghur, I think it takes him too much out of the way, leaves exposed the Company’s Dooab, and delays the junction with the Rajpoots. I think that he ought to have detached a reinforcement to the corps covering Rampoor, which corps should then have gone upon Delhi, and to have made his arrangements for crossing the Jumna; and while those were preparing, to have given chase to the pindarries who have performed the feat at Shekoabad. However, these are only speculations, not founded upon any facts of which I have a knowledge.

‘I have lost sight of Holkar entirely. My last accounts of him were that he was gone to plunder Ougein. It has been said since, that he is gone to the northward. I dread his invasion of Bengal. What happened at Shekoabad shows that there are but few soldiers there besides the Commander-in-Chief.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘You will see a letter from Cashee Rao Holkar, and my answer, which I have sent to Mr. Duncan.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct., 1803.

‘I have reason to believe that the enemy have not come through the ghaut; and it is possible that they will now return to attack you, with all the force they can bring.

‘Your first object will of course be to beat the campoos, before the cavalry under Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar can join; or to drive them across the Taptee, and to such a distance, as that they cannot come back so quickly as to join with the cavalry in an attack upon you, before I can reinforce you.

‘If, however, they should be able to join before you can attack the campoos, you must decide what line you will adopt.

‘There are three lines of operation to be adopted: to attack the enemy, to stand his attack, or to draw off towards me.

‘In respect to the first, it is impossible to say what quantity of cannon they may have collected at Burhampoor; or what their real force may now be. I recommend that you should adopt this with caution, and only in case of necessity.

‘In respect to the second, it may possibly be worse than the first; as, unless you intrench your position, which I should recommend, if you adopt this line, your inferiority of cannon will tell against you still more than it would in the case of your attacking the enemy.

‘In regard to the third, it might be attended with risk, and even loss, excepting in this case. When I shall descend the ghaut, which I shall on the 4th, after leaving this, you might make two marches towards me, which would bring us within one march of each other. Till they are prepared for their attack, which, as they are very slow, will take some-time, they will not stay nearer to you than at the distance of two marches; and supposing them to be able to make two in one day, I shall have joined you before they can do you any mischief.

‘Supposing that you determine to have a brush with them, I recommend what follows to your consideration. Do not attack their position, because they always take up such as are confoundedly strong and difficult of access; for which the banks of the numerous rivers and nullahs afford them every facility. Do not remain in your own position, however strong it may be, or however well you may have intrenched it; but when you shall hear that they are on their march to attack you, secure your baggage and move out of your camp. You will find them in the common disorder of march; they will not have time to form, which, being but half disciplined troops, is necessary for them. At all events, you will have the advantage of making the attack on ground which they will not have chosen for the battle; a part of their troops only will be engaged; and it is possible that you will gain an easy victory. Indeed, according to this mode, you might choose the field of battle yourself some days before, and might meet them upon that very ground.

‘There is another mode of avoiding an action, which is, to keep constantly in motion; but unless you come towards me, that would not answer. For my part, I am of opinion, that after the beating they received on the 23rd of September, they are not likely to stand for a second; and they will all retire with precipitation. But the natives of this country are rashness personified; and I acknowledge that I should not like to see again such a loss as I sustained on the 23rd

September, even if attended by such a gain. Therefore, I suggest to you what occurs to me on the subject of the different modes, either of bringing on, or declining the action which it is possible, although by no means probable, that they intend to fight. I shall march the moment I hear that they have moved to the northward.

‘I have many people out for intelligence. Your hircarah, however, who brought the account that it was reported in their camp on the 7th that I had come this way, was premature, as I did not show any inclination to do so till the 9th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To J. H. Piele, Esq., Secretary to the Resident at Mysore.

‘MY DEAR SIR, ‘Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th Oct., 1803.

‘The crops have failed in this country this year, so that there is every reason to expect a great scarcity, if not a famine. This evil will also be felt at Bombay; indeed, I imagine that it is felt already, as the Governor of Bombay has found it necessary to stop the supplies of grain for the army, to provide for the wants of the settlement, notwithstanding that the grain he has was laid in store at my request in January last, to guard against want.

‘I have recommended that he should fill granaries from Canara; and I have given notice to the collectors in Canara of the probable call upon the surplus produce of the countries under their management, and have recommended that they should stop the exportation till they shall hear from Mr. Duncan on the subject.

‘As the scarcity extends even to Guzerat, and will prevail in all parts of Hindustan, it is not improbable but that the call upon the resources of Canara will be very large; and it is most probable that very heavy demands upon the grain resources of Mysore, for the supply of Canara, will be made at a very early period. I have requested the collectors in Canara to communicate with you upon this subject; and I proceed to give you my opinion how far you ought to encourage the export to Canara of the grain (rice particularly) in Mysore.

‘Canara is a fruitful country, but the people there are all traders; and the common practice is to export all their produce, each man keeping in his own store what he thinks will answer for himself and family.

‘There is commonly, therefore, a scarcity in that province annually; and we are obliged to provide for the subsistence of the troops at the end of the year, by having grain in store, which is very rare in other countries; and there is not such a thing in the whole country as a grain bazaar.

‘The dealings of a people such as those in Canara are limited only by the demand, and by the means of supplying it. In this year there is no doubt whatever that the demand on Canara will be very great; and if due encouragement is given to the inhabitants of the rice countries in Mysore, the means of supplying it will be very great likewise. But that encouragement must be attended with many regulations. Your object should be first to keep your own markets well supplied, so that you may have no scarcity in Mysore; secondly, to keep them so full as to be able, with care, to fill the brinjarries whose bullocks are still in the country, in order that you still might have it in your power to supply the army. You will see from this the necessity of regulating, highly, the exportation to Canara, that you should have the means of knowing constantly the exact quantity of grain exported, and may have it in your power to stop the drain whenever you may find it expedient.

‘You may depend upon it that if you had ten times the quantity of grain in Mysore that you have, there would be a demand for it in Canara, in the course of the next year; and therefore it will be necessary to connect, with due encouragement to the exportation, great vigilance that it does not create distress in Mysore, and does not deprive you of the means of assisting your friends in this quarter by the brinjarries.

‘The enemy, after having fled in great confusion towards the Taptee, and lodged the remainder of their infantry at Burhampoor, upon that river, have come out with all their horse, and a small body of infantry, with guns, and have made a march or two to the southward; apparently, and, as it was given out, with an intention of passing through the Casserbarry ghaut, which is about forty miles N. W. from Aurungabad.

‘I have sent Colonel Stevenson to levy a contribution in Burhampoor, and to attack the fort of Asseerghur, if he can; and I have come down three marches to the southward, towards Aurungabad, to stop the execution of this new plan, in which I have succeeded.

‘I think the Marhattas must be nearly tired of this war; we have been about two months engaged, and literally they

have not yet entered what might be called the Nizam's territories. Along the frontiers half the villages belong to the Nizam, and half to the Marhattas, and to these alone they have done injury, but to none of the regular territory.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*J. H. Piele, Esq.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To J. Ravenshawe, Esq., Collector in Canara.

'SIR, 'Camp at Phoolmurry, 12th October, 1803.

'I am concerned to inform you that there is great reason to apprehend a scarcity of grain, if not a famine, in this part of the country, in the ensuing season; and it will be necessary to draw from Bombay a great part of the grain which will be consumed by the troops in the field. It is also apprehended that the scarcity will be felt at Bombay, and the government of that settlement has already found it necessary to stop the supplies for the army; although the grain now there was laid in at my request in January last, with a view to guard against want by the troops.

'I have written to Mr. Duncan upon the subject of this probable want; and I have requested him to give directions that a correspondence might immediately be opened with you, in order to procure from the countries under your management their surplus produce, for the use of the troops in the field. The quantity which I have requested Mr. Duncan to provide for the consumption of the next year is 600 garces; and I give you this early notice of the want, in order that you may take such measures as you may deem necessary to stop the exportation.

'I have reason to believe that the crop in Mysore this year is a good one. I have written to the Secretary of the Resident in Mysore, to request him to communicate with you upon this subject; so that by his influence with the government in Mysore, the markets in Canara may be kept full; notwithstanding the call there will be for the grain, not only in this quarter, but most probably for the use of the troops in Guzerat, where likewise I understand that the crops have failed entirely. 'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*J. Ravenshawe, Esq.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'SIR, 'Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th October, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, enclosing extracts of a letter from the Military Board, upon which the Honorable the Governor in Council has desired to have my sentiments.

‘ In answer to the 2nd and 3rd paragraphs of the letter from the Military Board, I am concerned to inform you that Captain Mackay, the officer alluded to, was killed in the action of the 23rd of September. It was unfortunate that I was not at first apprized of the precise objections to Captain Mackay’s accounts; because I could, by the return of post, have transmitted the declaration on honor required from him by the regulations of the Bombay Government.

‘ All I can now say on the subject is, that as far as it is possible for one man to answer for another, I will answer for Captain Mackay, that the money laid out on account of the Government of Bombay was honestly and fairly laid out for the public service, and that Captain Mackay derived from it no benefit whatever. Indeed a great proportion of the expenditure charged in his accounts was not incurred personally by him. It is principally for the purchase of bullocks, on which duty I employed natives in the service of the Rajah of Mysore, and others sent to me by Major Malcolm from Poonah; and it is but justice to Captain Mackay to say that the bullocks purchased by him did not cost near the sum that those cost which were supplied by these natives. Some also were sent by the servants of the Nizam’s government, which were very dear.

‘ While writing upon this subject, I request to know whether the Honorable the Governor in Council will make to the late Captain Mackay an allowance of four rupees for every bullock purchased on account of the Government of Bombay, which is given to officers on the Bombay establishment who make those purchases? Captain Mackay applied to me on this subject before he was killed: but, having matters of more importance to attend to, I omitted to bring it before Government.

‘ I have already stated the reasons for which the muster rolls of the drivers were not sent, which I conclude are satisfactory to the Honorable the Governor in Council.

‘ In respect to the desertion of the followers, I have to observe on the remarks of the Military Board, that as the followers sent from Bombay are paid in every instance one third more than the same description of followers serving with this army, and in many instances twice the sum, it might be expected that they would feel most sensibly the benefits of their situation; that they would adhere to the service; and that those belonging to the eastern parts of India would desert. However, the contrary is the fact; and I think it will be found on reference to the correspondence

of officers commanding detachments, composed entirely of troops belonging to the Government of Bombay, that the complaint of the desertion of the followers is general, and not confined only to this army.

‘I have already, under date of the 11th instant, addressed the Government upon the subject of supplies of rice.

‘I can give no other answer to the 5th paragraph of the letter from the Secretary of the Military Board, excepting that if the harvest in this part of the country had been tolerably good, I should not have been obliged to request that preparations might be made at Bombay, to so large an amount, to supply the probable wants of the troops in this country in the next year.

‘The supplies at Poonah and Ahmednuggur are now fully equal to what I had ever in contemplation to establish at those places; but in proportion as the subsistence of the troops is drawn, particularly from the latter, the store ought to be replenished; and this can only be done from Bombay.

‘I have also to mention, that in case I should be able to drive the enemy entirely out of the Deccan, or to carry the operations of the troops, as I wish, into Berar, it will be necessary to establish depôts still nearer than at Ahmednuggur, the supplies for which can be drawn only from Bombay.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘HONORABLE SIR, ‘Camp, 13th October 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 4th instant, in which you have enclosed the proceedings of a Court of Inquiry on the conduct of Captain Bates of the 65th regiment, in retiring from Bardoly in the month of July last.

‘2. From a perusal of these proceedings, of which I enclose extracts, it is my opinion that the following facts are established:—

‘First, That Captain Bates withdrew his detachment from Bardoly in consequence of orders from Lieut. Colonel Anderson and Colonel —, his commanding officer.

‘Secondly, That he left his tents behind him because he had no means of carrying them off the ground; the coolies who had carried the ammunition having deserted, he was obliged to employ the tent bullocks to carry ammunition.

‘Thirdly, That Captain Bates had informed the commanding officer at Surat, of the desertion of his coolies two

or three days previous to his march, and that information was received.

‘ Under these circumstances it is my opinion that great injustice has been done to Captain Bates by Colonel — ; and that if any body is to be blamed because the tents belonging to Captain Bates’s detachment were left at Bardoly, he is the person, for having omitted to make arrangements to bring in those tents, when he ordered Captain Bates to march to Surat, an order which that officer must have obeyed at his peril.

‘ 4. I therefore most anxiously recommend that ample justice should be done to Captain Bates, and that if the Honorable the Governor in Council should agree in opinion with me upon this subject, he should give orders that a copy of this letter should be published in orders by the commanding officer in Guzerat.

‘ 5. When making extracts from the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which tend in my opinion to establish the facts stated in the second paragraph of this letter, I have thought it proper to make others which, in my opinion, ought to meet the eye of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

‘ 6. The detachment of European troops under Captain Bates, some of which had not been six months in India, when only one march from Surat, were not supplied with their regular provisions. It appears that the Committee were not unapprized of this fact, and that the complaints of the troops were loud, and that they were becoming sickly in consequence of the want of provisions.

‘ 7. This want appears fully established ; and as it could not have occurred in such a situation unless some person was in fault, I hope that the Honorable the Governor in Council will mark with his decided disapprobation the person who has been guilty of a neglect of duty in this instance.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘ G. O. }

‘ By Government. }

‘ Bombay Castle.

‘ The Court of Inquiry, of which the proceedings are now published, preceded by a letter from Major General Jones, in his capacity of commandant of the garrison of Surat, having, some time ago, been instituted at the recommendation of the Honorable Major General Wellesley, and that officer having expressed his opinion on the merits of the case,

an extract of his letter to the Secretary to Government stands after the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, which include the other extract to which his observations make reference.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR, 'Camp at Phoolmurry, 13th October, 1803.

'I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 26th of September, and I am glad to find that you are getting on in a manner so satisfactory to yourself.

'I certainly approved of your instructions, as involving all the material points at issue between the government at Bombay and me; and I believe you will experience no inconvenience from the paragraphs to which you particularly object. In fact, it is necessary that the political agents at the durbars of the native princes should be supposed to have a considerable degree of power. In this part of the world there is no power excepting that of the sword'; and it follows that if these political agents have no authority over the military, they have no power whatever.

'The natives would soon find out this state of weakness, and the Residents would lose their influence over their councils. It may be argued, if that is the case, the military Commanding officer ought to be the Resident, or political agent. In answer to this argument, I say, that the same reasoning applies to every part of the executive government; and that, upon this ground, the whole ought to be in the hands of the military. In short, the only conclusion to be drawn from all reflection and reasoning upon this subject is, that the British Government in India is a phenomenon; and that it will not answer to apply to it, in its present state, either the rules which guide other governments, or the reasoning upon which these rules are founded.

'There is nothing in the instructions to you which does not exist at this moment at Hyderabad, and would not have existed at Poonah, if the subsidiary force had ever been established at that place; and as far as I am acquainted with Major Walker, I will venture to say that he will act with you cordially for the good of the service.

'I am glad that you intend to attack Canojee. Move upon him with the utmost celerity as soon as you can, and attack him whatever may be his numbers. We must get rid of that domestic war in Guzerat, before we can expect to derive any advantage to the general cause from the troops in

that province. If you had not Canojee upon your hands, I should long before now have requested you to move upon Ougein.

‘Take care that, in establishing your frontier, you do not interfere with Holkar. He has not hitherto committed hostilities against us, and I have cautiously avoided to touch upon him. I wish you to bear this in mind.

‘I ought to have written you an account of our action on the 23rd of September; but I really had not time, and I knew that Major Walker or you would receive the particulars from Mr. Duncan. It was the most severe battle that I have ever seen, or that, I believe, has been fought in India. The enemy’s cannonade was terrible, but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the piquets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did.

‘We took either ninety-eight or one hundred and one pieces of cannon on the field of battle, besides others lost on the road by the enemy, and, I believe, all their ammunition. Since the action they have fled to Burhampoor, where they left the remains of the defeated infantry. They brought out two or three fresh corps of infantry, with guns, and made first a march or two to the westward, along the Taptee; they then turned to the southward, and threatened to pass to the southward through the Casserbarry ghaut.

‘I consequently moved to Phoolmurry to meet them again, and I have sent Colonel Stevenson to Burhampoor. I think that he will drive the defeated infantry into Hindustan; and possibly the cavalry, with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, will follow them; at all events, these movements must stop their southern trip.

‘You must be the best judge what ought to be done for the defence of Surat. I should be afraid that these detached redoubts would be weak, and that the men in them might be exposed to the want of water, &c. If the castle is in a commanding situation, by far the best mode would be to repair it, and raise a second wall for the defence of the town wall. If the company have these places and are at war, they must incur the expense of defending them.

‘ In one of Mr. Duncan’s letters, I think he said that there was a position near Surat, for a small body of troops, which defended the only avenue to the palace. If that is the case, I would recommend that the position should be strengthened, and that the town should have nothing in it except the sebundy. However, at present there is little probability of Surat being molested.

‘ You must have many depôts of provisions besides Baroach and Surat. Mr. Duncan misunderstood that part of my letter to him respecting the depôts. He thought that the places mentioned were to be supplied with provisions only for their garrisons ; whereas I intended that they should be depôts for the corps in the field, to be used in case the line of operations should take them towards these places.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th Oct., 1803.

‘ I received a letter yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, the person whom I sent to Holkar. He had not been able to get on to that chief, as the country was much overrun by Scindiah’s pindarries, and he says that Holkar is gone to the northward to Boondy and Kota. He sends me a copy of a letter which he had received from Holkar on the 6th of this month, in which Holkar desires him to join with the troops of a chief who was about to march from the Taptee. Kawder Nawaz Khan was, however, unable to join this chief, on account of the pindarries and thieves, who literally swarm in the countries bordering on the Taptee and Nerbudda. He says that the hircarrahs who brought Holkar’s letter, told him they had left that chief on his march towards Boondy, at a place 20 coss north from Ougein.

‘ I have recalled Kawder Nawaz Khan ; and I have written a letter to Holkar, in which I have informed him that I have so done, as I find that his army has gone to a considerable distance ; and as the enemy’s pindarries infest the country between Kawder Nawaz Khan and his army, it is therefore impossible for him to join.

‘ I think it would not answer to allow the person sent on this mission to remain any longer in the place and state in which he has been for the last two months ; and indeed, at all events, it is necessary to bring him back, in order to supply him again with money, of which he is in great want. I have therefore desired him to join Colonel Stevenson’s camp.

‘I think that General Lake’s capture of Allyghur is one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, viz., to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded. I have always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this instance.’

‘I hope soon to hear that the General has again returned from Delhi. We must watch Holkar closely. His sudden march to the northward shows no good intention; and it may be depended upon that he will enter into the war, if he should see a prospect of advantage.’

‘Holkar has now a stake in India, which depends upon the existence of his reputation as a soldier; and I think that he will not venture to risk it, by crossing the Jumna or the Ganges, and being on the same side of these rivers with General Lake. But how is your province of Bahar defended? That, in my opinion, will be the point to which he will direct his march, in case he should enter into the war.’

‘The rain, which usually falls in this country in the months of September and October, has, in this year, entirely failed; the consequence will be a great scarcity of grain, and there is every reason to apprehend a famine. This is a bad prospect for us. The same misfortune is apprehended at Bombay, and Mr. Duncan has accordingly stopped the supplies of rice for the army, in order to feed the settlement; although the grain which he now issues to the latter was laid in for the use of the former, at my suggestion, made so long ago as the month of January last. However, I have a tolerable store for the fighting men in Ahmednuggur; and I have written to the collectors in Canara, and have requested Mr. Duncan to commence a correspondence with those gentlemen, in order to secure for the army the surplus produce of that fertile province.’

‘The enemy have not yet passed the Casserbarry ghaut: I believe that my movement to this quarter has stopped them; and there is a chance that Colonel Stevenson will drive the infantry entirely out of the Deccan.’

‘Kawder Nawaz Khan writes me that the enemy’s cavalry are deserting; some of them pass daily through the place in which he is, and they say that the army is in great distress for food. Believe me, &c.’

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘I wish I could hear what progress has been made in the negotiations with the Rajpoots. It is possible that Holkar may have gone to Boondy to act as a check upon them.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,’ Phoolmurry, 14th October, 1803.

‘I enclose a letter which I have written to the Secretary of Government at Bombay, respecting Captain Bates, from the perusal of which, you will observe that Captain Bates did what he was ordered, and could not avoid what happened.

‘I likewise enclose an extract of a letter which I have written to Major Shawe, in which you will see an account of the intelligence which I received yesterday from Kawder Nawaz Khan, also my opinion respecting Holkar’s designs.

‘It is possible, however, that Holkar may have gone to Boondy only to keep in check the Rajpoots, on whom he has claims, and with whom the Governor General has opened a negotiation. But he ought to be watched closely. Send Malcolm this last paper.

‘There is some intrigue going on at Poonah, through the medium of Sirjee Rao Ghautky. I have had intelligence of it from two or three quarters; he certainly is a dangerous fellow, and ought to be sent away.

‘Appah Dessaye writes to desire that Neelkund Rao Scindiah and Jolebah Goorparah, two fellows in his service, may be sent from Poonah to join him. He says that they are intriguing against him, and they are the cause of the attack which has been lately made upon his country and the fort of Manowly, by the polygar of Jalloor, in which the Rajah of Kolapoor and some other rascals are concerned.

‘I have written to General Campbell upon the subject; but it would be as well if the Peshwah were to give a hint upon it to the Rajah of Kolapoor, and I shall write him a letter also.

‘I believe I told you that Sirjee Rao Ghautky has written, as he said, by the Peshwah’s orders, to Appah Dessaye to give up the fort of Manowly. I desired Appah Dessaye to tell him to mind his own business, and that, if any body should venture to attack that fort, the English would defend it.

‘There is no understanding these Marhatta intrigues. The Peshwah and his government always appear to be concerned as individuals against his subjects, instead of as the head of the government.

‘Goklah also appears very uneasy respecting Nurgoond. He was here again the night before last upon the subject; and I should not be at all surprised if, in consequence of the intrigues of Poonah, both Goklah and Appah Dessaye were to desire to go off to their own countries.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Hon. the Governor of Ceylon.

SIR,

Camp, 14th October, 1803.

I have received your letter of the 9th September, and should be happy to avail myself of any opportunity to be of service to your government. But I did not take any of the Arab troops prisoners who were opposed to the troops under my command at Ahmednuggur; those who defended the pettah having been, with the killadar, driven out; and the troops who defended the fort having made a capitulation, under which they were allowed to evacuate it; I have therefore no Arabs in my possession. If I had, I should take the liberty of suggesting to you my doubts of the propriety of employing them on the island of Ceylon. They are undoubtedly the bravest of all the troops that I have yet seen in the service of the native powers, and they defend the posts intrusted to their charge with determined valor: but I have never seen them in the field, and I believe that they do not serve willingly except in garrison; they are a high-spirited people, and are by no means amenable to discipline and order, which it is absolutely necessary should prevail in our camps and forts; and I believe that it has happened, more than once in India, that they have mutinied, even when well treated, and have been the cause of terror to their employers. I do not know exactly what pay they receive in general; but, as they are esteemed good troops throughout the Marhatta empire, particularly for the defence of posts, I conclude that they receive more than double the sum which you propose to pay them, as the common pay allowed to a Marhatta chief for his infantry is ten rupees per mensem.

They would certainly refuse to serve under European officers, or any person excepting those belonging to their own tribe and nation. When these inconveniences would be felt, you would be desirous to send them from the island; and you might find it necessary first to subdue them; and, while that operation would be going on, some of them might escape and join your natural enemies on the island.

I shall, notwithstanding these objections to the Arabs, make it my business to find out at what rate of pay they can be hired, and whether they will serve in the field; and more particularly respecting their character, when I shall have the honor of addressing you again.

I have the honor to be, &c.

The Governor of Ceylon.

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Phoolmurry,
14th Oct., 1803.

‘I find that the enemy were still at Maryapoor on the 10th. I have not heard of their movements since that day.

‘Kawder Nawaz Khan’s letter was in Kanaree, which is the cipher used between him and me. I have ordered him to endeavor to join you: he is much distressed for money; and I shall be obliged to you if you will contrive to send him some to Lassoer, a place belonging to a Patan, by name Gujar Khan. If you can send him only a few hundred rupees, you will render him a great service.

‘Whether you get a contribution from Burhampoor or not, I think you will do well to bring away with you all the principal shroffs and soucars, by way of reprisal for the injuries of that kind done by the enemy to the Soubah’s country. If they should hesitate about giving you a contribution, possibly a shell or two from your twelve pounders, having in them a bit of quick match, besides the fuse, and a threat to give them up to general plunder, would accelerate their decision.

‘I wish that you would fit out a detachment, such as that which I have under Captain Baynes, to keep your camp supplied. If you do not, you may depend upon it you will be in want. I have not a third of the number of bullocks that you have; but, by means of this detachment, I have been tolerably well supplied.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Phoolmurry, 14th October, 1803.

‘1. In addition to the other difficulties I experience in this country upon the subject on which I have troubled you at different times, the people attached to my camp experience one of considerable magnitude in taking gold coins in the Soubah’s country. The people are willing to take them, but at a very depreciated rate of exchange; in some instances, at the rate of one half, at others of two thirds of their value, and of that rate under which I am under the necessity of issuing them to the troops.

‘2. The consequence is, that the price of every article is much increased; and in many instances the dealers have returned without loads, rather than submit to this extortion of the inhabitants, and thereby a distress is occasioned in camp.

'3. It is not possible to avoid the issue of these gold coins to the troops. Very lately, General Stuart sent to Colonel Stevenson and me six lacs of pagodas in gold coins of different descriptions, and I really believe, that at this moment there is not a rupee in the camp of either.

'4. Under these circumstances, I shall be much obliged to you if you will request the Soubah's ministers to issue proclamations as soon as possible, requiring the people of the country to receive these gold coins in payment of articles required for the camp of the British troops, and holding forth engagements that those coins will be received in payment of the revenue at the same rates of exchange.

'5. I have the honor to enclose the nerrick of the rates at which the coins are issued to the troops.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'Rate at which the undermentioned coins are issued to the troops:

	R.	A.	P.
Star Pagodas	3	8	0
Behaudry, or Hydry, or Rajah's Pagodas	3	12	1
Porto Novo, or Feringhy Pet Pagodas	3	0	0
Gold Fanams, $3\frac{1}{2}$ per	1	0	0
Bombay Gold Mohurs	15	0	0
Hydry, or Behaudry or Rajah's Gold Mohurs	16	0	0

'N. B. These are the coins principally in circulation at present; and if they should be received in the country at the rates specified above, no inconvenience will be felt. But besides these coins, there are a variety of others in circulation, upon all of which there is a loss*.

* 'Rupees have lately become so plentiful that their value has fallen in camp: this at first sight appears very extraordinary, but we carry a set of men about with us, whose power is superior to the General's in this branch, and to their exercise of it it is necessary to submit: the shroffs, or bankers of India, are well known, and are a very well-connected body of men, who live on the mercantile transactions of all other classes. From the southward, many of these men have accompanied the army; and here, in a strange country, they not only rule the camp exchange, but form connexions which enable them to supply money when it is not to be procured by any other means. For General Wellesley's bills on every part of India, which, for the convenience of the service, he is authorized to draw, they constantly procure money; not that of the country, but of Madras, and the southern parts of India, which are not in use, or known here; these, of course, made part of the treasure on setting out, or have since been receiv-

To Colonel Murray.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th September, and 2nd instant. It is very probable that you will do nothing with Canojee by negotiating. I suggested the means only because I observed that he was extremely weak in troops, and was absolutely destitute of money, and that he could procure none. At the same time, the few troops he has were likely to keep in employment all our troops in Guzerat, during the most precious time of the campaign, and thus divert them from the prosecution of the general war, to domestic purposes. If you should negotiate, I anxiously hope that you will not stop your operations on that account; that mode will never answer any good purpose.

‘ It is heart-breaking to see the state of the 65th. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of sending that corps to Surat at that season, and afterwards putting them in the field without any means necessary to secure even their existence, much less their comfort, during a monsoon.

ed; yet its re-collection by the shroffs, and the substitution of coins current in the country for the purchase of all the necessary articles, must demand an attention, and be the effect of a system, of which it is very difficult to form any idea without their assistance. I dare say they make a profit by the bills; they regularly do a monthly one upon some of the coins most in use: as soon as they know the proportion of coins in the treasury in which we are to be paid, the value of that coin unalterably falls, and continues depressed until the issue of another; then the first is poured back into the treasury at its real value, if not more. The loss falls on the soldiers, a little perhaps on government; but the ability it gives to the latter to make the payments with punctuality, as they always have been in the army, overbalances the objection on its side, and the soldiers readily acquiesce from the regularity and certainty with which they get their month's pay, in a week or less after it is due; when in garrison they may be three or four months in arrear. The difference of price on account of prompt payment may be equivalent to the loss. The coins generally current in camp are, Star, Behaudry, Sultauney, and Porto Novo pagodas; Venetians, Chandory, and Company's rupees; there are also the gold and silver fanams—the copper coins are those of the country, called piu, which are continually varying in size and value, at times we receive nearly sixty piu for a rupee, at others not more than thirty six. The troops are paid in the six first-named coins, in proportions named monthly in General Orders. The natives of the interior part of India have but very little gold current amongst them; silver is soon lost in their buried hoards or family ornaments; copper, and the exchange of superfluous articles, seem to be their mediums of traffic.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B.*

‘ I have had no report regarding the deserters of the 75th regiment. Your account of the manner in which the troops are treated at Baroda is very unpleasant. It is positively contrary to all rules, diminishes the respect for the troops, and their sense of their own character, to allow them to run after palanquins and horses, and ought not to be permitted. However, the subject is a very delicate one at Baroda; I will take an opportunity of bringing it before Mr. Duncan, who alone can apply a remedy.

‘ I suspect that you will not find the patans of much use; however, a few of them can do you no harm, and they may be the means of opening the communication with their friends on the frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 15th October, 1803.*

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 6th. It gives me great pleasure to have it in my power to do any thing to gratify Azim ool Oomrah, and accordingly, I request that you will be so kind as to return to him the enclosed letters, and beg of him to intercede with the Soubah of the Deccan for the killadar of Dowlutabad.

‘ 2. It will be proper, however, to take this opportunity of impressing the mind of this killadar with the necessity which exists that he should have full confidence in the British officers, that he should treat as friends the British troops, and that he should obey the orders which he may receive from Raja Mohiput Ram.

‘ 3. On the other hand, I declare that I have no intention whatever to make use of the fort of Dowlutabad, excepting on occasions which may be absolutely necessary to forward the service, in which the interests of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan are more involved than are those of the British Government.

‘ 4. I have the honor to enclose another memorandum which I received yesterday from Captain Baynes, on the subject of difficulties experienced by the brinjarries; and I shall be obliged to you, if you will urge the ministers to give orders that the grievances complained of may be redressed.

‘ 5. I shall take an early opportunity of forwarding to Rajah Mohiput Ram and Rajah Sookroodoor the letters directed to them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

' MY DEAR COLONEL, ' Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘ I have received intelligence from more than one quarter, that a carkoon, by name Ballojee Punt, or Babajee Punt, has been sent from the enemy’s camp to Poonah. He has with him ten or fifteen horse. It will be well to watch this fellow, and ascertain the object of his mission. It is said, also, a Frenchman is gone to Poonah, but that I doubt.

‘ Be so kind as to send the enclosed to the Rajah of Kolapoor. ‘ Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.' **'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'**

To Captain Graham.

' MY DEAR SIR, ' Camp, 15th October, 1803.

' I have received your letter of the 11th.

‘ I beg you to give 1000 rupees to Ram Rao, and another 1000 among the peons and cavalry, as a reward for their services. With respect to the remainder, I wish to have a particular account of every thing taken. If it should turn out to be of that kind of which I have the disposal, I shall do so ; if not, I shall refer the matter to Government.

' You will do well to keep the papers you mention, as well as Madhajee Scindiah's seal, upon the subject of which I shall address the Governor General.

‘ I wish that you would lose no time in raising your horse: nothing but a body of them will keep the country in tranquillity, and secure our communication with Ahmednuggur, which is now in a very unpleasant state, and requires constant guards and escorts.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Captain Graham.' **'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'**

To Major Malcolm.

' MY DEAR MALCOLM, ' Camp, 15th October, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 8th, and I am glad to see that you and I agree in opinion respecting Amrut Rao. I have heard nothing of him lately. I have received from Colonel Murray, a sad account of the state of the troops in Guzerat. The 65th regiment, which arrived in India about six months ago, 400 strong, has now only 280 in the field; and the 86th about 500; the native corps none more than that number, and some only 200. I foretold to Mr. Duncan the consequence of putting the 65th regiment in the field

during the monsoon, without any one comfort necessary to their existence. However, there was some reason for not employing Colonel Watson; and the 75th, the seasoned corps, was kept in garrison, and the 65th, the new corps, sent to the field, and we now feel the consequences.

‘ But Colonel Murray has mentioned another circumstance to me, which certainly requires a remedy, but to which nobody can attempt to apply one, except Mr. Duncan himself. The Rajah, the minister, and the Resident at Baroda, have guards so exceedingly strong, as to run away with the whole garrison. There is, besides, only a gate guard of sixty men; and, in consequence of the number on duty, the men now on those guards will not be relieved at all until Colonel Murray quits the field. This is notoriously ruinous to discipline, and must in the end operate to the prejudice of those very persons for whose safety these strong guards have been established.

‘ It would be much better to find out the number of sentries each party required, and give him a guard in proportion to that number, viz., three men for every post, and to have those men relieved daily, if possible, by the garrison; if not possible, then weekly.

‘ Another circumstance mentioned to me by Colonel Murray is, that the Rajah, the minister, and the Resident, have more than half of their guards running after them on foot, when they go out, whether in a palanquin, or on horseback. It is very obvious that the consequence of this is, that all respect for troops used in this manner must be at an end; and that those troops must lose all respect for themselves. It is therefore very desirable that this practice, which does not prevail elsewhere, should be stopped at Baroda.

‘ You will be surprised when I tell you that Purneah never has with him a Company’s sepoy, excepting, possibly, an orderly from me; and that, as for the Rajah at Mysore, he has at Mysore one company of native infantry, who do the duty of that place and the Rajah’s palace, and never move from it.

‘ I wish that you would try what you can do with Mr. Duncan upon this subject.

‘ I think that the present weakness of the garrison of Baroda, and the want of all the troops that is possible, for field service, might be used as an argument with the Rajah, to decrease his guard to the number required for his sentries, and to relieve it daily, which measure would of itself put an end to the use of the Company’s sepoys as sowarry.

‘ I believe I have intrusted you with a more difficult negotiation than you have ever had in your diplomatic career ; but I am convinced that you will see the necessity of putting an end to this practice, and this appears a favorable opportunity to attempt it.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ Camp, 16 miles North of Phoolmurry,
16th October, 1803.

SIR,

‘ I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 2nd instant.

‘ In my opinion, the best way of sending me the money which you intend for my use, would be from General Campbell’s division, by the route of Meritch to Poonah, and thence to Ahmednuggur ; from whence I can contrive to bring it forward. It might come on bullocks lightly loaded, with a large proportion of specie.

‘ I wish, however, to apprise you that some of the gold coins lately sent to us with Major Hill are almost useless. The rupees of any kind pass best in this country, although I know that the gold coins are most convenient for carriage. But the loss is immense upon every species of gold coin, excepting Behaudry, or Hydry, or Madras pagodas. The Porto Novo pagodas, in particular, of which I have at this moment above a lac, cannot be passed at all. I have written to Major Kirkpatrick upon the subject, but I despair of a remedy.

‘ The money from Canara, in case there should be any, might be embarked at Goa, and sent to Bombay, addressed to me ; otherwise not improbably it may be seized there.

‘ As I perceive an inclination among the polygars between the Malpoorba and the Gutpurba to create disturbances, it is possible that the communication by that route may be impeded ; and I much doubt the security of any other along the frontier of the Nizam and the Marhattas.

‘ In that case it may be necessary to send the money which may be collected at General Campbell’s camp to Goa, there to be embarked ; or to Hyderabad, or to Beeder, avoiding the frontier, and thence to Dharore, from which place I can bring it forward.

‘ I received intelligence last night that Scindiah was on the 13th still at the station which he had taken up on the road to the Casserbarry ghaut ; but he had detached Gopal

Bhow and other sirdars, with some cavalry, to the northward, on that day. I am convinced, therefore, that he has no intention of coming to the southward, and I have marched this morning towards Adjunttee.

‘Since my arrival here, a man has come in whom I had sent to examine the Untoor ghaut; and he brings a report that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made a movement to the northward on the 14th: however, this is not so clearly ascertained. I shall be within reach of Colonel Stevenson before the enemy can attempt any thing upon him, supposing them to intend it, after what has already happened. But by all accounts, they are sadly disorganized.

‘However, it is impossible to say whether they may be able to equip another corps of infantry at Burhampoor: and, although I doubt whether our loss would have been much less than it was on the 23rd of September, supposing both divisions to have been engaged, I should not much like, upon any speculation of my own, to run the risk of such another loss, by engaging the enemy’s whole army of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, with one of our divisions only, supposing them to be able and inclined to engage with us.

‘Colonel Stevenson knows my sentiments upon this subject, and has directions to guide his conduct accordingly.

‘I have lately received a letter from Kawder Nawaz Khan. He was still at Lusoor; but Holkar had written to him a letter that he received on the 6th of October, in which he pressed him to come on; and desired him to join a sirdar who was about to march from the Taptee to join Holkar’s army, north of the Nerbudda. The country bordering on the Taptee swarms with pindarries and thieves of all descriptions, and Kawder Nawaz Khan was unable to move. The hircarra who delivered Holkar’s letter told Kawder Nawaz Khan that he had left him in full march to Boondy and Kota, and that he was twenty coss north from Ougein. Boondy belongs to one of the Rajpoot Rajahs, upon all of whom Holkar has claims, with the Peshwah and Scindiah. It is possible, therefore, that he is gone only to realize these claims. On the other hand, he may intend to co-operate with the confederates in Hindustan.

‘At all events, I have not thought it proper to leave Kawder Nawaz Khan any longer in the disagreeable situation in which he is at Lusoor, and I have ordered him to join Colonel Stevenson, if he possibly can. I have written to Holkar to apprise him, that, as he was gone to such a distance, and the country was so completely overrun by pindarries and thieves, I had recalled Kawder Nawaz Khan.

‘Amrut Rao’s vakeel told me that Holkar and Scindiah had not yet agreed. It appears that Scindiah has for many years collected, and applied to his own use, the whole of the peshcush paid by the Rajpoots; and Holkar now claims, not only to collect his own share, and half the Peshwah’s in future, which Scindiah has offered, but the whole peshcush for the same number of years that the whole has been collected by Scindiah. It is impossible to say whether this or any other story told by a Marhatta is true; but Holkar’s march to the northward, of which I have no doubt, may be possibly made with a view to realize this claim, at least in this year, in which Scindiah is engaged with us. If this is the case, nothing can be more fortunate.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘Camp, 16 miles North of Phoolmurry,
16th October, 1803.

‘SIR,

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 8th instant.

‘2. It is but justice to you to express, that I am perfectly sensible that you have done every thing in your power to induce the servants of the Soubah’s government to attend to my requisitions for the public service; but whether they are unaccustomed to obey the orders of any person, or whether they have a particular objection to receive orders from an European officer, it is very certain that they do not attend to me; and, therefore, I most anxiously recommend that one of the sirdars in the Soubah’s service should have power over all persons under the Soubah’s government in this part of the country.

‘3. I believe Salabut Khan to be a man of the first rank, consequence, and family at present serving with the Soubah’s troops; and Colonel Stevenson has always mentioned him with respect and regard. But it does not appear that he is trusted by, and that he enjoys the confidence, of the government to the same degree as Rajah Mohiput Ram. The latter also is more accustomed to business than the former, who trusts the management even of the business he has at present to Futty Jung Khan.

‘4. Under these circumstances, I should recommend Rajah Mohiput Ram to be the person vested with this authority by the Soubah’s government. But if Salibut Khan, or any other sirdar, either with the army or at Hyderabad, should be

preferred by his Highness, I shall be ready to co-operate with such person for the general good.

‘5. I agree in opinion with you, that it would be very inconvenient for his Highness to join his army on the frontier in person ; and, for the reasons you mention, the measure ought not to be proposed to him. I suggested it only as an alternative, that the armies might enjoy the resources of the country in case it should not be possible to prevail upon his Highness to trust any of his sirdars with sufficient powers over the killadars and others in this part of the country, to bring forward those resources.

‘6. I think it will be advisable to send forward the five lacs of rupees alluded to in the seventh paragraph of your letter of the 8th, and any rice, &c., for which you may have carriage, to Dharore, as you have proposed.

‘7. My letters to his Excellency the Governor General will have apprized you that I had marched towards Aungababad, and with my reasons for moving in that direction. If the enemy ever intended to pass to the southward by the Casserbarry ghaut, they have now relinquished that intention ; as I heard in the course of last night, that on the 13th a part of their cavalry had moved to the northward. I consequently marched towards Adjunttee from Phoolmurry this morning, and I have since received accounts from persons whom I had sent to examine the Untoor ghaut, from which I think there is reason to believe that Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar made a march in a northerly direction on the 14th.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp at Pahlood, 17th October, 1803.*

‘1. I am concerned to have to inform you, that thirty of the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment deserted on the night before last, and one hundred last night ; I am therefore under the necessity of requesting that measures may be taken to obtain at Bombay at least two hundred and fifty dooley bearers for the service of that regiment.

‘2. As I observe in a late letter from Government to the Military Board, upon the subject of the desertion of the camp followers hired at Bombay, that the Honorable the Governor in Council is of opinion that this practice among that class of people had been very unusual, I am apprehensive that the degree to which it has prevailed among those hired at Bombay

only, in this camp, may be attributed to improper interference in the management of them, or to the extraordinary hardships under which they labor.

‘3. The Honorable the Governor in Council will have observed, by the orders which I formerly transmitted for his confirmation, that I left the Bombay establishment exactly as I found it, under the management of the officers appointed by the regulations of the Bombay Government to superintend it. The dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment, in particular, have always been under the surgeon of that regiment, and employed solely in carrying the sick of the corps, although all the other dooley bearers with the army, in the pay of the public, whether from Mysore or the Carnatic, are under charge of the Staff Surgeon, and are applicable to the general service as they may be required.

‘4. Indeed, I was anxious to prevent their too frequent communication, as the former receive ten and a half rupees per mensem, and the latter only seven; and I was apprehensive that those who received least pay, and did most work, would desert.

‘5. Besides the dooley bearers attached to the 78th regiment, their watermen have gone also; and I believe every private follower in the regiment raised at Bombay.

‘6. As our operations have been carried on in countries entirely exhausted, and as the season has been very unfavorable, the price of grain has been high; but the average price has not been higher than at Poonah, when the army was in the neighborhood of that city; and I have the satisfaction to reflect, that, although certainly dear, grain has always been plentiful. If its high price was likely to occasion desertion, it is probable that it would occasion it among that class of people who have the lowest, rather than among those who have the highest pay.

‘7. I believe, therefore, that this distressing desertion of the followers hired at Bombay is to be attributed rather to the nature of the people, to the ease with which they have it in their power to return thither, and to the fact that, however numerous the desertions, the police of Bombay have not the power of applying a remedy.

‘8. I have not had much experience of the service in this part of India; but wherever I have seen the Bombay troops employed, whether in this quarter or on the coast, complaints have always been sent of the desertion of their followers: and I believe that, upon a reference to the letters received from officers commanding escorts or detachments in this part of India, since the beginning of April last, it will be found

that not one has marched and performed the service on which he was sent, without making a complaint of the desertion of his public followers.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ Sir, ‘ Camp at Adjutee, 18th October, 1803.

‘ 1. As the season for reaping the harvest is now approaching, I wish to draw your attention to the state of the magazines of grain in the forts on the frontier of his Highness the Soubah.

‘ 2. It is very difficult to get any account of what those magazines contain; and the accounts which I have received are imperfect, and so indistinct, that I am not certain at this moment whether it is intended to express the value of the grain each magazine contains, counted in rupees, or a certain number of measures, or what those measures are: they were given to me at the moment when Rajah Sookroodoor was about to march with Colonel Stevenson’s division, and I had no opportunity of having from him a personal explanation, and I have never received an answer to the letter which I wrote to him upon this subject.

‘ 3. I am therefore of opinion, that there is some reason for concealing from the officers of the British government the real state of these magazines.

‘ 4. That state, however, becomes every day more important; there is great reason to apprehend a scarcity, if not a famine, in the next season, in the countries north of the Godavery, and particularly in Hindustan it is said that the crops have failed entirely. Measures ought to be immediately adopted, therefore, to find out the real state of the grain magazines at Dowlutabad, Puttun, Dharore, and all the smaller forts to the northward in particular, and to have them filled with jowarry wheat and chinna, if they should not be so already.

‘ 5. There appears to be no doubt but that under the treaty the Soubah is obliged to fill his magazines with grain; and it is certainly intended that the British troops should have the use of the grain which the magazines contain. But, excepting a small quantity which Colonel Stevenson received from Dowlutabad, we have got none; and from the difficulties we have experienced, even in approaching the forts, I think it probable that the Soubah’s servants

do not understand that the contents are intended for the use of the British troops.

‘ 6. Under these circumstances, and considering that a great expense will attend the filling of the magazines, that the Soubah is supposed to be fond of money, and that he had already shown some indisposition towards the British government, it is a question which I wish you to decide, whether these magazines shall be filled at the expense of the British government, or at that of the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ 7. At all events, it appears to me to be proper that you should have an explanation upon the subject with the minister, and that you should ascertain his sentiments. The first point to be ascertained is the real state of the magazines, and whether it is understood that they are resources for the use of the British troops, and by what means their contents are to be procured. The next point to be ascertained is whether his Highness is willing to replenish the magazines at the present moment.

‘ 8. If there should be any doubt upon this subject, or whether the contents of the magazines were considered as resources for the use of the British troops, it will become necessary that they should be filled on account of the British government; and I shall be obliged to you if you will urge the minister to give the necessary orders to the killadars and amildars, if you will settle with him the mode in which the grain is to be paid for, whether to the government at Hyderabad, or to the amildars in the countries in which it is collected, that in which the quantities are to be ascertained, and that in which the grain is to be drawn from the magazines by the British troops.

‘ 9. If the grain laid into the different forts is considered a resource for the British troops, I understand it is to be paid for in proportion as it is drawn out.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Mirza Wahed Bey.

‘ 19th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 10th of October, written to Captain Johnson, in which you say it is written in the presence and by desire of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ I never heard and knew nothing of any letter written by Colonel Collins from the top of the ghauts. I have already

written fully to Ballojee Koonger on the subject of sending a sirdar to the camp of the Maharajah, and I still entertain the same sentiments that I did when I wrote that letter.

‘The desire of the British government to remain at peace with the Maharajah cannot be doubted; and I repeat what I said to Ballojee Koonger, that, if the Maharajah had complied with the reasonable requisition which I made to him to withdraw his troops from the frontier of his Highness the Nizam, the peace of India would have been insured.

‘But the Maharajah listened to the advice of evil counsellors, and the consequence is, that he is involved in a war with his oldest and most faithful allies.

‘If the Maharajah has any proposition to make to me, let him send here a sirdar. Whatever that proposition may be, it shall be attended to and answered with respect.

‘In regard to the designs entertained in the Maharajah’s camp, and the threats which you communicate in your letter, I have to observe, that it does not become you to write them, and I shall certainly not throw away my time by noticing them.

‘*Mirza Wahed Bey.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp at Ferdapoor,
21st Oct., 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have received your letters of the 9th, 14th, and 15th, and I will endeavor to reply to them, although weak from the effects of a fever, which I have had for the last two days.

‘I never imagined that Bundelcund was in the hands of the Peshwah, and I concluded that our government must take possession of that province either by force, or in consequence of the influence which it had acquired there. That becomes still more necessary, as the only shadow of influence which the Peshwah has, is through the carkoon of the late Ali Behauder. As that province must be taken possession of by British force, in consequence of British influence, and as I do not see any reason to apprehend that our force will fail in taking possession, or to believe that the policy of government will induce them to delay to attempt it, and all this must have been foreseen and known by the Governor General at the time that he consented to the modification of the treaty of Bassein, under which we are to have Bundelcund, I do not think there is any necessity for delaying the cession of Oolpar, merely on account of the defects of the

instrument by which the Peshwah has conveyed to the British Government the province of Bundelcund.

‘ Indeed, these defects show an unusual honesty in the Peshwah’s government, for if they had wished to have deceived us, they might have addressed their orders to amildars, sersoubahs, &c., instead of the carkoon of the late Ali Behauder.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I think that Oolpar ought to be ceded immediately to Vittell Seo Deo. I am sorry to observe that that chief will not accommodate with us at all ; however, it might be well to give him a hint that the British Government, after the favor shown to him, will not submit to his being the object of that favor to the prejudice of the city of Surat ; and that if his amildars and people did not accommodate with the gentlemen of Surat for the benefit of the city, the place would be taken from him.

‘ The Peshwah is too bad : it is really discreditable for the British Government to have anything to say to him. There is no going on, unless thieves are punished, whoever they may be, or by whomsoever they may be employed. These thieves at Ahmednuggur were plundering in our districts, and I shall send orders that they may be hanged.

‘ By the tappalls come in last night, I see that our intercourse with the southern countries is re-established. The letter which I have written to the killadar of Poonadur, and the posting the companies on the road, may keep it up, and I should wish it to continue by the direct road if possible. Indeed, in point of security, I do not think much would be gained by altering the direction, as the road through the Bhore ghaut, as well as every other road in this blessed country, is infested by thieves, and certainly much would be lost, in point of time. Besides, it is discreditable to have even our tappalls interrupted or removed by such a set of rascals. Therefore, although I wish the runners to be posted on the Bhore ghaut and Baramooty roads, I wish the tappalls still to continue to run by the direct road, and not to be sent by the circuitous route, unless it should be absolutely necessary. I request you to give directions upon this subject to Mr. Frissell.

‘ I am obliged to you for Mr. Stuart’s report. I have sent orders to Poonah that he may enjoy the benefits held forth in the Governor General’s Proclamation of the 29th of August.

‘ The only brigade that escaped on the 23rd was part of Begum Sumroo’s. They were with the baggage, and got off in safety. I knew this on the day of action, and saw them

go off. There may also have been one battalion of Pohlman's with the baggage, but I am not certain of that. Dorsan was certainly killed, and the bodies of other Europeans, who did not belong to us, were seen.

'Your sepoys joined me, and I detained them in case I should find it necessary to attack the place, of which they were able to give a description. One of them was taken sick, and they are at present both absent by leave, but Barclay knows where they are.

'Stevenson took possession of Burhampoor without opposition on the 16th, and he was going the next day to look at Asseerghur. By the last accounts the enemy were still about Parola. They have made another offer of peace, in the same style with the last, which has been answered in the same manner; and Colonel Lang met Colonel Collins's news writer in the road between this and Eedlabad, with letters for me, which he said contained propositions for peace. This man is arrived in Colonel Stevenson's camp, but he has not produced these letters, although he certainly has them.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Graham.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Camp, 22nd October, 1803.

'I have just received your letter of the 17th. If you cannot get the horse at the lower price, you must of course give a higher; but certainly 25 rupees a month, regularly paid, is more than is given by any Marhatta chief.

'If an attack should be made on Chumargoonda, you may make a requisition on Captain Lucas to send a detachment to relieve that post; but let it be sufficiently strong and respectable in cannon, to insure the completion of the service; and let the detachment return as soon as they shall have relieved the place.

'I wish to have from you a particular report on the subject of the thieves sent into our district by Vittojee Naig. They must be kept in confinement in the mean time, as I think that I shall be obliged to order them to be hanged.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Captain Graham.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd October, 1803.

'I have a report from an hircarrah, which I believe to be true, that Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur

on the 21st, upon which I beg leave to congratulate you. Scindiah certainly intended to interrupt his operations, and he moved as far as Ahoonah on the Taptee.

‘ He has been there for two or three days, and halted only when he heard I had come down the ghauts.

‘ The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said is gone towards Chandore, to pass through that ghaut to the southward. This report may be circulated, or he may have gone by that road in order to draw me after him, and to leave Scindiah at liberty to carry into execution his designs against Colonel Stevenson. However, as soon as I shall be certain that Colonel Stevenson has taken Asseerghur, I shall re-ascend the ghauts, if I find that Ragojee Bhoonslah has really passed through by Chandore, as I see by Colonel Stevenson’s letter of the 19th that the infantry of the campoos cannot recover from the effects of the battle of Assye ; and Colonel Stevenson is fully equal to undertake any thing against Scindiah’s cavalry only.

‘ I have desired the Colonel not to give up his operations against Asseerghur, if he should not have got possession, as I have equipments for a siege ; and even if guns should fail, we will try if we cannot blow it up.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that the wounded officers and men are doing remarkably well. Some of the former, and many of the latter, have returned to their duty.

‘ I have not heard from Bengal since the 16th, or from Colonel Harcourt since he took Jaggernaut. It is reported here that something unpleasant has happened to the latter.

‘ Colonel Murray is getting on in Guzerat much better than I could have expected, with very defective means. The 65th regiment, which landed at Bombay in May last 900 strong, exclusive of two companies which have been destroyed in Ceylon, have now only 100 men for duty. This corps has been ruined from the want of common care to give them the necessary food and cover when they were sent to the field, and by putting them into unhealthy barracks at Surat ; by which two regiments, the 75th and 84th, had been before destroyed.

‘ Colonel Murray was not far from Godra on the 7th of this month, and he expected to be able either to drive off or to engage the rebel Canojee immediately. He was on good terms with all the Bheel Rajahs. Godra is not, I believe, 100 miles from Ougein. ‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR, ‘Camp, at Ferdapoor, 23rd October, 1803.

‘The hircarrah who carried the packet, in which the enclosed letter was included, reported that Colonel Stevenson had got possession of the fort of Asseerghur; and as he had no letter for me, and none of the letters for gentlemen in this camp mentioned in the capture of the place, I took the liberty of opening the enclosed, as it was of importance that I should have an early knowledge of the real state of the case.

‘The enclosed does not contain the wished for intelligence; but the hircarrah who carried it said as follows: That he had been two nights and one day upon his road, and that we had possession of the fort before he came away. Upon being asked whether he had seen our flag flying on the fort? he said he had.

‘After the perusal of the letter to General Stuart it occurred to me that the hircarrah might have seen our flag flying, and our troops in possession of the pettah, and not of the fort; I therefore questioned him upon this point, and he said that he had seen the flag in the pettah only; and he gave an accurate account of the manner in which the troops had got possession of that part of the place, but he still persisted that we had got possession of the fort itself. I then desired him to say whether he had seen our troops in it, and he gave the following as an account on which I might depend: That he was with Rajah Mohiput Ram at Burhampoor on the 21st; that he heard the Rajah read a letter from Salabut Khan, stating that we had got possession of Asseerghur; that he heard the orders given for firing a royal salute at Burhampoor, on that occasion; and heard Rajah Mohiput Ram send a message by another hircarrah to the British officer in command at Burhampoor, to apprize him of the intelligence.

‘I have been thus particular in giving you all the details of this hircarrah’s report, in order that you may form your own opinion of its truth or falsehood. I believe it to be true. Scindiah certainly moved to the northward, with an intention to disturb Colonel Stevenson’s operations, as I suspected. He arrived at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, two days ago, where he heard of my arrival at the bottom of the ghauts; and he was still at that place yesterday. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said is gone

towards Chandore, most probably with a view to draw me to the southward, that Scindiah might have an opportunity of impending Colonel Stevenson's operations.

- 'If I find it to be really the case, that Colonel Stevenson has taken Asseerghur, I shall re-ascend the ghaut; as I see that the enemy's infantry cannot recover from the effects of the battle of Assye; and as for their cavalry, they are very incapable of doing any of us much mischief. I think it possible that when the Rajah of Berar shall hear of the capture of Asseerghur, he will endeavor to reach his own country, by marching to the southward of Aurungabad, particularly if he should have come through the Chandore ghaut.

'By letters from Colonel Murray, from Guzerat, I observe that he was getting on much better than I could have expected, with very deficient means.

'He was ten coss from Godra on the 7th; he had all the country Rajahs on his side, and I think it probable that he will either have driven off or have beaten the rebel Canojee. At all events, Godra is not above 100 miles from Ougein, which, if Asseerghur be taken, is Scindiah's only possession.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR, 'Camp at Ferdapoor, 23rd October, 1803.

'I have derived great satisfaction from the perusal of your letters of the 4th and 7th, and I assure you that you are getting on much better than I could have expected with your defective means.

'I think that Canojee will not engage in an action with you, but he will retire; you must then guide yourself according to the circumstances of the country, the state of your supplies and resources, and of your force compared with that of the enemy, whether you will move upon Ougein.

'It is not possible for me, at this distance from the scene, to do more than give you a general outline, and to communicate to you the information I have of the enemy's actual force. To beat or drive away Canojee must be your first object; the security of Guzerat your next.

'If there were not in that quarter a number of little low objects which are always in view with the native governments, and which the British influence in that quarter rather encourage and promote than discourage, I should think it

very possible to connect the security of Guzerat with an invasion of Ougein.

‘However, I have not sufficient information upon the subject, and I must leave the decision to yourself.

‘Scindiah was levying a new brigade at Ougein; he has besides I believe there two or three battalions of Filosé’s corps. Besides this, I learn from Colonel Stevenson that the beaten infantry has gone that way from Asseerghur; sixteen of their European officers and serjeants have come over to the Colonel, and he says that they are entirely ruined by the battle of the 23rd of September, and never can be formed into corps again.

‘Holkar certainly went in the beginning of this month to Boondy and Kota, far to the northward. Scindiah had two brigades of infantry to the northward of the Nerbudda besides Filosé’s, and the one to be newly raised; but I believe that they went to the Rajpoot’s countries, and at all events their European officers have left them.

‘Ougein is a large city, surrounded by a wall in a ruinous state in many places.

‘Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheels and other rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Anund Rao respectively.

‘In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve entirely of your settling the country as you go on, as I know that it is the only mode of securing and of having a tranquil rear. But the Bombay government have thrown into Major Walker’s hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble; and as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.

‘I have received an hircarra report, which I believe, that Colonel Stevenson took Asseerghur on the 21st. He certainly got possession of Burhampoor without opposition on the 15th. Scindiah is at Ahoonah, on the Taptee, about fifty miles west from hence. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and is gone towards Chandore, with what view I do not know. As Scindiah, however, intended to impede Colonel Stevenson’s operations at Asseerghur, and I came down this ghaut to stop him, it is possible that they may be separated, and the Rajah may move more south in order to

draw me off again, and leave Scindiah at liberty to act against Colonel Stevenson.

‘ I wrote yesterday about Captain Bates.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ *MY DEAR COLONEL,* ‘ Camp, 23rd October, 1803.

‘ I have just received your letter of the 18th. I have no reason to suspect Goklah of disaffection. Like every other Marhatta, he wants money. Poonah is the focus of his intrigues, and he is worked upon by the reports which come from thence.

‘ If we could establish any thing like a cordial communication or a solid community of interest with the Peshwah which would be apparent to the world, or if we could even know what the Peshwah is about, or what is going on at his durbar, in the first case, there would be an end of these intrigues; and in the second, they would give us no anxiety, and we should be able with one word to calm that of our friends. But we know more of what passes in the durbar of the enemy than we do of what passes in that of the Peshwah.

‘ There is no doubt whatever of the communication between the enemy and the southern chiefs, and that the former are moving heaven and earth to prevail upon the latter to act against us. Our victories and successes and the disposition of our troops to the southward have kept them in check hitherto, and they will continue to have that effect. But would it not be advisable to employ agents to observe the councils and intentions of these chiefs, and to spend money and exert ourselves for this purpose?

‘ The Marhattas have been famous for corruption, but we have never touched them upon that point.

‘ Mulwa Dada has not 500 men, instead of 5000, and if Captain Graham would only exert himself to raise the peons I ordered two months ago, he would drive out in one day the rascals who have kept us in hot water in that district ever since I left it; merely because Captain Graham began upon a principle of employing small detachments of infantry against them, ill formed in every respect, which were obliged to retreat. I have ordered a detachment out against Chumargoonda, which will relieve that place; but I must give you notice that one-eighth of the disasters of which you have heard from Captain Graham need not be believed.

‘The worst article of intelligence in your letter is the stoppage of the supply of money for bills on Bombay. I have desired Bellingham to send you blank bills drawn at short dates, which I hope will produce it again. But if they do not, we must give the game up almost immediately as lost, for without money I cannot carry on the war.

‘In return for your bad news, I have the pleasure to inform you that I have reason to believe that Colonel Stevenson took possession of the fort of Asseerghur on the 21st. He writes on the 19th, that the infantry which had collected between that place and Burhampoor was gone off towards the Nurbudda. Sixteen of the European officers, serjeants, &c., had come in to him on the terms of the proclamation, among whom were Colonel Dupont, Captain Mercier, and Captain Mann. The Colonel says the infantry had been so completely destroyed, that they never could be collected again in corps, or be of any use to Scindiah.

‘Scindiah has come as far as Ahoonah, and intended to make an effort to relieve Asseerghur. But he halted when he heard that I had come down the ghaut, and he was still at Ahoonah yesterday. Ragojee has separated from him, and it is said is gone towards Chandore, to pass to the southward through that ghaut.* This report is circulated, I imagine, to induce me to return to the southward and leave Scindiah at liberty to pursue his plans against Colonel Stevenson, or he may pass the ghaut with that view. However, I shall hold my ground till I am certain that we have Asseerghur, and then possibly I may ascend the ghaut again, and wait till I see what are decidedly Ragojee’s plans.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

* ‘Six roads up the ghauts are now open. Here it may not be out of place to mention, that, immediately on coming to our ground each day, the neighboring villagers, or rather some of the most consequence amongst them, are sent for, and the Captain of the Guides, after comparing their accounts, takes down all the necessary information relative to the roads to the flanks and front, where, and in what quantity, water is procurable; this is the main object of enquiry, unless where ghauts are to be passed, or rivers forded; the latter, however, rarely occurs. After the camp has been pitched and the men been refreshed, the Officers of Pioneers examine the adjoining roads, and take care that a passage to the front and one to each flank are prepared, at least for the distance of one mile. Such, or nearly similar precautions, are of course in general use.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

To Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘ Camp, 24th October, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter, and I sincerely congratulate you upon the success against Asseerghur.

‘ I had already written to Colonel Stevenson to request that he would place a garrison in Asseerghur to secure the place ; and that he would give you over the country, and desire you to establish therein the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, to take possession of the tannahs and districts, establish in them sufficient garrisons, collect the revenues, and do every thing in your power for the benefit and protection of the people.

‘ It is my intention that the Soubah’s authority alone should prevail in those districts, as a division of the government must occasion weakness and confusion. Hereafter it will be easy for the Company’s government, and that of his Highness, to settle the accounts of the revenues, and the share which is to belong to each party.

‘ I have sent to Colonel Stevenson, to be delivered to you, an order from the Soubah, by which you are put in charge of the whole of his Highness’s western frontier, and in the command of his troops ; upon which I congratulate you. In the exercise of the important duty confided to you by this order, as well as of that which you will have to perform in the districts under Asseerghur and Burhampoor, I recommend to you moderation and justice in all your proceedings.

‘ Intermixed with those under your charge, there are several districts and villages belonging to the Peshwah, and others to Jeswunt Rao Holkar. The Peshwah is now his Highness’s ally, and Jeswunt Rao Holkar is not his enemy. You must act with justice towards them, and not on any account interfere with them.

‘ You must take care to entertain and keep up a sufficient force, particularly in the districts belonging to Asseerghur. This is a time of war, and the resources of the country can be preserved only by having in it a sufficient force. To endeavor to collect a large revenue would be useless, and would most probably eventually occasion loss.

‘ In respect to Wahed Beg, tell him that I desire he will give you the letter addressed to you, and either bring or send the letters addressed to me which he brought from the Maharajah’s camp, and which he showed to Colonel Long.

‘ If he does not do that, you will do well to seize him, and send him here to me ; as he has gone to you with no good purpose.

‘ I have already acquainted Ballojee Koonger in writing that I have always been desirous of peace, and that if the Maharajah had any thing to propose to me, and should think it proper to send here a sirdar, he should be treated with respect and attention, and should have a distinct answer.

‘ I have desired Colonel Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor, in which I request you to assist him.

‘ *Rajah Mohiput Ram.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ Camp at Ferdapoor,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, 24th Oct., 1803.

‘ I received last night your letter of the 21st, and I sincerely congratulate you on your success against Asseerghur.

‘ My letter of yesterday will have apprized you that I had received a report of it, to which I gave credit.

‘ The first object of your attention must now be to establish a garrison in Asseerghur. Possibly 300 men of the Company’s troops, and a small detail of artillery, with a careful non-commissioned officer, and 400 or 500 of Rajah Mohiput Ram’s infantry, would be a very sufficient garrison. Throw into the post a sufficient quantity of provisions for these troops ; and desire one of your officers of artillery to see that the most useful guns on the works are properly arranged, and provided with the necessary quantity of ammunition.

‘ I conclude that the granaries in Asseerghur are already well stored : if they should be so, I recommend that you should not take the grain in the fort for the purpose of filling your bags for your supply on your expedition into Berar if you can get grain in the country, or in Burhampoor : as in case it should be necessary hereafter to push our operations into Hindustan, the depôt at Asseerghur will be very useful to us.

‘ In respect to Burhampoor, after you shall have levied a contribution on it, I mean that it should be given over to Rajah Mohiput Ram. The British troops may be withdrawn from it, and a garrison of the Soubah’s infantry established there. I mean that the country depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur should be delivered to the charge of Rajah Mohiput Ram, for the Soubah of the Deccan. I will request you to speak to him upon this subject ; and desire him to make his arrangements for placing his tannahs in the different villages belonging to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for establishing in

the country the government of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and for collecting the revenues.

‘ I take this opportunity of sending you the letters from the minister to Rajahs Mohiput Ram and Sookroodoor, by which the latter is displaced ; and if I should have leisure I shall this day write a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, to recommend to him moderation in the exercise of his powers. As soon as the officers appointed by you shall have ascertained the amount of the property in the fort, let me have an account of it, and I will recommend to Government that it may be given to the troops as prize.

‘ All these arrangements will take up some days ; and I do not think that to be regretted. In fact we have run the length of our tether against Scindiah. He has nothing more to lose in the Deccan ; and your presence for a few days at Burhampoor will give countenance to Mohiput Ram, and will enable him to settle the country more completely than he would have it otherwise in his power to do.

‘ My letter of yesterday will have apprized you of my wish that you should, if possible, reinforce yourself in ordnance and ammunition from Asseerghur, preparatory to the siege of Gawilghur. That place is not so strong, it is said, as Asseerghur ; but as it is the great hold of the Rajah of Berar’s government, as it contains all he possesses and as it is more than probable it is garrisoned by good troops, well paid, you must not expect to get possession in the manner in which you have got possession of Asseerghur. You will therefore see the necessity of being well equipped.

‘ As soon as you shall have completed the arrangements above alluded to, you might begin your march towards Gawilghur, as you propose, by Mulcapoor. While you are carrying on this operation, I shall keep an eye on the enemy, in the same manner as I have done since you have been at Burhampoor and Asseerghur ; and prevent them, if possible, from invading our own territories, or from interrupting you.

‘ Tell Rajah Mohiput Ram that the letter addressed to him was opened by accident.

‘ I wish that you would tell the officers of Scindiah’s corps that they are to reside at Poonah, unless they have a wish to reside elsewhere ; and you might send them to my camp, from whence I will forward them to the southward.

‘ All your medicines are arrived. You must send an escort for them, which will not be inconvenient to you, while you are making your arrangements at Burhampoor. If you want

money I will send some at the same time. The officers above mentioned can come with this guard. It is said here that you found at Assye an account book of Lieut. Stuart, which proves that he was in camp on the 22nd of September; I wish that you would let me know if that be true.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th October, 1803.

‘1. I enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to peruse and forward. You will observe that the report which I communicated to you yesterday was well founded.

‘2. You will see by the enclosed letter, that I am of opinion that negotiations for peace will soon be opened by both the confederated chiefs. It is very desirable, therefore, that I should be furnished, if possible, at an early period, with an account of the districts, of which the revenues are collected in part by his Highness the Soubah, and in part by Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the Rajah of Berar, respectively; the value of those districts, and the amount collected by each party.

‘3. If a negotiation should be commenced, it would be very convenient, and would preclude delays and intrigues, if one person only were to negotiate for the allied governments; and I should endeavor to carry it on upon this footing. But if his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan could be prevailed upon to give me powers, such as those I hold from the British Government, it would prevent delay, and obviate all objections.

‘4. I should wish, however, that his Highness would let me know with what person he is desirous that I should consult for the benefit of his interests.

‘5. I have to observe upon this subject that, under the treaty of defensive alliance, that Soubah is entitled to an equal share with the Honorable Company, of any benefit that may be derived from a war; and, therefore, it is not probable that he will derive any very great advantage from having a person, more likely than a British officer, to attend to his interest in the negotiation for a peace.

‘But supposing he should have such a person, and that there should be a difference of opinion between that person and the negotiator, on the part of the British Government, under the same treaty his Highness is bound to attend to

the councils of the British Government, in his intercourse with foreign powers; and it is probable that his Highness would be obliged to give up this point for which the person charged with his separate interest in the negotiation might have contended.

‘In quoting this treaty of defensive alliance, I write from memory, as I have not a copy of it.

‘6. It would appear, therefore, that for his Highness to name such a person would tend only to create delay and intrigues, and would answer the purpose of the enemy more than it would that of the allied governments.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Ferdapoor, 24th October, 1803.

‘I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that Colonel Stevenson took possession of the city of Burhampoor, without opposition, on the 16th instant; he marched to Asseerghur on the 17th, took possession of the pettah on the 18th, opened a battery against the fort on the 20th, and obtained possession of it on the morning of the 21st. I have not yet received a detailed account of the manner in which Colonel Stevenson obtained possession of this important fortress, or whether he sustained any loss in the attack of the pettah on the 18th, or of the fort.

‘After I had arrived at Phoolmurry, about sixteen miles north from Aurungabad, I found that the enemy did not advance to the southward, as I had been informed they first intended; and in the night of the 15th I received a particular account of the disposition of their troops, baggage, &c., which convinced me that they intended to interrupt Colonel Stevenson’s operations at Asseerghur.

‘I therefore marched on the 16th to the northward, and descended the ghaut on the 19th. Scindiah had moved to the northward, but he halted as soon as he found I had returned; and he was yesterday at Aboonah on the Taptee. The Rajah of Berar has separated from him, and it is said has gone towards Chandore. I suspect that the report has been circulated with a view to draw me to the southward again; but as Colonel Stevenson has got possession of Asseerghur, and is fully equal to any thing that can be sent against him, it is my intention to re-ascend the ghaut immediately.

‘Sixteen officers and serjeants belonging to the campoos have joined Colonel Stevenson under your Excellency’s proclamation of the 29th of August. I will hereafter send a list of the names, and account of the pay each is to receive. The infantry retired towards the Nerbudda when Colonel Stevenson approached Burhampoor, and by all accounts it is completely destroyed and disorganized. It is impossible to form it into corps again, and it is not probable that it will ever be of any service to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘I have directed Colonel Stevenson to leave a garrison in Asseerghur, and to deliver the districts depending upon that fortress to the charge of the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan. Your Excellency will observe that this is the last of the possessions of Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the Deccan; and the operations of the troops will now be directed against those of the Rajah of Berar.

‘By reports which I have received from Colonel Murray, I observe that he was likely to be at Godra about the 9th or 10th instant, which place is on the road to, and, I imagine, not more than 100 miles distant from, Ougein. But as the troops in that part of India are incomplete in numbers, and the troops remarkably unhealthy, the 65th regiment in particular having only 100 men fit for duty, although they had 900 when they arrived at Bombay in May last, I fear that Colonel Murray’s corps is not sufficiently strong to advance upon Ougein.

‘Besides this deficiency of strength, the existence of the domestic war in Guzerat against Canojee, which might be fatal to Colonel Murray if he should advance, unless he should be so fortunate as first to defeat Canojee, must prevent this desirable movement, even if, by the recovery of the health of the troops, Colonel Murray should become sufficiently strong.

‘On the other hand, an attack upon Ougein from this quarter would leave exposed the territories of the Peshwah and the Nizam, and would render it necessary to defer, or possibly to forego altogether, the attack which I propose to make on the territories of the Rajah of Berar, which is, in my opinion, the most likely to produce a peace.

‘Since I forwarded to your Excellency the copies of my correspondence with Ballojee Koonger on the subject of peace, I have received various messages and letters through different channels on the same subject, but all written or delivered by persons not having any official character, and unauthorized, which are not deserving of your Excellency’s

notice, and, therefore, I do not transmit copies of them. I have uniformly referred them to the answer which I wrote to Ballojee Koonger.

‘It is reported that Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar have quarrelled; that the latter intends to endeavor to obtain a peace through the mediation of Amrut Rao, and the former through that of the Peshwah, or by secret negotiation. Excepting that these chiefs have separated their armies, I have no reason to believe that they have quarrelled, and I can give your Excellency no information to enable you to form a judgment of the truth of the remainder of the report.

‘I think it probable, however, that negotiations for peace will soon be commenced by both those chiefs. I can only assure your Excellency that I shall not suffer them to be carried on in any channel in which the result can be influenced or the conclusion delayed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor of Bombay.

‘Camp at Adjunttee,
25th Oct., 1803.

‘HONORABLE SIR,

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant and its enclosures.

‘2. When I had the honor last to address you, by desire of Lieut. General Stuart, upon the subject of the supplies to be furnished by Bombay for the use of the troops about to march from the Toombuddra to Poonah, I calculated them for the whole army which was assembled at Hurryhur, under the command of his Excellency in the month of March, but for a limited period of time, and for a state of operations far within that on which the troops under my command have since been employed.

‘3. I was aware that General Stuart had made a requisition for a still larger supply, for the use of the subsidiary force serving with the Nizam, which I had not included in my calculation.

‘4. My address of the 11th instant was intended to recall these circumstances to your recollection, to point out to you that I had reason to expect a supply of rice at Bombay to the amount of 600 garces; that I had no other resource; and that consequently I hoped you would give orders that the supply might not be discontinued, and that it might be replenished from Canara.

‘5. In the letter which I have had the honor to receive from you, it appears that the statement in my letter of the 11th is erroneous, and that I have received the quantity of rice which I expected: I do not deny that it has been received by the troops, all of whom are placed under my command; but not by those for whom it was calculated, and whom I must have had in contemplation when I wrote that I had not yet received 600 garces of rice.

‘6. Upon this occasion those troops may be classed in three divisions: first, those serving in the territories to the northward; secondly, the division which marched to Poonah under Colonel Murray, and is now commanded by Lieut. Colonel Coleman; thirdly, the division of troops under my immediate command.

‘7. In respect to the troops serving to the northward, I never could include them in my calculation of supplies required for those serving in this quarter. Indeed, I never imagined that it could be necessary that they should be supplied from Bombay, as the scene of their service has the reputation of being the most plentiful spot in India. At all events, supposing it to be necessary to supply them from Bombay, their food could not be called an extraordinary call upon the resources of that presidency, as it must have been supplied at all events if I had never appeared in this country. Their supply, therefore, in my opinion, ought not to be included in the 600 garces respecting which I had the honor of addressing you.

‘8. When I was approaching Poonah, I had the honor of addressing you respecting the arrangement to be made for the food of the troops under the command of Colonel Murray; and in answer to my letter upon that subject, I was informed that it was not necessary that I should make any arrangements for their subsistence, and that every thing that was necessary should be done by the Government of Bombay. These troops likewise subsisted on the resources of Bombay before I arrived at Poonah; and in making a calculation of the extraordinary call upon those resources, it was not to be expected that I should include their consumption; in my opinion, therefore, the consumption of the troops of this division ought not to be included in the 600 garces.

‘9. It is true that the stores from which that division and those which the division of troops under my immediate command have been fed, have been received; but the accounts of the issues from those stores have been kept separate, and it will not be difficult to ascertain what quantity has been

issued to the troops of Colonel Murray's or Colonel Coleman's brigade.

' 10. The remainder of the grain sent to Panwell which has been the consumption of this division of the army, and forms the store at Ahmednuggur, or the store at Poonah (although that is applicable solely to the consumption of the brigade under Colonel Coleman), is what ought properly to be carried to account against the 600 garces upon which I calculated.

' 11. I have the same objection to the account of the salt meat and spirits, said to have been received on my requisition, that I have to the account of the rice; a great proportion of the former, and the greatest proportion of the latter, have been consumed by Colonel Coleman's brigade. However, I should have made a further requisition for measures to be taken to provide larger quantities of salt provision and spirits, if I had imagined there could have been any want of them, when I made the first requisition in January last; as I mentioned in the second paragraph of this letter, although I provided for a larger body of troops, I had not in contemplation operations of such extent or duration.

' 12. I beg leave to allude, in this place, to the enclosure, No. 4, in your letter, being an account of the number of bullocks which have been sent from Bombay for the service of the army above the ghauts. I have not received one of the 10,351 bullocks specified in that return, excepting 1000 carriage bullocks which were received from Colonel Murray's corps when I marched from Poonah. I am not aware of the number that have been received for the Pontoon establishment.

' 13. In respect to our future demands, in my opinion I ought to have 4000 bullock bags of 144 pounds each, in each of the months of November and December; and I imagine that when the deductions which I have above specified have been made from the consumption, more than that quantity will remain of the 600 garces.

' 14. In the next year, if Colonel Coleman's brigade is to be included, provision ought to be made to supply 1000 garces instead of 600, for which I wrote in my letter of the 11th. I cannot include the troops in the territories to the northward, as I can make no calculation of their consumption.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' *The Governor of Bombay* ' ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick. .

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Adjuntée, 25th October, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 13th instant, in which you have enclosed copies of your dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General.

‘2. These contain intelligence of a most important and delicate nature. It is very obvious that his Highness the Soubah is not aware of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government. In fact his Government could not stand, and would not have stood one day without the powerful support which it has received.

‘3. The war in which the British Government is engaged is in support of the Government of the Soubah of the Deccan. The immediate cause of the war was the refusal of the Marhatta chiefs to remove from his Highness’s territories the large armies which they had collected for the purpose of invading them. The remote cause may be supposed to be the treaty of Bassein ; but however desirable in other respects to the British Government that treaty might have been, the completion of it was a most essential object with a view to the security of the Nizam, and his Highness derives the advantage of that treaty at this moment.

‘4. In the war thus entered into for his Highness’s interests, in which the greatest exertions have been made by the British Government, and the most complete success has attended them, his Highness calculated how far the terms of his treaty with the British Government are to lead him. I do not recollect the terms of the treaty, but the principle and spirit of it is, protection on the part of the British Government, which his Highness has received, and co-operation and assistance to the fullest extent on that of his Highness. Without quibbling upon words, it would not be difficult to show that, in such a war as this, the admittance into his Highness’s forts of our small detachments and convoys is an essential assistance, which his Highness is bound even by the terms of the treaty to give.

‘5. However, considering the coolness which exists between his Highness and his minister, and the declared sentiments of his Highness at the time at which he was partially reconciled to him, it is my opinion, that it will be useless to make any representation to his Highness at present upon the subject, either of his declaration upon that occasion, or of his erroneous conception of his engagement under the treaty of

defensive alliance. For the same reason, I think that it would be prudent to defer to come to any explanation with his Highness upon the subject to which I drew your attention in my letter of the 18th and 24th instant.

'6. It appears to me, that his Highness's mind is irritated, and that he has no notion of his real situation, or his true interests. The agitation of the topics above alluded to, however desirable, will only increase this irritation, may be the cause of the adoption of some violent step respecting the Minister, and will certainly answer no good purpose. In time, his Highness will perceive the candor and honor of the British Government in all its transactions; and the delivery of the territory depending upon Asseerghur and Burham-poor to the officers of his Highness's government, will be a striking proof of those qualities, as well as of the benefits which he derives from his alliance with the British Government.

'7. I must endeavor to work through the war without the assistance of his magazines; and in case of negotiations for peace, to bring them to a successful conclusion, notwithstanding the intrigues which I anticipate.

'8. The Rajah of Berar has passed through the ghauts, and was near the Godavery. I have therefore returned to the southward, and have apprized the killadars of my movements, in order that they may hold out. I have gone so far as to threaten them, in case they should pay any contribution that he may attempt to levy before I can reach him.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Krikpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, '25th October, 1803.

'The march of the Rajah of Berar to the southward, and the fear that I may be detained to the southward for some time, during which all their country would be exposed to Scindiah, make it necessary that we should revise our plan in some degree.

'Accordingly, I wish you for the present to watch Scindiah, and to prevent him from undertaking any thing of consequence, or doing any material mischief, till I can give the other a turn to the northward, when all will be safe.

'You may, in the mean time, make all your arrangements for the Berar expedition, all your inquiries respecting roads, distances, &c. &c., upon which you shall certainly go as soon as I shall have brought up the Rajah; this I may possibly do in a few days.

‘I leave with Captain Scott for you 75,000 pagodas, in various gold coins, and 25,000 pagodas in silver, the whole thirty bullock loads, and I leave all the medicines for your corps, fifty-four bullock loads. You will do well to send an escort and carriage for that money and medicines.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Pahlood, 26th October, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 17th, upon the subject of the repairs of the fort of Baroach. In my opinion, all that is necessary at present is to repair the breach, and any other parts of the wall that may require it, in order to make the place a secure hold: and to put in a serviceable state the buildings which are necessary to give effectual cover to the garrison and hospital. Every thing else may be deferred to a future period.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To J. H. Piele, Esq.

‘MY DEAR PIELE, ‘Camp at Pahlood, 26th Oct., 1803.

I have received your letter of the 14th, and I am obliged to you for having sent my horse.

‘The Nabob of Savanore may be permitted to reside in Mysore; but as, between ourselves, the Company are not now to have possession of the Savanore revenue, I do not see any necessity for giving him any more money.

‘I shall request Colonel Close to urge the Peshwah to provide for him permanently, and I shall urge Goklah not to interfere with the arrangements which the Peshwah may make for the Nabob. I have desired that the 500 pagodas may be repaid to Bistnapah. It would be a proper trick to prevail upon Purneah to send our money 800 or 900 miles for us, and then to make him stand to the losses to which its transportation might be liable.

‘I learn from Bistnapah that Purneah has some thoughts of sending him the horse which he may raise according to the directions from Government. The greater number I have of these troops, the better I shall be pleased; but I rather believe that it is the intention of government that these now to be raised should serve in the defence of Mysore; and I think that before you allow them to be sent to me, you will do well to take the opinion of government upon that subject.

‘ I have written to Colonel Close respecting the thieves who robbed Bistnapah’s party. I think they ought to be hanged ; some at Sungoly on the Gutpurba, and others on the Kistna, and one or two at Hurryhur : if Colonel Close agrees in opinion, I shall order the escorts for them, and that they may be executed accordingly.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ J. H. Piele, Esq.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp at Pahlood, 26th Oct., 1803.

‘ In my opinion, Purneah’s thieves ought to be hanged, There is no other way of putting a stop to these robberies ; and I am not quite certain that it would not be best to send six to be hanged at Sungoly, two at Goorgerry, and two at the post on the Kistna, and the remainder at Hurryhur. If you agree in opinion on this subject, I will give orders that the thieves may be escorted and executed accordingly. Coleman should keep his post at present ; hereafter, when I shall have brought up the Rajah of Berar, I will write respecting the attack you have proposed. I am moving to the southward with all expedition.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Camp at Pahlood, 26th Oct., 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 4th, and Sydenham’s report of the campaign to the northward, up to the 17th September. Every thing appears to prosper, and I hope we shall soon bring the war to a conclusion.

‘ Since the battle of Assye, I have been like a man who fights with one hand and defends himself with the other. With Colonel Stevenson’s corps I have acted offensively, and have taken Asseerghur ; and with my own, I have covered his operations, and defended the territories of the Nizam and the Peshwah. In doing this, I have made some terrible marches, but I have been remarkably fortunate : first, in stopping the enemy when they intended to pass to the southward, through the Casserbarry ghaut ; and afterwards, by a rapid march to the northward, in stopping Scindiah, when he was moving to interrupt Colonel Steven-

son's operations against Asseerghur; in which he would otherwise have undoubtedly succeeded.

'I moved up the ghaut as soon as Colonel Stevenson got possession of Asseerghur; and I think that, in a day or two, I shall turn Ragojee Bhoonslah, who has passed through to the southward. At all events, I am in time to prevent him doing any mischief.

'I think that we are in great style to be able to act on the offensive at all in this quarter; but it is only done by the celerity of our movements, and by acting on the offensive or defensive with either corps, according to their situation, and that of the enemy.

'Sydenham's account of Scindiah's force is tolerably correct. We understand, however, that Pohlmann's brigade of eight battalions was called the 1st, which was destroyed on the 23rd of September: the two other brigades in that action are not accounted for by Sydenham; they were four battalions of Begum Sumroo, and four battalions of Dupont. The latter was formerly Filosé's, and was entirely destroyed by Holkar, in the action at Ougein. It was raised at Poonah, and was not under Perron's command.

'Doudernaigue's brigade, the 4th, of six battalions; and Brownrigg's, as the 5th, of four or five battalions, are in Hindustan; I believe, at present, in the Rajpoot countries.

'According to Sydenham's, and this account, these are the only two brigades that have not been engaged, and are not destroyed; excepting, possibly, one or two battalions of Begum Sumroo's, and one of Pohlmann's which were sent off with the baggage at the commencement of the battle of Assye.

'Besides these, I understand that some of the troops of Dupont's brigade, and some belonging to a brigade now raising are at Ougein.

'How unfortunate it is that we have not Guzerat in style! If we had, I should immediately have a corps from that province on the back either of Scindiah's troops on the Taptee, or of his brigade in the Rajpoot countries; and thus put an end to the war by one blow.

'You will see that we shake at Hyderabad; but Heshmut Jung,* with all his faults, certainly manages well that durbar; and I have written to him to suggest that he should, for the present, desist from all teasing remonstrances upon trifling objects, and endeavor to convince the Nizam that a sense of his true interests, as well as the spirit of his treaty

* Major Kirkpatrick.

taking Gawilghur, and if possible forcing Ragojee to a peace. I wrote to Rajah Mohiput Ram to desire him to take possession of the talooks, depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, in the name of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I shall be near Aurungabad to-morrow. Your Buswunt rice was to be on the Godavery on the 25th. I shall forward it on to Adjuttee, to which place you might send for it.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Ballojee Koonger.

‘30th October, 1803.

‘I have received your letter (its contents recapitulated), and Colonel Stevenson has transmitted to me a Persian letter, in which you have informed him that Mahomed Meer Khan was about to be sent on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see Meer Khan. I will receive him in a manner suitable to his rank, and I will pay every attention to what he may have to communicate.

‘Ballojee Koonger.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Mahomed Meer Khan.

‘30th October, 1803.

‘I have received your letter, and Mirza Wahed Beg has communicated to me what you desired he should, and Colonel Stevenson has sent me different letters which you have written to him, and one which Ballojee Koonger has written to him in the Persian language, by which I learn that you are coming here on a mission to me. I shall be happy to see you, and will receive you with the honors due to your rank and character, and I shall pay every attention to what you may have to communicate.

‘Mirza Wahed Beg will inform you of the arrangement which I have made for a guard to meet you. I enclosed a letter to the officers in the service of the Company, and their allies, to desire that you may be suffered to pass in security to my camp.

‘You will hear at Adjuttee at what place you may find my camp.

‘Mahomed Meer Khan.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 31st October, 1803.

‘I. I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 19th instant with its enclosure, being the copy of one from Messrs. Forbes and Co., and Messrs. Bruce, Faucett, and Co.

‘ 2. As far as I am concerned in the property captured at Baroach, I am of opinion that the proposition of those gentlemen is very reasonable, and that it ought to be complied with.

‘ 3. In respect to the letter from those gentlemen, it might probably have been as well to have omitted all the injurious expressions and reflections which it contains.

‘ 4. I have not by me at present any papers or documents to which I can refer, and I write solely from memory. But as well as I can recollect, his Majesty has reserved to himself the disposal of the property in all forts captured in India, in the operations against which his troops may be employed with those of the Company, excepting military stores, half of which are by charter granted to the Company.

‘ 5. His Majesty has been graciously pleased, from time to time, to grant this property to the troops employed in the capture of the fort in which it might be found, and occasionally the Supreme British Authority in India has taken upon itself to anticipate his Majesty’s intention, and to give the property to the troops; and this is the claim which the troops have to prize property.

‘ 6. The question respecting the property belonging to British merchants found at Baroach is, whether it is included in that reserved by his Majesty in his Royal Charter. Those concerned in the capture, I conclude, think it is; the merchants think it is not. But surely there is no occasion for interference or acrimony of expression, on reflection, in urging the claim of either party.

‘ 7. Whatever may be the fate of the property hereafter, it is certain that, if it had not been for the gallantry of the troops who took Baroach, it would never have come into the hands of the British merchants; and it might be as well, possibly, to refrain from accusing of injustice and unjustifiable measures, those to whom such benefits are to be attributed, only because they state their doubts respecting the real ownership of the property, which, according to the writers of the same paper that contains these accusations, is a question involving points of a peculiar and delicate nature.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov. Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ Camp at Naundair Barry,
31st October, 1803.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have marched every day since the 25th, and arrived here this morning. I was tantalized all the morning with the sight of the enemy’s camp, pitched at the distance of

twenty miles. But when I arrived within six or seven miles of them, they went off in a southerly direction. They have hitherto done no mischief, excepting to the small villages.

‘Your rice is safe at Goondy. It arrived there yesterday.

‘I do not know how long I shall be detained on this expedition against Ragojee Bhoonslah. You must therefore continue your watch upon Scindiah’s motions. I still think that Ragojee will move off to the east.

‘Mirza Wahed Beg went off this morning. He wishes to have an order upon Surat for 400 rupees, which I have promised to give him, if he will lodge the money in Captain Johnstone’s hands, and order Captain Johnstone to receive it.

‘I should not be surprised if Scindiah also were to come this way.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp at Naundair Barry, four coss N.E. from
‘MY DEAR COLONEL, Puttun, 31st October, 1803.

‘As soon as I was certain that Asseerghur was in our hands, I determined to march to the southward to give a check to Ragojee Bhoonslah, leaving Colonel Stevenson to watch Scindiah.

‘This is my second halt from the bottom of the Ferdapoor ghaut; the distance is, I believe, nearly one hundred miles. Ragojee Bhoonslah’s camp was in my sight from a hill at the distance of twenty miles all this morning, but he went off when I arrived within seven miles of him. It is said that he has escaped along the Godavery. I arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th. He heard of it on that night. He marched three times, on the night before last and yesterday, and once this day. He has a vast quantity of baggage and a number of tents, and I do not despair of coming up with him. I have pushed him so hard already, that he has not had time to do much mischief, excepting to the small villages.* A large convoy of Colonel Stevenson’s and mine,

* ‘In the rear of the left of our regiment there is a rose garden (I am told they are numerous and extensive in Hindustan) : a Mussulman came to protect it; but the stubborn hearts of the bullock drivers could not be softened by any thing he said; they drove the artillery of the park through it. This reminds me to mention in this place, that although this division, which, including followers, who are the most determined plunderers, cannot be reckoned at less than 40,000 men, has now marched three times over the same road, and been encamped near Phoolmurry for four days, not a village has been

14,000 bullocks, is safe on the Godavery, within reach of me, and Ragojee dares not go near it.

'Amrut Rao has not joined him, but is at Toka. The alarm in Ragojee's camp is very great. There is no occasion for Colonel Coleman sending the detachment to protect the tappall.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major General Campbell.

'DEAR SIR, 'Camp, at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov., 1803.

'I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 24th of October, and I am glad to find that you are returning to the westward. Your position thereabouts strengthens every thing in this quarter.

'I enclose a copy of my last letter to the Adjutant General, which will show you how matters here stand.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General Campbell.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR, 'Camp, 2nd November, 1803.

'1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 25th October. The enclosed letter to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward after perusal, will show you the state of our military operations in this quarter.

'2. In addition to that letter, I have to inform you that I have brought Captain Seton to trial before a General Court Martial, for disobedience of orders, in omitting to march from Dharore on the 21st of October, according to the orders he had received, by which the risk to which the convoy was exposed would have been avoided, and my movements against the enemy would not have been cramped by the necessity of taking care of it.

'3. The officer in charge of the treasure is at Dharore, and I shall send a detachment to-morrow to bring him in.

pillaged or injured; indeed, rarely entered, except by the lower servants of the public departments: stacked grain remains now untouched; that in the village granaries has never been drawn from thence, but at fair prices; not a man has fled from any village on this line, as far as I know or believe. Had any native army passed once, it is not improbable that it could not, without difficulty, have subsisted itself a second time on the same route.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

‘ 4. I cannot express to you how much I am distressed, and how much the public cause suffers by the total want of means of defence in this country. In order to save it this last time, I have been obliged to march 120 miles, and to pass through the Adjunttee and Chowka ghâuts in eight days; and when I arrived, all the amildars were in treaty with the enemy to pay contributions. Notwithstanding that I had announced my intention of marching in this direction, desiring that they would defend themselves, and threatening them if they should make any accommodation with the enemy, those who received the notice paid no attention to it, and, at all events, did not communicate it to their neighbours.

‘ 5. As a proof of the ease with which the country could be defended, and our troops employed in the enemy’s districts, I mention that a jemidar and twenty men, who had been posted at Rackisbaum in charge of boats, and whom I have detained there since the river has fallen, in order to give confidence to the grain dealers going to the southward to purchase grain, saved that town, although Ragojee Bhoonslah was encamped near it with his army: when he marched off, the jemidar sallied out, took an elephant, some horses, and threw the baggage into confusion. If the Government of Hyderabad would have attended to your recommendation, this would have been the case with every village in the country.

‘ 6. In respect to the minister’s letter, I have again to observe, that I have been particularly cautious not to suffer any grain to be consumed in this camp which is brought by the grain dealers attached to the Nizam’s troops. It frequently happens that they come to this camp, and as regularly I send them off with an escort to that of the Nizam. Colonel Stevenson informs me that he is equally cautious upon this subject.

‘ 7. I am fully aware that it is very desirable to carry the war into Berar, and I have no doubt but that, unless we do carry it there, we shall have no peace. But the question is, can the war be carried into Berar unless the Soubah of the Deccan defends his country? and is he, or his ministers, willing to submit to the loss, which must be incurred, by exposing it to invasions, undefended by a British army, in its present state*?

* ‘ To describe the means used by the natives of India to remove calamity, far exceeds my ability; they are, however, generally such as cunning and intrigue dictate, rather than any generous efforts, either of resistance or resignation. A fellow to-day offered two hundred rupees to our

' 8. If the war should be carried into Berar, I conceive that the Soubah will not be exonerated from the necessity of storing his forts with grain ; and I certainly should think the expedition into that country a matter of some risk, if the only dependence of the subsistence of troops was the grain which they should find in the Rajah's territories.

' 9. Although the smaller forts are in the hands of the zemindars and others, it is to be supposed that there is some mode of obliging them to keep them in repair, to have garrisons in them, and to defend them. If something is not done on this subject, I must confine the operations of the troops to a strict defensive.

' 10. I conclude that the Soubah's mind will have been satisfied upon the subject of the division of the conquered territory, since that depending upon Burhampoor and Asseerghur has been delivered over to the officers of this Government. But he has no occasion to complain respecting the territory depending upon Ahmednuggur, as the district of Jalnapoor, which was included in that territory, has been given over to him.

' 11. But this question respecting territory ought not now to be taken into consideration at all. Under the treaty the parties have agreed that they will adjust the rule of partition of all conquests, and that his Highness the Nizam shall be entitled to participate equally with the Company. But the meaning of the treaty is, that they may adjust the rule of partition of conquest after the war ; and, therefore, putting out of the question all considerations of the Nizam's right to participate equally with the Company, connected with the

advanced guide if he would lead the army a little to either hand, so as to avoid the village in which his property lay. General Wellesley is at all times extremely particular in his attention to the villages ; he has always from twenty to forty orderly men who march in front and on the flanks, and two or three of them are ordered into every place we pass, where they stay at the gates until the whole army and followers have gone by : these men resist the entrance of any of the lower orders, and even of the officers, if it seems to occasion alarm to the inhabitants. In villages near camp, they are also always placed for the same purposes. The natives derive not only confidence from this treatment, but their reliance on his protection makes them pass the bounds of respect to any officer occasionally going in, as I have often experienced in my evening rambles. I admire the cause, and can easily perceive that the effect must, in the end, claim the favorable opinion even of the persons who now abuse generosity which they cannot justly estimate, and which it is foreign to their nature to return.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

non-performance of his engagements, it does not appear to me necessary to give any other answer to this part of the minister's letter excepting to state the fact, that the Soubah's servants have possession of Jalnapoor, which is part of Ahmednuggur, and of the districts depending on Burhampoor and Asseerghur, and that the question of participation in conquests is one to be considered at the conclusion of the war.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Major Kirkpatrick.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Cheesekair, 2nd Nov., 1803.

'After I had sent off my dispatch of the 24th of October to your Excellency. I received authentic accounts that the Rajah of Berar had passed through the hills which form the boundary of Candeish, and had moved towards the river Godavery, I therefore ascended the Adjuntee ghaut on the 25th, and continued my march to the southward on the 26th, and passed Aurungabad on the 29th.

'The Rajah had advanced gradually to the eastward, and was at Luckagaum, about twenty miles north from Puttun, when I arrived at Aurungabad; and between that night and the night of the 31st, during the whole of which time I was in his neighborhood, he moved his camp five times.

'On the 31st, he detached a body consisting of 5000 horse to endeavor to intercept a convoy consisting of 14,000 bullocks, which was going forward to join the troops on the frontier. This convoy was protected by three companies of the 2nd battalion of 3rd Madras native infantry, with two 3-pounders under Captain Baynes: which detachment, with 400 Mysore horse, has for some time been employed in conveying grain from the districts south of the Godavery to my camp, and by a company from the subsidiary force, and two companies from the corps serving at Hyderabad, under the command of Captain Seton.

'They had marched from the Godavery on the morning of the 31st, and reached Umber, where they were attacked: they succeeded in beating off the enemy, and in securing the convoy, which arrived in safety in my camp yesterday, notwithstanding the great superiority of numbers by which they were attacked.

‘ I have the honor to enclose copies of the reports of this action, which I have received from Captain Baynes;* upon which I have to observe, that it affords another instance of what can be done, by disciplined infantry, determined to do their duty, against very superior numbers of cavalry.

‘ I beg leave also to take this opportunity to draw your Lordship’s notice to the Mysore cavalry under Bisnapah Pundit. This corps, which consists of 2000 men, have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army, since I was detached from the Toombuddra, in the month of

* *Captain Baynes to the Deputy Adjutant General.*

‘ SIR,

‘ Umber, 31st October, 1803.

I beg you will report to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, that I was attacked this day about two o’clock, P.M., by about 4000 or 5000 horse. They came on at first as if determined to charge, but receiving a few shot from our guns, they retired; and though they frequently came near us, as if to charge, and some of them within musket shot, they were always driven back.

‘ Our loss is one European wounded, two sepoys wounded, and some Mysoreans killed and wounded, besides a few (perhaps three) horses killed. The loss of the enemy is much greater, particularly in horses. I beg you to say to the General that I shall take post till I shall receive his instructions. I write this by moonlight, which will, I hope, apologize for haste. we were under arms till about sunset, at which time they were out of sight.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ T. BAYNES, Captain.

‘ *Captain Barclay, Dep. Adj. Gen.*

‘ Commanding a Detachment.’

Captain Baynes to the Deputy Adjutant General.

‘ SIR,

‘ Umber, 1st November, 1803.

‘ I last night had the honor to inform you that I had repulsed a body of Bhoonslah’s horse, and have now, for the information of Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, to make you more fully informed of the circumstances.

‘ I arrived with my convoy about twelve o’clock, and encamped near the town, with my right flank to it, and my rear protected by a hill. At two o’clock P.M. the attack began, without more than ten minutes’ warning of their approach, by throwing great numbers of rockets, and advancing upon our left: this obliged me to change my front by wheeling to the left; at the same time some of them were within musket shot. I then opened my guns, which stopped their approach; they at this time moved round, as if to gain the rear, where the brinjaries were. This movement obliged me to detach a party to cover them, and having previously posted a company on the hill in my rear, my line became very small; to prevent their knowing my exact strength, I drew up the Mysore horse in one line. They came on repeatedly as if to charge, but were always stopped by our guns. They continued to rocket us till dark, when they retired. I am sorry to

March last. They have performed these duties with the utmost cheerfulness, and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with the enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses.

' To the credit of the Government of Mysore, I mention that they are paid as regularly as the British troops; and the consequence is, that it is possible to keep them in order and from plundering the country. It is to their example that I attribute the conduct of the Marhatta troops serving with this division of the army, and of which I have no reason to complain.

' The Rajah of Berar has moved to the eastward, and I think he is going to his own territories. I have no doubt but that he would have been obliged to do so, even without my presence in these districts, if any one step had been taken by the government for their protection, or, I might add, if there existed any government in the country. It is now obvious that horse alone cannot make any impression on a country; and if there had been only a few peons in the villages, as has been frequently recommended to the government of Hyderabad by the Resident, the Rajah must have lost the whole of his baggage in the confused and precipitate flight which he has made since I have been in this neighborhood.

' The government of Hyderabad appear determined to do nothing in their own defence; and your Excellency will be surprised to learn that even the city of Aurungabad, in which so many of his Highness's relations, and the families of so many of his sirdars reside, is held by 500 men of the old French Infantry, who, I have every reason to believe, are a part of the corps which, under the treaty, ought to be in the field.

' This conduct in the Government of Hyderabad will, I much fear, put it out of my power to carry the war into Berar as I wish, unless the Rajah should retire towards Nagpoor. I am convinced, however, that, until I am en-

add that 100 of the gram bullocks were carried off, and some brinjarry bullocks (perhaps 100) while at grass. I have the honor to enclose a list of killed and wounded.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' T. BAYNES, Captain,

' Commanding a Detachment.'

' Captain Barclay, Dep. Adj. Gen.'

abled to carry the war into that country, no progress will have been made towards procuring a peace.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah moved to the eastward as soon as I ascended the Adjunttee ghaut, and he was at Eedlabad on the 29th of October.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 4th November, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a copy of a letter that I have written to the Governor General, which will show you how we stand in this country.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 20th and 21st of October. I am in daily expectation of a vakeel from Scindiah, to treat for peace. By the last accounts I had from his camp, he had just heard of the victory gained by General Lake, which will tend to hasten his determination on this subject.

‘I shall fix the salaries and office establishments according to your directions.

‘I enclose the translation of a letter that Captain Young has received, from which, as well as from reports that have reached me, I am afraid that the Governor is not pleased with my having appointed an officer to fill the office of bullock agent, when Captain Mackay was killed. The fact is, that nothing could keep that important establishment together at that time, excepting to appoint some person to take charge of it. Many bullocks and drivers were killed in the action of the day before; and the people were so much terrified and shocked by the death of Captain Mackay, to whom they were much attached, that I am convinced that they would have all gone off, if I had delayed to place any body at their head; or if the situation had been given to an officer with whom they were unacquainted.

‘Your experience of the people of this country, and of the importance of this department to the very existence of a body of troops, will, I am sure, convince you of the necessity of making this arrangement; and will, I hope, induce you to remove from the mind of the Governor any unfavorable impression which he may have received in consequence of it.

‘If it is not intended that Captain Young should retain the situation, it would have been better for him to have remained in that which he held before: and if he is to

remain in it, or whatever may be the arrangement determined on, it is best that the accounts of the department should be settled by, and pass through the hands of only one person, in the manner in practice ever since the bullock establishment has been in the Company's service.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'Camp at Cheesekair,
4th Nov., 1803.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'I have received Colebrooke's letter of the 27th, and I am much concerned to find that you have been unwell; but I hope that you are now recovered.

'Of course European officers must be left in Asseerghur; and if our three hundred men are sufficient for the garrison, there will be no occasion for Mohiput Ram's.

'Send Meer Khan to me, if he should come to you; and refer to me any proposal for peace that may be made to you: we must keep the negotiations for peace entirely clear from Mohiput Ram, or any of the Nizam's sirdars.

'You will have heard of Scindiah's being near Colonel Lang; if he goes into Berar, you may as well follow him upon our Gawilghur plan.

'You shall have my 12 pounders and howitzers, if I can get near enough to you to send them. Artillery officers are never satisfied with a battering train. In my opinion, if you have plenty of shot for your 18 pounders, you have as good a train as you can require; and my 12 pounders will only add weight to it, without much efficacy.

'The money for you, 100,000 pagodas, is at Adjuntee: your Buswunt rice has joined me. The convoy was attacked by 5000 horse, at Umber, and repulsed the enemy. Baynes commanded the party, which he had joined with my supply, detached according to my orders. I shall keep the rice in my camp for a few days, till I see which way all these parties of horse, that are now travelling about the country, will go; and then I shall send it to you. The Rajah of Berar is off to the eastward.

'Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'DEAR SIR,

'The General desires me to add his request that you will send him the details of the capture of Asseerghur, list of ordnance, &c., taken. If you get the Calcutta newspapers,

you will see how much is made of all those things ; and the Governor General remarked to the General the want of such a detail and return on a former occasion, I believe at Jaulna.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ R. BARCLAY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 4th November, 1803.

‘ I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 28th October, with enclosure concerning the revenue arrangements made by Colonel Murray in Guzerat.

‘ I have given Colonel Murray no public instructions on that subject ; but I apprized him in a private letter, that the Honorable the Governor in Council had been pleased to appoint Major Walker to take charge, as Collector, of all the districts which might be conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in that quarter ; and that it was my opinion, in any temporary arrangement he might make, that he ought to proceed in concert with Major Walker, and to deliver over the districts to that gentleman.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov. Bombay.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ Camp, 4th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 30th and 31st of October. You will see, in the enclosed letter to Mr. Duncan, an account of what I have been doing since the fall of Asseerghur. The express you sent me was, I know, intercepted ; and it is desirable that you should not send expresses. The runners think that they must risk every thing to deliver them ; they do not wait their opportunities as the common tappalls, and in consequence they are carried off. I have heard, however, of Colonel Harcourt’s success. Tell Malcolm that he may now come on with great safety. Let him bring with him, however, the four hundred infantry of Purneah, which came up to Poonah with his baggage.

‘ I have heard from Webbe of the strange erroneous impressions at Madras respecting Mysore ; but no impression made there can at all affect the situation of affairs in that quarter. The Governor General took that country into his own hands shortly after I marched.

‘ Webbe’s going to Mysore will, however, be useful and convenient in more than one respect, and so I have told him.

‘ I think we are shaking a little at Madras : I hear that the arrangement I had made in the bullock department, consequent on the death of poor Mackay, although the only one that could keep it, and consequently the army together, is disapproved of, and it is to be altered after the campaign. All this is very well, but the government, upon the present scale, cannot be carried on, as it has been, if confidence be not placed in the persons employed ; and if they and their acts are liable to misrepresentation in their absence.

‘ I will get from Appah Dessaye the letter you mention, and send it to you.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ *SIR,* ‘ Camp, 5th November, 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st, relative to the arrangements to be made with the chiefs of the Bheels in the Attavesy and Guzerat.

‘ 2. I had yesterday the honor of addressing you upon the subject of the revenue arrangements made by Colonel Murray, upon which I apprized you that I had addressed the Colonel privately. I have since referred to a copy of my letter to Colonel Murray, in which are the following words : “ In regard to your revenue concerns, I approve of your settling the country as you go on, and I know that this is the only mode of securing a tranquil rear. But the Government of Bombay have thrown into Major Walker’s hands the revenue management of all the districts conquered from Scindiah, and it will be necessary that you should make them over to him. This will save you a great deal of detailed trouble ; and as Major Walker must have good revenue servants, it may be a beneficial arrangement for your military operations.” This letter was dated the 23rd of October.

‘ 3. I observe that Colonel Murray has made a complete revenue settlement of the districts of Godra for one year ; and as it appears that the Honorable the Governor in Council does not conceive that settlement contains any thing objectionable, and as to depart from it may occasion difficulties and disturbances in the country, and will certainly create an impression very unfavorable to our good faith, I most anxiously recommend that Major Walker may be directed not only to abide by the general terms of it in favor of the inhabitants, but to keep in employment the person whom it appears Colonel Murray has appointed to be a kind of

farmer of the revenue. It may then be hoped that no inconvenience will be felt from the change of authority.

‘4. I believe that Godra is the last of Scindiah’s possessions in Guzerat : if it should not be so, it would be proper that he should send his servants with the troops, with directions in what manner to settle the countries which will be handed over to them by Colonel Murray.

‘5. In respect to the Bheels, I wrote to Colonel Murray as follows, in the same letter of the 23rd of October : “ Communicate with Major Walker upon the subject of all your treaties with the Bheel and other Rajahs, in order that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements with them and Rajah Anund Rao respectively.”

‘6. In my letter of the 2nd of August, I stated to the Governor in Council my opinion generally upon this subject. The greater experience I have of this people, the more convinced I am that the course which I then recommended to be adopted respecting them is the best. Colonel Murray, with great truth, says, “ It is not to be expected that the Bheels and Chieftains will remain attached to us without some prospect of advantage :” those which they have had hitherto are trifling, and cannot be supposed to have influenced their conduct ; neither are they a description of people to be influenced for any length of time by the mild and civil language of the British agents towards them.

‘7. They feel strongly the oppression of the Marhatta government, and they are willing to close with any offer which holds out a prospect of a change : but when they find that the change which they have made is only of a more powerful, instead of a weak superior, that they are to continue to pay as they have done before, and to pay regularly, which probably they never did, they will become our most irreconcilable, and, from the situation and strength of their country, our worst enemies.

‘8. The question, whether the tribute payable by the Bheels ought to be remitted, may be viewed under two distinct hypotheses : one, if Scindiah’s territory in Guzerat should be restored to him at the peace ; the other, if it should remain in the hands of the British Government.

‘9. I am not aware of the amount of the demand upon these Rajahs, but I should suppose it to be small, and not to be an object of consideration to the British Government, for the short period during which, in the first case, the country will be in our hands. At all events, it will not be one when compared with the advantages of having those people for our friends during the war, and with that of returning them

to Scindiah as discontented tributaries, who are close to his capital, and who must always hereafter be ready to join us in any contest in which we may be involved with that Chief.

‘10. If the country should remain in the hands of the British Government, the revenue payable by the Bheels becomes an object of greater consequence. But even in this case, the first question that occurs is, whether this war was undertaken to obtain an increase of revenue; and whether it is an object to obtain such military advantage as the possession of the defiles in the countries of the Bheels, and the assistance of these people, even at the expense of the remission of the tribute which they paid to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, before we obtained possession of the country?

‘11. But even if, as is supposed, we continue to enjoy the advantages which we at present possess in the countries of the Bheels, without a remission of the tribute, I doubt the policy of obliging them to continue to pay: experience teaches us that tribute of this description cannot be collected from the inhabitants of the hilly and jungly tracts of India, without frequent appeals to arms. I have but little doubt the Company would have been richer, and I am convinced that the military reputation of the British nation would have stood higher, and that the power of Government would have been greater, if all tribute payable by hill polygars and rajahs had been originally remitted.

‘12. In this part of India, in particular, the policy of Government should be cautiously to avoid involving themselves in hostilities such as those above described: their operations are very difficult and uncertain; they require large bodies of the best troops, numbers of men are generally lost, no credit is gained by success, and failure is disgraceful. The Government have no troops to spare in Guzerat to fight the battles which must eventually be the consequence of the demand of the tribute. They have not a sufficient army even to guard their own territory and that of their allies against the inroads of a foreign enemy, without the assistance of these Bheel Rajahs; and it may be depended upon, that a failure in a contest with one of them for tribute, an event which, as it has happened in other parts of India, may also be expected in Guzerat, will occasion the loss of our reputation, which I believe will be found to be the strongest support of the British power in that quarter of India.

‘13. In respect to Rajah Amrut Rao, there may be some objection to giving up his claims upon these Rajahs, on account of the difficulty of reconciling him to the measure;

but if this difficulty did not exist, I should think it very desirable that he should give up all claims of this description; and, at all events, the British troops ought to have no part of the trouble of enforcing them on those Rajahs who cover the country from a foreign enemy, and to whom the Company may have remitted the tribute payable to their own Government.

‘14. I am also of opinion that endeavors ought to be made to induce the Guickwar government to give up these claims, rather than that they should be encouraged to make them.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 5th November, 1803.

‘I have this morning had the honor of receiving your secretary’s letter of the 24th October, and I am satisfied that the arrangement for the payment of the hircarrahs south of the Kistna is a convenient one. I am only apprehensive that the Governor is displeased at my having appointed a person to take charge of Captain Mackay’s office, which I certainly should not have done, had not the different circumstances of the moment rendered it absolutely necessary: and as Captain Young accepted the office with reluctance, from an apprehension that he should not be able to give the satisfaction that Captain Mackay did, and at my repeated desire, I hope he will not suffer for his acquiescence with my wishes, which certainly will be the case if he should be deprived of the office after this service is over.

‘I have only to add upon this subject, that till Captain Young was appointed Assistant Commissary of Provisions with this division of the army, I had no knowledge whatever of him, excepting what I gained while he was at Seringapatam, and on the march to Hurryhur; and that in this arrangement I could have no private wishes, nor any object excepting the benefit of the service.

‘I took the liberty of recommending to you yesterday a jemidar of the 1st of the 6th. This man has behaved remarkably well in other instances, besides that stated in my letter to the Adjutant General. If the Soubah had had a dozen such men in his service, the Raja of Berar would have lost his baggage in his flight from me.

‘I hear that Scindiah has marched to the eastward along the valley of the Taptee and Poorna, and that he is enter-

ing Berar. Indeed, I know that he passed Mulcapoor, in which place there was a battalion of the subsidiary force, on the 30th of October. I now hope that we shall be able to take up the offensive in Berar, as there is no longer any reason to apprehend an invasion by Scindiah.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 6th November, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose the copy of a letter to the Governor General.

‘I am sorry to tell you that Colonel Stevenson is in a very bad state of health at Burhampoor; so much so, as to be quite incapable of attending to business, and to have been unable to march with the subsidiary force, on the 30th, towards Mulcapoor, near which place Scindiah was encamped with his cavalry. Captain Johnstone tells me, however, that on that day he was rather better, but still in his bed. He has been ill, I believe, ever since the fall of Asseerghur.

‘A vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is on his road to my camp, and I expect that he will arrive in a day or two.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘6th November, 1803.

‘I have received Captain Colebrooke’s and Captain Johnstone’s letters of the 31st of October. I hope that by this time you have quite recovered.

‘I have also received your letter of the 26th, regarding your operations at Asseerghur, &c. I want only to have from you the statement of the officers, and the regular pay and allowances which they received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and the returns of the ordnance, and stores, and grain found in Asseerghur, and of the other property.

‘I have already informed you that your Buswunt rice is in my camp. I desire to know to what place you wish it to march to join you. I am not more than six marches from the Adjuntee, or from the Dewal ghaut; and I believe I could send it in safety to either, if Scindiah should go into Berar.

‘If he does go there, I conclude that you will go also. I wish the rice to leave my camp, as the people are much dis-

tressed, and are of course tempted to sell, although I am willing to assist them with money.

'Ragojee Bhoonslah has gone along the Godavery to the eastward, in a most violent hurry.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Graham.

‘ MY DEAR SIR,

‘ Camp, 6th November, 1803.

'I regret exceedingly the disasters which have befallen your peons. The want of success in their operations is very unpleasant. You may pay Mr. Grant for his attendance upon the wounded, as for sepoys, as you propose, and charge the amount in your revenue accounts.

‘ We must retake the post of Chumargoonda immediately, otherwise we shall have the enemy attacking some other place, and approaching nearer to our communication with Poonah, which will be very unpleasant. By your account of the place, I suppose that the enemy will not attempt to hold out against our sepoy; but should they, I recommend that two of the short brass 18 pounders, captured at the battle of Assye, should be equipped and sent with the detachment now at Runjengaum, with 100 rounds of ammunition for each gun, if it should be possible to provide means of sending it. There are some of my tumbrils at Ahmednuggur, and I suspect there must be in the place plenty of shot for these guns, which are, I believe, of the calibre of French 16 pounders.

‘Captain Lucas, who is the only officer at Ahmednuggur who has any experience, must go with the detachment.

‘ Tell him that I request that if he should be obliged to breach the wall, he will take care to bring the guns sufficiently near ; that is to say, to the distance of two hundred to two hundred and fifty yards. They must then be loaded with but a very small quantity of powder, otherwise the carriages will be knocked about, and probably be destroyed in the firing. He must make some cover, of course, for the guns, if he should find no houses nor any other cover near the place. But as there are no guns at Chumargoonda, a slight mud wall proof against musketry, with very small embrasures for the guns, will be fully sufficient.

‘ If the wall should be so bad as not to require breaching, or if it should be breached, when the place shall be stormed, no quarter is to be given. The Chitty you mention, and the jemidar of peons, in particular, must be hanged.

‘ After Captain Lucas shall have got possession of Chumargoonda, I agree with you in thinking that the place ought to be destroyed, and you ought to occupy Peepery. Let Captain Lucas, accordingly, destroy Chumargoonda, and then march back to Ahmednuggur; and you will order your peons to occupy Peepery.

‘ Be so kind as to communicate this letter to Captain Lucas, which he is to consider as an instruction to himself.

‘ Ragojee Bhoonslah has fled to the eastward, and Amrut Rao is, I believe, coming to join me.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Graham.*

‘ **ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**

To the Governor General.

‘ **MY LORD,**

‘ **Camp, 6th November, 1803.**

‘ I now proceed to give your Excellency a detailed account of Colonel Stevenson’s operations against Asseerghur.

‘ On the 16th of October he advanced to Asseerghur, and encamped three miles south of the fort. The remains of the enemy’s infantry had fled towards the Nerbudda on the preceding day, in the state in which I reported them to be, in my letter of the 24th of October; and Colonel Stevenson therefore determined to attack Asseerghur.

‘ On the 18th he reconnoitred the fort, attended by a squadron of cavalry, and the piquets of the Native infantry; and having seen a favorable opportunity, attacked the pettah and carried it, and made a lodgment within one hundred and fifty yards of the lower wall of the fort. In the evening he reinforced the troops in the pettah by a battalion.

‘ On the 19th all the preparations were made for carrying on the siege; and two batteries were ready to open at two o’clock in the afternoon of the 20th; one to breach the upper wall, and another, of four brass 12 pounders, to destroy the defences of the lower wall.

‘ On the 18th Colonel Stevenson had sent a flag of truce to the killadar to summon him to surrender the fort, to which message he did not receive a decided answer. The communication was continued; but Colonel Stevenson did not relax his operations against the fort, as there was reason to believe that the negotiation was carried on only to give time to Dowlut Rao Scindiah to come to its relief. Before opening his batteries, Colonel Stevenson apprized the killadar of the terms on which he should surrender the fort; which were, that the garrison should march out with their private property, and be allowed to go where they might think proper,

and that their arrears should be paid to the amount of twenty thousand rupees.

‘After the batteries had opened about an hour, a white flag was shown from the walls of the fort, which was the signal which had been agreed upon in case the terms should be accepted; hostages were sent down, and an engagement made that the fort should be delivered up on the following morning. It was accordingly evacuated; the garrison carried off their property in security, and received the sum agreed to be paid to them.

‘Colonel Stevenson mentions in high terms the conduct of the officers and troops under his command; and I cannot omit to take this opportunity of expressing to your Excellency my sense of the merits of Colonel Stevenson, and of the body of troops under his command. Upon every occasion I have received from the Colonel the most cordial and zealous assistance; and the troops under his command are in the highest state of discipline and order, and fit for any service in which they can be employed.

‘On the 16th, nine officers, four sergeants, and one matross, formerly in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, delivered themselves up to Colonel Stevenson, under your Excellency’s proclamation of the 29th of August.

‘I have the honor to enclose a list of their names, and a copy of the order issued by Colonel Stevenson to provide for their subsistence. Lieut. Stuart also delivered himself up at Poonah in the end of the last month. I have called for accounts of the regulated pay and allowances which these persons received in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency.

‘I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded of the troops under the command of Colonel Stevenson, during the operations against Asseerghur. Hereafter I shall have the honor of transmitting returns of the ordnance, stores, grain, and other property captured in that fort.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘Killed 2 Rank and File.

‘Wounded 5 Rank and File.’

To Major Shawe.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 6th November, 1803.

‘I have nothing particular to tell you from this quarter, excepting that a vakeel from Dowlut Rao Scindiah is now on his road to camp, and I expect will be here in a day or

two. You may believe that I am anxious to receive from Bengal accounts of the state of your negotiations with the Rajpoots, Jauts, &c., and of your military operations, of which I know nothing since the 18th of September; particularly how matters are getting on in Bundelcund.

‘The Rajah of Berar is flying to the eastward as fast as he can along the Godavery. I have not heard that he has yet turned to the northward, but I expect he will; as Scindiah marched to the eastward in the valley of the Taptee and Poorna rivers. I know he passed Mulcapoor on the 30th of October, as it is said, on his way to Berar. This movement relieves us from all apprehension of his attacking the territories of the Nizam or the Peshwah, and immediately sets at liberty Colonel Stevenson’s corps, who will follow Scindiah into Berar. I think it very possible that the four armies may be in that country in a few days, which will be delightful to the Rajah of Berar.

‘You will see in my letter to the Governor General of this day, that I have reported some property captured at Asseerghur. I wish he would make me acquainted with his sentiments upon the subject of these captures. You and I know well that there is nothing respecting which an army is so anxious, as its prize money. Excepting by the Governor General, the army in India have not been well used by government about prize; and they in particular are suspicious and anxious on the subject. I shall be obliged to you therefore, if you will urge him to give me his sentiments respecting it.

‘Malcolm left Bombay on the 30th, on his return to the army.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 7th November, 1803.

‘We are all in confusion on the Kistna and to the southward, in consequence of a report that Succaram Ghautky was coming to attack the post there, which has been circulated in the first instance by an hircarra of Sir W. Clarke. The consequence is, that the officer in command on the Kistna has taken upon himself to order back Purneah’s battalion that was marching up with Malcolm’s baggage, and has called for a reinforcement from Hullahall, which that fort has sent him, and that post is left almost without a man.

‘ The tappall runs very irregularly from Poonah to the Kistna, although it runs on regularly enough from Poonah to the army. I wish Coleman would send down the detachment, as heretofore ordered, to see how the matter regarding the tappall really stands, and to set all right.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, a vakeel from Scindiah, has come into camp this day.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*

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To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 7th November, 1803.*

‘ 1. I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 28th of October, on the subject of cavalry to be raised under the government of Bombay.

‘ 2. The memorandum from the Adjutant General appears to me to contain all the principal arrangements for that object, and the tables of pay, &c., are, I believe, correct; if not so, it will be easy to correct them, by a reference to the pay tables of the government of Fort St. George, if the cavalry establishment under that government is to be taken as the model of that to be formed at Bombay.

‘ 3. I have however, objections to some of the arrangements proposed in the Adjutant General's memorandum, which I shall now proceed to specify.

‘ 4. In the fourth paragraph it appears to be intended that the followers, viz., the horsekeepers, shall be under the commanding officer of the regiment. Every man must be under the commanding officer of the regiment, and must be considered liable to be moved from one troop to another, and to do what may be ordered. But the horsekeepers and followers must be posted to troops, and must not be removed from one troop to another, excepting by a formal regimental order. When in a troop, they must be mustered in it; the roll must be made out by the commanding officer of the troop, and he must draw their pay, and they must be paid by him.

‘ 5. The mode of supplying forage and gram, as proposed in the 6th paragraph, will not answer. The principle of it has been exploded for years under the government of Fort St. George; and the mode proposed is far worse than the old mode under the government of Fort St. George. That mode was a contract with the commanding officer to supply gram for the horses of his regiment, at certain rates. No individual without public assistance could perform the con-

tract. The same objection exists to the mode proposed, with this addition, that the officer in command of the regiment is to send a bill, upon honor, for the expense incurred.

‘6. These bills upon honor should not be multiplied. The expenses of the military establishment should be brought under regular heads of account, and there should be a regular mode of supplying every thing for which there is a regular demand. A bill upon honor ought never to be admitted, excepting for an extraordinary service or demand which could not have been foreseen, and for which no provision can have been made by any previous order or regulation.

‘7. Besides the commanding officer of a regiment of cavalry has, or ought to have, too much to do to be able to attend to a concern, so complicated as that of supplying the horses of the corps under his command with gram, particularly when the supply of forage is to be added thereto. When his corps shall take the field, the carriage of a month’s gram for the number of horses proposed will require 1000 bullocks, which alone is as much as he could well manage.

‘8. I therefore recommend that either for the whole of the cavalry, or for each regiment, an agent may be appointed for the special purpose of supplying the horses with gram and forage, whose bills of purchases will of course be checked by the usual vouchers; and that the commanding officer should have nothing to do with the feed of the horses, excepting to see that they get it.

‘9. It is unfortunate that the grass cutters will not answer in the countries in which the Bombay cavalry are likely to be employed, as I consider that by far the cheapest, the best, and the most efficient mode of procuring forage for the horses.

‘10. On the subject of the 9th paragraph of the memorandum, my opinion is as follows:—In the service of the cavalry there are many minute details, which are of no great difficulty to acquire, but without the knowledge of which a body of regular cavalry cannot exist. Under the government of Bombay I do not believe there is an officer who has served in the cavalry, and therefore none can have acquired the necessary knowledge. An establishment of this kind, in which all would be learners, and where there would be no teacher, cannot get on; and the attempt to make the cavalry a regular body at first, will tend only to delay the period at which it will be of use, and to increase the expense of the establishment.

‘ 11. I should therefore recommend to government to purchase the number of horses they may require, and to hire a description of persons well known by the name of Bargeers to ride them ; to give them the establishment of European officers, &c. ; to arm them, and to clothe them in the red jacket, made according to the Hindustanee fashion.

‘ 12. These people will be useful immediately. By degrees those who will submit to discipline will be disciplined ; and those who will not, ought to be discharged when their services shall not be required, and their places filled by young men of the description and caste proposed by the Adjutant General in the 9th paragraph. The officers will also learn their duty.

‘ 13. By this mode of proceeding, the government of Bqm-day will immediately have the service of a good body of horse, under European officers ; and they will have a regular regiment of cavalry, at least as soon as they might expect one in any other manner.

‘ 14. I recommend that the person proposed to be appointed Adjutant, and some of the officers who it is intended should be removed to the cavalry corps, should be sent, with the permission of the Right Honorable the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Fort St. George, to do duty with the cavalry under the government of Fort St. George.

‘ 15. In respect to the 15th paragraph, I strongly recommend that government should send to England for the saddles they will require for the cavalry.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.* ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 7th November, 1803.

‘ 1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 24th of October, relative to the garrison of Surat.

‘ 2. The unhealthy state of the troops that have been at Surat for a length of time past is a most lamentable circumstance, and I am of opinion that as nothing is so useful to the Company as a healthy soldier, and nothing so useless, expensive, and burdensome, as one in hospital, any measure which can be adopted to improve the state of health of those whom necessity obliges the Government to detain at Surat, is one of the greatest public utility and wise economy.

‘ 3. In respect to the defence of Surat, there appears to be but one opinion upon that subject, and that is that Surat is by no means in a state of security. The wisdom and the

policy, and even the justice of Government appear to me to require that some decided steps should be taken to defend that important city.

‘4. In the present state of the Company’s power, I have been long induced to doubt the policy of building forts on the sea coast, or in situations in which they may be liable to an attack from a power at sea; but it is very certain that if necessity should oblige the Government to build one in such a situation, it ought to be a fort of the first order, of which our European enemies could not get possession, excepting by a very long siege.

‘5. This general principle will apply to building a fort at Surat. However, its soundness depends upon many local circumstances, with which I am not acquainted: viz., the possibility of bringing a large fleet to Surat, and of remaining there in safety; the number of months in the year in which that is possible; and the generally prevailing winds in the offing. I have also to observe, that the Honorable the Governor of Bombay has orders from the Court of Directors not to undertake a work of this magnitude; and therefore, even if it should be decided to be necessary and proper, he could not undertake the work; and in the mean time the question respecting the propriety of building a fort can be well canvassed and considered.

‘6. But whether a fort is to be built or not, some measures must be taken to secure the wealth and people of Surat from our native enemies. The town wall is acknowledged to be in an indefensible state, and the castle not much better; and the former to be so extensive, that even the number of troops now allotted for its defence are not sufficient. In my opinion it will be proper to keep the town wall in repair, and to repair the castle in such a manner, that at least no native enemy could attack it with hopes of success.

‘7. If the castle were in such a state as to stand the attack of a native power, I should think the property of the town very secure from any attempt they could make upon it.

‘8. The intrenched camp proposed for the troops intended for the defence of Surat appears a good measure; but if a wholesome situation can be found nearer than eleven miles distant, I should recommend it in preference to that proposed. Indeed it appears to me to be desirable that, if possible, the camp should not be at a greater distance than half that proposed.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Campbell, 74th Regiment.

MY DEAR CAMPBELL, 'Camp, 7th November, 1803.

'I write only to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 12th and 14th October, for which I am much obliged to you: I regret exceedingly your sickness, of which I had heard; but I hope that the cold weather will bring you about. I wish that you would think of going to England; nothing but that can be a sufficient remedy for the disposition to fever, which you appear to have.

'Your nephew Colin will write you the news from hence.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Col. Campbell, Ganjam.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp at Chitchooly,
9th Nov., 1803.

'I received in the night your letter of the 2nd. Your rice will go off from hence to-morrow morning, and will reach Adjuttee on the 15th. I expected that you would have been well supplied at Burhampoor, otherwise I should have sent it off as soon as it reached me.

'Two of the companies in charge of it belong to the corps at Hyderabad, where they are much wanted, on account of the weakness from the number of detachments out. I shall, therefore, order the officer to return to Hyderabad from Adjuttee, unless he should receive contradictory orders from you. There will remain with the brinjargies one company of the 2nd, under a soubahdar.

'I am glad to find that your preparations for Gawilghur are so forward. You will of course follow Scindiah to the eastward, according to my former letter.

'I do not give much credit to that story of Scindiah's hir-carrah respecting Meer Khan and Bungash. The subsidiary force did not march from Burhampoor till the 31st, and its march could not have been the subject of conversation in Meer Khan's camp, although it might have been known to Meer Khan on the 1st. I have observed that whenever Rajah Mohiput Ram is left with few troops, we always hear through him of a large body of troops assembled in his neighborhood, and I suspect that this is a story of the same kind.

' I have never heard of Meer Khan's return across the Nerbudda; and I rather suspect that the whole of Holkar's force is assembled to the northward, at Kota, excepting a few troops to guard the person of Kundera Rao Holkar.

' You have not mentioned your health in the letter of the 2nd, therefore I hope it is mending.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

' MY DEAR COLONEL,

' Camp, 9th November, 1803.

'I was sorry to hear from Colebrooke yesterday that you were still unwell, and that Colonel Halyburton was also indisposed; but I hope that we shall soon have better accounts of you.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will desire Rajah Mohiput Ram to be cautious not to interfere with two pergunahs belonging to Narsing Kundee Rao, one called Dhoolea, the other Soangheery, both in Candeish. A vakeel from Scindiah came in here yesterday. There is no other news. The Rajah of Berar is continuing his progress to the eastward.

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

Camp at Chitchooly.

' MY DEAR COLONEL, 9th Nov., 1803.

‘ I received yesterday evening your letter of the 5th, and I am much concerned that Malcolm should have been again indisposed. We have now plenty for him to do. Jeswunt Rao Goorparah arrived in camp the day before yesterday, as the wakeel from Scindiah; and as he is a man of high family, being a nephew of Morrari Rao, and as he has more the manner and appearance of a gentleman than any Marhatta that I have yet seen, I suspect there is an intention, on Scindiah’s part, to make some concessions for the sake of peace.

‘Goorparah visited me yesterday, and I propose returning his visit this evening; and after that ceremony is over, I conclude that business will begin.

'Our weather here is delightful, only too cold. I am concerned to hear of a deficiency of funds at Bombay. I conclude that the government of Fort St. George are laying

out their money in investments also, by order of the Governor General, and I dare not alter either that order, or that relative to the loans at Bombay. I have repeatedly written to Bengal upon the subject of supplies of money and grain* for Bombay; but I have not received a line from Calcutta since the 18th of September, and I am entirely in the dark respecting all the transactions in that part of India.

'As to the operations of the armies, particularly of the detachment in Bundelcund, which to us here is a most interesting point, I know nothing about them. Ragojee has turned to the northward, and is flying towards Nagpoor, which sets all matters right.

'I have my doubts respecting the capture of Poonadur: I expect Amrut Rao in camp immediately, and I think that I shall be able to get that place from him; and if I should succeed in that object, it may be the means of forcing some concession in his favor from the Peshwah. But if I do not succeed in that object, the attack must be considered as a matter of risk with the force now at Poonah; and, at all events, would involve us in fresh disputes with Amrut Rao.

'The question is, whether the possession of Poonadur is absolutely necessary to us under present circumstances? If it is, it must be taken at all risks, and whatever may be the consequences: but I do not think it is. We have some little difficulty, it is true, with our tappall; that difficulty is only occasional, and I suspect that it is much exaggerated by the runners, who are Mysore people, and are obliged to stay upon the road. Purneah, who has undertaken to pay them, has not paid them either so regularly, or so much, as when they were paid by the officer in camp.

'The killadar of Poonadur promises fairly (at least as

* 'By the Madras regulations, in order to ensure grain for the sepoys at all times, it is provided that a seer of rice daily shall be issued to each, for which they are to pay whatever may be the bazaar price, but not above the rate of a rupee for twelve seers; thus out of his seven rupees being certain of sufficient food for two and a half. Whether it was ever carried into effect in any former war I know not, but from the commencement of this service, General Wellealey has ordered, and that from a conviction that it is cheaper, that each sepoy shall receive daily half a seer gratis from the Company. Thus, though he gives up half the price apparently, he saves half the carriage—a most important difference when grain is thus issued to four or five thousand men. It is given out generally every eighth day in advance. The General has extended this to the Bombay troops at Poonah, and elsewhere under his authority. Half a seer of rice is paid, with the usual addition of curry stuff, and meat now and then, to give a sufficient quantity of food for a sepoy.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

fairly as the Peshwah), and we know that he has never interrupted our supplies, which have been constantly travelling up. I doubt whether we should be so well treated by the Peshwah's killadar. But, it may be said, it will gratify the Peshwah to put him in possession of this fort. Upon this point I have to observe, that I would not put the public interests to the smallest risk, or incur the inconvenience of a moment's dispute with Amrut Rao, to gratify the Peshwah.

His Highness may mean well, but it is impossible for a person with the very worst intentions to act in a manner more contrary to the letter and spirit of his treaty with the Company than he has, or to do us more injury by his actions. Therefore, in my opinion, the principle of all our actions towards the Peshwah ought to be our own convenience, and the benefit of the British Government.

While writing upon the subject, I have to mention to you that an officer of the Peshwah, the person who collected the choute at Aurungabad, was discovered to be in a secret correspondence with Ragojee Bhoonslah on the day I arrived there; and I have my doubts whether I should not have surprised that chief, had it not been for that correspondence. His name is Seermunt, and he is now arrested at Aurungabad.

‘ Another man, in the same office at Burhampoor, has been playing the same tricks, and I have ordered him likewise to be arrested. I have also to mention to you, that the person who, I before apprized you, was going to Poonah as an agent from Scindiah, has arrived there.

'The Rajah of Kolapoor's letters are civil, and I enclose an answer to them.'

‘ Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.

'ARTHUR WELLSLEY.'

‘P.S.—I have just received your letter of the 8th. Nothing will give me more pleasure than to hear that Sirjee Rao Ghautky is arrested, and that the Peshwah’s palace is secured by us while that is going on;—only let care be taken that secrecy is observed, and that the blow does not miss: if it does, we shall have the fellow at large in the shape of an enemy, and he will give us much trouble.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

' SIR, ' Camp, Jaum, 9th November, 1808.

1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 2nd instant, upon the subject of dooley bearers.

2. In my letter of the 27th of September, I had the

honor of requesting the Governor in Council to give orders that one hundred doolies might be prepared at Bombay, to carry away my disabled soldiers from the hospital which I had it in contemplation to form; but that they should not be sent away till I should require them.

‘ 3. My reason for making this request was, that I thought it probable that the bearers would not desert, if they knew they were to go only to the hospital, and to return with the sick soldiers, and that they certainly would desert if they were detained for a time at any station till the soldiers should be sufficiently recovered to be able to move.

‘ 4. I fear, however, that there has been some mistake upon this subject, as the doolies which I imagine were intended for the removal of the wounded from the hospital have joined the army. However, that is not of much consequence, as the doolies were wanted for the 78th regiment, to which they have been attached; and I enclose two notes, which will show that although they have not been here many days, the bearers have begun to desert.

‘ 5. The bearers now sent will be detained at Poonah, according to orders which I have given to Colonel Coleman some time ago, at least if that officer should hear of their arrival there, and copies of the papers sent by the Superintendent of Police should be transmitted to him: it is to be hoped that they will remain at Poonah till the wounded may recover sufficiently to bear removal.

‘ 6. I have to observe that I am ignorant of what arrangement it is proposed should be adopted to give food to these bearers, or what the quality or quantity of food they are to receive; and shall be glad to receive the orders of Government upon that subject.

‘ 7. While writing upon the subject of dooley bearers, I have to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 26th of October, which contained the copy of a letter from Colonel Woodington upon the subject of camp followers. Upon this subject I have only to observe, that I might have hoped that a fact which I reported might have been considered as true, without the necessity of referring to Lieut. Colonel Woodington for an opinion regarding its probability.

‘ 8. I have also to acknowledge the receipt from Lieut. Colonel Coleman of a letter from the Government of Bombay on the 29th of August, with various depositions of deserted bullock drivers, against Captain Mackay, taken by the Superintendent of Police at Bombay.

‘ 9. Unfortunately for the service, the gentleman against

whom these accusations have been made was killed at the battle of Assye, otherwise I should not now be obliged to write his defence. This officer was notoriously the most humane and gentle towards the natives of any I have yet seen in this army; indeed, this virtue was carried to an excess in his character, that might almost be termed a fault.

‘10. At my particular desire, and contrary to his own inclinations, he took charge of that part of the Bombay bullock establishment which was to serve with the troops under my command; and as it was by no means in order, two thousand out of three thousand bullocks being entirely unfit for service, it was necessary to introduce some regulations to provide for the food and care of the cattle. This Captain Mackay certainly did, but neither harshly nor suddenly; and for having done his duty in this instance, those who have deserted this service have been allowed to libel and defame his character, through the medium of the police; and by going through the offices of government, these libels are placed upon record.

‘11. As the officer is killed, his character cannot be entirely cleared from the stigma recorded respecting it, on the authority of the lowest and vilest men in society. But I can safely say, that as far as I can answer for another man, these depositions do not contain one word of truth, excepting that the deponents deserted from the service.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,’ ‘Camp at Jaum, 10th Nov., 1803.

‘Your rice went off this morning, and will arrive at Adjuttee on the 15th. It goes by the road of Jaulna.

‘I have sent after the convoy this evening four lacs of rupees for Mohiput Ram’s troops; and the Bheer man has just been here, and tells me that he will send five lacs of rupees more, which last sum is to meet them at Adjuttee. Inform Mohiput Ram of this circumstance. I have no news for you.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Colonel Stevenson.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,’ ‘Camp, 11th November, 1803.

‘I am afraid that you will be disappointed respecting the arrival of your Buswant rice. The fault is owing to Captain

Seton, who came in charge of it from Hyderabad. He did not obey the orders he received, and thereby exposed the convoy; for which conduct he has been tried by a General Court Martial. Afterwards it was delayed till I could hear from you what should be done with it; but this last delay was not more than of four days. It could not have been at Adjuttee at any rate till the 10th, after I relieved the convoy; and it will now be there on the 15th, with plenty of money for Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘I see also that you will not be prepared with your stores till the 18th, and therefore the delay will not be of any material consequence.

‘By the last accounts the Rajah of Berar had turned to the northward, and is going to Nagpoor. It will be a good measure to drive Scindiah into the Berar country before you. It will be awkward if he should turn to the south, as that must keep me here; and at all events till the motions of one of these chiefs lead decidedly to the northward, I do not think that we can undertake the siege of Gawilghur. However, I hope that both will go into Berar; and if that be the case all will be right.

‘I am glad to hear that your health is better. The hock and tea go by a camel hircarrah this day to overtake the convoy, and will arrive at Adjuttee with them.

‘There are many of your brinjarries with the convoy, besides those carrying the Buswunt rice; I believe 2500, loaded with dry grain. I think it would be advisable that you should send off 2000 or 3000 brinjarries to Ahmednuggur to get loads of rice. Give them orders upon the stores there: let me know the amount of these orders, and I will send directions that they may be complied with.

‘I do not think that Scindiah has it in his power to form a large force again. Numbers of his cavalry and many sirdars, I know have deserted.

‘General Lake gained a victory in the town and on the glacis of Agra on the 10th of October, and I expect to hear that he took that fortress on the 13th.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM,

‘Camp, 11th November, 1803.

‘I fear that Mr. Duncan is but little acquainted with my principles or opinions, or he would not think that I had altered my mind respecting the arrangement in Guzerat.

'Colonel Murray's revenue arrangements are really ridiculous, and show that he has entered into a laborious investigation of a subject which ought not to have occupied his attention for a moment. I repeated my opinion to Colonel Murray upon this subject, in a letter which I wrote to him on the 23rd of last month, an extract of which I sent to Mr. Duncan; and I wrote to him two letters upon the subject last week.

'I see now that Colonel Murray has involved himself in a dispute with the Paymaster and Military Auditor General at Bombay. There are two parties throughout the Bombay establishment, and these are, the civil and military services; and the latter are divided into two parties, those in the King's and those in the Company's service. The disputes of these parties are the sole business of every man under the government of Bombay; and they are maintained by the system of encouragement given to correspondence, and the perpetual references to individuals by Government. In short, I see clearly that nothing can succeed with those people as it ought; and I wish to God that I had nothing to do with them.

'The Dhar man ought to be encouraged; and if he should be of any service to us, or even if he decidedly keeps away from Scindiah, a stipulation shall be made in his favor, that he shall receive no injury from Scindiah for his conduct during the war. But we must be cautious in all our proceedings with these fellows, otherwise we shall be burdened with the defence of a pack of rascals of inferior rank, but of the same description with their Highnesses the Nizam and the Peshwah.

'Ragojee has turned to the northward. Scindiah is still in the valley of the Poorna, to the east of Mulcapoor. It is said that the former, as well as the latter, is going to Nagpoor. God send it may be true. If it is, we shall destroy him entirely. Amrut Rao is at no great distance from me, and, I believe, is coming in.

'In respect to money from Bombay, you are mistaken respecting the amount which it was excepted that Presidency should supply. I told Mr. Duncan that I thought we should require sixteen lacs of rupees. General Stuart told him that we should require double that sum. If four lacs coined from dollars belonging to the government of Madras be taken out of the account, I believe that we have not received the first sum; and certainly not to the amount of the last. It is true that Mr. Duncan may include in the expenses of this army, all those of Colonel Coleman's detachment, all those

of the troops in Guzerat, and all those of Bombay, civil and military ; as he did in the account of the consumption of rice by this army, the consumption of all the troops stationed in those places, at Fort Victoria, &c., and that of the populace at Bombay.

‘ However, there is no doubt whatever, whether it was foreseen or not, that the calls upon the resources of Bombay have been very heavy, and that they must increase. Upon this subject I have written repeatedly to Bengal, and I have received no answer upon that or any other matter, upon which I have addressed either the Governor General or his secretary.

‘ I particularly requested that seven lacs of rupees in Bengal mohurs might be sent to Bombay for my use, as long ago as during the siege of Ahmednuggur ; to which request I have received no answer. Then the Governor General writes the most positive orders to spend money to draw off sirdars and horse ; to pay Amrut Rao ; entertain 5000 horse under the modified treaty of Bassein ; to take Meer Khan into the service of the Company and the Nizam : and on the other hand he sends no money, and orders the government of Bombay not to make a loan, and the government of Madras to have an enlarged investment : these orders are not consistent, but who can alter them ?

‘ I had a conference last night with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, from which I rather augur well. Great pains were taken to convince me that the war was owing to Collins’s precipitate and violent conduct ; and that all that was required of him was to wait in camp until my answer should be received to the famous letter proposing that Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah should retire to Burhampoor, and I to Madras and Seringapatam. I overturned this statement by a relation of the facts which occurred at Ragojee’s tent, two nights before these letters were sent ; and I showed him that Collins had refused to admit that proposition, and has positively said that he must go if it was made, upon which another was offered.

‘ Jeswunt Rao Goorparah agreed in the truth of this story, but said that what had then passed was verbal, and ought not to have been considered as decided. In answer, I replied that we never could admit that position ; for if we did, the consequence must be, that all business must be transacted in writing. All this preliminary anxiety about the cause of the war is very natural, as they well know that we shall found our claims to satisfaction and security on the fact that they were the aggressors.

‘He has brought no credentials, except a slip of paper to Appah Dessaye, upon which subject I have not been very strict hitherto, as in fact I have none myself from the Peshwah and the Nizam. But I foresee a variety of inconveniences from going any farther without seeing them. In fact, I believe he has them: he admitted the necessity of producing them last night, and I told him I expected to see* them as soon as an hircarra should return; and that I should not speak to him for a moment upon the subject, if he were not a man of high rank, of whose deceiving me I could entertain no suspicion, and whom Scindiah would not dare to disavow.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 11th November, 1803.

‘1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 4th instant, which contains papers on a variety of subjects referring to Colonel Murray.

‘2. I am much concerned that there should have been any difference of opinion between Colonel Murray and the paymaster of the army under his command. But I conceive that the question between those gentlemen is one entirely referrible to the existing regulations, upon which the Honorable the Governor in Council can put his own construction, without any reference to my opinion.

‘3. If Colonel Murray has a paymaster in his camp, it must be a matter of indifference who the person is, provided he is capable of doing the duty; and I have only to add that I should consider it my place to support and enforce the existing regulations and the orders of government, whatever they may be.

‘4. I take the liberty, however, to recommend as a general rule, that between those public officers by whom business can be done verbally correspondence should be forbidden, as having a great tendency to prevent disputes upon trifling subjects, and to save the time of the public officers who are obliged, some to peruse and consider, and others to copy, those voluminous documents about nothing.

‘5. In former letters I have had the honor of submitting my opinion to the Honorable the Governor in Council, regarding Colonel Murray’s political and financial arrangements.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ 11th November, 1803.

‘ On the 6th of October, I had the honor to apprise your Excellency that propositions, tending to negotiations for peace between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, had been made to me in various channels, one of which was through the medium of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, commonly called Appah Dessaye, who is serving with this division of the army, in the command of a body of the troops belonging to the Peshwah. The result of his communications has been, that a vakeel has been sent here by Dowlut Rao Scindiah to treat for peace.

‘ The name of this person is Jeswunt Rao Goorparah. He is the nephew of the late Morari Rao Goorparah. The usual visits of ceremony have taken place, and I have had one conference with him. In this conference nothing of any consequence passed. He appeared anxious to prove that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been desirous to remain at peace with the British Government, and that if Colonel Collins had not quitted his camp upon receiving the letter addressed to me, which immediately preceded the commencement of hostilities, the war would not have taken place.

‘ His arguments upon this subject were overturned by a narrative of what passed at Ragojee Bhoonslah's tent immediately previous to the dispatch of the letters in question, as related in Colonel Collin's dispatch to me of the 30th of July. The principal subject of this conference was occasioned by my calling upon Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to produce his full powers when I showed him in my hand the paper containing those with which your Excellency had intrusted me, of which I explained the nature.

‘ In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah said that it was not customary to send a letter by a sirdar of high rank, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah had particular objections to write a letter to me, because I had omitted to answer that which he had written and transmitted in Colonel Collins's dispatch of the 6th of August. I explained that I had written an answer to that letter, and a long conversation ensued upon that subject, in which he positively denied that the answer had ever been received.

‘ I then pointed out that it was the common practice throughout the world, and more particularly in the Marhatta empire, that no agent ever was employed in the transaction of the most trifling business, who did not possess some powers from his employers which he could produce: and I

stated the inconvenience which would result in transactions between states, if this practice was departed from. I said that I was convinced that a man of his name and high rank would not attempt to deceive me, and that Dowlut Rao Scindiah would not venture to deny that he had employed him as a vakeel; but on this ground, and as Appah Dessaye had a letter from Scindiah saying that he was his vakeel, I should suffer him to remain in camp, and should listen to what he had to say. But that I insisted upon his producing full powers to treat for his employer as soon as a messenger could return from Scindiah's camp.

'In answer, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah acknowledged the truth and justice of my observations, and said that he should produce the usual powers as required.

'I have given your Excellency only an outline of the conversation which passed upon this subject. A memorandum has been taken of this conference, a copy of which shall be transmitted as soon as it can be made.

'I cannot account for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah coming unprovided with the usual powers. In proportion, however, as I gain experience of the Marhattas, I have more reason to be astonished at the low and unaccountable tricks which even the highest classes of them practise, with a view, however remote, to forward their own interest.

'As Jeswunt Rao Goorparah is a man of high family, and in his manner and appearance rather superior to the Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen in general; and as there is no doubt but that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is reduced to great distress, it is probable that his mission is intended to obtain peace.

'It is only lately that Dowlut Rao Scindiah has heard of the brilliant successes of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the neighborhood of Delhi, and it is probable that the first accounts he will receive of that of the 10th of October near Agra will be from this camp, when he will of course be more anxious to obtain peace.

'I have, therefore, no doubt that the proper powers will be transmitted to his vakeel within the time specified; and if they are not, I shall request Jeswunt Rao Goorparah to withdraw from the camp.

'As I apprized your Excellency early in the month of October of the probability that I should soon have propositions for peace, and I transmitted the letters I had received from Ballojee Koonger and Mahomed Meer Khan, I think it possible that I may receive your Excellency's instructions applicable to the state of affairs at the period at which you

will have received my dispatch of the 6th of October; but lest I should not, I proceed to state to your Excellency the demands which I propose to make to Dowlut Rao Scindiah, according to your Excellency's instructions of the 27th of June.

'First, I shall demand from him the cession of all his territories north of those of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

'Secondly, The cession of the fort of Baroach, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to——; and the fort of Ahmednuggur, and a territory depending thereon, amounting to——.

'Thirdly, The cession of all his territories situated southward and eastward of the hills called the Adjutee Hills, including the fort and district of Jalnapoor, and all districts in which he may have a joint right with the Soubah of the Deccan, and collects the revenues.

'Fourthly, A renunciation of all claims of choute, and all other claims, of whatever denomination, upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and all the allies of the British Government.

'Fifthly, An acknowledgment of the independence of the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur.

'Sixthly, A renunciation of all claims upon the Ranah of Gohud, who is in future to be dependent upon the British Government.

'Seventhly, An engagement never to entertain in his service any Europeans belonging to a country which may be at war with Great Britain.

'Eighthly, That his Majesty is to be under the protection of the British Government.

'Ninthly, That he shall not molest the chiefs who may have assisted the British Government in the war, of whom I shall include the names of as many as I can procure.

'I propose, also, to settle some plan for ascertaining what districts in Candeish and Malwa belong to the Peshwah, and what to Scindiah.

'According to this plan for a peace, Scindiah will gain his province of Ahmednuggur, excepting the fort; his territory subject to Baroach; the fort of Powanghur, and all his territory in Guzerat; the fort of Asseerghur, all the city of Burhampoor, with all the territory depending on them in Candeish.

'This plan appears to provide for all the material objects of your Excellency's instructions of the 27th of June, and I shall now state my reasons for not making demands to the full extent of those instructions.

‘ The only objects which I could obtain in addition to those which I propose to demand, are the fort of Asseerghur and the city of Burhampoor, and the territory depending on them in Candeish; the territory depending on Ahmednuggur; that in Guzerat depending upon Baroach; and the fort of Powanghur and its dependency and territory.

‘ The fort of Asseerghur, if ceded by Scindiah, would belong to the Soubah of the Deccan; and from what I have seen and experienced of his Highness’s government, I think there are weighty objections to the increase of his Highness’s territories on his northern frontier.

‘ His Highness depends entirely for their defence upon the exertions of the British Government. The system of operations on this frontier must be fundamentally defensive, from the nature of his Highness’s government, from the deficiency of his means of defending his country, and the probable strength of the corps which the British Government can allot in case of war to give him assistance.

‘ But in proportion as the distance of the frontier is increased, the difficulty of defending it will increase likewise. The fort of Asseerghur will give no strength to it; and as for the city of Burhampoor, it would be an additional weak point on the extreme frontier for the defence of which it would be necessary to provide as for Aurungabad, in the present war, out of the means provided by the treaties with the British Government for carrying on operations in the field.

‘ Another reason for ceding these territories to Scindiah is, that unless they are given to him, he has no motive for making peace. This reason is likewise applicable to the cession of the territories depending upon Ahmednuggur, and those in Guzerat.

‘ I have also to observe, that as Jeswunt Rao Holkar has kept himself hitherto entirely out of the war, and as he will not be weakened in proportion as Dowlut Rao Scindiah has been by its operations, and as he will be by its result, under the proposed peace, it may be thought necessary by your Excellency to preserve a part of Scindiah’s strength to enable him to support himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ On this ground, and as I think it most desirable to detach Scindiah from the confederacy, by which the peace of Mysore, and of the Company’s territories on the Toombuddra, will be in a great measure insured, I have it in contemplation to propose to Scindiah to give him a compensation in Berar for the territories which he will cede to the British Government in the north of Hindustan, provided that he will cede to the

Company all the territory in Guzerat depending on Baroach, and will join in the war against the Raja of Berar.

'This will make Scindiah more powerful against Holkar and the Raja of Berar than he was before the war: it will probably induce him to conclude the peace immediately; at the same time that, relatively to the British Government, it will not alter the state of his power.

'However, I shall not make this offer, unless I should find great difficulty in obtaining the other objects.

'If peace, according to the plan above proposed, should be made, it will remain to be determined in what manner the Soubah of the Deccan is to participate equally with the British Government in the advantages of the war. I believe there is no doubt but that his Highness has not performed all the conditions of the treaty of defensive alliance with the Company; but, upon the whole, your Excellency may think it more consistent with the liberal policy of your government to admit him to a share of the benefits of the peace.

'However, before this is done, it is my opinion that advantage ought to be taken of his Highness's breach of his engagements, to improve the treaty of defensive alliance, and to provide some security in future for the due execution of its most material articles. The interests of the parties, it might be supposed, would alone provide a sufficient security for this object; but the Soubah's government are well acquainted with the interest the British Government have in their preservation; they will for ever depend upon that interest, and trust to the known honor of the British Government for their support, and will never make any exertion, the object of which is to provide their own security, so long as they have the support of the British power.

'I would therefore recommend the following amendments to the treaty of defensive alliance, which will insure the existence of some strength in the government of Hyderabad.

'First, That the British Resident should have the power of mustering, at certain periods, the troops which his Highness is bound by the treaty to maintain. I believe that his Highness's government exercise this power in respect to the British troops, and no reasonable objection can be made to the exercise of it by the British Resident in respect to the troops of his Highness the Soubah.

'Secondly, That for every horseman found absent at muster, his Highness should pay fifty rupees per mensem; and for every foot soldier twenty rupees per mensem, till the numbers of each description should be complete.

'Thirdly, That the British Resident should have the

power of sending persons into the forts on his Highness's frontiers to inspect the state of their magazines, and see that they are filled with grain according to the tenor of his Highness's engagement with the Company.

'Under these arrangements, the state of the Soubah of the Deccan will revive, and the government will have some strength to enforce obedience to its orders, and to preserve tranquillity in the country, besides the Company's troops stationed at Hyderabad.

'If these arrangements should be consented to, his Highness will have Jalnapoor and all the districts of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah has hitherto collected the revenue jointly with his Highness, situated to the southward and eastward of the Adjuttee Hills. I do not know the value of these districts, but I believe it is above three lacs of rupees per annum.

'I take the liberty of recommending to your Excellency to take into consideration the question regarding the Peshwah's claim to choute on his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan. If the result of the discussions on that subject should be to substantiate the claim of his Highness the Peshwah, the best mode of settling the claims of the Soubah of the Deccan, under the treaty of defensive alliance, would be to take upon the Company the satisfaction of the claims of the Peshwah; and this might be done, either by restoring to his Highness the territories in the west of India, ceded to the Company by the treaty of Bassein, or by restoring to him a part of Bundelcund, ceded under a late arrangement made at Poonah to amend the treaty of Bassein, to the amount of his claims for choute upon his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

'According to this plan, his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan will remain at the end of the war with a larger territory, freed from all the vexatious claims of the Marhattas.

'If the result of the discussion upon the subject of choute should be, that his Highness the Peshwah has no claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, the share of the latter in the conquests can be given to him in money, or in territory south of the Toombuddra, yielding a revenue equal in amount to that to which he will have a claim.

'As well as I can recollect the treaty of Bassein, the Peshwah has no claim to participate in conquests; and if he had under the treaty, his breach of all its stipulations would free your Excellency from the necessity of giving him anything. However, your Excellency may deem it proper that he should enjoy some of the advantages resulting from the

war, and the cession of his territories in the Surat Attavesy would be full satisfaction for all his claims. But before this territory should be ceded to his Highness the Peshwah, he ought to be required to consent to the improvements of the defensive alliance which I have above recommended should be required from his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I am of opinion that the fortress of Ahmednuggur ought to be kept in the hands of the British Government until all these arrangements shall have been completed, and your Excellency shall see in what manner the defensive alliances will work.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, • ‘Camp, 12th November, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 9th. Appah Dessaye told me last night that his troops had beat off those which were attacking Manowly, so that the Peshwah’s government have misinformed you upon that point. I suspect also that they have misinformed you regarding the manner in which Appah Dessaye got possession of Manowly.

‘I took the fort in 1800, and gave it to Ball Kischen Bhow. He transferred it to Appah Dessaye; and if he is at Poonah he will inform you by what motive he was urged to do so. I suspect that it was some arrangement made between him and Appah Dessaye, and that the fort, by being transferred to the latter, was saved from the attack of Scindiah’s campoos, which were in the neighborhood when I quitted the Marhatta territory in November, 1800.

‘I have asked Appah Dessaye for the letter in question; but he tells me that he has got into so many scrapes already by giving me papers which have been afterwards handed up to the durbar, that he is afraid to give this letter. When he sees Sirjee Rao Ghautky arrested, it is probable that he will not have this fear, and that I shall get the letter.

‘I omitted to mention to you that I have had a very pleasant letter from Prittee Niddee, in which he promises to send his quota to Poonah, to serve as the Peshwah may think proper. I have seen Amrut Rao this day.*

* ‘We were joined to-day by Amrut Rao, who is the adopted son of the famous Ragoba, in whose favor the Bombay government so long contended with the Peswah, and whose son is now seated on the Poonah musnud. The adoption of Amrut Rao was prior to the birth of Bajee Rao, and Chimnaje

‘ As for money, I am now in no want, and I expect nine lacs of rupees from Hyderabad.

‘ I have desired Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor, and he expected to get ten lacs there. God knows whether he will get one. However, before the sums I have expended, I trust that the government of Bengal will recollect our possible necessities.

‘ I shall send to-morrow to Poonah, if possible, a dispatch I have written to Bengal on the peace. I think that it ought not to be sent to Bombay, at least till I am out of the way, as you will see that the consequence will be that I shall be burnt in effigy..’

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

' MY LORD, ' Camp, 13th November, 1803.

'I have the pleasure to inform your Excellency that Amrut Rao joined me yesterday, and that I had a meeting with him in the neighborhood of his camp. I am to visit him this day.

‘ I have lately received a letter from Pursheram Punt Prittee Niddee, in which that chief informs me that he proposes to send immediately to Poonah his quota of troops which he ought to furnish for the service of the Peshwah.

‘The Chiefs to the southward are in tranquillity, and have no extraordinary numbers of troops about them. The polygars alone, situated between the rivers Malpoorba and Gutpurba, have been guilty of committing some outrages, encouraged, I believe, by Sirjee Rao Ghautky.

‘Ragojee Bhoonslah is gone towards the Raim ghaut, on the road to Nagpoor ; and Scindiah was, by the last accounts, with a body of cavalry to the east of Mulcapoor, likewise on his road towards the Berar country. Colonel Stevenson has by this time completed his equipments for the siege of Gawilghur, from the stores at Asseerghur ; and I hope that

is younger than either. This prince was in close alliance with Holkar, and placed on the musnud by him in 1802. On that Chieftian's retreat, he accompanied him a part of the way into his own territory, I believe in Baglana, and there he has peaceably awaited the event of our hostilities to choose his side. Until the battle of Assye his views were doubtful ; since then his intercourse with us has been friendly, and it is now thought he means to follow our fortunes, or rather promote his by our means. He has three or four thousand troops with him.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

we shall now be able to carry on that operation, and to make the Berar country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

‘I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of the conferences which I have had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, and Appah Dessaye, on the subject of peace.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana arrived in this camp three days ago, as vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah: the former is a nephew of Morari Rao Goorparah, and both in his manner and appearance is superior to the other Marhatta chiefs whom I have seen. Enclosed I send a dispatch for the Governor General, which I request you to forward, in which you will see what has passed in the conference I have had with these persons.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letters of the 29th of October.

‘I learned only yesterday from Colonel Elliott that Major Campbell wished to exchange with Major Crawford; and I assure you that if I had known it before, I should have foregone all the wishes that I had formed that Colonel Houghton of the 88th should exchange into the 33rd. This officer, whom I requested Colonel Gore to recommend for the exchange, is an old acquaintance of mine, who has met with misfortunes in the world, which made him desirous to remain in this country, an object which would have been much facilitated by his exchange into the 33rd. I dare say that he will find no difficulty in getting another exchange; and in the mean time I am very glad that we have got Major Campbell.

‘Lieut. Colonel Harness’s letter upon the subject of Colonel — was a public one, which I sent to you in a private form, in order that you might do with it what you might think proper. Colonel — is certainly not a fit person to be at the head of a regiment, and so I have told him; and I can have no objection to your making use of my

sentiments on this subject, in any manner that you may think proper. At the same time I am much flattered by your desiring to have my sentiments upon the production of that letter to Government, before you determined to do so.

‘The enclosed copies of dispatches to the Governor General will show you how we stand in this country. I think that I shall be able to settle a peace with Scindiah on the terms stated in my dispatch of the 11th.

‘The greatest difficulty that I shall have, in my opinion, will be the arrangement for the Rajpoot Rajahs; and yet this is indispensably necessary, as I believe that the Governor General has made a treaty with these Rajahs, in which he has promised to make them independent. I know that he intended it, although these Rajahs are tributary to the Peshwah and Holkar, as well as to Scindiah. How the affair of their independence is to be settled with Holkar I cannot tell; but I have apprized the Governor General of Holkar’s and the Peshwah’s claims upon them.

‘I propose to move into Berar immediately. Colonel Stevenson will be prepared to march up the valley of the Poorna by the 15th or 16th of this month.

‘We are in the best state of equipment in every respect: I fear only our want of money, as now that Amrut Rao is arrived our expenses will much increase. We have drawn Bombay dry; and the Governor General has not sent them any money, although Mr. Duncan and I have written repeatedly to him on that subject. I have enough to keep me going on, and I desired Colonel Stevenson to levy a contribution on Burhampoor. He expected to get ten lacs of rupees: God knows if he will get one; but if I can reach Nagpoor, I think I shall levy a good contribution there.

‘Wherever there is an army in the field there is risk, particularly in this country, in which we are liable to so many accidents of losses of cattle, &c.; but, excepting from the want of money, I think I may now venture to say, that we are in such a state of equipment, and both our divisions are so well supplied with provisions, that we must bring the campaign to an honorable and successful close.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘I expect that Amrut Rao’s family will go off to Ahmednuggur in a day or two, and I conclude that a dwelling will

have been prepared for them at Bingar, according to my former directions. I request that the lands and revenues of Bingar may be settled in such manner and given to such person as may be agreeable to this family.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Captain Graham.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM, ‘ Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 9th.

‘ I have desired Coleman to send the horses for the cavalry with you, and you must take two companies from the corps at Poonah to increase your escort. These two companies must be relieved by a detachment of three or four companies at Ahmednuggur, with guns, with which you will proceed towards Rackisbaum, on the Godavery.

‘ On the road, or at Rackisbaum, you will meet Baynes with three or four companies, with guns, and four hundred horse, with whom you will come forward to the army, sending back to Ahmednuggur the detachment with the guns which you will have brought from thence. Your Mysore infantry may as well come on the whole way.

‘ I shall send off immediately some troopers, &c., to take charge of the remount horses.

‘ I enclose dispatches which contain all that has been done, and all my papers for the peace. That of the 11th in my opinion ought not to go to Mr. Duncan; if it does, I shall be burned in effigy at Bombay. However, I leave it to you and Colonel Close to do as you please on that subject. Send the dispatch or not as you like.

‘ You may well suppose that I shall soon put a stop to this go-between style of going on through Appah Dessaye.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Malcolm.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Lucas.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp, 13th November, 1803.

‘ Captain Baynes is about to proceed from camp towards Ahmednuggur, in command of a detachment which will form the escort to Amrut Rao’s family, who are going to reside at Bingar.

‘ It is desirable that Captain Baynes should be met on the road between Ahmednuggur and Rackisbaum by a detachment consisting of four companies and two 6 pounders, to

which he will deliver over the charge of the family above mentioned, and afterwards proceed to carry into execution further orders which he will receive.

‘Accordingly, I request that a detachment of that strength may be prepared without loss of time, and that they march towards Rackisbaum as soon as they shall be ready.

‘It is desirable that the 3000 brinjarry bullocks sent from Poonah by Colonel Coleman, and loaded with the Company’s rice, should come with this detachment; and you will give orders and make preparations accordingly; likewise any individuals or stores waiting at Ahmednuggur for a convoy. I should wish you to take 100 loads of rice from the brinjarries, and place it in the garrison stores, and give them 100 loads of salt in lieu thereof.

‘The officer commanding this detachment is to deliver these brinjarries, &c., to Captain Baynes, when he shall receive from him the charge of Amrut Rao’s family.

‘I request you to give directions that the 6 pounders which will go out upon this occasion, which are to be those attached to the 2nd of the 3rd, may have new wheels, of which, many for the 6 pounders have lately arrived from Poonah; that they may have with them two tumbrils likewise, with new wheels, and the tumbrils and limbers to be completed with ammunition.

‘These guns and tumbrils are to be handed over to Captain Baynes; and the officer commanding the detachment from Amednuggur is to take two 3 pounders, now attached to Captain Baynes’s detachment, with which he is to return to Ahmednuggur.

‘Be so kind as to send 50 of the best draught bullocks with the 6 pounders above mentioned; from which, and the bullocks of his 3 pounders, Captain Baynes will choose such as he may think will answer best for the service on which he is employed.

‘It will be necessary that two of the captured 6 pounders should be fitted up to go out upon occasional detachments from the garrison of Ahmednuggur.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain Lucas.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 14th November, 1803.

‘Ragojee has decidedly gone towards his own country, through the Wausim ghaut, and I am on my march that way

‘In considering a variety of plans proposed by Major Walker for the campaign in Guzerat, I stated my sentiments fully to Mr. Duncan upon this subject, which it appears he has omitted to communicate to you.

‘In my opinion, your time has been employed more profitably since you have assembled your corps, and more in consistency with the views of the Governor General, than if you had spent it in a fruitless pursuit of Canojee. You have organized the countries belonging to Scindiah; and by the arrangements which you have commenced with the Rajahs bordering on Guzerat, you have provided some barrier in that province against invasion; at the same time that if circumstances should hereafter permit you to move upon Ougein, every thing on the road is in the state to facilitate that operation. Your pursuit and defeat of Canojee is therefore now well timed, and I wish you to do your utmost in that way.

‘I enclose you an extract of my letter to Mr. Duncan on the subject of the operations in Guzerat, written on the 22nd of August. Since I last wrote to you, Scindiah has returned across the Taptee, and has gone to the eastward, along the valley of the Poorna towards Berar. I have driven the Rajah of Berar from the Godavery, I believe also into Berar; and I think that in a few days I shall make that country the seat of the war in the Deccan.

‘My letter of the 23rd of October will have explained to you the arrangement made by the Governor of Bombay for the civil government of the countries conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat. In writing to Government upon this subject, since I have read your dispatches to General Nicolls on revenue, I have strongly recommended that Major Walker should be directed to conform to all your arrangements; and that he should continue in employment all the people employed by you, and maintain the bargain made by you with the person whom you appear to have employed as a farmer of the revenue. I think, therefore, that no public inconvenience will be felt from the apparent change of authority.

‘I have lately received a long letter from Government on the subject of strengthening Surat. The proposal was to intrench a camp at the distance of eleven miles: I have recommended half that distance, if an equally good position should be found. This proposal comes from the Military Board, not one of whom, I believe, has ever seen Surat. However, any thing is better than the present state of that

place; and Mr. Duncan appears inclined to adopt that plan for its defence, which, at all events, is better than nothing.

‘I have the honour to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 15th November, 1803.

‘I have just received your letters of the 11th, and I hope that as your baggage arrived on that day, contrary to your expectation, you will have been able to quit Poonah at a period proportionably earlier than the 17th or 18th.

‘My reason for being very anxious on this subject is, that I have ordered Baynes now to march towards Ahmednuggur with Amrut Rao’s family. He will arrive at Rackisbaum on the Godavery, four marches from Ahmednuggur, on the 19th; from thence he will go on until he shall meet a detachment that I have ordered from Ahmednuggur with grain, which will probably be on the 21st. He is then to deliver the family to this detachment, and is to proceed himself with the grain towards Dharore; and I expect he will join Captain Lemond, who is coming from Hyderabad with nine lacs of rupees and a reinforcement of artillery men, in the neighborhood of Dharore, on the 24th. He will afterwards proceed to join the army, and will arrive upon the Godavery about the 27th.

‘My point at present is Nagpoor; and if Ragojee does not turn back upon the Nizam’s territories, I shall not halt above one day till I reach that place. Baynes will follow me, and he will not be back again upon the Godavery, most probably, for a month after the period at which he shall leave it. I am therefore very desirous that you should join him before he shall march from the Godavery this time.

‘Time is every thing in military operations, particularly in conducting convoys. If these come on with celerity, they run no great risk; but if they are delayed long at any place, information is given of them, and they are attacked, and the success is always a matter of doubt. I am therefore very desirous that Baynes should not be materially delayed for you. But in order to give you a chance of coming up with him this time, I write to him to inform him of your motions, and of the latest period at which you will leave Poonah. If this should be the 18th, you ought to be at Ahmednuggur on the 23rd or 24th. From thence you might make Rackisbaum in three or at most four marches, which will bring you there on the 27th or 28th. Baynes will not

be at Rackisbaum on his return from Dharore, but possibly a march or two lower down the river, so that you may join him on the 29th or 30th.

‘I have desired Baynes to communicate with you, and you must communicate with him. If the detachment should not have returned with Amrut Rao’s family when you shall leave Ahmednuggur, you must take on your Poonah companies till you shall join Baynes, as that garrison is not strong enough to afford two detachments.

‘I enclose a sketch by which you will see, that by not going to Ahmednuggur you will save a march at least, by which means you will certainly arrive at Rackisbaum on the 26th or 27th, even if you should delay your departure till the 18th, which I hope you will not have done.

‘I wrote to Piele some time ago to caution him respecting the demands for rice in Canara. In fact, every inhabitant of Canara is a rice merchant, and the exportation from that province is limited only by the produce and the demand. In this season the demand will be infinite, and of course it will be necessary that Purneah should be very cautious in not allowing too much of the produce of Mysore to go to supply it. The people in Canara, although great traders, always take care to keep in their own houses a sufficiency for their own consumption till the next crop: but our Mysore people, who are not so much accustomed to trade, would not be so provident.

‘It appears that the arrangement proposed will answer well, if Mysore is to give Canara any assistance at all. If Purneah were to allow a certain quantity of rice to be exported from Mysore to Canara, from any part of the country from which it might be convenient to the inhabitants to export it, the inhabitants of those countries only which border upon Canara could avail themselves of this permission, as they alone could import their rice into Canara, at a price which the people of that province would be willing to give for it.

‘It is true, as Piele says, that the brinjarries will be delayed in looking for rice in the countries east of the Toombuddra; but they will not be so much delayed as they would be by looking for it first in the countries west of the Toombuddra, and, not finding it there, looking for it in those to the eastward. Besides, when they shall be informed that the rice in the western countries is allotted to supply the market of Canara, they will make their bargains at once for supplies in those to the eastward.

‘If any money should be sent with you from Poonah, let it come on to the camp, unless it shall be wanted to pay the current expenses at Ahmednuggur.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Major Malcolm.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Cuyler, 86th Regiment.

‘*SIR,*

‘Camp, 15th November, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 29th of October, and its enclosures.

‘Some time ago Mr. Duncan referred for my opinion a copy of a letter which he had received from the Company’s Council at Bombay; upon which for obvious reasons, I declined to give any opinion, but recommended to Mr. Duncan to make the inquiries stated in the two queries to Lieut. Colonel Woodington, in his letter of the 7th of October to Major General Nicholson.

‘My view in urging that these inquiries should be made was, to afford a ground for a claim for the army, at least for salvage for the property which they had saved from the hands of the enemy; supposing that Mr. Threipland’s opinion of the law respecting the right to the property was well founded.

‘It appears, however, from Lieut. Colonel Woodington’s answers to those queries, that the army did not save the property in question from the hands of the enemy, who had taken no pains to secure it, and that the owners of it might have carried it off whenever they pleased. Therefore there appears an end to the claim of the army for salvage.

‘However, I recommended to Mr. Duncan to refer the question to the Governor General in Council, as being the supreme British authority in India.

‘Since that time I have received another letter from Mr. Duncan, enclosing one from the merchants claiming the property captured at Baroach, written in rather extraordinary terms, a copy of which and of my answer I enclose.

‘I now proceed to give you my opinion upon the claim of the army to this property. I have no books nor any papers by me to assist me in forming this opinion, and I write only from memory.

‘As well as I recollect, Lord Rodney took the island of St. Eustatia, in the West Indies, from the Dutch, during the American war; at which island was found a vast quantity of British property, which was certainly contraband, and, moreover, was intended for the supply of the public enemies of

the state. The captors claimed this property as prize ; there was a long lawsuit upon the subject, which was decided against them.

‘ There can be no doubt whatever of the legality of the trade carried on by the British merchants at Baroach ; and that there is nothing criminal in their property being found there, as was the case in respect to the property found at St. Eustatia. Their case, therefore, is better than that of the merchants whose property was taken at St. Eustatia, and it is probably that any lawsuit upon the subject would be decided in their favor.

‘ However, I do not wish the army to take my opinion on the subject as conclusive. The best thing they can do is to make out a fair and clear statement of the case, and refer it to a lawyer for his opinion. If he should advise them to prosecute the claim, they must do it, as they will observe, at the expense of a lawsuit with the merchants. If he should advise them to give it up. I recommend them to do so.

‘ I do not think the Government will give them any compensation for this claim. If the property is considered as private, and belonging to the merchants, of course Government will object to giving any remuneration out of the public purse for any claim upon it, however well founded.

‘ I shall be happy to forward the views of the army in any thing they may think that I can be of service to them, and I have therefore given you my sentiments fully upon the subject on which you have written to me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Cuyler.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Shawe.

‘ **MY DEAR SIR,**

‘ Camp, 18th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 26th of October, with the memorandum and the notes thereon by the Governor General on the subject of the peace.

‘ Until I received this morning the Governor General’s letter of the 27th, I was afraid that my dispatch of the 11th would have been deemed tame, and that the demands which I proposed to make were below what we were entitled to expect. But I find, by the notes contained in his letter, that there is but little difference between his plan and mine ; and, in fact, I intended to amend my plan, before I received your memorandum, according to that contained in the Governor General’s notes.

‘ The principal difference in the plan contained in my dis-

patch, and that in the memorandum, consists first in the article regarding Europeans. I took the restriction contained in my plan from the treaty of Bassein : but upon reflecting further on the subject, and upon recollecting that the Peshwah would have been restricted from taking into his service any Frenchmen, if we had not been at peace with France, I determined to alter the plan so far as to demand that Scindiah should never have any Frenchmen in his service, nor Dutchmen, nor Italians, nor Spaniards ; and, in fact, that he should not have in his service the subjects of any European nation, the government of which should be at war with Great Britain.

‘ It appears, however, that the Governor General is desirous that they should not have any Europeans at all. This prohibition will go to their having no infantry or artillery, and this is a point which I think deserves consideration.

‘ Scindiah’s armies had actually been brought to a very favorable state of discipline, and his power had become formidable by the exertions of the European officers in his service ; but I think it is much to be doubted, whether his power, or rather that of the Marhatta nation, would not have been more formidable, at least to the British Government, if they had never had an European, as an infantry soldier, in their service ; and had carried on their operation, in the manner of the original Marhattas only by means of cavalry.

‘ I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery, possibly, indeed, by other causes ; at all events, it is certain that those establishments, however formidable, afford us a good object of attack in a war with the Marhattas, and that the destruction of them contributes to the success of the contest, and to the re-establishment of peace ; because, having made them the principal object of their attention (which they must do, in order to have them at all,) and that part of their strength on which they place most reliance, they become also the principal reliance of the army ; and, therefore, when they are lost, the cavalry, as is the case in this war, will not act.

‘ Two questions occur here,—one is, whether the Marhatta cavalry were ever better than they now are : if they were, whether they would regain their spirit, if the infantry establishment were to be destroyed ? I believe they were formerly better than they now are. In regard to the second point, I have to observe, that if there were no infantry in a

Marhatta army, their cavalry would commence those predatory operations for which they were formerly so famous; and although I am aware of the greater difficulties they would now have to encounter than their ancestors formerly had, from the practice which is universal in the Deccan, and I believe in Hindustan, of fortifying every village, (and I know that these are means of opposing them successfully,) I should still consider these operations to be more formidable to the British Government, than any that they can ever carry on by means of the best body of infantry that they can form.

‘On this ground, therefore, I think that they should be encouraged to have infantry rather than otherwise. As, however, the Governor General has given a positive opinion upon this subject, I shall make a demand in conformity to his wishes: but this shall be the last of my demands, in hopes that I may hear further from you on the subject, before the peace shall be concluded.

‘In treating with Ragojee Bhoonslah, I shall attend to the 3rd Article of the Memorandum; but I think it would be desirable that the gentlemen in Cuttack should conquer, if they have the means, the territories which they wish me to demand. Their operations in that quarter would be a diversion in favor of us and the Nizam, and their success would afford a fair ground for claiming the districts in question. I shall write to Colonel Harcourt upon this subject. I am anxious about it, because, in fact, we have as yet done no harm to Ragojee Bhoonslah in this quarter: and if Holkar were to come again into the Deccan, which is not impossible, we should be obliged to defer all our offensive plans in Berar till we should have beaten him.

‘My plan for a peace includes every thing contained in the 5th Article of the Memorandum, as far as the Nizam is concerned. In respect to the Peshwah, his territories are so intermixed with those of every other power in India, and it is so difficult to ascertain what does and what does not belong to him, that I despair of settling that point, excepting by means of commissioners acting under the arbitration of the British Government. This would be a long business, and can only be settled by the treaty of peace, by stipulating that commissioners shall be appointed for this purpose.

‘I propose to destroy the upper fort of Powanghur, and then to give back to Scindiah that part of his territories, keeping the territory dependent on Baroach. I think it better to do this than to keep Powanghur, because there are a parcel of Rajahs depending upon that place, with whom I

see plainly that the Guickwar government will never come to any arrangements; and if Mr. Duncan's mooluk-gheerys, on account of that government, are not stopped, of course we shall never be at peace with them; and by our operations against them we shall lose our character in that quarter, as we have already in Malabar, by similar operations. I have recommended that all tribute should be remitted while we have them under us; and I propose to stipulate, in the peace, that they shall receive no injury for having given us assistance. In this manner they will remain perpetual thorns in the side of Scindiah, and we shall avoid all contests with them.

'In respect to the 6th Article of the Memorandum, I have written fully, in my dispatch of the 11th, on the subject of increasing the Nizam's territories to the northward, as well as upon the subject of Ahmednuggur. I see by the Governor General's notes, that he is not anxious that the Nizam should have the Taptee for his boundary; and by the by, as Holkar has Chandore and other territories, down to the Godavery, the Nizam would not gain strength by being brought forward to the Taptee.

'The Peshwah's claim of choute upon the Nizam will not be a question at the peace, excepting that the Governor General should act respecting that claim as I have recommended in my dispatch, and then Scindiah will have nothing to do with it.

'I shall attend to what is stated in the 8th Article of the Memorandum.

'You will see by my dispatch of the 11th that my plan includes all that is contained in the 9th Article of the Memorandum.

'The 10th Article of the Memorandum contains matter to be arranged with the Peshwah, which has nothing to do with the peace.

'The 11th and 12th the same. All these arrangements must be made with the Peshwah, upon giving him a part of the benefits resulting from the war.

'I shall stipulate for the independence of the Seik chiefs, and generally of all persons north of Joudpoor, Jynaghur, and Gohud, according to the 13th and 14th Articles of the Memorandum.

'The 15th, 16th, and 17th Articles do not refer to me. I shall attend to the 18th in the treaty with Ragojee Bhoonslah.

'The plan in my dispatch of the 11th will provide for the independence of all the persons alluded to in the 19th, 20th,

21st and 22nd Articles of the Memorandum. But I proposed that the Ranah of Gohud should be dependent upon the Company, according to the letter of instructions of the 17th of June; and I think that the Governor General proposes that he should be in the same state with the Rajahs of Joudpoor and Jynaghur. I shall stipulate with Scindiah that he shall be independent of them, and that any arrangements made with the Company by the Ranah are to hold good.

'In regard to the 22nd Article of the Memorandum, I recommend that the stipulation respecting the independent Chiefs, furnishing troops whenever they may be called upon, may be very strictly drawn; and, if possible, that the British Government should have the power of mustering the troops at all times.

'The 23rd Article of the Memorandum, is provided for in my plan.

'The 24th and 25th Articles are not referable to me.

'Of course, the treaties of peace will be separate. I gave the answer to Appah Dessaye in the conference of the 11th, upon the subject of Scindiah's treating for Ragojee Bhoonslah, to lay the groundwork for giving Scindiah compensation from Berar, if that should be necessary; or rather that there might be no inconsistency in my proposing that measure, which would have been the case, if I had refused positively ever to allow Scindiah to treat for Ragojee Bhoonslah.

'If I can have any communication with him, I shall make a proposal to Holkar, to have the projected treaty with him; but you will have observed from my former letter, that I can establish nothing of the kind.

'The 27th Article of the Memorandum is not referable to me; but I have to observe upon it, that if these three chiefs are admitted to the benefits of the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein, and are each to have a subsidiary force, the military establishments must be increased to the full amount of the force which they are to have.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

'SIR,

'Camp, 19th November, 1803.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th of October, and one from Mr. Melville of the 31st, written by desire of his Excellency the Governor General, and containing your opinion upon the subject of a frontier to the

newly conquered province of Cuttack, towards the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘I shall pay due attention to those opinions in case an opportunity should offer of settling a peace with the Rajah of Berar.

‘It would, however, materially forward the views of Government upon this subject, and might possibly remove all objections on the part of the Rajah, to cede the districts which are thought necessary by Mr. Melville and yourself to complete the Company’s boundary in that quarter, if you were to conquer and take possession of them.

‘Other advantages would also attend this measure: one, that you would secure the province which you have already conquered; and in case of the continuance of the war, shut out the enemy effectually from the southern districts of Bengal and Bahar: the other, that you would make a division in favor of the troops which are carrying on their operations against the Berar country from the westward, and possibly might draw the enemy out of the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘I have to inform you that, hitherto, I have not been able to make much impression on the Rajah of Berar, which is to be attributed to various causes. If it should be possible, I propose to attack his fort of Gawilghur, in a short time; and as this is his principal hold, the attack of it may bring him to his senses. But whether circumstances may permit me to attack it or not, there is no doubt but that by taking possession of the districts which are thought by you and Mr. Melville to be necessary for the security of the Company’s territories, by which means you will be brought near to Nagpore, you will aid most materially in bringing the war to a conclusion.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P.S.—I request you to communicate this letter to Mr. Melville.’

To Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘Camp, 19th Nov., 1803.

‘I suggest the measure proposed in the enclosed letter, only in case you deem your force sufficient, or if the Governor General can reinforce you, or if this operation should suit with the other views of Government. If it does, it will be highly advantageous, and will annoy the Rajah much. He

has viewed your operations with great jealousy; but he is afraid to encounter the British troops, and he has collected all his force under the command of his brother and his son, under the guns of Gawilghur, the fort in which he is supposed to have all his treasure. He himself is still within the Nizam's boundary with about 10,000 horse.

'Colonel Stevenson's division is on its march towards Gawilghur, and I am on my march to the northward, in hopes of drawing the Rajah through the ghauts; but I fear I shall not succeed. In the mean time, if Jeswunt Rao Holkar returns to the Deccan, which is not impossible, I must defer the attack upon Gawilghur, until I shall have defeated him.

'If there were any government, or any strength in these countries, I should be able to destroy Ragojee Bhoonslah in a short time; but as it is, I am forced to be much on the defensive, and to take up the offensive only when a fair opportunity offers; otherwise every thing would shake at Hyderabad and Poonah, and some of the Nizam's principal cities would be plundered when I should be forward.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'Camp at Iwankoad on the Payn Gunga,
19th November, 1803.

'SIR,

'1. I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 10th instant. You will have been agreeably undeceived respecting the report sent to you by Lieut. Hay, by my letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 2nd instant, which I sent for your perusal.

'2. I have to observe, however, upon Lieut. Hay's report to you, that I did not order him to remain behind Captain Seton at Dharore; in fact, I did not know of his arrival there, and gave him no orders: knowing that a detachment under Captain Baynes had come to the neighborhood in order to bring on Captain Seton in safety, he ought to have joined that detachment likewise. But he waited at Dharore for orders, for which he could not be blamed, and he has since joined me in security.

'3. In respect to Captain Seton, if he had obeyed the orders which he received, the convoy would never have been in danger, and would not have been attacked; and it is possible that I should have been enabled to make a greater

impression than I did on the rear of Ragojee Bhoonslah's army, as my movements would not have been cramped by the necessity of providing in the first instance for the safety of the convoy.

' 4. Ragojee Bhoonslah has continued his march to the northward and eastward, and I was in hopes that by this time he would have passed the ghauts into Berar. As soon as I was joined by Lieut. Hay with the treasure, I marched also towards the Wausim ghaut, with an intention to enter Berar, to cover and support the attack of Gawilghur by Colonel Stevenson's division.

' 5. The Rajah, however, has not yet passed the ghauts, and I think that he is going through Mahoor. Colonel Stevenson was on the 15th to the eastward of Mulcapoor, on his road towards Ellichpoor.

' 6. No sooner, however, have I begun my march, than the amildars, killadars, &c. &c., in all parts of the country have called out for assistance, not against the common enemy, but against the freebooters who have long been in the frontier, and who have been kept out of the Ahmednuggur districts by the collector's peons, with very little assistance from the battalion in the garrison of Ahmednuggur. The amildar at Bheer, in particular, has desired to have one of the Company's battalions of sepoys placed in garrison at Bheer, in order to defend that place against this rabble.

' 7. It is distressing to witness the state of the Soubah's territories for want of the common means of defence. In obedience to the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, I observe that you have urged the Soubah's ministers to take measures to drive the enemy's amildars and troops from those districts; the revenues of which have heretofore been collected partly by the Soubah's government, and partly by that of one of the confederates.

' 8. Instead of taking any measures to effect this object, which is one of great importance, they have not even taken possession of their districts bordering upon the Godavery, from which we drove the enemy's amildars two months ago, and I cannot prevail upon them to entertain peons to keep possession of the valuable towns and districts of this quarter, from which my detachment daily drive the enemy.

' 9. In order, therefore, to secure these places from falling again into the hands of the enemy, by which he could have an opportunity of annoying my communication, I have been obliged to call in the freebooter ghazy Khan, and to give him possession of the places which I take from the enemy.

‘ 10. I mention this subject to you now, as I suspect that it will be made a matter of complaint at the durbar, and you will know in what manner to answer these complaints.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

• ‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

• ‘ P.S.—I forward this day several letters to the Governor-General, which are duplicates of those written to his Excellency since the 12th of September last. I shall be obliged to you, if you will give directions that they may be sent on express from Hyderabad. It is desirable, however, that no expresses should be sent to camp, as the runners are less cautious when they have an express to deliver, and more likely to fall into the hands of an enemy on their road. Indeed, the expresses have generally been taken, when the common dawks, by seizing their opportunities when the road has been clear, have arrived in safety.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘ Camp at Nankode, on the Payn Gunga,
20th November, 1803.

• SIR,

‘ Nothing particular has occurred since I last wrote to you. I have been much detained in my march towards Berar, by the delay in the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan to produce the peons, who were necessary to take possession of the towns and districts from which my detachment drove the enemy; notwithstanding that the Resident at Hyderabad has repeatedly urged the ministers at Hyderabad, not only to provide means to take possession of these districts, but to drive the enemy from them themselves. In fact, the whole force of the Hyderabad state now consists of the few troops that Colonel Stevenson has with him. They have not another man of any description, and they depend solely upon the British Government for their support. I do not believe the Governor General ever imagined that this was the case, but so it is.

‘ Nothing further has been done in the negotiations. I sent a messenger to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah three days ago, to let him know that I was impatient for the arrival, of his powers; and hinted that unless they soon arrived, it would be necessary that he should take up his abode at a distance from camp, as it was very unusual to allow a person of his description, without powers, to remain in camp. He answered that he daily expected them, and that he was much more anxious for their arrival than I was.

From what I learn, I suspect an intrigue is going on in Scindiah's durbar, to have Meer Mahomed Khan employed to make peace for Scindiah, at the bottom of which is Rajah Mohiput Ram. The Mussulman will naturally wish that our demands for compensation should be in the Deccan; and that the king should not get into our hands. Meer Mahomed Khan is a servant of the king. I am indifferent who is the person employed by Scindiah, as I am determined to make peace only on certain terms. But I should doubt his having any confidence in Meer Mahomed Khan, and I suspect that this intrigue will tend only to create delay.

'Captain Johnston's salary, as surveyor, and Captain Noble's, as, assistant commissary, have been retrenched by the Military Auditor General, although the appointment of the former was confirmed, and that of the latter was made by you. I have nothing to produce to prove that you have confirmed any of my orders, or that they were confirmed by Government, excepting the letters from the Adjutant General, stating that certain copies of orders were laid before you, and that you had confirmed them.

'These retrenchments will create great inconvenience and difficulty, as well as delay in the final settlement of the accounts. I therefore take the liberty of recommending that copies of such orders as you or the Government may confirm, may be sent to the office of the Military Auditor General, certified by the Adjutant General and the Secretary of Government respectively as being confirmed. According to this mode these retrenchments will be avoided.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Stevenson.

'Camp at Nankode, on the Payn Gunga,

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 20th November, 1803.

'I have been detained by the necessity of depriving the enemy of his tannahs in these districts, in order to insure my communication, and by the slowness of Soubahan Khan's people in producing the peons to take possession of the districts from which I drive the enemy.

'I learn, also, that Ragojee has not yet passed the ghauts, and is not even gone into the Wausim district, as I had been informed he was. I got yesterday your letters of the 15th. Your Buswunt rice will certainly be in time.

'Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has certainly been sent here by Scindiah, but if he has come only to discover my sentiments

about peace, he has not yet succeeded in the object of his mission.

‘Scindiah would find it difficult to procure a man to undertake the dangerous office which Wahed Beg has assigned to Goorparah, as hanging would be the certain consequence of it. I suspect that there is an intrigue going on in Scindiah’s camp, respecting the peace; at the bottom of which is, I am afraid, Mohiput Ram. He and the Mussulman, for obvious reasons, wish to carry on the negotiations through the channel of Meer Mahomed Khan, and I doubt whether Scindiah or his ministers would trust him. For my part, I care not whom Scindiah employs; I shall make peace upon certain conditions and no others, be the negotiator who he may. But I see clearly that all these intrigues and lies, backward and forward, will throw many difficulties in the way, and will delay the business much. ‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 22nd November, 1803.*

‘I have the honor to inform you that I have this day concluded an agreement with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scin-

* *Captain Barclay, Deputy Adjutant General, to Colonel Stevenson.*

‘DEAR SIR,

‘22nd November, 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley has just now received Captain Johnston’s letter of the 19th. He is particularly engaged just now, and has desired me to write to you,—

‘1st. That the representations of Wahed Beg are in consequence of an intrigue in Scindiah’s durbar

‘2nd. That Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has received ample powers as vakeel from Scindiah.

‘3rd. The General had a long conference with him yesterday, and has sat down again with him now.

‘4th. He has consented, in general terms, to a suspension of hostilities between the British troops and Scindiah, and will probably arrange all the particulars to-night: in which case he will communicate them to you immediately.

‘In the mean time, he thinks it necessary to apprise you of the general agreement; and also that the vakeel proposed that Scindiah should be allowed to remain with this army at Burhampoor, during the negotiation for peace, to which the General objected, and proposed that he should remove to some place twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and remain there during the negotiation. The vakeel could not engage for his doing so, but would communicate this condition to Scindiah; and in case that Chief moves towards the position above described, of course you will allow him to go off without interfering with him: but if he attempt to pass to the westward, he begs that you will attack him, and cut him up if possible.

diah, for a suspension of hostilities between the troops under my command and those belonging to that Chief.

‘I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting you a copy of this agreement. In the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that the principal article of this agreement is, that Dowlut Rao Scindiah is to take up a position with his army in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, in which case the British troops are not to attack those in his service.

‘Accordingly I request that you will refrain from attacking the troops of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, if you should find that he complies with this condition.

‘There is nothing in this agreement which at all affects the state of the war against the Rajah of Berar.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson, or Officer ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’
commanding the Subsidiary Force.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Rajoora, 23rd November, 1803.

‘At the time I dispatched my last letter to you, I received the strongest proof of the fact which I therein mentioned,

‘This division of the army will be through the Rajoora ghaut, or some other ghaut near it, on the day after to-morrow, or the 24th, and will move up towards you without delay.

‘The General’s principal reason for agreeing to the suspension of hostilities with Scindiah was that the siege of Gawilghur might be uninterrupted by him; and the General begs that you will order every preparation to be made for commencing it, immediately on your arrival, and carrying it on with the utmost celerity and activity. But as he observes, with much concern, from Captain Johnston’s letter, that you are very much weakened and reduced by your late indisposition, he begs that you will not risk your life in the arduous undertaking of the siege of Gawilghur, if you do not find your strength equal to conducting the operations of it. And if you find yourself too weak for that, he will change situations with you, for the period of the siege, by his joining the subsidiary force, while you take the command of this division.

‘He reckons it of the utmost importance that the suspension of hostilities should be kept a secret from the servants of the Soubah.

‘You will probably receive an order of this date to suspend hostilities against Dowlut Rao Scindiah; but that is not to prevent you from attacking him, if you find that he will not take up the proposed position, and wants to pass to the westward.

‘I have the honor to be, &c

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen

viz., that the officers of the Soubah's government were intriguing to bring the negotiation for peace into their own hands. However, on the following day, the vakeels, who had already arrived here, received their full powers; which, although not quite so extensive as I could have wished, enabled me to converse with them on the subject of peace.

'Accordingly, after pointing out to them the causes of the war, and the violence and aggression of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I told them that they were not to expect that the Company would make peace with that Chief unless they and their allies were to receive compensation for the injury they had sustained, and security against such attacks in future. I then asked them whether they had powers from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to make those principles the basis of the peace with the Company? In answer, they said they had not; and I then desired them to apply for further instructions.

'They then requested that I would consent to suspend hostilities. I positively refused to suspend hostilities against the Rajah of Berar; and they then proposed that I should agree to suspend them against Scindiah. To this proposal I consented, provided Scindiah would remove to a position in Berar, twenty coss east from Ellichpoor; and that he would take care to keep at the distance of twenty coss from either of the British divisions while carrying on their operations against the other enemies of the British Government.

'They wished the suspension to extend to Hindustan, to which I would not agree; but I agreed that it should extend to Guzerat. In that quarter our troops are not to advance beyond Dohud, which is the most advanced place we have got, and they are not to come nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

'My motives for agreeing to this suspension of hostilities are, First: that I have no power of injuring Scindiah any further. I have taken all he had in the Deccan; and the troops in Guzerat cannot advance upon Ougein, for the reasons stated in a late dispatch to the Governor General, of which I enclosed you a copy. His army now consists of horse only: and in order to distress that, it will be necessary to follow it to a greater distance from our sources of supply; which, considering the distance we are from them already, becomes a matter of some consequence; and from our operations upon the Rajah of Berar, which are most likely to bring about a peace.

‘Secondly: Scindiah’s horse might do us much mischief, and might derange our plans against the Rajah of Berar, supposing them to be at liberty to act. The Rajah of Berar’s infantry, and a corps of cavalry, both under Manoo Bappoo, are encamped not far from Gawilghur, the place which Colonel Stevenson has been ordered to attack. It is probable that both he and Scindiah would retire upon Colonel Stevenson’s advance; but they would attack Colonel Stevenson during the time that he might be employed at Gawilghur: or, possibly, Scindiah would make an irruption into the Soubah’s territories, to draw me off to a distance, and Manoo Bappoo would attack Colonel Stevenson.

‘Thirdly: Bappojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan to defend Ougein against our troops, supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. There is already at Ougein some infantry, which have not been engaged, and the defeated infantry are on the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find Colonel Murray necessarily engaged with Canojee Rao Guickwar, and Dohud held only by one battalion, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is prevented by the cessation from hostilities. Guzerat, instead of being our strongest, is by far our weakest point in every respect.

‘Fourthly: by leaving the Rajah of Berar out of the arrangement, Scindiah’s interests become separate from his; all confidence in Scindiah, if such a thing ever existed, must be lost, and the confederacy becomes, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

‘I see no inconvenience that can result from the measure, particularly as I have the power of dissolving the agreement whenever I please.

‘I acknowledge that this cessation of hostilities is against all the rules; but, in this instance, I think they are rules of which the breach is more likely to be beneficial to the public than the observance.

‘I have not yet made up my dispatches to the Governor General upon this subject, or upon many others connected with the negotiations for peace; and the papers which must accompany them are so very long and numerous, that I fear some time must elapse before I can make them up. The Governor General has also directed me to send them in duplicate; and they are of that nature that I cannot trust them to be copied by any body excepting those officers attached to myself. Two of these have been laid up ever since the battle of Assye, and all of them have their other duties to perform.

'I hope, therefore, you will excuse me if you should not receive copies of the dispatches as regularly as heretofore. I shall take care, as I have above done in this letter, to let you know the result upon all occasions, and to give you the general outline of the discussions which may have taken place, and an account of my motives for all my actions. Besides this, I shall send you copies of the dispatches as soon as they can be made.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will do me the favor to communicate to Lord William Bentinck such parts of this letter as you may think proper, particularly the reasons for which the dispatches are not sent.

'I have the honor to enclose a copy of the agreement for the cessation of hostilities.

'I think it is probable that I shall succeed in making peace. I have had a good deal of conversation with the vakeels upon the subject of the demand for compensation, to which they appear to have made up their minds, and to be convinced of the necessity of peace to the affairs of their masters. They hinted last night that Scindiah intended, after the war, to place himself under the protection of the Company. They seem to have much confidence in me, which, at all events, is a point gained in the negotiation.

'I have the honor to be, &c.'

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Colonel Stevenson.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 23rd November, 1803.

'I enclose herewith the duplicate of a letter which I wrote to you yesterday, and the copy of a treaty for a suspension of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'I have but little to add to what Barclay wrote you yesterday upon this subject by my desire.

'You will observe that the condition of the agreement is that Scindiah is to go to the east of Ellichpoor. His ministers were very anxious that he should remain to the west; but I told them that unless he went to the east the agreement would be void. You are to attack him if he should attempt to pass you to the westward, and no parties of his horse must be allowed to remain near you without being attacked.

'At all events, whether he goes to the east or west, march towards Gawilghur as soon as possible after you shall have received your supplies, and begin your operations there. I shall be through the ghauts to-morrow or next day, and shall watch the enemy and cover your operations.

‘If Manoo Bappoo remains near, you might endeavor to attack him on your march towards Gawilghur. But I do not recommend that you should leave your baggage and stores behind you, as to get them up again will be difficult, and will create delay. ‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 23rd November, 1803.

‘I have the honor to inform you that I have this day concluded an agreement with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for a suspension of hostilities between the troops under my command and those belonging to that Chief.

‘I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting you a copy of this agreement; in the mean time, I have the honor to inform you, that the articles of this agreement referable to the troops in Guzerat, are, that the British troops are not to advance beyond Dohud; and those in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah are not to approach Dohud from the eastward nearer than twenty coss.

‘If you should have pushed your corps, or a detachment, beyond Dohud, I request you to draw it into that place; if you should have drawn it off from Dohud, you will not advance it farther towards Ougein than the place at which this letter will find you.

‘This arrangement is liable to be broken off by either of the parties, upon giving notice of such intention.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘This agreement is applicable only to the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.’

ARMISTICE concluded by Major General the Honorable
A. WELLESLEY with DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH.

‘Camp, 23rd November, 1803.

‘Major General Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, on the part of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, having each communicated to the other their full powers, have made the following agreement:—

‘1. There shall be a cessation of hostilities between the troops commanded by Major General Wellesley; in the Deccan and in Guzerat, and those in the service of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'2. To prevent accidents, and in order to insure the execution of the 1st article, it is agreed, that there shall be an interval of twenty coss between the different British and allied armies, and that the Maharajah will march with his army, and take up a position twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and he will forage still farther to the eastward.

'3. In case the operations of the British and allied armies against the other enemies of the British Government should draw either of them nearer than twenty coss to the position which the Maharajah will have occupied, according to the 2nd article, previous notice of such operation will be given, in order that the Maharajah may take timely measures always to preserve an interval of twenty coss between his army and the British allied armies.

'4. In Guzerat the British troops shall not advance beyond Dohud; those of the Maharajah, on the side of Guzerat, shall not approach nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

'5. Notice must be given, in case either of the parties should be desirous to put an end to this Agreement.

'6. This Agreement is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and his ratification is to be given to Major General Wellesley in the space of ten days from this date.'

To Major Shawe.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Camp at Rajoora, 23rd Nov., 1803.

'Dowlut Rao Scindiah's vakeels have received their powers, but they are not so full as they ought to be. I have had a conversation with them on the subject of peace, in which I told them that the British Government would not make peace, unless it received compensation for the unjust aggression of which Dowlut Rao Scindiah had been guilty. I asked them whether they had powers to agree to make compensation and future security to the Company and their allies, the basis of the negotiation for peace? They said they had not: and I referred them to Dowlut Rao Scindiah for further instructions.

'They then desired that I should agree to a suspension of hostilities, including the Rajah of Berar. To this proposal I declared that I never would assent.

'They then proposed that I should agree to a cessation of hostilities with Dowlut Rao Scindiah only; to which I have agreed, upon condition of his going with his army into Berar, twenty coss to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and of his

keeping at all times at that distance from the British troops carrying on their operations against the other enemies of the British Government.

‘ They wished the cessation to extend to Hindustan, to which proposal I would not consent; but I consented to its extending to Guzerat, in which quarter our troops are not to advance beyond Dohud, and theirs are not to approach nearer to Dohud than twenty coss.

‘ I suspect that I shall have some difficulty in convincing the Governor General of the propriety of this arrangement; and as there are many papers to be copied, and, moreover, from the conduct of the Soubah’s amildars, the dawk is not very secure, I shall advert in this letter to the circumstances by which I was urged to adopt this measure. •

‘ I have already apprized the Governor General that it was not in my power to do anything more against Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Nothing could be done on the side of Guzerat in particular, where we shall remain in possession of the most advanced station we have got, and which we hold only by one battalion; while Colonel Murray, with the remainder of his corps, is obliged to move upon Canojee Rao Quick-war.

‘ Scindiah has with him in the field an army of horse only. It is impossible to expect to make any impression upon this army, unless by following it for a great length of time and distance. To do this would remove our troops still farther than they are already from all the sources of supply, and would prevent the operations against the Rajah of Berar, from which alone, in my opinion, we are to expect peace.

‘ These facts would possibly be sufficient to prove the propriety of the step which I have taken; but there are others which prove it still more strongly: the fort of Gawilghur, which Colonel Stevenson is equipped to attack, and which I have ordered him to attack forthwith, is one of considerable strength, and is of great importance to Ragojee Bhonslah. Ragojee’s corps of infantry, and a body of horse under Manoo Bappoo, are assembled near this fort.

‘ They and Scindiah also would probably retire upon Colonel Stevenson’s advance to Gawilghur; but it must be expected that they will endeavor to attack him when he is engaged with the fort; or, supposing Scindiah to be at liberty, that he will make an irruption into the Soubah’s territories, to draw me to a distance; and that Manoo Bappoo will attack Colonel Stevenson. I avoid this by the cessation of arms.

‘ Bappoojee Scindiah has been detached to Hindustan to

oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat towards Ougein. I have already informed you there is some infantry at Ougein which has not been engaged; and the remains of the defeated campoos are on the Nerbudda.

‘On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that we cannot invade it, and he would naturally make an irruption into Guzerat. This is avoided by the cessation of hostilities.

‘The Rajah of Berar’s troops are not included in it, and consequently there becomes a division of interests between these two Chiefs; all confidence in Scindiah, if it ever existed, must be at an end, and the confederacy is, *ipso facto*, dissolved.

‘I see no inconvenience whatever that can result from the measure; and if the negotiations for peace are delayed in consequence of having concluded the cessation of hostilities, I have it in my power to put an end to that agreement whenever I may think proper.

‘The rule not to cease from hostilities till peace is concluded is a good one in general: and I have adhered to it, in practice, at the siege of Ahmednuggur; and I have ordered an adherence to it in all instances of that kind. But in this, I think it is a rule, of which the breach is more beneficial than the observance.

‘I shall send a large packet to the Governor General upon this subject, and the negotiations for peace, as soon as the papers can be copied. Now that these papers become so numerous, as the Governor General has desired to have duplicates of the letters addressed to him, and as I cannot trust them to be copied by any excepting the officers attached to me, two of whom have been laid up ever since the battle of Assye, and all have, besides, their usual duties to perform, I must omit to send copies of them to the governments of Fort St. George and Bombay, and only apprize those governments of the general results.

‘I have received from Malcolm his memorandum upon my proposed plan for a peace, and for the division of the conquests. You will observe that I have amended my plan in part, as proposed by Malcolm; and in regard to the division of the spoils, it is a question not referable to me.

‘I only request that the Governor General, if he should have seen this memorandum, will not make up his mind finally on that subject till I shall have had a conversation with Malcolm.

• Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Remarks upon Major Malcolm's Memorandum on a proposed Treaty of Peace.

‘23rd November, 1803.

‘I agree in the first parts of Major Macolm's memorandum; and as will appear by my letter to Major Shawe, I intend to amend my plan for the peace nearly in the manner proposed by Major Malcolm.

‘In respect to the participation in the conquests at the end of the war, that is not a question referable to me; but while writing upon the general subject of peace, I stated my ideas of the only practicable mode of settling that question, consistently with the engagements of the British Government.

‘Under the proposed peace with Scindiah only, the Nizam will have to receive nearly fifty lacs of rupees annually, that is supposing the Peshwah to receive nothing; Major Malcolm objects to the mode proposed by me of paying that sum, and has proposed others, though he has not specified them.

‘The first of the modes is to look to the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

‘Upon the peace with the Rajah of Berar, the Company will gain the province of Cuttack; and besides will connect the northern circars with Bundelcund. The Nizam must receive an equivalent upon his own frontier. If, besides this, he is to receive fifty lacs of rupees from the Rajah of Berar, the Rajah's state will be annihilated. That plan, therefore, is inconsistent with the Governor General's idea of preserving all these Marhatta states; and, at all events, is impracticable consistently with making peace at an early period.

‘The next plan is to increase the subsidiary force, and to keep a body of horse.

‘My object in proposing a plan for obliging the government to have some force, was, that I felt severely, in carrying on the war, the want of it; and I wished not to increase the dependence of the government upon the British power, but to create some force in the state which could carry it through ordinary events. Without such a force in the state, all will look well at Hyderabad and in a dispatch from the Resident to the Governor General, but really, and at bottom, all will continue to be weakness and confusion; and in the end the Nizam's government will fall to pieces.

‘If such a force is not established in the state, in my opinion, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled; and there

ought to be a body of horse besides : and moreover, the British Government will be involved in constant warfare and constant expense to support the Nizam's government in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Let Major Malcolm come into the country, and he will soon perceive the truth of this statement.

'In respect to the Peshwah's claim of choute, it is one, as I understand, founded on treaties ; and the British Government is bound, by treaty to both parties, to arbitrate and decide it according to the principles of justice, on the ground of the treaty of Mhar.

'There never was such an opportunity for a government to show its justice and its power ; and surely that opportunity ought not to be lost.

'But the fact is, that choute is collected in all parts of the Nizam's territories at this moment ; and when Major Malcolm shall come here, he will know it. The strongest advocate for the Nizam ought, therefore, to wish that that question should be decided.

'Major Malcolm says that the Nizam has claims upon the Peshwah for expenses incurred in restoring his government. That is a point for the justice of the British Government to decide, and is no argument at all against canvassing the question. He then says, that the Peshwah might be induced, by some concession or consideration, to give up his claim of choute upon the Nizam.

'In my opinion it would not be right to urge him to do so ; as, if that is done, there will be no other mode of satisfying the claims of the Nizam under the peace. But supposing the Peshwah could be induced, by any concession, to give up his claims of choute upon the Nizam, the Governor General has to choose between the Attavesy and Bundelcund.

'I shall deliver no opinion upon this subject, excepting that I consider the Attavesy as no object for the defence of Surat ; and that I consider Bundelcund as a great object for the defence of Benares.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 24th November, 1803.

'I have received your letters of the 18th and 19th.

'You have done right in not sending the letter to Mr. Duncan. I have received a memorandum from Malcolm on the subject of my plan for a peace, part of which I approve of, but in the latter part I cannot agree. As is frequently the case, Malcolm has said that other arrangements would

be better; I know that well; but let him specify those arrangements, let him examine my instructions, and then see whether any thing else is practicable.

‘ For instance, he does not approve of giving up the Attavesy, but let him ask the Governor General whether he will give back Bundelcund or the Attavesy to the Peshwah; he will choose Attavesy. He says the Nizam must be indemnified by the Rajah of Berar: but he forgets that the Governor General takes to himself all Orissa, and connects the northern Circars with Bundelcund: and the fact is, that it will be as difficult to find compensation for the Nizam, for the British acquisitions, from Ragojee Bhoonslah, as it will for those from Scindiah, consistently with the preservation of the state of Ragojee at all.

‘ Then he says, “ Keep horse for the Nizam, and increase the subsidiary force rather than muster the troops.” In answer, I say that I do not want to increase the dependence of the Nizam upon the British power: on the contrary, I want to see some power in the country that can go on, in ordinary cases, by itself. There is no such thing now in the country of any sort, and that is the greatest inconvenience I feel. Malcolm’s plan is no remedy for this evil; mine is. But I agree that if mine is not adopted, the subsidiary force ought to be doubled.

‘ There is no foundation for any of Sir William Clarke’s reports. The secret history of Colonel ——’s report has reached me. Angria discharged his troops lately; among others, a party of Scindians. A sirdar of these people went to Colonel ——, and told him this story with a view to procure employment for himself, and to have the plundering of his old master. There is no truth whatever in the report.

‘ I shall write you further about Amrut Rao, when I receive your dispatch to the Governor General upon that subject. I mentioned to his vakeel my wish, that Amrut Rao should give up all the territory he held from the Peshwah, and no great objection was made to the measure. But Amrut Rao has been a march or two in the rear ever since he joined, for the sake of plundering more conveniently, and I have not yet been made acquainted with his sentiments. I, however, expect the vakeel to-morrow or next day, as I have sent for him.

‘ I shall order the guns for the Peshwah from Ahmednuggur, with bullocks, &c., but I have no tumbrils. He shall have bullocks with them, and every thing complete.

‘ The progress I have made in the negotiation is just this. I have desired that compensation to the Company and their

allies should be made the basis of the treaty. The vakeels have no authority to make it so, and I have referred them to Scindiah for further orders.

‘I have agreed to the cessation of hostilities on the ground of my incapability to do Scindiah further injury, as stated in my dispatch to the Governor General of the 24th October; on that of it being impossible to injure his army of horse; on that of the injury he may do me in the operations against Gawilghur and in Guzerat, to which quarter he has sent Bappojee Scindiah; and on the political ground of dividing his interests from those of the Rajah of Berar, and thereby, in fact, dissolving the confederacy.

'I was never more convinced of the propriety of any measure, although I am aware it is liable to cavil.

‘I wish you would endeavor to find out what are the Peshwah’s objects, and I will get them for him if I can. I am on the very best terms with the vakeels ; and they talk of throwing themselves on the generosity of the British Government, and of placing themselves under its protection.

' Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR,

' Camp, 24th November, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a letter which I have written to Colonel Murray, which I request you to forward, and to make known to the Colonel your sentiments regarding the order which I have given him to destroy the upper fort of Powanghur.

'I must beg leave to delay for a few days to make you acquainted with my reasons for agreeing to this cessation of hostilities, as I am at present much pressed for time.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor of Bombay.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

' Camp, 24th November, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a triplicate of a letter which I wrote you on the 22nd, and which I directed to Major Holmes, that he might open it.

‘Notwithstanding this agreement, it is necessary that Major Holmes should be much upon his guard: I should deem it desirable that you also should move towards Dohud with the

remainder of your corps, if this movement should be consistent with other objects in Guzerat.

‘My reason for mentioning this wish is, that I have learnt from Scindiah’s vakeels, that he has detached a body of horse under Bappojee Scindiah to Ougein, to oppose the progress of the British troops in Guzerat towards that place. This cavalry may be joined at Ougein by a body of infantry which has not yet been engaged, and by the defeated infantry which are upon the Nerbudda.

‘Bappojee Scindiah will soon learn the strength of the British corps at Dohud ; and in case of the renewal of hostilities, he may be induced by its weakness to make an irruption into Guzerat.

‘I by no means wish that you should draw off the corps from Dohud, or that you should go there yourself, if it should not be consistent with other objects ; I only point out the benefits which will result from this movement in case it should be possible to make it.

‘I think it would be desirable to destroy the upper fort, or balla killa, of Powanghur ; it never will be of any use to us, as the lower fort is all that we shall ever occupy.

‘I request you to give directions accordingly, that the work may be done effectually.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp, 24th November, 1803.

‘Since I transmitted my dispatch of the 11th instant, with an account of the conferences which I had with Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, as the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, I have received a letter from that Chief dated the 14th, by which it appeared that he intended to appoint Mahomed Meer Khan to be his vakeel in this camp ; and that he in a manner disavowed Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana. This was further confirmed by a letter received at the same time from Mahomed Meer Khan, Ballojee Koonger, and Mirza Wahed Beg, translations of which I enclose.

‘In my letter of the 24th of October, I apprized your Excellency that I had received a variety of propositions, all tending to the commencement of negotiations for peace, but made by unauthorized persons ; and which, being unworthy of your Excellency’s notice, I omitted to transmit. On the 30th of October, Mirza Wahed Beg arrived in my camp

with letters from Mahomed Meer Khan and Ballojee Koonger, addressed to Colonel Stevenson and myself, translations of which are enclosed; in answer to which I wrote a letter to Mahomed Meer Khan, in which I told him, that if Scindiah should depute him to this camp, he should be received with attention and respect. I likewise enclose a translation of this letter, and that of one written at the same time to Ballojee Koonger.

'This is the letter which I conceive Scindiah has construed into a request that Meer Khan should be sent here; and I transmit translations of all the papers addressed either to Colonel Stevenson or to me, which have come into my hand, and translations of all that have been written, in order that your Excellency may form a judgment upon the subject.

'I should have apprized your Excellency of the receipt of these letters on the 30th of October, only that at the very moment I wrote to Meer Khan, I learnt that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah was on the road, and I sent a passport to enable him to come to my camp. I therefore concluded that this supposed mission of Mahomed Meer Khan was one of those transactions constantly going on in the native durbars, for which it is impossible to account.

'As soon as I received the letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah of the 14th of November, I sent for Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and his colleague, and had a conference with them, of which your Excellency will find the details in the enclosed paper*.

* The proceedings of the conferences between Major General Wellesley and the vakeels of the confederates from the 10th of November to the 29th of December, are in the Major General's own hand-writing, and occupy eighty-six pages. As the substance of these conferences is to be found also in the dispatches, the compiler has not inserted these voluminous, though curious and important documents.

The detail of each conference commences with the date, &c.; for instance, 'Camp, 24th December, 1803. The vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah came to Major General Wellesley's tent, and a conference was held, at which were present, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, Naroo Punt Nana, Eitul Punt, and Moonshee Kavel Nyn,—Major General Wellesley, Major Malcolm, the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, and Govind Row.' After the last conference, and when the treaty of peace was signed, Rajah Mohiput Ram, the vakeel, or Resident in camp, from the Nizam, Soubah of the Deccan, was anxious to ascertain from Major General Wellesley what particular countries and districts were likely to fall to the lot of his master, in consequence of the treaty of peace. For various reasons, too long to detail, the Major General declined giving any information on the subject, when Mohiput Ram offered the General five lacs of rupees for it: to this the General replied—

'I had no doubt whatever of the mission of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; indeed I had sufficient proofs of it; and it appeared to me to be probable that full powers would be sent to Jeswunt Rao, as soon as Scindiah should receive the accounts of the manner in which he had been received in this camp; and that the mission of Mahomed Meer Khan, in whom it was not probable that Scindiah could have much confidence, was the result of an intrigue in the durbar. I deemed it most prudent therefore to point out to Jeswunt Rao Goorparah, and Naroo Punt Nana, the dangers of the situation into which they had been brought, and the great moderation and favor with which they were treated in not being punished, rather than to dismiss them at once with disgrace as impostors.

'They accordingly departed from my tent much pleased with the manner in which I behaved to them, and much disgusted with their employer; and in the course of two hours after they had left me, Naroo Punt Nana returned with a letter from Scindiah, conveying powers to these persons, and Appah Dessaye, of which I enclose a translation.

'Since I received this last letter, I have received another letter from Mirza Wahed Beg, and Colonel Stevenson has received one from Mahomed Meer Khan, translations of which I enclose. From these letters, it appears clearly that there is a scramble at the durbar of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who shall conduct the negotiations for peace. It is probable that Jeswunt Rao Goorparah has succeeded, by exaggerated reports of the wishes he found here for peace, and by encouraging hopes that I would send an officer to Scindiah's camp. But whatever may be the mode in which he has succeeded in retaining his appointment, I think it more probable that he has, than that Mahomed Meer Khan has, Scindiah's confidence.

'At all events, the communications which we have had with him and his colleague already, have had the effect which they have upon all the natives, of convincing them of the justice and propriety of our proceedings; they appear to have confidence in us, they are open and candid in all their proceedings, and have declared more than once, that if Scin-

'can you keep a secret?' Rajah Mohiput Ram, hoping that he had touched the right chord, eagerly answered 'Yes.'—'And so can I,' replied the General. Rajah Mohiput Ram was not, however, it is said, dismayed by this failure, and was supposed in camp to have attained his wishes by a more decided measure; as the tappall, or messenger, who carried the dispatches containing the desired information, was afterwards waylaid and murdered.

diah did not make peace with the Company, his state must be destroyed, and that his only reliance was upon the generosity of the British Government.

‘ On the other hand, your Excellency will have observed that Rajah Mohiput Ram was the person who began the communications with Mahomed Meer Khan, a circumstance which has never been accounted for; and that endeavours have been made by the latter, in Scindiah’s durbar, to carry on the negotiations with the former.

‘ I enclose an extract of a letter from Colonel Collins, which shows who Mahomed Meer Khan and Mirza Wahed Beg are, and what is the nature of the employment of both at Scindiah’s durbar. From the nature of Mahomed Meer Khan’s employment and his connexions, it is not very probable that he would be desirous to see the King, Delhi, and the Doab transferred to the Company; and of course Rajah Mohiput Ram and Ballojee Koonger would wish that the compensation for the war should be taken in the Deccan.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion that the result of this intrigue in Scindiah’s durbar, which shows the great anxiety and desire there is for peace, is fortunate for the British Government.

‘ In the memorandum of the conferences, your Excellency will find a detailed account of what passed at the first meeting between Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and me, upon the subject of peace. I thought it proper in that conference to go no farther than to require that compensation to the British Government and their allies, for the injury they had received by the unjust aggression of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and his confederates, should be made the basis of the negotiations for peace; and when I found that the vakeels were not authorized to grant compensation, I referred them to their master for further authority.

‘ They then pressed me to agree to a cessation of hostilities, to which your Excellency will observe that I have agreed; and you will find the terms in the minutes of the conference of the 22nd instant.

‘ My reasons for agreeing to a cessation of hostilities are as follow :—

‘ In my letter of the 20th of October, I have shown your Excellency that as I had deprived Dowlut Rao Scindiah of all his territories in the Deccan, and as the corps in Guzerat was not sufficiently strong, and as there existed a domestic war in Guzerat which required all its exertions, and as it was necessary to guard the frontier of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and of his Highness the Peshwah, and to

endeavor in the first instance to take Gawilghur, I could not hope to be able to make any further impression on Scindiah at present.

'The army he now has with him consists only of horse; and in order to make any impression upon that description of troops, it would be necessary to follow them for a great length of time and of distance, by which means the distance from the sources of our supplies would be increased, which is a subject of very serious consideration, and our operations against the forts in Berar delayed.

'On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary to endeavor to strike a blow against the Rajah of Berar which he will feel; and with this view Colonel Stevenson's corps has been equipped for the siege of Gawilghur.

'Ragojee Bhoonslah's infantry and cavalry under Manoo Bappoo, and Scindiah's army, are both encamped at present on the road towards Gawilghur, but not joined. It is probable that both will retire, upon Colonel Stevenson's advance; but it is also probable that they would afterwards endeavor to interrupt the siege, or that Scindiah would, with his cavalry, make an irruption into the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, in hopes to draw me to a distance, and to leave Manno Bappoo at liberty to interrupt Colonel Stevenson in the siege of Gawilghur. The result of this operation would be fresh loss to, and fresh complaints from, the Soubah of the Deccan, and possibly some of our convoys would be cut off.

'Bappoojee Scindiah has been sent into Hindustan, to oppose the troops supposed to be advancing from Guzerat. He will be joined at Ougein by some corps of infantry that have not yet been engaged, and by the defeated infantry which were upon the Nerbudda. On his arrival at Ougein, he will find that the troops in Dohud consist only of one battalion; and that Colonel Murray is necessarily employed with the strength of his corps, in the pursuit of Canojee Rao Quickwar. It is probable that he would then make an irruption into Guzerat.

'Upon the whole, therefore, upon military principles, the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah was desirable to me; and I had made up my mind to grant it, as soon as I had reason to suspect that it would be asked.

'As a political measure, as it does not extend to the Rajah of Berar, and as Scindiah is kept within his territories, it has the effect of separating the interests of those Chiefs entirely. It is impossible that the Rajah of Berar can ever hereafter

have any confidence in Scindiah, and it may be considered that the confederacy is dissolved.

‘ If advantage should be taken of the cessation of hostilities to delay the negotiations for peace, your Excellency will observe that I have the power of putting an end to it when I please; and that, supposing I am obliged to put an end to it, on the day after I shall receive its ratification, I shall at least have gained so much time everywhere for my operations, and shall have succeeded in dividing the enemy entirely.

‘ Such an agreement is certainly not usual, and in general impolitic: but the circumstances of this case are also unusual, and upon the whole, I am induced to hope that your Excellency will approve of the measure.

‘ I have great hopes that I shall be able to conclude a peace with Scindiah on favorable terms; and your Excellency will observe, in the conclusion of the conference of the 22nd, a hint thrown out by the vakeels, of an intention to place Scindiah’s government under the protection of the Company, which I think is likely to lead to satisfactory results.

‘ I have the honor to enclose translations of my letter to Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ Camp, 22nd November, 1803.

‘ I have received your Persian letter of the 14th November. In answer thereto, I have only to inform you, that I shall receive with respect and attention any person you may send here as your vakeel; and that, of course I shall not negotiate with any person who has not a writing signed and sealed by you in the usual manner.

‘ *Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

* *Translation of a Persian letter from Dowlut Rao Scindiah to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, 14th November, 1803.*

After titles and compliments:

‘ The sincere Mirza Wahed Beg has arrived here, and has explained the whole state of affairs.

‘ He has also brought your letter inviting Azim ool Dowlut, the Nabob Mahomed Meer Khan Behauder, Naswunt Jung, who is born of an illustrious race, and sprung from the family of the Prophet. He laid the letter before me, and it has given me much pleasure. I always have approved, and I still approve, the friendship with the Company, which was formerly confirmed by treaties. I see no manner of alteration in it. The Nabob

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘Camp, 22nd November, 1803.

‘I have received your Marhatta letter dated the 17th November, shortly after I had received your Persian letter, in which you informed me that you would send your vakeel, Mahomed Meer Khan. In the mean time, as your vakeels Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana are persons trusted on your part, and you desire that I shall converse with them, and they have communicated to me those orders which they have received from you, I have conversed with them on the subject of peace between the British Government and its allies and you, and they will make you acquainted with the particulars of my conversation. In respect to your wish that I should send an officer to your camp, I have to observe to you that I can have no objection to that measure, excepting that it is useless. The peace between the British Government and you can be settled only in this camp. But if I should have any thing in particular to communicate, I shall send an officer to represent it.

‘*Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘Camp at the bottom of the Rajoora ghaut, 25th Nov.. 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘I have just received your letter of the 24th; and in the night, one of the 21st, and another of the 22nd.

‘I have already informed you that the whole of Scindiah’s durbar are intriguing for the office of vakeel in this camp, and who shall make the peace. This information will give you the clue to all Mirza Wahed Beg’s letters; and will account for his urging us one day to do every thing that can be agreeable to Scindiah, and on the next, to attack him with all our forces.

‘In a military, as well as in a political point of view, I never was more convinced of the propriety of any measure, than of that of agreeing, at the present moment, to the cessation of hostilities with Scindiah; and I am glad to find, by your letter to me of the 24th, that you are of the same opi-

who is named above will soon be sent off, in compliance with your summons. My friend, if in the mean time any other person should hold out that he is negotiating for me, you must by no means believe him, without a writing, signed and sealed by me in the usual manner.

‘What shall I write more?’

nion. Indeed, the cessation is so favourable to us, and so little so to Scindiah, that I almost doubt his ratifying it. If I find it is used as a mode to delay the conclusion of the peace, I shall put an end to it directly.

‘Notwithstanding the arrangement in the cessation of arms, I think it probable that Scindiah will endeavor to place himself to the westward, instead of to the eastward, of Ellichpoor. If you should find that you can stop him, without delaying materially your arrival at Gawilghur, it would be desirable to do so; but if to attempt it should be likely materially to delay your arrival at Gawilghur, it is better to take no notice of him.

‘If he should send my letter to you to inform you of the cessation of arms, (a duplicate of which I sent on the 23rd,) and he should still be to the westward, I recommend that you should write to him, that the condition of the cessation is, that he should go to the eastward of Ellichpoor, and that you hope that he will comply with it.

‘If he should not comply with it, and he should be within your reach to attack, without putting yourself materially out of your way, I recommend that you should do so; otherwise not. I recommend that you should march by the west road towards Ellichpoor, as you propose.

‘My intention is to move up towards Ellichpoor, to cover your operations. I shall be to-morrow at Barsee Tankly, or at Scindkeira—they are only two coss distant from each other; next day I shall be at Akola. I conclude that you will leave Ballapoor on to-morrow, the 26th, and will be at Huttee Andoorah, on the Poornah river, on the 27th. This place is only four or five coss from Akola; and I shall send you two of my 12 pounders, and my two 5½ inch howitzers, on the 27th. I have no 8 inch howitzers.

‘I shall send with this ordnance some pioneers; but I cannot send you any artillerymen, as I have but few of them.

‘If any thing should prevent me from sending you the ordnance, as I have above proposed, it shall be sent on to join you from Ellichpoor, long before you can require it at the siege.

‘I shall also endeavor to get an account of Gawilghur, which I will send you.

‘I am happy to hear that your health is mended. Shall you want my bullocks with my ordnance? If you do, you shall have them.

‘I shall send the ammunition with the howitzers, but not with the 12 pounders.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘ Camp, at Scindkeira, 26th
November, 1803.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL,

‘ I have just received your letter of yesterday ; but you differ, in your account of your situation, from a man who declares he saw your camp last night at Moorgaum, about eleven miles from hence. The account I have of the distance between Akola and Huttee Andoorah is, that it is twelve coss : it will, therefore, be impossible to send you the guns to-morrow, as I intended ; but if I should find the distance to be within reach, I shall send them to you ; if not, I shall send them to you hereafter, as I told you in my letter of yesterday.

‘ Let me know the particulars of your route to Ellichpoor, in case I should have an opportunity of sending the guns before you reach that place.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Colonel Stevenson.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lord W. Bentinck.

‘ Camp at Scindkeira, in Berar,
26th November, 1803.

MY LORD,

‘ Your Lordship will have been made acquainted with the state of affairs in this quarter, from time to time, by the copies of my dispatches to the Governor General, which I have regularly transmitted through General Stuart. But within these few days the enclosures of these dispatches have been so numerous, and are so long, that I have been under the necessity of delaying, for some time, to send copies of them to Fort St. George ; but I have acquainted General Stuart, in a letter of the 23rd instant, with the general situation of our affairs here ; and I have requested him to lay such parts of it before your Lordship, as he might think necessary for your information.

‘ I hope you will excuse my adopting this mode of communicating to you the state of affairs, to which nothing but the circumstances I have above mentioned should induce me. Since I wrote that letter to General Stuart, matters have remained nearly in the same state in which they then were. I have moved into Berar, and am at a short distance from Colonel Stevenson, who is on his march towards Gawilghur.

‘ I take this opportunity of congratulating your Lordship on your arrival at Fort St. George. I should have written to you when I heard of your arrival, only that at the time I

had nothing to communicate which you were not likely to know from a persual of my dispatches to the Governor General.

‘ I beg to present my respects to Lady W. Bentinck, with whom I had the pleasure of being acquainted formerly : but so much time has elapsed since I have met her, that I am afraid she will have forgotten me.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Lord W. Bentinck.*

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ *MY DEAR COLONEL,* ‘ Camp, 26th November, 1803.

‘ I have received your letter of the 20th.

‘ The present state of the Peshwah’s mind is very satisfactory, and I will give him the guns. I wrote this day to Ahmednuggur, to desire that six guns may be got ready, their carriages to be neatly painted, the bullocks, &c., to be well equipped with yokes, and to be sent to you at Poonah. I beg you to present them to the Peshwah ; but before you do so, it will be necessary to have some Poonah people as bullock drivers, as my Mysore people will not stay with him ; and even if they would, I could not well spare their services from Ahmednuggur, where I have nearly one thousand gun bullocks.

‘ Amrut Rao has not yet joined ; his vakeel is not yet come in, and, therefore, I am unable to give you an answer upon the subject of your letter to the Governor General. In a few days, however, I hope to be able to write to you fully upon that subject.

‘ I have taken the freebooter Ghazy Khan into the Company’s service ; and he is to be employed in keeping my rear quiet.

‘ I have nothing new to tell you about the negotiation.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ *MY DEAR COLONEL,* ‘ Camp at Akolah, 27th Nov., 1803.

‘ Amrut Rao has come within a short distance from camp, and I have seen and spoken to his vakeel respecting a cordial reconciliation with the Peshwah. I spoke to him particularly respecting the cession of Poonadur ; and he said that he was certain that Amrut Rao would have no difficulty in giving

up the fort, provided the killadar with his family were taken under the protection of the Company, and carried away to Ah-mednuggur; and that the arrears of the garrison, amounting to fifty thousand rupees, were paid, and Amrut Rao allowed to carry away his private property which is now there.

'The vakeel is to come to me again to-morrow upon this and other subjects, and I will let you know what I shall arrange with him. Amrut Rao's vakeel told me that Baba Phurkia had taken service with the Soubah of the Deccan.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Lieut. Colonel Close.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'SIR,

'Camp, 27th November, 1803.

'I have had the honor to receive your dispatch of the 18th instant, upon the subject of Captain Parmentier.

'The Governor General certainly intended that his proclamation of the 29th of August should be liberally construed; and I am of opinion that, as far as the evidence goes, Captain Parmentier is entitled to benefit by it.

'Before I can fix the sum which Captain Parmentier is to receive, it is necessary that I should know from him the amount of his monthly pay, and regulated allowances in the service of Dowlut Rao Scindiah. Accordingly, I request that this account may be required from him.

'In the mean time, if Captain Parmentier should want money for his present subsistence, which, as he has money at Bombay, is not very probable, I request that he may be supplied to the amount of 300 rupees per mensem. The difference between this sum and that which he received in Scindiah's service will be paid to him as soon as I shall have ascertained what he received heretofore.

'I have no objection to Captain Parmentier residing at Bombay on his *parole*, if the Honorable the Governor thinks proper to permit him so to do.

'I have called upon Lieut. Stuart to give an account, similar to that I have above requested might be required from Captain Parmentier. I have no objection to his residing at Bombay; and I will let you know what sum is to be paid to him monthly, as soon as I shall receive the document in question. In the mean time, he might receive 200 rupees per mensem on account.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'You may release the patel of Korget Coraygaum; but write a complaint of him in my name to Rao Rumbo's manager.

'You did right to promote the jemidar's son.

'Some days ago Amrut Rao sent me a memorandum, by which it appears that a village, now in the Ahmednuggur district, was formerly allotted for the support of a pagah of horse, which is now serving with him. He acknowledges that they have no longer any right to draw their subsistence from that village; but he wishes that the horses which are detained there should be allowed to be taken away.

'I shall be obliged to you if you will inquire upon this subject. I have lost the memorandum, but have explained the contents of it, as well as I can recollect them, and I beg you to let the horses go.

'Believe me, &c.

'Captain Graham.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Parterly, 30th November, 1803.

'I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the armies of Dowlut Rao Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar yesterday afternoon, on the plains of Argaum in this neighbourhood, with the divisions of the army under my immediate command, and the subsidiary force serving with the Soubah of the Deccan, under Colonel Stevenson, and completely defeated the enemy, having taken from them their cannon, ammunition, &c., and destroyed vast numbers of them.

'I have reason to believe that the loss which I have sustained upon this occasion has not been great. No officer has been killed, and but few wounded. I will forward to your Excellency a detailed account of this action, as well as of the circumstances which led to it, as soon as I shall receive a return of the killed and wounded.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.' • 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp, at Parterly, 30th November, 1803.

'Having found that the Rajah of Berar was moving towards his own territories,—that the body of troops he had with him was but small, decreasing in numbers daily, and not likely to do much mischief to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, I descended the ghauts by Rajoora on the 25th, in order to support and cover Colonel Stevenson's operations against Gawilghur in Berar.

‘ Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asseerghur for the siege of that fort, and had marched to Ballapoor, where he was joined on the 24th by the brinjarries, and other supplies which had been saved from the enemy by Captain Baynes’ affair at Umber; and he marched forward on the 26th.

‘ Your Excellency has been informed, that on the 23rd I had consented to a suspension of hostilities* with the troops of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, in this quarter and Guzerat. The condition on which this agreement depended, viz., “that Scindiah should occupy position twenty coss to the east of Ellichpoor,” had not been carried into execution; and Scindiah was encamped at Sersooly, about four miles from the camp of Manoo Bappoo, brother to the Rajah of Berar, which was at this place. The army of the former consisted only of cavalry; that of the latter, of cavalry, and a great part, if not the whole, of Ragojee Bhoonslah’s regular infantry; and a large proportion of artillery.

‘ In the course of the 28th, the vakeels from Dowlut Rao Scindiah urgently pressed me not to attack these troops; but I informed them repeatedly that there was no suspension of arms with Ragojee Bhoonslah; and none with Scindiah, till he should comply with the terms of his agreement; and that I should certainly attack the enemies of the Company wherever I should find them.

‘ Colonel Stevenson’s division and mine both marched to this place yesterday; the Colonel having with great prudence and propriety halted on the 28th at Huttee Andorah, to enable me to co-operate in the attack of the enemy. We found on our arrival that the armies of both Chiefs had decamped; and from a tower in Parterly, I could perceive a confused mass, about two miles beyond Sersooly and Scindiah’s old camp, which I concluded to be their armies in march.

‘ The troops had marched a great distance on a very hot day, and I therefore did not think it proper to pursue them; but shortly after our arrival here, bodies of horse appeared in our front, with which the Mysore cavalry skirmished during a part of the day; and when I went out to push forward the piquets of the infantry to support the Mysore cavalry, and to take up the ground of our encampment, I could perceive distinctly a long line of infantry, cavalry, and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of that village, and about six miles from this place, at which I intended to encamp.

* See Agreement, p. 492.

‘ Although late in the day, I immediately determined to attack this army. Accordingly, I marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading in a direction nearly parallel to that of the enemy’s line ; covering the rear and left by the Mogul and Mysore cavalry.’

‘ The enemy’s infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on their left. Scindiah’s army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of pindarries and other light troops. Their line extended above five miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum ; and in their front a plain, which, however, was much cut by water-courses, &c.

‘ I formed the army in two lines ; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second, and supporting the right ; and the Mogul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy ; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy’s left. Some little time elapsed before the lines could be formed, owing to a part of the infantry of my division which led the column having got into some confusion. When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order ; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Scindiah’s cavalry charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed ; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition.

‘ The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels and much baggage. The Mogul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Some of the latter are still following them ; and I have sent out this morning all of the Mysore, Mogul, and Marhatta cavalry, in order to secure as many advantages from this victory as can be gained, and complete the enemy’s confusion.

‘ For the reasons stated in the commencement of this letter, the action did not commence till late in the day ; and unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have wished ; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a return of our loss in this action. The troops conducted themselves with their usual bravery. The 74th and 78th regiments had a particular opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and have deserved

and received my thanks. I am also much indebted to Colonel Stevenson, for the advice and assistance I received from him ; to the Hon Lieut. Colonel St. Leger for the manner in which he led on the British cavalry ; and to Lieut. Colonels Wallace, Adams (who commanded Lieut. Colonel Harness's brigade, the latter being absent on account of severe indisposition,) Halyburton, Maclean, Pogson, and Major Huddleston, who commanded brigades of cavalry and infantry ; to Major Campbell commanding the 94th regiment ; to Captain Beauman commanding the artillery with the divisions under my immediate command ; to Captain Burke commanding the artillery with the subsidiary force ; and to the officers of the staff with my division, and belonging to the subsidiary force.

'I have also to inform your Excellency, that the Mogul cavalry under Salabut Khan, and the Mysore cavalry under Bisnapah Pundit, distinguished themselves. The former took a standard from Scindiah's troops. The Marhatta cavalry were not engaged, as the person who went to them with orders missed his road. Amrut Rao was not in the action, as he had encamped some distance in my rear on the 28th, and he could not march the whole distance to Parterly yesterday morning ; but he sent for orders as soon as he heard that I intended to attack the enemy.

'I propose to march to-morrow towards Gawilghur, and I shall lose no time in attacking that place.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor General.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To Colonel Murray.

'SIR,

'Camp, 1st December, 1803.

'Since I wrote to you on the 24th ultimo, Dowlut Rao Scindiah has failed to carry into execution the articles of agreement made by his vakeels for suspending hostilities with the troops under my command, and joined himself with an army commanded by Manoo Bappoo, in the service of the Rajah of Berar. Accordingly, I attacked their combined armies on the 29th November, and entirely defeated

* '*Return of the Killed and Wounded of the Division of the army under Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley and of the Troops composing the Subsidiary Force.*

H. M's. 19th Lt. Dragoons.
The Hon. Company's Artillery.
H. M's. 74th regt.
— 78th do.
— 94th do.

<i>Europeans.</i>				
	Cap.	Sub.	Drum.	R. & F.
Killed	—	—	—	15
Wounded	3	6	6	145

them, taking from them cannon, ammunition, &c. My loss upon this occasion has not been great. Since this action, Scindiah is gone off to the westward with the remnants of his army, which likewise is directly contrary to the treaty.

'By letters received this day from the Government of Bombay, I am happy to observe that you will soon be relieved from the fruitless pursuit of Canojee, and that the Resident at Baroda is exerting himself to bring into the field a respectable body of Marhatta cavalry. Whatever may be the success of those exertions, you will be enabled, by the flight of Canojee, to join Major Holmes at Dohud; and I conclude that you will have commenced your march to that quarter as soon as possible. You will be so kind as to make all your preparations for moving forward upon Ougein from Dohud, when I shall send you orders to do so.

'I certainly never should have agreed to the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat, if I had had the smallest hopes that you could have been able to move forward upon Ougein; and I certainly shall not allow myself to be tricked out of the benefits of it in this quarter, now that I find that the situation of affairs is so much improved in Guzerat, as to render it no longer desirable there.

'I should not be surprised if Scindiah were himself to go into Hindustan. I know that he has once or twice intended it, as he is now only a vagabond in the Deccan: but I will keep you apprized of events as they occur; and I have only to request that you will be in a state of equipment to move forward at once, when you shall receive orders to do so; and that you will do every thing in your power to obtain information of roads, distance, &c.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

3rd regt. Native Cavalry	
4th do.	do.
5th do.	do.
6th do.	do.
7th do.	do.
1st batt. 2nd regt. Infantry.	
2nd do.	do.
1st do. 3rd	do.
1st do. 4th	do.
1st do. 6th	do.
2nd do. 7th	do.
1st do. 8th	do.
2nd do. 9th	do.
1st do. 10th	do.
1st do. 11th	do.
2nd do. 12th	do.

Natives.
Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates.

Killed	31
Wounded	148
Missing	5

N. B.—The Officers being British are included under the head of Europeans.

'R. BARCLAY. Dep. Adj. Gen.'

To Major Shawe.

‘ MY DEAR SIR, ‘ Camp at Akote, 2nd Dec., 1803.

‘ I have but little to add to my letter of the 30th to the Governor General respecting the battle of Argaum. The number of the enemy destroyed is very great. Vittell Punt, who commanded the cavalry of the Rajah of Berar, was killed ; and Gopal Bhow, who commanded Scindiah’s cavalry that fought, was wounded. If we had had daylight an hour more, not a man would have escaped.

‘ We should have had that time, if my native infantry had not been panic struck, and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assye, being broke and running off, when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there, I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for every thing that we should certainly have performed.

‘ The troops were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night.

‘ Nothing could have been more fortunate than my return to the northward. I just arrived in time. Colonel Stevenson was not delayed for me more than one day ; and it is a curious circumstance, that, after having been so long separated, and such a distance between us, we should have joined at a moment so critical.

‘ A vakeel has come in from the Rajah of Berar, but nothing very particular has occurred. I have demanded compensation from the Rajah ; and I have desired the vakeel to stay at Ellichpoor until he is authorized to grant it.

‘ The powers to Scindiah’s vakeels were not quite so perfect upon this point as I wished ; and they shall go away to-morrow, unless they can produce them in a more perfect form. There is no dealing with these Marhattas, unless they are treated in this manner ; and unless a regular document is brought forward upon every point that may occur.

‘ The Rajah is much alarmed about Gawilghur, and I think he is sincere ; indeed, I think Scindiah is so likewise. But every Marhatta chief is so haughty, and so prone to

delay, that I suspect that both these Chiefs will be ruined, rather than submit to the conditions which I must require from them.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Akote, 2nd December, 1803.

‘ I have received and perused your letter to his Excellency the Governor General, of the 15th November.

‘ I entirely agree in opinion with you respecting the propriety of resuming parts of the great jaghire lands as the best mode of restoring the government of the Soubah of the Decan. But I beg leave to recommend, that the first step taken should be to provide some public force for the service of the Soubah’s government, by the means of which this measure could be carried into execution.

‘ Unless this is done, the execution of the measure will fall upon the British Government, whereby a great expense will be incurred; and the unpopularity of the British Government, which certainly exists already in a great degree, will be much increased.

‘ This object is certainly not one immediately referable to me; but I think it possible that, at the conclusion of the war, some means may be devised to place the public force of the Nizam’s government upon a better footing; and it is very desirable that you should turn your thoughts to that subject.

‘ In its present state, it is of no use whatever. The Soubah can do nothing without the assistance of the British Government: this inconvenience will increase daily, unless some remedy is applied, and in a greater proportion as the extent of the Soubah’s territories may be greater; or the consequence will be, that the British troops must always be in the field; and indeed, if the Soubah’s military establishments are not improved, the subsidiary force, as at present, will not be equal to the duties which will be required from it.

‘ I hope that you will excuse the liberty I have taken in drawing your attention to this subject; but it is one which I consider of great importance, and the evil certainly requires a speedy remedy.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

' SIR. ' Camp, 2nd December, 1803.

' I received yesterday evening your letters of the 9th and 12th of November, after I had written to you the public letter of yesterday's date, which will reach you through Mr. Duncan.

‘ I am concerned to observe the state of your Marhatta cavalry, and the trouble they give you by plundering the country : there is no remedy for it, but I positively forbid it.

‘ I recommend to you to have a conference upon this point with the Chief of the Guickwar troops, to tell him that this practice must be stopped, and that you are determined to punish, with the utmost severity, any that might be guilty of it.

'If my Marhatta allies did not know that I should hang any one that might be found plundering, not only I should have starved long ago, but most probably my own coat would have been taken off my back.*

'There is no intention whatever, at least I shall never consent to the measure, to give the countries conquered in Guzerat to the Guickwar government to pay their troops.

'I have recommended that no tribute should be taken from any of the Bheel Rajahs.

* 'One of the camp followers was hanged yesterday for stealing a cow from a village, and this evening two villagers were executed in the same manner, for binding a Sepoy, and carrying him off with an intent to rob, if not to murder him. Two officers, who were shooting, discovered the transaction, and pursued the fellows, who ran off, after robbing their prisoner, but were brought in to the number of fourteen, from their village; the other twelve were soundly flogged and dismissed. The proceedings on these occasions are very summary: the fact and person ascertained, punishment follows in a few hours. many affect to think this a very arbitrary exercise of illegal power, but these are persons who are not daily subject to the deprivations occasioned by camp robbery; yet it cannot be questioned that such a mode of proceeding is in the end the mildest, best adapted to the people of the country and the camp followers, and, as above mentioned, impartially applied to both.' If justice was not effectually administered between bad servants, the certainty of a ready sale, and great difficulty of detection, with the expertness and number of the country thieves, our property would never be secure, either on a march or at night. For smaller thefts, neglects, and insolence, there is a smaller punishment, that of flogging through the bazaar; the Deputy Adjutant General is in these cases the judge, aided by the cutwal of the bazaar: and the complaints of officers, when well founded, are paid immediate attention to.—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K C.B., 24th Nov. 1803.*

‘In respect to your being under my orders, the best thing you can do is, to correspond officially with me; and to send copies of your letters, or of such parts of them as you may think necessary, to Mr. Duncan. By this mode of transacting business, every thing will be much more clear than it is now, and you will be made acquainted with my sentiments on every point in a public form.

‘In respect to your arrangements with the Bheels, they must and shall be confirmed as far as they affect the British Government, provided they are not inconsistent with the other engagements of the government with other powers. The Guickwar government has nothing to do with them. But you must let me have an account of all the arrangements you have made with the Bheels and other Rajahs.

‘The Company never can nor will pay choute, and therefore the arrangements you have made with the Barreah Rajah must be confirmed.

‘I hope to be able to write to you to-morrow, to let you know whether or not you are to advance to Ougein.

‘What troops do you leave at Surat, if you draw away the 75th? That city is very important, and I know that each of the confederates has had an eye upon it; and Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar had designed to march there with their cavalry after the battle of Assye.

‘I have the honour to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘Camp at Paundy, 15 miles south of Gawilghur,
3rd December, 1803.

‘SIR,

‘I have the honor to enclose a letter from Captain Dalrymple, which Colonel Stevenson has put into my hands, at the same time strongly recommending the writer of it. It appears that he has taken much pains with his department, and is well deserving of your favor.

‘While writing upon this subject, I take the liberty of mentioning to you that Captain Noble has applied to be made a commissary, instead of an assistant, as he now is. To grant this application will make no difference in point of expense, and it is an object to Captain Noble in case he should be promoted. I beg leave to recommend him to you, as an officer with whom I have every reason to be satisfied.

‘I have Gawilghur now in sight, and it does not appear to be so strong as many hill forts in Mysore taken by our troops. However, we shall see more of it in a few days.

ridiculous reports among my posts on the Kistna, by which all were alarmed; and the commanding officer at Hullihall thought proper to detach a great part of his garrison to their relief. There was not the smallest foundation for this, or many other reports brought to and circulated by——; and I have desired him to order his hircarrahs, if he should think proper to employ them, not to go near my posts.

‘The country has been undisturbed since I passed through it in March last, except by a few polygars who attacked the fort of Manowly, belonging to Appah Dessaye, when General Campbell last moved down towards Raichore. It will remain in the same state of tranquillity, if no unnecessary alarm is created; but if the common hircarrahs and news writers are attended to, we shall in the first place suffer all the inconvenience of war in imagination; and in the next place we should, by our fears, at last provoke disturbances.

‘I have given a pretty strong hint to —— upon this subject; for I see that these histories of his are circulated in all parts of the country, and at Bombay; and they even come to Poonah. I know that they are entirely without foundation.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

‘P.S.—The communication with Mysore has been to this day uninterrupted. We have not lost a bullock load of anything during the war, or a tappall among the rivers. The few tappalls which have been carried off, have been by thieves near Poonah, and I have a post near Poonadur to check them.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘*SIR,* ‘Camp at Ellichpoor, 5th December, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 23rd of November, upon the subject of the conduct of the military at Surat. When the residence of officers who have been accused of improper and riotous behaviour has been described, names have in some instances been stated, and in all a description of their persons, and of their mode of conveyance, has been given, it is scarcely to be credited that the commanding officer had it not in his power to discover those who were accused. At all events, measures might, and ought to have been adopted by the commanding officer to put an end to these disgraceful proceedings, which it appears he entirely neglected.

‘ 2. Under these circumstances, I take the liberty of recommending, first, that the commanding officer of Surat may be removed from his situation ; and secondly, that orders may be given to the civil magistrate to seize, and send to Bombay for trial in the court of the Recorder, any officer who may hereafter be accused for rioting in the streets or city of Surat. Of course, the civil magistrate must do every thing in his power that the person of the officer of whom complaint may be made may be ascertained, and his name known ; and in this respect I have to observe, that the civil magistrate does not appear to me to have done every thing that he could do.

‘ 3. I have also received your dispatch of the 23rd of November, relative to Colonel ——. Upon this subject I have to observe, that it would be very agreeable to me if Lieut. Colonel — were removed to another corps ; and this measure would put a stop to all complaints from the Peshwah’s amildar at Panwell. I cannot allow Lieut. Colonel — to join his corps at Poonah, because I do not conceive he is the fittest person to have the command of the troops there ; I have therefore ordered that he should remain at Panwell ; for it appears that he acknowledges, and is determined to continue, the abuses of which the amildar complains.

‘ 4. I have likewise the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 24th, regarding Mr. De Souza’s complaint against Lieut. Colonel ——. I beg leave to suggest that Mr. De Souza may be desired to prosecute Lieut. Colonel — in the Recorder’s court for his conduct. I beg leave to recommend that Lieut. Colonel — may be dismissed from his command, and Lieut. — from his situation of Fort Adjutant of Baroach ; and I am of opinion that it would be very beneficial to the service in this country to send Lieut. Colonel — to join that part of his corps which is in Europe.

‘ 5. I have likewise had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 25th of November. It is impossible but that the Governor must suppose that I should feel the greatest concern in reading Colonel Murray’s letter to Major General Nicolls of the 12th of November. It must rest with government to take such measures as may be thought proper to vindicate its own dignity and authority. I cannot presume to suggest any thing in such a case ; and I have only to add, that I will submit with cheerfulness, and carry into execution, as far as may be in my power, whatever may be ordered upon this unfortunate occurrence.

‘6. In respect to the allusions to my opinions on the Governor’s remarks upon Colonel Murray’s letter, I have to say, that I never had but one opinion upon the subject of the revenue management of the districts conquered from Scindiah in Guzerat; and that was, that it should be in the hands of Major Walker. In my private letter to Colonel Murray the same opinion was given; and a conduct conformable thereto was enjoined. It is perfectly true, that I approved of Colonel Murray’s settling the country as he went on; but the reasons for that approbation were, first, that it was absolutely necessary for the subsistence and safety of the troops that the country should be settled; secondly, that Major Walker was not with the army himself, and had no servants with it to take charge and make the settlement of the countries which it should conquer. The approbation contained in my private letter to Colonel Murray went no farther than to his settling as he went on under these circumstances; and it is followed by a particular injunction to do it in communication with Major Walker, to whom I informed him that the revenue management had been given by order from the Bombay government.

‘7. In conducting the extensive duties with which I am charged, it has been my constant wish to conform to existing rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, every thing might go on in its accustomed channel. For this reason, and for others not necessary at present to discuss, I have sent no orders to Colonel Murray, excepting two orders applicable to the general state of affairs, which have lately gone to him, but which were first submitted to the Governor for his approbation.

‘I do not comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system according to which the connexion with the Guickwar government is carried on; but this possibly proceeds from ignorance of the subject. At all events, I know that I am not able to suggest or order any measure that could remedy it; and if I were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would be inconsistent with the existing system. I am therefore very desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part in the internal concerns of Guzerat than I have hitherto; and that matters should be conducted as usual, under the immediate orders of government. Whenever the Honorable the Governor in Council may think proper to call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it him, to the best of my judgment and abilities; and I shall do so whenever I may think it necessary, in all matters which

have a relation to our general situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never intended that I should be charged.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘ Camp, 6th December, 1803.

‘ I have this instant received a proposal from Baba Phurkia to be allowed to come in upon a cowle. The amount of the proposal is, that I should give an asylum to him and his family, and endeavor to procure a pardon for him from the Peshwah; the meaning of which is, that I should find means of paying four thousand horse, which he says he has with him.

‘ Baba Phurkia, in my opinion, stands strictly in the relation of a rebel to the Poonah state; and it is doubtful to me whether it will be proper to have any communication with him excepting with the Peshwah’s consent. At all events, I should not like to commence an arrangement with Baba Phurkia without first sounding the Peshwah on the subject.

‘ It is certainly desirable that this, as well as every other great chief of the Marhatta empire, should be conciliated and brought back into the service of the Peshwah. On this ground I wish you to try whether you could prevail on the Peshwah to pardon Baba Phurkia.

‘ He promises fairly that he will serve his Highness faithfully, and will never again have any communication with his enemies. If his Highness should consent to pardon Baba Phurkia, I think that I can arrange with him to serve the state for his ancient serinjaumy, which was for seven hundred horse.

‘ I have informed Baba Phurkia that I know the Peshwah is much incensed against him, and that I fear I shall find it difficult to appease his Highness. In the mean time, I have desired him to remove from the Soubah’s territories, in which he now is, to those of the Rajah of Berar, beyond the Wurda, and I have promised to move to his assistance in case the Rajah should attack him.

‘ Thus I have succeeded in bringing upon that rascal the full measure of God’s vengeance; and if I live a month longer, he shall either be at peace with the Company, or I

shall be at Nagpoor, with all the armies either with me or about me. We shall take Gawilghur, I hope, with ease. The fort has been firing all day at my parties, which I have pushed to the foot of the hill.

‘Our late victory was grand; it has made a great impression throughout the country. Indeed, between the destruction there dealt out, and the consequent desertion of troops, the enemy have but few troops left; and I anxiously hope that they will come within reach to allow me to give them a parting blow with our cavalry only.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

• *To Colonel Murray.*

‘*SIR,* ‘Camp at Ellichpoor, 6th December, 1803.

‘I have received your letter of the 15th of November, upon the subject of Bulchund having joined Canojee. That may be the case, and yet Holkar may not have entered the confederacy. I acknowledge that as he has kept out of the scrape so long, and as we have been so successful, I shall be slow to believe that he will now come forward.

‘I have already answered you upon the subject of the arrangements with the Bheels. Concert them with Major Walker, so that we may not be involved in contradictory engagements, and let me know what you propose should be done, and I will ratify them, if I should approve of them.

‘I have read, with the utmost concern, the copy of a letter which you wrote to General Nicolls on the 12th of November. This paper was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more of it; and I strongly recommend to you to desire to withdraw it. It contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan personally, and upon his government; and a hope is expressed in it, which I am convinced you could never entertain, that the day was not far distant when the Government, and of course the British interests, would be involved in difficulties.

• ‘An officer in the service of a government, let his rank be what it may, has no right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to that government; even supposing that they were merited, and had been excited in his mind by a long course of injurious treatment by such government. So far from that being the case, I must say that the occasion upon which you wrote did not warrant such opinions, and ought not to have excited your anger in any manner. On the contrary, I think that the letter written to Major General

Nicolls, by the Government of Bombay, promised the fullest support to your revenue arrangements at Godra, and that was all that you could expect. For my part, I did not expect it; and when I received the copy of their letter to Major General Nicolls, which I did when it was written, I was astonished that the subject should have been viewed in so liberal a manner.

‘I enclose you a copy of my letter to the government of Bombay upon this subject. Remember that I tell you that no person can approve of your having written the letter in question; you may depend upon it that the Governor General will take the most serious notice of it, and, therefore, I again most anxiously recommend you to withdraw it.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp, 10th December, 1803.

‘Since I wrote to you this morning, Amrut Rao’s vakeel has been here, and has told me that thirty sirdars and 500 of the Peshwah’s Pagah horse, whom his Highness sent away when he embarked at Mhar, had joined Baba Phurkia. Baba Phurkia has lately dismissed them, (in fact he has been defeated in the Nizam’s territories) and they are now desirous of returning to the Peshwah’s service, obtaining a pardon; or, if that should not be granted, they are ready to deliver up their horses. They are now in a village in the Nizam’s country, ten coss, and if the Peshwah chooses to have them, Captain Graham will be able to find out from Amrut Rao’s son where they are. I enclose an account of their names.

‘Besides these people, there is a body of 3000 horse in this camp belonging to Amrut Rao, which I am now paying, which the Peshwah might as well take into his service. I wish you would propose this measure to him; but if he does not comply with your proposal, I shall discharge them immediately.

‘Amrut Rao has also a very fine battalion of infantry of 700 men; possibly the Peshwah would like to have that also. But I do not know whether Amrut Rao would part with it. You may sound the Peshwah, and I will try Amrut Rao. The whole expense of Amrut Rao’s troops is 87,000 rupees per mensem.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Armstrong.

‘Camp before Gawilghur, 11th
December, 1803.

‘SIR,

‘I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 14th of November, conveying the orders of his Excellency the Governor General, that I should order one of the European regiments in Guzerat to be sent to Fort William.

‘From the different letters which I have lately addressed to him, his Excellency will have observed that the troops in that part of India are very unhealthy. There are in Guzerat three complete regiments of Europeans, besides detachments, which in numbers of companies ought to amount to a fourth; but Colonel Murray has been obliged to draw from the garrisons, and from Surat, the troops thought necessary and allotted for their defence, in order to reinforce his corps in the field. The 65th regiment, which arrived at Bombay nine hundred strong in May last, has not now one hundred men for duty; and the 75th regiment is nearly in the same state.

‘Under these circumstances, it does not appear to me that it will be practicable to withdraw a regiment of Europeans from Guzerat, without exposing to risk all the British interests in that quarter.

‘The actions in which the troops of this army have been engaged, and the general severity of the service, have weakened the corps to such a degree, that none of them would be a great acquisition to the army under the Commander-in-Chief, or to the garrison of Fort William, even if it was practicable to detach a regiment through Berar in either direction. But that appears to be impossible, on account of the great distance, the natural difficulties of the country through which the troops would have to pass, and the savage ferocity of the inhabitants.

‘The batteries against this fort will, I hope, open the day after to-morrow.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain Armstrong.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Shawe.

‘Camp before Gawilghur,
12th Dec., 1803.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘I sincerely congratulate you upon General Lake’s victory at Cassowly*, which I hope will be the last in this war.

*Afterwards called the battle of Laswarree

‘I wish it was in my power to reinforce General Lake’s army; but you will have seen by my letter to Captain Armstrong that it is impossible; and, indeed, I doubt much, whether the Governor General will wish to weaken Guzerat, when he observes the importance which the enemy attach to the operations of the corps in that country; and when he contemplates the probability, that if I should make peace with Ragojee Bhoonslah, or should be able to disengage one of the divisions from the operations in his country, I shall carry it immediately into Hindustan, and the corps in Guzerat will come into activity.

‘I think that I am getting on towards peace. Ragojee’s vakeel does not object to the compensation which I have asked for the Company; but he does to that required for the Nizam. I have demanded that his boundary should be the Wurda river, from its source in the Gawile hills to its junction with the Godavery. It would then be advanced as far as it appears to be in Rennell’s map.

‘I shall find a difficulty in settling with Scindiah, on account of the total want of information respecting the countries which I have demanded from him. His vakeels declare that he has no countries north of the Rajpoots, of which the Peshwah and Holkar have not each a third; excepting Perron’s jaghire, which he is willing to make over to the Company.

‘Therefore, unless we make war upon Holkar, and deprive the Peshwah of his territories, we shall not succeed in driving the Marhattas entirely from these countries, although Scindiah should cede his rights. And I acknowledge that if this is really the state of the case, I should prefer to see Scindiah remain in the partnership, than to introduce the Company.

‘However, I shall adhere as strictly as I can to the instructions which I have received. But the want of information regarding the proceedings of General Lake, even to the extent to which he has pushed his conquests, and of the country from which he has expelled the Marhattas, and taken possession, is a great bar to the progress of the negotiations.

‘The battle made by Scindiah’s ministers, this day, was principally to preserve his influence over the King, and his territories about Ahmednuggur; the last of which, they declared, being the place of his nativity, and the old possession of his ancestors, he never could be brought to consent to give up. I think it appears from what they said about the

King, that the countries in Hindustan were managed in the name of his Majesty, by Scindiah, his vizier.

'The vakeels disclosed this day a great apprehension of Holkar's power; and they almost expressed an expectation that Holkar would attack them, as soon as the peace with the Company should be settled. They said that, in that case, they must depend upon the Company for assistance, in money and troops. When going away, they said they had a proposition to make, to draw closer the connexion between the two governments after the war; to which they hoped we should consent.

'In short, every thing appears to go on well, and I think I shall succeed in settling a peace to the satisfaction of the Governor General

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'I shall open upon this place to-morrow.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 12th December, 1803.

'I have perused your letter to the Governor General, and have received that written to me upon the subject of the Peshwah's desire to receive Cashee Rao Holkar at Poonah.

'You will have observed by my correspondence with the Governor General that I refused to receive Cashee Rao in my camp. The reasons for which I refused it were: first, that he is useless; secondly, the reception of him was likely to create uneasiness in Holkar's mind, and to increase the number of our enemies.

'Both these reasons apply equally to the reception of Cashee Rao by the Peshwah. It is certain that he will be useless, and a burthen to his Highness; but that will not be of much consequence, as his Highness will not do any thing for his relief. It is equally certain, that his residence at Poonah will make Jeswunt Rao uneasy; and it will never be believed that his arrival there, has been unknown to, and without the concurrence of, the English.

'When the war with Scindiah is concluded, of which the prospect becomes better every day, it will be necessary that some arrangement should be made with Holkar to obtain from him the territories of the Poonah Government, provided the Peshwah can make such an exertion as to raise troops to take and keep possession of them. But Holkar may, upon good grounds, refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as his Highness gives an asylum to one whom he affects

to call a rebel and a pretender to the Holkar territories. I most anxiously deprecate fresh cause for war and disturbance, particularly when no end is answered by it; and therefore I am anxious that the Peshwah should be told that he must not receive Cashee Rao Holkar.

'One of two things will be the consequence of his arrival at Poonah. Holkar will refuse to give up the Peshwah's territories, so long as he is there; and we must go to war to force them from him, or we must dismiss Cashee Rao from Poonah on his demand. The first will be inconvenient; the last disgraceful; and it is best to avoid to do that which will probably lead to the necessity of adopting either.

'I have got very far with Scindiah's vakeel. It is strange, that the only demand with which they have positively refused to comply, is one for the Ahmednuggur territory. They consent to give up the fort for the Peshwah. But they say that Jaumgong, Chumargoonda, &c., are the earliest possessions of Scindiah's family, and that he never can give them up. My first project went to his keeping them, but I altered it on Malcolm's suggestion. I wish to know from you, whether these territories are a great object to the Peshwah, and whether they really are the family possessions of Scindiah. I shall storm this fort either to-morrow or next day.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Captain Graham.

'MY DEAR SIR, 'Camp before Gawilghur, 12th Dec. 1803.

'I have received your letter of the 3rd. I approve of your having relieved the garrison of Nimgaum, as you state.

'It will not answer to place in the field a permanent detachment, as you propose, because we have not certain means of feeding it: for however strong it may be, we can never make it one-tenth of the strength of the enemy; and they, by bringing all their forces upon it, may distress it for provisions, and destroy it. In the former case it must retire, and in both cases we should lose our reputation, and that will not answer. It is therefore best to go on as hitherto.

'Your tour, whenever you make it, will be attended with great advantage.

'I approve of your having given 5,000 rupees to Amrut Rao's son; and I wish you to give him 10,000 more. Make an arrangement with one of Amrut Rao's people for the rent of Bingar.

'I enclose two memorandums which I have received from him: one regarding some horses belonging to a silladar in his service, which have been seized in the Ahmednuggur district. I have given this man a cowle, and I request you to let him have his horses; the other, regarding a village said to belong to this man: I have promised him that you would inquire into this claim. I also enclose a claim from Holkar to some villages, upon which I request your answer.

'I expect to-morrow to open my batteries against this place.

'Believe me, &c.

'*Captain Graham.*'

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'*SIR,* *'Camp before Gawilghur, 13th December, 1803.*

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 30th of November, enclosing one from the Medical Board upon the subject of the surgeons sent to this army.

'Since that letter was written, this army has fought another battle, in which many officers and 300 men were wounded; and one of those surgeons is in charge of the hospital which I have established for them. I am at present engaged in a siege, in which I must expect some loss; and, upon the whole, I do not think that I can allow these surgeons to return to Bombay, with justice to the troops under my command.

'I have also received your letter of the 1st instant, enclosing one from the superintendent of police, with a demand of food for dooley bearers. The quantity demanded is three times as much as is issued to any fighting man in this army, and therefore I conclude it is inadmissible; unless the government of Bombay should think it proper to send with them a commissary of provisions, supplied with provisions which it is stated to be necessary to issue to these followers.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*'

'*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'*Camp before Gawilghur,*
14th Dec., 1803.

'*MY DEAR COLONEL,*

'I take advantage of a few moment's leisure, afforded me by having completed all the arrangements for storming this fort this day, as soon as the breach shall be practicable, to write to you upon the subject of the reconciliation between the Peshwah and Amrut Rao.

‘ I enclose a long paper which I have received from Amrut Rao, which contains rather a history of the rascally intrigues of himself and the Peshwah, than an account of the real ground of their dispute. It appears to me to be the desire of Amrut Rao to exercise part of the power of the Poonah government, and the fear and the determination of the Peshwah not to give it to him.

‘ In the prosecution of this dispute, both have been guilty of unjustifiable measures. Amrut Rao joined the Peshwah’s enemies ; and I believe there is little doubt that he was concerned in a plot to deprive his Highness of his government, and to substitute his son in his place. The Peshwah, on the other hand, has imprisoned the families, he seized the houses and property, not only of Amrut Rao’s immediate servants and adherents, but he has imprisoned the persons of the old servants of the state ; those who formerly carried on its business, and those who alone can again carry it on ; under a pretence of their being the adherents of Nana Furravees, or of Amrut Rao.

‘ In respect to Amrut Rao, he has now placed himself in the hands of the British Government ; and considering all the circumstances of the moment, it is not very probable that he will again be guilty of the crimes of which the Peshwah has complained with so much reason.

‘ In respect to the Peshwah, I cannot consider his conduct in the light of a wise sovereign.

‘ In a case such as Amrut Rao’s, there are two lines of conduct to be pursued. One is to raise a force to attack and subdue the rebel, the other is to pardon him ; and if he will not accept the pardon, to endeavor to draw off his adherents by conciliating them : and at all events, by avoiding every act of oppression on their families and servants.

‘ But the principle of the government of Poonah is revenge ; and the gratification of that detestable passion, and nothing else, has yet been listened to.

‘ The parties at this moment stand thus in the contest. Amrut Rao has possession of Poonadur and of some other forts, and valuable territory belonging to the Peshwah ; and the Peshwah has possession of some women, children, and houses at Poonah belonging to Amrut Rao’s servants and adherents, and has the means of annoying others. I think that Amrut Rao has certainly the best of it.

‘ In order to bring the parties to a decent state of reconciliation and friendship, it will be necessary to save the honor of both parties, and that there should be no formal stipulation.

‘Amrut Rao is ready to give up Poonadur and all the places belonging to the Peshwah, provided the houses and property are restored, the families released, and no longer oppressed, belonging to the persons whose names are in the enclosed list No. 1; and provided no oppression is practised on those whose names are in the list No. 2; and on the terms which I stated in a former letter for the surrender of Poonadur particularly.

‘If the Peshwah should comply with these terms, I will engage for Amrut Rao’s surrender of the forts, &c. But his compliance must be accompanied by a real execution of the measures required from him.

‘In response to the persons whose names are mentioned in the paper No. 3, Amrut Rao does not make their release a point on which must depend his reconciliation with the Peshwah; but I consider it to be one of material importance to the welfare, if not to the existence, of the Poonah government.

‘At present, the Peshwah has not in his service a common carkoon or amildar whom he can trust with the management of a single district. His territories are all either in the hands of his enemies, or without managers on his part; and all those persons belonging to his state who are capable of arranging it, and of rendering its resources available for the service of his government, are either in the service of his enemies, or the greater part of them imprisoned or oppressed by his Highness’s government: this is a most serious consideration.

‘The day, I hope, is not far distant, when I shall be able to resign my charge in this country, and when the Peshwah will have an opportunity of settling his countries. But how is it to be done? He has not a carkoon or amildar whom he can put in charge of any one district; he has not a sepoy or a peon whom he can place as a guard on any tannah; and not a soul in his government capable of giving a line of information upon any one point, concerning the administration of the extensive territories, the government of which is in his hands.

‘Not less than fifty times I have pressed the fellow he has here by way of a vakeel, to urge the government to send into Candeish proper persons to take possession of his Highness’s rich districts in that province, which the Nizam’s officers (whom I desired not to interfere with them) have told me are going to ruin for want of a person to manage them.

‘But nothing is done; because, in fact, all the people who are capable of taking charge are in prison, or oppressed

by the Peshwah : I therefore most anxiously recommend it to you to urge the Peshwah to release these people, and to make arrangements for employing them in settling his country and government upon some rational principle. Otherwise, be assured that the Poonah state will never revive.

‘ Another question which occurs upon this point is, what is in future to become of Amrut Rao ? I certainly think that the most satisfactory arrangement for him would be to give him a jaghire to the amount of his pension ; and for the British Government to make good the jaghire to the Peshwah, either by a payment of money, or by a cession in Bundelcund. But this is a question, like many others, which may be deferred till the conclusion of the peace. At all events, I conceive that the British Government ought not to give over to the Peshwah any part of the territories which they may intend to cede to him, until he shall have arranged all his matters with Amrut Rao to their satisfaction.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Colonel Murray.

‘ *SIR,* ‘ Camp before Gawilghur, 14th December, 1803.

‘ I have received your letters of the 17th, 19th, and 23rd November. I have already written to you fully upon the subject of the revenue concerns. All that you have arranged in revenue will be confirmed ; but Major Walker has been appointed by Government to take charge of the districts conquered from Scindiah, and they must be made over to him.

‘ This arrangement will be convenient, as it will save you much time and trouble ; provided there is a perfect understanding between you and Major Walker, and a sincere desire on both sides to carry on the service, and no wish in either to raise his individual personal consequence above that of the other, all will go right ; and the natives will not perceive that there is a divided authority.

‘ It might possibly be proper that there should be no such division of authority ; but upon this point I have to observe, that it is impossible, at such a time as this, to alter all the established system and usages of government without inconvenience, and I certainly cannot attempt such a change. You do not say where Lieut. Carter is, but I have issued an order that he may go to Surat.

‘ In respect to Canojee, I must write you public orders, which I will send to Mr. Duncan. It is a most desirable object to accommodate matters with Canojee ; but unluckily, the state of our engagements with the Guickwar government does not allow of our guiding their affairs in relation to foreign states, in which description may be classed such rebels as Canojee. An arrangement between us and Canojee, in which the Guickwar should not be included, would be liable to the inconveniences of its being unattended to by them, and the war would continue between Canojee and Anund Rao. In this state of affairs we should be obliged to take part with one of the two ; and in this manner we should lose all the advantages which we might hope to derive from the arrangement.

‘ I have very little hope, I acknowledge, that the Guickwar government will be brought to consent to such an arrangement with Canojee, as he ought reasonably to be satisfied with ; not because it is impossible to prevail upon them to consent to such an arrangement, but because I observe that in all our concerns with that government, instead of endeavoring to check the inveteracy of their prejudices and hatreds, (which are common to all native governments,) and the propensity to making their individual passions the rule of the conduct of the government, those evil dispositions are encouraged, and British assistance is given to carry into execution their dictates. I therefore almost despair of an arrangement with Canojee on any ground ; but at all events, supposing him to be inclined to accede to one, it will not answer to make it simply with the British Government, without including the Guickwar state.

‘ I had always the idea of the Bheels stated in Colonel Anderson’s letter. The Bheels (properly so called) are the uncivilized race who inhabit the hills, and rob and plunder every body indiscriminately. The Rajahs, in and bordering on the hills, have great influence over these people, and are besides formidable in themselves, on account of the natural strength of their countries, and the numbers of armed men they can bring into the field for their defence. Both would be our best defence against the attack of a native army ; and the adoption of a liberal policy towards them at once will secure them to us for ever.

‘ The way of securing the uncivilized, or thief Bheels, would be to conciliate the Rajahs, and then we shall be secure. I recommend that, of all other things, we should avoid any interference in their individual quarrels ; or the consequence will be, that we shall be involved in a system of

hostilities, more destructive than that which would attend an attempt to subdue them to the British authority. Under existing circumstances, I think that the suspension of hostilities in Guzerat is a great advantage.

'I expect to storm this fort to-day. The batteries are open, and the troops are in readiness, waiting till the breach is complete. If I do not storm this day, I shall to-morrow. I have then to take Nernulla, and shall make my arrangements for marching a division upon Ougein by Burhampoor. I think that Nernulla will be given up; but at all events, as soon as I shall get possession of it, I shall break the suspension of hostilities with Seindiah, and shall march a division upon Ougein. You might then come forward also.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Colonel Murray.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp, at Deogaum, 15th December, 1803.

'After the battle of Argaum, I determined to lose no time in commencing the siege of Gawilghur. I accordingly marched on, and arrived at Ellichpoor on the 5th instant, with both divisions, and halted there the 6th, in order to establish an hospital for the wounded in the battle of Argaum.

'The fort of Gawilghur is situated in a range of mountains between the sources of the rivers Poorna and Taptee. It stands on a lofty mountain in this range, and consists of one complete inner fort which fronts to the south, where the rock is most steep; and an outer fort, which covers the inner to the north-west and north. This outer fort has a third wall, which covers the approach to it from the north by the village of Labada. All these walls are strongly built, and fortified by ramparts and towers.

'The communications with the fort are through three gates; one to the south with the inner fort; one to the north-west with the outer fort; and one to the north with the third wall. The ascent to the first is very long and steep, and is practicable only for men; that to the second is by a road used for the common communications of the garrison with the countries to the southward; but the road passes round the west side of the fort, and is exposed for a great distance to its fire: it is so narrow as to make it impracticable to approach regularly by it, and the rock is scarped on each side. This road also leads no farther than to the gate. The

communication with the northern gate is direct from the village of Labada, and here the ground is level with that of the fort; but the road to Labada leads through the mountains for about thirty miles from Ellichpoor; and it was obvious that the difficulty and labor of moving ordnance and stores to Labada would be very great.

‘ However, after making inquiry at Ellichpoor, it appeared both to Colonel Stevenson and me, that this point of attack was, upon the whole, the most advantageous, and we accordingly adopted it.

‘ Colonel Stevenson had equipped his corps at Asséeerghur for the siege of Gawilghur, for which service it had long been destined; and I therefore determined that he should make the principal attack by Labada, while I should cover his operations with my own division and all the cavalry; and, if possible, assist them by other attacks to the southward and westward.

‘ On the 6th instant, the 1st batt. 2nd regiment, under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and two companies of the 94th, and the 1st batt. of the 6th under Captain Maitland, were detached; the former to drive in the enemy from the ground which they occupied to the southward of the fort; and the latter to seize the fortified village of Damergaum, which covers the entrance of the mountains by the road by which Colonel Stevenson was to pass towards Labada, and to protect the parties sent forward to reconnoitre and repair the roads in the mountains. Both these detachments succeeded.

‘ On the 7th, both divisions marched from Ellichpoor: Colonel Stevenson, into the mountains by Damergaum, and my division towards the southern face of the fort of Gawilghur. From that day till the 12th, on which Colonel Stevenson broke ground near Labada, the troops in his division went through a series of laborious services, such as I never before witnessed, with the utmost cheerfulness and perseverance. The heavy ordnance and stores were dragged by hand over mountains, and through ravines, for near the whole distance, by roads which it had been previously necessary for the troops to make for themselves.*

* ‘ Our park consisted of four iron 12 pounders, four brass ditto, six or eight 6 pounders, and two 5½ inch howitzers, with a large number of tumbrils, ammunition, forage and store carts. To each corps of cavalry and infantry a brigade of guns is attached; the 19th dragoons, 6 pounders, native cavalry, 3 pounders; the former drawn by six horses, the latter by four, all mounted. Their limber boxes do not contain many rounds, and they are so frequently

'On the 12th, at night, Colonel Stevenson erected two batteries in front of the north face of the fort; one consisting of two iron 18 pounders, and three iron 12 pounders, to breach the outer fort and third wall; and one, consisting of two brass 12 pounders and two 5 inch howitzers, to clear and destroy the defences on the point of attack.

'On the same night the troops of my division constructed a battery for two iron and two brass 12 pounders on the mountain under the southern gate, with a view, if possible, to breach the wall near that gate; or, at all events, to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. Unfortunately the iron guns could not be moved into the battery, notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the troops; and the fire of the brass guns produced but little effect.

'The fire of all these batteries opened on the 13th, in the morning; and on the 14th, at night, the breaches in the walls of the outer fort were practicable. All the arrangements were then made for storming on this day. Lieut.

out of order, that it would probably be better to have had but half the number of guns, 6 pounders, with a larger proportion of ammunition, and not attached to corps: they have not been of any great service, as far as my inquiry has reached.

'The infantry have all 6 pounders, but of different weight and length; the Madras guns are old and short; the heavy guns have twelve bullocks, the others ten; the tumbrils are heavy, and drawn by twelve. The carriages vary much in make; they have adopted the new mode of making the gun tumbrils and limber wheels of the same size, though some officers still prefer the same limber wheels. Some have iron, others teak, axle trees; the latter, when well seasoned, have proved the best; indeed they do not work well in iron, generally.

'The iron 12 pounders are drawn by forty-four bullocks, nine sets formed abreast, and four pairs of leaders; four abreast, they take up very little more room than the breadth of the carriage. In my opinion, so many are not by any means required at all times: to each gun there is a spare bullock; to the larger ones, more. To each pair of iron 12 pounders an elephant is attached, which assists them in their draught in very sandy, miry, steep, or otherwise difficult parts of the roads: in the former, they raise the wheel or gun as most necessary; in the latter, they apply their proboscis (about a foot below the eye), to the muzzle, and push it up with the greatest ease, easing the cattle of the weight, nearly. The noble sagacity of these animals is wonderful; their tractability no less so: they follow the first gun, applying their aid without direction, when well trained to it, when necessary, and then falling back on one side until the other has passed, when they follow in their place: they will, if required, chastise the bullocks with their trunks when they do not pull heartily. The two now with the park are females. To the smallest cart there are four bullocks.'—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K. C. B.*

Colonel Kenny, of the 11th regiment, commanded the party for the storm, consisting of the flank companies of the 94th regiment, and of the native corps in Colonel Stevenson's division, supported by the 94th regiment, and Lieut. Colonel Halyburton's brigade, with Lieut. Colonel Maclean's brigade in reserve. At the same hour, I made two attacks from the southward to draw the enemy's attention to that quarter. One, under Lieut. Colonel Wallace, consisting of the 74th regiment, five companies of the 78th and 1st battalion 8th regiment, on the southern gate; and one under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, consisting of five companies of the 78th and the 1st battalion 10th regiment, on the north-west gate. These last attacks could be of no service, except to draw the enemy's attention from that from the north; unless they should succeed in blowing open the gates; and till they should communicate with detachments from Colonel Stevenson's corps, as they had no other means of entering the fort. All the troops advanced at about ten in the morning. The detachment under Lieut. Colonel Chalmers arrived at the north-west gate at the moment when the enemy were endeavoring to escape through it, from the detachment of Colonel Stevenson's corps, which had been sent to communicate with Colonel Chalmers; and he entered without difficulty.

'The wall of the inner fort, in which no breach had been made, was then to be carried. After some attempts upon the gate of communication between the inner and outer fort, a place was found at which it was possible to escalate the wall. Captain Campbell, with the light infantry of the 94th regiment, fixed the ladders against this place, escalated the wall, opened the gate for the storming party, and the fort was shortly in our possession.

'The enemy's garrison was numerous. It consisted of Rajpoots, and of a great part of Beny Sing's regular infantry, which had escaped from the battle of Argaum, commanded by Beny Sing himself. They were all well armed with the Company's new muskets and bayonets. Vast numbers of them were killed, particularly at the different gates.*

* 'When General Wellesley entered the fort, his first inquiry was for the killadar, and he went immediately to his house: his son, a fine lad of nine or ten years of age, said he did not know where he was; that he had gone out about two hours before, and had not returned. The poor fellow was ignorant of his fate perhaps; but when order was sufficiently restored to admit the inhabitants who survived to venture out, a search was

‘This service has been performed, I hope, with small loss on our side. No officer has been killed; and but few wounded, that I have heard of, excepting Lieut. Colonel Kenny of the 11th regiment, and Lieut. Young of the 2nd of the 7th.

‘In the performance of this service all the good qualities of British troops have been conspicuous to a degree which I have seldom witnessed. In bringing on their ordnance and stores to the point of attack, the troops of Colonel Stevenson’s division performed the most laborious work with a zeal for the service, and patience and perseverance never surpassed; and when opposed to the enemy, their conduct showed the same gallant spirit that has carried the British troops through so many difficulties in the course of this war.

‘I am particularly indebted to Colonel Stevenson for the manner in which he conducted the service entrusted to him, from the moment of his march from Ellichpoor to that of the capture of Gawilghur; to Lieut. Colonel Kenny for the manner in which he led on the storming party; to Captain Campbell and the light infantry of the 94th regiment, for the escalade of the inner fort; to Major Campbell and the 94th regiment, and to Lieut. Colonel Halyburton and his brigade, which troops supported the attack.

‘Captain Burke, who commanded the artillery with the subsidiary force, Captain Heitland of the pioneers, and Captain Johnson of the Bombay engineers, are also entitled to my acknowledgments. The two latter were sent from my division to assist Colonel Stevenson. Upon the occasion of mentioning the name of Captain Johnson, I cannot omit to inform your Excellency, that throughout this campaign that

made, and his body, with that of Beny Sing, was found amidst a heap of slain, near the gateway. These two men, of good Rajpoot families, had determined to die in defence of their trust; and, according to the custom of their country, to save their wives and daughters from destruction, by putting them to death, before they went out to meet their own. From some cause unknown to us, this was but imperfectly performed: of twelve or fourteen women, but three, I think, were dead when our men discovered them; and three or four more lay bleeding, having received two or three cuts or stabs with a knife or dagger; probably these Rajpoots entrusted this shocking duty to hands more humane than their own. General Wellesley visited them, and ordered every respect and care to be shown to them. Beny Sing, and the killadar, however personally brave, do not seem to have been able to frame any regular plan for the defence of the inner wall, or to have infused much of their own spirit into their Sepoys: the former is said to have killed or wounded two or three of our men before he fell.’—*Journal of Major General Sir Jasper Nicolls, K.C.B.*

officer has performed the most important service in the department of the guides entrusted to his charge; and I have no doubt but that his surveys will be a valuable public acquisition.

‘Although the most laborious and the most brilliant part of this service did not fall to the lot of the troops of my division, I have to apprise your Excellency that they performed the part allotted to them in a manner perfectly satisfactory to me: and Lieut. Colonel Wallace, Lieut. Colonel Chalmers, and Captain Beauman, commanding the artillery, have received my thanks for the manner in which the two former led their divisions to the attack, and the latter exerted himself to forward the service of his department.

‘I shall hereafter have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency a list of the killed and wounded, and returns of the ordnance and property captured in the fort.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘The Governor General.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘*Treaty of Peace between the Honorable English India Company and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, on the part of Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.*

Deogaum, 17th Dec. 1803.

‘Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable Company and their Allies on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other.

‘Art. 2.—Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the province of Cuttack, including the post and district of Balasore.

‘Art. 3.—He likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all the territories, of which he has collected the revenues, in participation with the Soubah of the Deccan, and those of which he may have possession, which are to the westward of the river Wurda.

‘Art. 4.—It is agreed that the frontier of Senah Saheb Soubah, towards the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, shall be formed to the west by the river Wurda, from its issue from the Injardy hills to its junction with the Godavery. The hills on which are the forts of

Nernulla and Gawilghur are to be in the possession of Senah Saheb Soubah, and every thing south of those hills, and to the west of the river Wurda, is to belong to the British Government and their Allies.

' Art. 5.—Districts amounting to four lacs of rupees per annum, contiguous to, and to the south of the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur, are to be given over to Senah Saheb Soubah. Those districts are to be fixed upon by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley, and delivered over to Senah Saheb Soubah at the same time with the forts.

' Art. 6.—Senah Saheb Soubah for himself, his heirs and successors, entirely renounces all claims of every description on the territories of the British Government and their Allies, ceded by the second, third, and fourth articles, and on all the territories of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

' Art. 7.—The Honorable Company engage that they will mediate and arbitrate, according to the principles of justice, any disputes or differences that may now exist, or may hereafter arise, between the Honorable Company's Allies, Secunder Jah Behauder, his successors, and Rao Pundit Purdhaun, his heirs and successors respectively, and Senah Saheb Soubah.

' Art. 8.—Senah Saheb Soubah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British Government; or any British subject, whether European or Indian, without the consent of the British Government. The Honorable Company engage, on their part, that they will not aid or countenance any discontented relations, Rajahs, Zemindars, or other subjects of Senah Saheb Soubah, who may fly from or rebel against his authority.

' Art. 9.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

' Art. 10.—Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with feudatories of Senah Saheb Soubah. These treaties are to be confirmed. Lists of the persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to Senah Saheb Soubah when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

' Art. 11.—Senah Saheb Soubah hereby renounces for himself, his heirs and successors, all adherence to the confederacy formed by him and Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and other Marhatta chiefs, to attack the Honorable Company and their

Allies. He engages not to assist those chiefs if the war with them should still continue.

' Art. 12.—This treaty of peace is to be ratified by Senah Saheb Soubah within eight days from this time, and the ratification of it is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley; at which time the orders for the cession of the ceded territories are to be delivered and the troops are to withdraw. Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that the treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and that the ratification shall be delivered in two months from this date.

*Done in Camp at Deogaum,
this 17th December, 1803,
answering to the 2nd Ram-
zaum, 1213, Fuzale.*

(A true copy.)

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.

' JESWUNT RAO RAMCHUNDER,
on the part of

' SENAH SAHEB SOUBAH.

' ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.'

To the Governor General.

' MY LORD, ' Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th December, 1803.

' I have the honor to enclose the English, Marhatta, and Persian copies of a treaty of peace, which I have this day concluded with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar.

' I have made the treaty in the name of the British Government and its Allies generally, and have engaged that it shall be ratified by your Excellency only. The reasons for omitting to name the Allies in the treaty, and to engage that they shall ratify it, will become sufficiently obvious, when the character and conduct of the government of these Allies are recollected.

' It will remain with your Excellency to give such orders as you may think proper, to the Residents at the different durbars, to obtain the assent of the Allies to this treaty. But I should imagine that the Rajah of Berar will be satisfied with your Excellency's ratification.

' The cessions under the treaty are made to the British Government and its Allies; and I have drawn it in this manner in order that your Excellency may have an opportunity of disposing of them hereafter, in such manner as you may think proper. As soon as the Rajah shall ratify the treaty, I propose to desire the officers of the Soubah of the Deccan to take charge of the countries ceded in this quarter; but I shall request the Resident at Hyderabad to apprise

his Highness's ministers that it must be considered only a temporary arrangement; and that all the acquisitions must be liable to be disposed of hereafter, when peace shall be made with all the powers engaged in the war.

'I wished to be able to define more accurately the bounds of the cession of the province of Cuttack, but I had no information upon the subject. Lieut. Colonel Harcourt stated his opinion, that it would be convenient if the districts of Sohnpore and Boad were ceded besides Cuttack; and Mr. Melville his, that it would be convenient to add to the province of Cuttack countries which would have joined the northern circars with the province of Bundelcund. But upon reference to the map, which is all the information that I could procure, I found that even the first would have increased the extent of the demand, on that side, to such a degree as to make it necessary to give up part of what I demanded on this side; or to risk the conclusion of the treaty altogether.

'I learn also, by a late letter from Lieut. Colonel Harcourt, that he has commenced negotiations with the Rajahs of Sohnpore and Boad; and if he should conclude them by treaties, those districts will be added to the Company's territories under the 10th article of the treaty of peace. If he should not, it is certain that the Company will not have for Cuttack the boundary for which Lieut. Colonel Harcourt wished; but I do not doubt but that that province will have a very good boundary.

'By the 3rd article, the Company and their Allies gain, on this side, the whole province of Berar, and the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan will be carried forward to the Wurda river. The countries thus ceded are old possessions of the Soubah of the Deccan, the revenues of which have been collected by them and the Rajah of Berar, in different proportions at different times. When the latter were admitted to a participation of them, they received one fifth, afterwards a fourth, then half, by treaty; and latterly, four fifths by exaction and violence. It appeared to me to be an object of greater importance to get rid of the Rajah of Berar entirely from this fine country, than to secure an additional barrier for Cuttack.

'The revenues of Berar, on this side of the Wurda, are computed to amount to about one crore of rupees. The Rajah had appropriated entirely to himself countries, the revenues of which are computed to have been ten lacs of rupees; and the remainder, under different treaties, was to be divided equally between him and the Soubah of the Deccan. How-

ever, I have reason to believe, from the conferences during the negotiations, that the Rajah of Berar never received more than thirty lacs, as his share of the countries on this side of the Wurda.

‘Territory of this value was a great object to gain in this quarter, considering the probable circumstances of the peace with Scindiah; but whatever may be the real value of the acquisition, a great object is gained by defining the frontier of the Rajah towards the Soubah of the Deccan; and by his renunciation of all claims, of every description, not only on the countries ceded, but on the other territories of the Soubah.

‘In the course of the conferences in the negotiation, the minutes of which I shall have the honor of transmitting as soon as they can be copied, the Rajah’s minister declared repeatedly, and I have reason to believe with some truth, that the demands made were of the finest and most valuable parts of his territory.

‘By the 4th article I have agreed that the Rajah shall have possession of the forts of Nernulla and Gawilghur. In fact, these forts are of greater importance to the power which remains in possession of the mountains, than to that which possesses the plains. Without them the Rajah could not have exercised the powers of his government over the Goondwanah Rajahs in those mountains, a race of people who, above all others, require restraint; and to have given them to the Soubah of the Deccan would have added nothing to his Highness’s power.

‘I consented to the 5th article, because the districts in the plains immediately under the hills will always be liable to the depredations of the inhabitants of the hills. The loss to the Soubah’s government will be but trifling, in comparison with that which it would incur if the Rajah were not interested, as he will now be, to restrain the incursions of the hill people into the plains.

‘The 7th article provides that the Honorable Company are to arbitrate between the Rajah and the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah. The Rajah’s minister was desirous that I should consent to confirm all grants and treaties made heretofore by these powers; but I refused this, on the ground that I could not consent to anything of which I had no knowledge. I then proposed the mediation and arbitration of the British Government and its justice, as the best security the Rajah could have for his claims upon the Soubah of the Deccan, and the Peshwah; which proposal was accepted.

‘ The territory which the Rajah wished to secure by this demand was the province of Gurrah Mundela, of which he ought to collect the revenues in participation with the Peshwah ; but I imagine that he has lately seized the whole for his own use.

‘ At all events, it appears to me to be an important point gained, and highly honorable to the character of the British Government, that even its enemies are willing to appeal to its justice, against the demands of its allies. There was no objection on the part of the Rajah’s minister to the 8th or 9th article of the treaty. The last clause was added to the 8th, by his desire, after the treaty had been drawn up.

‘ The 10th article is one of considerable importance. The Rajah’s minister appeared to feel the full extent of the engagements to which it bound the Rajah, and expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject. He said, that after ceding Berar and Cuttack, the Rajah had no territories excepting what he had conquered from the zemindars, rajahs, &c. ; and that by this article he might be bound to give up the whole of his territories. I told him, that whatever might be the consequence, the article was indispensable, and must be agreed to ; that peace would not have been agreed to, if the British Government had wished for the destruction of the Rajah’s state ; and that it certainly was not intended that the article should apply to more cases than were absolutely necessary to preserve the good faith of the British Government ; and I promised him that the British Government would apply it to as few cases as possible, consistently with an adherence to good faith.

‘ The vakeel was satisfied with this assurance, which I requested him to convey to the Rajah ; as I think it probable that this article will be that to which his durbar will have the strongest objections.

‘ I had demanded a hostage for the performance of the 11th article of the treaty ; but upon considering all the circumstances of the case, it appeared to me, that the best security the British Government could have, would be its strength and continued success, and I had therefore determined not to persist in that demand. In giving his answer upon it, the vakeel said that the Rajah would send to me whomever I pleased, excepting his brother, his son, or his nephew, who are the only persons whose detention in my camp might possibly be a security against his hostility.

‘ It appeared to me that he would not consent to send either of those persons, and the presence of any other would certainly have been useless. Upon the whole, therefore, I

thought it best not to persist in a demand with which he would not comply, and which might have risked the whole treaty.

‘I hope that your Excellency will approve of, and ratify this treaty. It appears to me to provide for all essential points, at the same time that it leaves the Rajah’s government in existence and strength. I should have demanded a sum of money, but I think there is every reason to believe that the Rajah of Berar is as poor as the other Marhatta chieftains.

‘I have written to Mr. Webbe, to inform him that I have signed this treaty; and to request him to prepare to set out for Nagpoor as soon as possible. In the mean time, I propose to send the Hon. Mr. Elphinstone to the Rajah to act as Resident, till the arrival of Mr. Webbe.

‘In case your Excellency should ratify the treaty, I request that the ratification may be sent to the Resident at Hyderabad, to be forwarded either to Mr. Elphinstone or me, according to circumstances; as I might be at a great distance, and the ratification might not reach the Rajah in the time specified.

‘Upon the occasion of mentioning Mr. Elphinstone, it is but justice to that gentleman to inform your Excellency that I have received the greatest assistance from him since he has been with me. He is well versed in the languages, has experience and a knowledge of the interests of the Marhatta powers, and their relations with each other, and with the British Government and its allies. He has been present in all the actions which have been fought in this quarter during the war, and at all the sieges; he is acquainted with every transaction that has taken place, and with my sentiments upon all subjects. I therefore take the liberty of recommending him to your Excellency.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Stevenson.

‘MY DEAR COLONEL, ‘Camp at Ellichpoor, 17th Dec., 1803.

‘I desired Barclay to apprise you of the circumstances which prevented me from writing to you yesterday; and as I did not sign the treaty till seven o’clock this morning, the same occupations prevented me from writing to you before I marched.

‘By the treaty of peace with Ragojee Bhoonslah, he will cede to the Company and their allies territory of the value

of fifty lacs of rupees annually; and I have consented to restore to him the fort of Gawilghur. I shall send a copy of the treaty, as soon as one can be made. He is to ratify the treaty in eight days from this day.

‘If I had not made this peace, my plan was to march my own division upon Nagpoor, in order, if possible, to force Ragojee to it; and to occupy yours, first in the capture of Nernulla, which I believe would not be a difficult operation, after what has been done in Gawilghur; and afterwards to watch the motions of Scindiah (with whom I intended to have broken the suspension of hostilities) till I should have forced Ragojee to the peace. This is a general outline of the plan I had in contemplation when I spoke to you on the day before yesterday.

‘From circumstances which have occurred in the course of the negotiations, I am induced to believe that Ragojee is serious, and that he will ratify the peace, the terms of which have been for some time before him. But there is nothing so likely to produce this desirable result as the continuance of the pressure upon him. I propose, therefore, to continue my march to the eastward, but not with so much celerity as I should have done, if there had been no peace. I intend to halt here to-morrow, and move on slowly afterwards towards the Wurda river, which is to be hereafter the Nizam’s boundary, where I shall arrive about the day that Ragojee ought to send back the peace ratified.

‘In respect to your corps, the first thing to do after they shall have got a little rest, will be to repair your carriages, and to re-equip yourself for a siege, in case the continuance of the war with either of the confederates should make another necessary. The next thing to do will be to bring your division back into the plains; as I believe at all events, supposing even that you are to attack Nernulla, you must approach it by coming to the southward of the mountains.

‘I believe that, upon the whole, the best way for you to return to the plains will be by the roads by which you entered the mountains. The road through the fort from Labada, and out of the Kood gate, is very bad; and Captain Johnson reports that it is not practicable for guns, excepting it receives much repair. The road is not much shorter to Damungaum than that by which you marched; and, these things considered, I am of opinion that if measures are taken to avoid the ravine at Colonel Maclean’s old post, which I am informed can be done, that by which you entered the mountains will be the best and easiest for your return.

‘The fort of Gawilghur is to be restored, but not till the

countries ceded are taken possession of. However, I think it will be desirable, on many accounts, that the property should be moved out of the fort at an early period, and carried to Ellichpoor; from whence we can move it as occasion may offer. I shall be obliged to you if you will acquaint the gentlemen in charge with my sentiments upon this subject, and if you will give them every assistance of carriage in your power to send it away. You may probably be able to do this by keeping your grain department, and that part of your stores carried upon bullocks, at Labada, till the last moment; and let the bullocks carry away the prize property, and afterwards return for their loads of stores and grain. If you have any empty brinjaries, they likewise would let their cattle on hire for a trip of this kind.

‘The prize property might be lodged in the caravansera at Ellichpoor; one of the gentlemen might come over and look at it, and have it cleared.

‘It is very possible that there may be some treasure concealed at Gawilghur; and when I agreed to give up the fort (which, by the by, it was impossible to avoid without ruining Ragojee altogether), I determined to leave with you half my pioneers to assist the prize agents, as well in removing the property, as in searching for what might be concealed under ground. You will use them in such manner as you may think proper.

‘I have kept a battalion encamped hitherto under the Peerputty gate, near Emblee-baug, in order to keep open the communication, and guard the road through the jungles from the attempts of Bheels and others upon the passengers. As the prize property is now to come down by that road, and I shall draw off my battalion, I think that it would be advisable that you should send there five companies of one of yours. I likewise recommend that you should send down, by the same road a battalion without guns, to encamp at Damungaum, near Major Drew’s battalion. This battalion might reconnoitre the road from Maclean’s post, clear of the ravine, and might bring down your ordnance carriages, still at Maclean’s post.

‘These two detachments, with Saint Leger’s cavalry in the plain of Bourgaum, will keep the road very secure to Ellichpoor; but I still recommend that when any thing of value is sent, it may have a small escort.

‘I received last night your letter written at half-past four, and this morning your report of the attack. I did not know that Colonel Lang and Colonel Desse had acted such conspicuous parts in the assault; but I shall issue this day a

General Order upon the subject, in which I shall express my opinion of those officers.

‘Captain Barclay informed me that while detained at one of the gates to allow the troops to pass out, he had amused himself with making some of them lay down their plunder. But for my part I have seen many places taken by storm, and I never saw one in which so little irregularity was committed, and which was so little plundered; and it is but doing justice to the corps to declare that in an hour after having stormed that large place, they marched out with as much regularity as if they had been only passing through it. I think the best garrison for Gawilghur will be a detachment under one of the gentlemen appointed to take an account of the prize property.

‘I have written you a very long letter in a great hurry, and possibly may have omitted something I had to mention to you; but if I have, I shall write again.

‘I forwarded your letter to Mrs. Stevenson on the 15th, and told her we were all well, after having taken the place.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Colonel Stevenson.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Ellichpoor, 18th Dec., 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose a return of the killed and wounded at the siege, and in the storm of Gawilghur.* Lieut Young died after I addressed your Excellency on the 15th.

‘I have likewise the honor to enclose a return of the ordnance, &c., captured at Gawilghur. The quantity of property captured has not yet been ascertained; but I imagine that there will not be much.

* Artillery
H. M.’s 74th regt.
78th
94th

1st bat. 2nd regt. Infantry }
2nd do. 2nd do.
1st do. 3rd do.
1st do. 6th do.
2nd do. 7th do.
1st do. 8th do.
2nd do. 9th do.
1st do. 10th do.
1st do. 11th do.
2nd do. 11th do.
Pioneers

	<i>Europeans.</i>			
	Lieut. Col.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Rank & File.
Killed	—	—	1	5
Wounded	1	—	1	59

Natives.

*
Non-Commissioned Officers
and Privates.

Killed	*	9
Wounded	.	51

N. B. The officers of the Native Infantry, being British, are included under the head of Europeans.

R. BARCLAY, Dep. Adj. Gen., Mysore.

'After I had addressed your Excellency on the 15th instant, I received from Colonel Stevenson a detailed report of the proceedings of the division under his command, in the storm of the fort, from which I observe that Lieut. Colonel Lang and Lieut. Colonel Desse had opportunities of distinguishing themselves, of which they availed themselves. In the course of the campaign, I have more than once had occasion to observe the zeal of these officers for the service, and their exertions to forward it; they have received my thanks for their conduct on the 15th instant; and I beg leave to recommend them to your Excellency's notice.

'I have the honor to be, &c,

'The Governor General.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'Camp, fourteen miles East from Ellich-

'MY DEAR COLONEL, poor, 20th December, 1803.

'When the peace shall be ratified by Ragojee Bhoonslab, I propose to send Mr. Elphinstone to his camp, to act as Resident till the arrival of Webbe. I may also have occasion to request Malcolm to go to one of these chiefs, and, in this case, I shall be much in want of assistance. Malcolm tells me that you would have no objection to allow Mr. Strachey to come here, and if this be the case, I shall be much obliged to you if you will ask him to give me his assistance. If he starts from Poonah immediately on the receipt of this letter, he will meet Captain Baynes' detachment on the river Godavery, or it will arrive there in a few days after him. I have no doubt but that Ragojee will ratify the treaty.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. General Stuart.

'SIR,

'Camp, 20th December, 1803.

'I have the honor to enclose a translation of the treaty with the Rajah of Berar. I should have sent it off two days ago, only that I learned that our tappalls were stopped about thirty miles from Ellichpoor, by Scindiah's pindarries wandering about the country. But I have sent to disperse them; and I fancy that the tappall will now run without interruption.

'Captain Colebrooke has purchased many horses for the cavalry; and has nearly completed the regiments with very good horses, at a rate as cheap, I believe, as they are purchased by the horse agent. Indeed the 19th dragoons have now better horses than I have ever seen with them.

‘I shall be much obliged to you if you will let me know what you wish that Captain Colebrooke should have. I imagine the best mode of paying him for this trouble would be to give him an agency of ten per cent: as of course his agency will cease as soon as the regiments will be completed; a salary would not, I imagine, answer.

‘I have no doubt but that the Rajah will ratify his treaty, and that Scindiah will make his peace as soon as he can. Indeed his vakeel and I are agreed upon the principal points; and we should have concluded a treaty some days ago, if I had received from Bengal any information whatever of even the names of the countries which the Governor General wished to have. I was therefore obliged to acknowledge my ignorance, and to ask the vakeel for information of the state of the countries in Hindustan. This is preparing in Scindiah’s camp, and is the cause of the delay.

‘I believe that Scindiah’s vakeels are not yet aware that I have concluded peace with the Rajah of Berar. When they believe so, they will lose no time in concluding one likewise.

‘But little property has been found in Gawilghur, and all the dreams of treasures are disappointed. There is some money, but in copper; and I imagine the whole cannot amount to one lac of rupees.

‘I have the honor to be, &c

‘*Lieut. General Stuart.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 21st December, 1803.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 1st instant.

‘I enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote to Ghazy Khan’s son, which will show you the extent of the engagements into which I have entered with that freebooter. It appears that he has long been in the habit of collecting money for the zemindars, in the neighborhood of the range of ghauts between the Godavery and the Poorna, under the pretext of protecting them from robbers, but really to refrain from robbing them himself. Upon my arrival in that part of the country, I found it to be in a state so defenceless, and so little the object of the care of the Soubah’s government, that I saw clearly that unless I could attach Ghazy Khan to my cause, I must give up all hope of preserving my communication with the Godavery, through the extensive jungles and hills bordering on the Payen Gunga.

‘ I therefore thought it best to interest that freebooter in my success, by giving him some of the districts close to the ghauts, from which my detachments had driven the enemy; and as his son, whom he sent to my camp, expressed the greatest uneasiness upon the subject of his claims upon the zemindars, when the countries should come into the possession of the British Government, I promised in the enclosed letter that the Company’s troops would not interfere with those claims; and I further granted him an allowance of 3000 rupees a month, to assist him in carrying on the war against the Rajah of Berar.

‘ Peace having been made with the Rajah of Berar, and the whole of the country as far as the river Wurda having been ceded to the British Government and its Allies, it becomes necessary to put these arrangements, made with Ghazy Khan, on a more permanent foundation. At all events, his hostilities against the Rajah of Berar must be stopped; although it is necessary to continue the payment of his allowance, so long as any of our troops are in this quarter, in order to insure the communication with the Godavery.

‘ I propose immediately to send for his vakeel, and to make the following arrangements:—First, that he shall enjoy the districts which I have given to him, in the quality of a jaghiredar in the service of the Soubah of the Deccan. Secondly, that he shall continue to receive the money which he has hitherto received from the zemindars, on account of protecting them from robbers; provided he does really protect the country, and keep the communication free. Thirdly, that he is to be in all respects a faithful servant and subject of His Highness the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ The pindarries have lately been on the road by which my dawk runs, and I find that my peons have concealed themselves and their packets in the villages, till the road shall be free.

‘ For this reason I sent you the letter to the Governor General of the 17th, containing the copy of the peace; and I send you another this day, containing the memorandum of the conferences during the negotiation, by Rajah Mohiput Ram’s tappall, which he informed me went by a shorter route to Hyderabad than mine.

‘ You will find in the margin the dates of all the letters which I have received from you since the 25th of October. I beg you will make the use you proposed of the money sent for me by Major Bownass; and forward the remainder, with that expected from Vellore, as soon as it shall arrive at

Hyderabad. If Major Bownass loses on time on his road, he will arrive at Dharore by the time that Captain Baynes' detachment will be upon the Godavery.

'I think it will be advisable that you should purchase half of the 30,000 bullock loads of rice, to which you allude. I am sorry to say that I think there is reason to apprehend a scarcity of grain throughout the country; and although I think it almost certain that we shall have no foreign enemy, in a short time the troops will require that supply of rice.

'I am concerned to observe the state of affairs between the Soubah and his ministers. However, it is probable that all parties will be pleased with the English connexion, after the events of this war, and the care taken of his Highness's interests in the negotiation for the peace; and although, on private grounds, we might feel for the disgrace of his present servants, we may probably have no public cause to regret it, or to interfere in their favor.

'Rajah Mohiput Ram acknowledged to me that he had received orders to increase the numbers of his Highness's troops, but no money to enable him to carry these orders into execution; and I really believe that the body of troops in camp is not equal to more than half the number of which it ought to consist by treaty.

'Upon a late occasion the Rajah brought to me a proposal, to take into the Company's service a Mussulman sirdar in the service of Scindiah with 1000 horse. I took that opportunity of reminding the Rajah of the orders he had received from the durbar to increase his force, and of pointing out to him its incomplete state at that moment; but I told him that if he had not the means of paying the sirdar in question, and that if he plainly told me so, I could take him into the service, on the account of the Company.

'The Rajah then proposed that the Company should pay half of the expense: to which proposition I made the same reply; and as I believe in the course of that day he had received from the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar some information of the demands which I had made, for the satisfaction of the Soubah of the Deccan, he returned next morning, and told me that Rajah Sookroodoor had agreed to procure the money, and that he had apprized the sirdar in Scindiah's service that he should be taken into that of the Soubah of the Deccan.

'In the present state of the war, it is, in my opinion, a matter of immaterial importance whether the Soubah's army is increased or not; but I consider it as one of very great importance, with a view to the future settlement and ma-

nagement of his territories. These objects cannot be attained without a large body of effective troops in the service of the state, or the assistance of the subsidiary force. If the latter are required for the support of the internal government upon all the occasions that must be expected to occur, there is no difficulty in foreseeing that its number must be doubled at least; the forts must be delivered over to the British Government, and the whole system of the connexion must be altered. This would certainly end in the annihilation of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘If the Government are willing really to have in their service a body of effective troops, for the purpose of the support of the internal government in time of peace, and to act with the British troops in time of war, their own system in regard to their troops must be in some degree altered; the state must have troops paid by the public resources, through the medium of the public officers, without the intervention of the jaghiredars.

‘This last system appears to me to be most consistent with the Governor General’s views and liberal policy; and I think it probable that he will be desirous of seeing the Soubah’s army placed on a respectable footing.

‘If you should be of this opinion, I anxiously recommend to you to turn your attention to this subject: and as, from the disposition already manifested by his Highness, it is not probable that he will spontaneously adopt the measures which are necessary in order to give him an army, I suggest for your consideration the propriety of continuing to press upon his ministers the breach of the treaty by his Highness, in not producing the requisite force, as a ground-work of an amendment of the treaty of defensive alliance in this point, before the territories ceded by the enemy at the peace are given over to him.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM TRANSMITTED TO COLONEL STEVENSON.

‘23rd December, 1803.

1. Colonel Stevenson will have observed that, by the third article of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, the province of Berar, as far as the Wurda river, is ceded to the British Government and its Allies; and it is necessary to take possession of it, and settle its government.

‘2. From the nature of the government which has hitherto existed in this province, that will not probably be a very difficult measure. The government has, in fact, been in the hands of the Nizam, and his officers are already in all the

principal places in the country. The Rajah had the largest share of the revenues, but he collected the money by sending his carkoons into the different districts at the time the revenues were paid; or by having them constantly residing in the districts, at the same time that the Nizam's officers were carrying on the business of the government.

'3. These carkoons belonging to the Rajah of Berar have been driven out of the districts; and it is reported by Rajah Mohiput Ram that not one remains. The government therefore of the country may be supposed to be in the hands of the Nizam's officers.

'4. However, enough has been seen of the mode of conducting business by the Nizam's officers, to render it doubtful whether they really have possession of the country, as they say they have: at all events, it will be necessary to keep a force in this quarter, till the peace shall have been comparatively consolidated, and the Rajah shall have resumed his residence at Nagpoor, and dispersed his troops.

'5. Intelligence has been received, that he has crossed the Wurda, and is now employed in dismissing his troops. But these very troops thus dismissed may, and will most probably, employ their leisure moments in the plunder of this country; and the Rajah himself might not be disinclined to give us some employment in the territories ceded to us; not only by encouraging these discharged troops, but also by the inroads of some in his own service.

'6. For all these reasons, therefore, it appears necessary that some force should be kept up for a time in this country; and they have been particularly detailed, in order that Colonel Stevenson may have an opportunity of applying his instructions to the officer in command, to the different points which can occur.

'7. Rajah Mohiput Ram has been desired to take possession of, and make the arrangements for, the government of the country. He will leave in it a force in his Highness's service, with the commander of which Lieut. Colonel Lang may be desired to communicate for the public good. This force might be under Colonel Lang's orders, if Colonel Stevenson has been in the habit of arranging the service in that manner.

'8. From what has been above stated, it will appear that although Ellichpoor, or possibly Oomrawootty, which is farther to the southward, would be the most central situation for the detachment, it ought not to be entirely stationary; but should move, and with celerity, to those parts of the province in which its services may be most required.

'9 For the present, a garrison of three hundred men must be left in Gawilghur; and in case the detachment should move from Ellichpoor, the number of troops stationed there ought to be increased to one hundred. In a few days, it is expected that it will be possible to give up Gawilghur entirely, according to the treaty.

'10. Along with this memorandum will be sent the translation of a letter to Rajah Mohiput Ram, and translations of two proclamations, which will point out more clearly the arrangements which have been ordered. Maps of the country, as far as they can be made out, shall be sent to Colonel Lang.

'11. Lieut. Colonel Lang must be requested to have an eye upon the proceedings of the Nizam's officers, and to report any deviation from the instructions in that letter and those proclamations.

'12. He must be desired also to correspond with Mr. Elphinstone at Nagpoor (whose tappall will run to Ellichpoor), and to inform that gentleman, in case he should find any difficulty on the part of the Rajah's officers in settling the country, or that the Rajah's troops remain in it; and of course they must be attacked if they do remain.

'Colonel Stevenson.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

PROCLAMATION.

'23rd December, 1803.

'By the article of the Treaty of Peace between the Honorable Company and their allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other, the province of Berar lying to the westward of the river Wurda, having been ceded in perpetual sovereignty to the British Government and their Allies, by Senah Saheb; all amildars, &c. &c. are hereby required to obey the orders they will receive from Bahrah Muce, who is appointed by Major General Wellesley, and empowered to settle that country.

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

PROCLAMATION.

23rd December, 1803.

'Peace having been concluded between the Honorable the East India Company and their Allies, on the one part, and Senah Saheb Soubah Ragojee Bhoonslah, on the other:

'Hostilities are to cease forthwith; of which, all officers and others concerned are to take notice.

lowing arrangements to take possession of, and settle those countries in the name of the allied governments. You will bear in mind, that, from their situation, it is probable that they will be hereafter the possession of his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan solely; but it is impossible to settle that point definitively till peace shall be made with all the powers at war.

‘First, You will appoint a sirdar to take possession of the countries, in whose ability and integrity you can confide. Let me know the name of the person on whom you shall fix, in order that I may insert it in the proclamation of which No. 1 is a copy.

‘Secondly, You will place under the command of this sirdar a sufficient body of horse and foot to enable him to perform the service entrusted to him; and to drive out the enemy’s pindarries, who may be expected to remain here for some time. I will appoint some British troops to remain in the country and assist those of his Highness.

‘Thirdly, You are to give orders to this sirdar to circulate proclamation No. 2, which is enclosed; and he must conduct himself in every respect in the manner pointed out in the proclamation. If I should learn that he has been guilty of any oppression, or that he has persecuted any person because such person has formerly been the subject, or has rendered services to Ragojee Bhoonslah during the war, I will desire you to deprive this sirdar of his office; and will make to the court of Hyderabad a complaint of you and of him; and I shall particularly desire that he may never be employed again.

‘In the arrangements which I have thus requested you to make, you will observe a fresh mark of my confidence in you, and of my desire to act in a manner that will be agreeable to the Soubah of the Deccan; and I hope that, in carrying them into execution, you will take care to act in such a manner as will justify the confidence I place in you, and will be honorable to the British Government and its Allies, and particularly to the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘*Rajah Mohiput Ram.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD,

‘Camp 23rd December, 1803.*

‘I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I this day received the ratification of the Rajah of Berar of the

* *Marquis Wellesley to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘Fort William, 23rd December, 1803.

‘I received this morning your dispatch of the 30th November from Paterly, with the account of your signal and most seasonable victory of

treaty of peace, signed on the 17th instant, by myself on the part of the Honorable Company and their allies, and by Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder on the part of Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah. I propose hereafter to forward this instrument to your Excellency.

‘Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s ministers, Eitul Punt and Kavel Nyn, arrived in my camp this afternoon, for the purpose, as they say, of making peace for their master.

‘I yesterday gave notice to Scindiah’s vakeels, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah and Naroo Punt Nana, that I was desirous to put an end to the agreement made on the 23rd of November for suspending hostilities; and that I should consider it as null and void from the 27th instant.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.

‘Camp 4 miles east of Ellichpoor,

‘SIR,

‘24th December, 1803.

‘I have the honor to enclose for your perusal duplicates of dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General, which I request you to forward as soon as possible.

Argaum. Although I entirely approved your armistice, and thought it a most judicious measure, I confess that I prefer your victory to your armistice; and I think your last battle must have removed every obstacle to peace, and facilitated every accommodation which can tend to enlarge the channels of amicable intercourse.

‘I have not yet discovered whether the battle was occasioned by a rupture of the truce on the part of Scindiah, or by Scindiah’s refusal to grant to his vakeels the powers which you most properly have required, for the purpose of founding the basis of the negotiation on the admission of our retention of a part of our conquests; or by Scindiah’s re-disavowal of his avowal of Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; or by an accidental rencontre of the armies before the truce had commenced; or by a treacherous junction between Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. But, *quacunqve via*, a battle is a profit with the Native powers.

‘In any truce or treaty you must now require hostages from Scindiah’s or Ragojee’s family, upon Lord Cornwallis’ principle in 1792. If you should happen to take the persons of Scindiah or Ragojee, you will send them with an escort of honor to Fort William, to negotiate peace with me, and to be their own hostages for its due execution.

‘Ever yours, most affectionately,

‘*Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*

‘WELLESLEY.’

‘I do not know why you address your private letters to the private secretary, and not to me; consult, however, your own convenience.’

‘In consequence of the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, you will, I presume, cease all negotiations with his subjects and servants, without waiting for further orders from his Excellency.

‘I beg you to acknowledge the receipt of this letter by post, as well as by the return of the messenger.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Lieut. Colonel Harcourt.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘Camp, 4 miles east of Ellichpoor,

‘SIR,

‘25th December, 1803.

‘Lient. Colonel Close has transmitted to me a copy of your dispatch of the 2nd instant, on the subject of the claims of the Honorable Company on the Rajahs of Kolapoor, Sawunt Warra, and Baboo Rao Angria, for piracies committed under the authority of those chiefs.

‘The Rajah of Kolapoor is, I know, independent of the Peshwah; and it would not, perhaps, be consistent with justice to call upon his Highness to pay for his piracies, which he cannot have in his power to control.

‘I know of no connexion between Scindiah and the Rajah of Sawunt Warra and Angria, excepting, perhaps, relationship to the latter. At all events, the political connexion, if any ever existed, has been dissolved, as both these Chiefs have been neutral during the war; and the neutrality of the latter has been most advantageous to our cause.

‘I think it desirable to avoid affording grounds for the renewal of this political connexion, by calling upon Scindiah to satisfy the Company’s claims upon the Rajah of Sawunt Warra and Angria; and, therefore, unless the Governor in Council should particularly desire it, I propose not to notice this subject to Scindiah’s ministers. Another reason for omitting to mention it is, that it would answer no end whatever; Scindiah has no pecuniary means of satisfying those claims; and the consequence of agitating the question would be the necessity of deferring the consideration of it to a future period, and the certain revival, by our own act, of the political connexion between Scindiah and the Chiefs on the coast, which, if it ever existed, has been destroyed by the success of the war.

‘In respect to the claims upon the Rajahs of Kolapoor and Sawunt Warra, and Baboo Rao Angria, I think it very probable that they have not now, and never will have, the means of satisfying them. The Supreme Government alone can

decide what measures ought consequently to be adopted : but in the mean time it appears wise to block up their ports entirely ; and I believe that this measure, which is certainly a severe punishment, is the only satisfaction of which such a case will admit.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

Treaty of Peace between the Honorable English India Company and their Allies on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the other ; settled by Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies, and by Eitul Mahadeo Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Jeswunt Rao Goorparah Ameerool Omrah, and Naroo Hurry, on the part of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

‘ Surjee Anjengaum, 30th December, 1803.

‘ Art. 1.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honorable Company and their Allies, on the one part, and the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the other.

‘ Art. 2.—The Maharajah cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, all his forts, territories, and rights in the Doab, or country situated between the Jumna and Ganges, and all his forts, territories, rights, and interests in the countries which are to the northward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud ; of which territories, &c., a detailed list is given in the accompanying schedule. Such countries formerly in the possession of the Maharajah, situated between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former, are to belong to the Maharajah.

‘ Art. 3.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies, in perpetual sovereignty, the fort of Baroach and territory depending thereon ; and the fort of Ahmednuggur and territory depending thereon ; excepting those lands which it is agreed by article 8th of this treaty that the Maharajah is to retain.

‘ Art. 4.—The Maharajah likewise cedes to the Honorable Company and their Allies all the territories which belonged to him previous to the breaking out of the war, which are situated to the southward of the hills called the Adjuntee hills, including the fort and district of Julnapoor, the town

and district of Gundapoor, and all other districts between that range of hills and the river Godavery.

‘ Art. 5.—The Maharajah-Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, for himself, his heirs and successors, hereby renounces all the claim to the forts, territories, rights, and interests, ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles; and all claims of every description upon the British Government and their Allies, the Soubahdar of the Deccan, the Peshwah, and Anund Rao Quickwar.

‘ Art. 6.—The fort of Asseerghur, the city of Burhampoor, the forts of Powanghur and Dohud, and the territories in Candeish and Guzerat, depending on these forts, shall be restored to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

‘ Art. 7.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum, as a gift from the Kings of Hindustan, the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which are situated to the northward of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoer and Joudpoor, and of the Ranah of Gohud; and that lands in Hindustan, ceded by the 2nd article of this treaty to the Honorable Company and their Allies, are held in jaghire by persons of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and others by principal sirdars in his service, all of whom would suffer distress if deprived of the advantages they enjoy in those countries: It is agreed, that the Maharajah shall continue to hold, and enjoy in enaum, the lands of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah; and that Bala Baye Saheb, and Munsoor Saheb, Moonshee Kabel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, shall continue to hold their lands in jaghire, under the protection of the Honorable Company; and further, in order that no individual may incur loss or suffer distress in consequence of this arrangement, it is agreed that the Honorable Company shall either pay pensions, or grant lands in jaghire, according to the option of the British Government, to certain other sirdars, and others, to be named by the Maharajah; provided that the total amount of the sums paid, or jaghires granted or held, does not exceed seventeen lacs of rupees per annum, including the annual value of the lands which it is agreed by this article that Bala Baye Saheb, Munsoor Saheb, Moonshee Kavel Nyn, Boogajee Jamdah, Amrajee Jadhoo, and Wirdah Charie, are to continue to hold; and provided that no troops in the service of the Maharajah are to be introduced into Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, or the other lands held in jaghire, under the pretence of collecting the revenue, or any other pretence whatever.

‘ Art. 8.—Whereas the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah has represented that his family have long held in enaum certain lands or villages, &c. [51 *villages, &c., specified*] in the territories of Rao Pundit Purdhaun, which have lately been taken possession of by the British Government and their Allies; it is agreed that those lands and villages shall be restored to him; provided that no troops shall ever be introduced into those lands and villages, under pretence of collecting the revenues, or any other pretence whatever.

‘ Art. 9.—Certain treaties have been made by the British Government with Rajahs and others, heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah. These treaties are to be confirmed; and the Maharajah hereby renounces all claims upon the persons with whom such treaties have been made; and declares them to be independent of his government and authority, provided that none of the territories belonging to the Maharajah, situated to the southward of those of the Rajahs of Jeypore and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, of which the revenues have been collected by him or his amildar, or have been applicable as surinjaumy to the payment of his troops, are granted away by such treaties. Lists of persons with whom such treaties have been made will be given to the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah when this treaty shall be ratified by his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ Art. 10.—No person whatever is to be molested on account of the part which he may have taken in the present war.

‘ Art. 11.—It is agreed that the rights of his Highness the Peshwah to certain lands in Malwa, and elsewhere, shall be established as heretofore; and in case any difference should arise respecting those rights, it is agreed that the Honorable Company shall mediate, arbitrate, and decide, according to the principles of justice, between his Highness and the Maharajah; and whatever may be thus decided shall be agreed to by both parties, and shall be carried into execution.

‘ Art. 12.—The Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah hereby renounces all claims upon his Majesty Shah Alum, and engages on his part to interfere no further in the affairs of his Majesty.

‘ Art. 13.—The Maharajah Ali Dowlut Rao Scindiah engages never to take or retain in his service any Frenchman, or the subject of any other European or American power, the government of which may be at war with the British Government; or any British subject, whether European or

native of India, without the consent of the British Government.

‘ Art. 14.—In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the governments, it is agreed, that accredited ministers from each shall reside at the court of the other.

‘ Art. 15.—The Honorable Company being bound by treaties of general defensive alliance with his Highness the Soubah of the Deccan, and his Highness Rao Pundit Purdhaun, to which the Maharajah Ali Jah Dowlut Rao Scindiah is desirous of acceding, he is to be admitted to the benefits thereof; and the Honorable Company, with a view to the future security of the Maharajah’s territories, engage, in the event of his agreeing to the treaty above mentioned, in two months, to furnish him with a force consisting of six battalions of infantry, with their complement of ordnance and artillery, and usual equipments of military stores, &c. ; and the expense of this force is to be defrayed out of the lands ceded by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles. But it is agreed, that in case it should suit the interests of the Maharajah’s government to decline to enter into the treaty above mentioned, such refusal shall not affect any of the other stipulations of this treaty of peace; which are in every respect to be binding on the contracting parties, their heirs and successors.

‘ Art. 16.—This treaty is to be ratified by the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah in eight days from this time, and the ratification is to be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley engages that it shall be ratified by his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to the Maharajah in three months, or sooner if possible.

‘ The orders for the cession of the territories shall be delivered to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley at the same time with the ratification of the treaty of peace; but the forts of Asseerghur, Powanghur, and Dohud, are not to be delivered up till accounts shall have been received that the territories ceded have been evacuated by the Maharajah’s officers and troops.

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY, M. G.

Done at Camp at Surjee Anjengaum, this 30th of December, 1803, answering to the 15th Ramzaun, 1213, Fuzali.

‘ EITUL MAHADEO.

‘ KAVEL NYN.

‘ JESWUNT RAO GOORPARAH.

‘ NAROO HURRY.’

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp, 30th December, 1803.

‘ I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I have this day concluded with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and signed, a treaty of peace; copies of which, in the English, Persian, and Marhatta languages, I have the honor to enclose.

‘ This treaty, like that with the Rajah of Berar, is concluded in the name of the British Government and its Allies generally, and the cessions are made to all the allied powers. It will remain with your Excellency to give orders to the Residents at the different durbars, to procure the consent of the Allied Governments to the treaty, and to divide the conquests in such manner as you may think proper.

‘ By this treaty, which I hope your Excellency will ratify, all the important objects detailed in your Excellency’s instructions of the 27th of June are secured, and the ground is laid for a more complete alliance with Scindiah’s government; or, supposing that he should omit to take advantage of the terms offered to him, to ally himself more closely with the Company’s government, such an influence will be established in his as will render it very improbable that its means will ever be again directed against that of the Company.

‘ By the 2nd article of the treaty, Scindiah consented to cede to the Honorable Company all his territories north of the countries of the Rajahs of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud. A schedule is annexed to the treaty, which contains the best account that can be procured of the revenue of those territories.

‘ Besides the territories included in the schedule, there are three pergunnahs also north of the countries of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud, viz., Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah, which were formerly granted to the family of Scindiah in enaum, which have never been carried into the dufters under the head of lands in Hindustan, and have been considered as the private property of Scindiah’s house. These pergunnahs are to remain in his possession under certain stipulations, which exclude his troops from the line fixed upon by your Excellency.

‘ Besides these Purgunnahs, there are others, the jaghire lands of the ladies of the family of the late Madhajee Scindiah, and those of some of the principal sirdars and ministers of Dowlut Rao, also not included in the schedule, which, according to the 7th article, are to remain in the hands of

their present possessors, under the protection of the British Government; and the British Government is to give pensions, or jaghires, according to its option, to sirdars to be named by Scindiah, to the amount of seventeen lacs of rupees, including the value of those jaghires to remain in the hands of their present possessors under the 7th article.

‘It would have been impossible to arrange this great cession, in the disturbed state of Scindiah’s government, under all the circumstances of his misfortunes in the war, and of the great diminution of his military power and reputation, in comparison with that of his rival Holkar, without determining to provide, in some degree, for those who reaped benefits from the revenue of the ceded territories, or making up my mind to throw into Holkar’s hands, and to add to his armies, all the sirdars and troops who had been subsisted by the resources of those countries; and who must have been forthwith discharged from Scindiah’s service, and would have looked to Holkar for protection and future employment. I chose the former, which I think is most consistent with your Excellency’s policy; and it appears that, besides avoiding the evil of increasing the numbers of the followers of the only freebooter that remains in India, it tends to establish an influence in Scindiah’s durbar which must guide its measures in a great degree, even if Scindiah should omit to unite himself more closely with the Company, and must tend greatly to facilitate all the objects of the British Government in his durbar, if he should agree to the terms of the general defensive alliance.

‘Upon the whole, therefore I hope that your Excellency will approve of this arrangement, the expense of which will amount to about fourteen lacs of rupees annually, to be deducted from the revenues stated in the schedule.

‘The next point to which I wish to draw your Excellency’s attention, in order to bring under your view at once every thing relating to the cession in Hindustan, is the 15th article of the treaty; by which it is agreed that Scindiah shall have a subsidiary force, the expense of which shall be paid out of the cessions made by the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th articles of the treaty.

‘In the course of this war, Scindiah’s power, reputation, and military resources have been greatly diminished; while his rival, Holkar, after having recovered the possessions of his family, by his treaty of peace with Scindiah, remains with undiminished power and increased reputation. Comparatively with those of Scindiah, his power and his military resources are much greater than they were previous to the

war; and I have but little doubt but that the contest between those chiefs will be revived.

‘This would be a matter of but little consequence to the British Government, if the parties were so equal in point of strength, resources, and abilities, as to render the event of the contest doubtful. But Holkar is certainly, at this moment, superior to Scindiah in every point of view; and the consequence of leaving the latter to his own means must be, that he will fall an easy prey to Holkar; or if he should endeavor to avoid the contest, which I do not think probable, his government will, by degrees, become dependent upon that of his rival.

‘Under these circumstances, and particularly as I was aware of your Excellency’s determination to support the peace, and the relative situation in which it should leave the different powers in the manner in which that had been established, by the exercise of the force of the British Government, I thought it expedient to hold forth to Scindiah an option of becoming a party of the general defensive alliance; and as a further inducement to him to agree to that treaty, to engage that the assistance which should be given to him should occasion no further diminution of his revenue.

‘I was induced to make this last engagement, by the conviction that Scindiah would not agree to the treaty of general defensive alliance, although his ministers proposed that he should unite himself more closely with the Company, if he was to be obliged to pay for the assistance which he should receive; and that, if he does agree to that treaty, the peace of India is insured so far as it can be by human means.

‘I have every reason to believe, also, that when Scindiah shall wind up his affairs at the end of this war, he will not have a disposable clear revenue, such as the British Government would require, to pay the expenses of the force which might be given to him.

‘Upon this point I have likewise to observe, that, supposing Scindiah should agree to the treaty of defensive alliance, the diminution of receipt to the Company will be of eight lacs of rupees annually, if his Highness the Peshwah be admitted to participate equally with the Company and the Nizam in the benefits of the war; and twelve and a half lacs of rupees if his Highness the Nizam only should be admitted to that participation.

‘I have sanguine hopes, therefore, that your Excellency will approve of this article of the peace.

‘By the cession of Baroach the Company will gain a clear revenue of ten lacs of rupees annually, and a valuable territory in a commercial point of view.

‘I ordered that the hill fort of Powanghur might be destroyed, when I determined to return that conquest to Scindiah. My motives for returning the conquests in that part of India, and Asseerghur and Burhampoor in the Decan, are explained to your Lordship in my dispatch of the 11th of November; and although I intend to endeavor to retain possession of Powanghur and Dohud in the negotiation of the treaty of general defensive alliance, in exchange for land elsewhere, I am still of opinion that, without making some sacrifices, I could not have peace; and these places appeared to me to be of less consequence than any of the other conquests which the British troops had made.

‘The territories restored in the neighborhood of Ahmednuggur are the ancient family lands of Scindiah; and your Excellency will perceive, in the minutes of the conferences, which will be sent as soon as they can be copied, the great anxiety to retain their lands. They have been returned, therefore, under a particular stipulation, that no armed men are ever to be kept in them.

‘I did every thing in my power to retain the lands of which I took possession upon the capture of Ahmednuggur, as I wished to exclude Scindiah entirely from the Deccan; but as the lands are really his family property, to have kept them would have occasioned a personal inconvenience, which your Excellency would have been desirous to remove; and the restoration of them is accompanied by a stipulation which I hope will prevent the bad consequences attending his having any lands in those countries.

‘There was considerable difficulty, also, in settling the 9th article, respecting the treaties made with the Rajahs. The ministers appeared to be aware of the loss which Scindiah’s government might incur under this article, and they contended strongly against it, till at last I was obliged to tell them that, unless they agreed to it, I could not make peace. The advantage which it appeared to me that your Excellency expected to derive from the independence of the Rajahs of Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and the Ranah of Gohud, was, that these chiefs should connect themselves by treaty with the British Government. From the different accounts, however, which I have received, I observe that treaties have not been concluded with any of these chiefs, notwithstanding the rapid and astonishing success of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief. The consequence of their independ-

ence, unless they should have connected themselves with the British Government, would be, that the annual contest which they have had with the Marhattas, for the Peshwah, would cease, and the British Government would derive no additional security.

‘I therefore deemed it best to stipulate generally for the independence of every Rajah with whom a treaty should have been concluded, by which your Excellency’s object is insured in respect to all of this description; and in regard to the others, they are left to their fate.

‘There was not much difficulty in arranging the other articles of the peace. There were some objections to the 12th article, founded upon the necessity of Scindiah’s performing the duties of his office of vakeel ool Mutuluk, which, however, were easily overcome.

‘In negotiating this treaty, I have received the greatest assistance from Mr. Elphinstone, and, since he arrived in camp, from Major Malcolm, indeed the acquaintance of the latter with your Excellency’s sentiments upon all political questions, and his own political knowledge and abilities, have enabled me to conclude this difficult treaty in a manner which I hope will be satisfactory to your Excellency.

‘I have requested Major Malcolm to prepare to go to Scindiah’s camp, as soon as I shall have received the ratification of the treaty. By a residence there for some time, he will be enabled to settle with that chief the treaty of general defensive alliance, if it should be possible to arrange it; or, at all events, to acquire a knowledge of the characters at his durbar, and of the state of his remaining military resources.

‘In case your Excellency should think it proper to ratify this treaty, it will be best to send one copy of the ratification to Major Kirkpatrick, to be forwarded to Major Malcolm; and one to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, to be forwarded through Hindustan: as one of the objects of Major Malcolm’s attention will be to communicate with his Excellency by a dawk.

‘I propose to desire the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan to take possession of Scindiah’s territories, ceded by the 4th article of the treaty of peace. In respect to the other territories, they will remain to be disposed of, according to the orders which I may receive from your Excellency.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

perused them, will make you acquainted with the terms on which this treaty has been concluded.

‘ You will have been informed that I concluded a treaty of peace with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar on the 16th of December, of which I received the ratification on the 23rd. But lest you should not have received that information, or a copy of the treaty, I enclose one.

‘ Dowlut Rao Scindiah has expressed a desire to have some guns and military stores which are in the forts of Kanoor, Kishengur Mewat, Hansi, Goculghur, Malaghur, and Sehaurunpoor, which he alleges have not yet been taken by the troops under the immediate command of your Excellency.

‘ I have promised him to apply to your Excellency for the guns and stores in those forts, provided they should not have been taken before my application should reach you; and I hope, in consideration of the great degree to which his military power and resources have been reduced in the war, and of the difficulty which he will experience in supporting himself against Jeswunt Rao Holkar, your Excellency will be induced to grant my request.

‘ I enclose a memorandum* which I have received from Moonshee Kavel Nyn, one of Dowlut Rao Scindiah’s ministers, of which I request your Excellency’s notice.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To General Lake.

‘ *SIR,* ‘ Camp at Manusgaum, 5th January, 1804.

‘ You will have observed by the 7th article of the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, a copy of which I transmitted to you in my dispatch this day, that the districts of Dhoolpoor, Baree, and Rajah Kerrah in Hindustan, and situated, I believe, on the river Chumbul, are to remain in the possession of that chief on certain conditions specified in that article.

‘ In case the districts should have been taken possession of by the troops under your Excellency’s command, I write this letter to request that you will give orders to the collector or other persons in charge of them on the part of the

* MEMORANDUM FROM MOONSHEE KAVEL NYN.

‘ The Baugh Barah Derry belongs to Moonshee Kavel Nyn; but an officer has taken possession of it. The moonshee requests that his property in Delhi, in houses, gardens, &c., may be protected. The person who has charge of it will be found on inquiring at the Barah Derry.’

British Government to give them up to the person who will be sent by Dowlut Rao Sciudiah to take possession of them.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Général Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To General Lake.

‘ SIR, ‘ Camp at Manusgaum, 5th January, 1804.

‘ I have but little to add to my public dispatches of this date. The copies of my dispatches to his Excellency the Governor General, which I forwarded to you, will have apprized you of the late event of the campaign in this quarter; but, lest they should not have reached you, I now mention that I defeated the combined armies of the enemy at Argaum in Berar on the 29th November, taking all their cannon, and destroying vast numbers, with but small loss on our side, no officer killed, and but few wounded. The infantry and cannon in this action was the Rajah of Berar’s, and the cavalry his and Scindiah’s.

‘ On the 15th December I took the hill fort of Gawilghur by storm; on the 19th I signed a peace with the Rajah of Berar, and on the 30th December one with Scindiah. By the former the Company gain the province of Cuttack and the province of Berar, half of which, however, before belonged to the Nizam. But the revenue of the Rajah’s share is said to have amounted to fifty lacs of rupees. I really believe it is thirty lacs, and we certainly have got the only productive parts of the Rajah’s territories.

‘ Scindiah’s cessions in Hindustan appear by the account to be more than one crore and fifty lacs, Baroach is ten lacs, and seven lacs in the Deccan.

‘ I beg leave to take this opportunity of congratulating your Excellency upon the success of the troops under your immediate command in Hindustan. I am concerned to inform your Excellency that Lieut. Colonel Harness of the 80th regiment died at Ellichpoor on the 1st instant. Upon mentioning this event I must again take the liberty of mentioning to you Lieut. Colonel Wallace of the 74th regiment, whose services I have again had occasion to report in a favorable manner, since I addressed you upon this subject after the battle of Assye.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *General Lake.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

‘ 5th January, 1804.

‘ I wrote you a letter on the 16th of July last, which I hope you have received ; but lest you should not, I now send a duplicate of it.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have concluded treaties of peace between the Honorable Company and their Allies, and Dowlut Rao Scindiah and Rajah Senah Saheb Ragojee Bhoomslah respectively ; and I take this opportunity of congratulating you upon the restoration of peace in Hindustan and in the Deccan.

‘ During the existence of the late war, your conduct has been most wise and politic, and has been perfectly satisfactory to me ; and I repeat to you, upon this occasion, the assurance which I have frequently given you, that so long as you refrain from attacking the Honorable Company and their Allies, the British Government will not interfere with you.

‘ This will be forwarded to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman who is going to reside with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, on the part of the British Government. He will receive from you any communication you may be desirous of making to the British Government or to me, and will communicate with you on any point that you may consider likely to forward your interests, or to promote the friendship between the Honorable Company and you.

‘ *Jeswunt Rao Holkar.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Dowlut Rao Scindiah

‘ Camp, 5th January, 1804.

‘ This letter will be delivered to you by Major Malcolm, a gentleman of rank, and in the confidence of his Excellency the Governor General, whom I have sent to you, in order that he may take every opportunity of rendering permanent the friendship now re-established between the Honorable Company and you.

‘ I request you to consider what Major Malcolm will say to you as coming from me.

‘ *Dowlut Rao Scindiah.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray, or Major Walker, or the Officer, Civil or Military, in charge of the Revenue Department in the Districts conquered from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in Guzerat.

‘ SIR,

‘ Camp, 5th January, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to inform you, that, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I have concluded a treaty of peace

on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies with the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which the latter has ratified, and I have the honor to enclose a paper which contains copies of all the articles of the treaty which relate to Guzerat.

‘I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will cede the districts, places, &c., depending upon Powanghur and Dohud, including Godra, and every other place and right depending upon those forts, to the person who will be sent on the part of the Maharajah to take charge of them.

‘The forts of Powanghur and Dohud are not to be evacuated till further orders shall have been received from me; and I write by dawk to the commanding officer in Guzerat, to desire him to make certain arrangements for occupying those forts.

‘In case any treaties should have been made with any Rajahs or others heretofore feudatories of the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, you will be so kind as to apprize me thereof; and you will acquaint all Rajahs and others from whom the British troops have received assistance, but with whom no treaties have been made, of the purport of the 10th article of the treaty of peace. One hundred and seventy-four villages are included in the Baroach territory, ceded to the Honorable Company by the 3rd article.

‘There does not appear to me to be any necessity to inform the Rajah Anund Rao of the purport of the 5th article, till further orders shall have been received from his Excellency the Governor General.

‘The districts ceded by the 6th article are to be given up in the state in which they shall be on the day that you will receive this letter; you are to have nothing further to do with them, and are to make no claims whatever for arrears of revenue, &c., unless you should have made advances to the ryots, in which case you are to take measures to recover those advances.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray, &c.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 5th January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that, by virtue of the powers vested in me, I have concluded a treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah, and I have the honor to enclose a copy of the articles of that treaty which relate to Guzerat.’

‘I likewise enclose a copy of a letter which I have written to the officer civil or military in charge of the revenue department in that province, from which you will form a judgment of the measures which are to be adopted for restoring the conquest made in that quarter.

‘You will be so kind as to allot for the defence of the forts of Powanghur and Dohud such garrisons as you may think necessary for their security; and you will throw into the garrisons a supply of provisions to last four months, which you will inform the officers commanding is not to be touched excepting in a case of necessity.

‘I conclude that the upper fort, or balla killa, at Powanghur, has been destroyed according to my former orders.

‘In respect to the detachment which you have in the field, you will draw it back towards Baroda, into the territories of the Rajah Anund Rao, unless it should be required in advance for any local purpose.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Captain Graham.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 5th January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you that, by virtue of the authority vested in me, I have concluded a peace on the part of the Honorable Company and their Allies with the Maharajah Dowlut Rao Scindiah, which the latter has ratified; by which I have consented to cede to the Maharajah the districts, lands, and villages specified in the enclosed paper, which is a copy of the 8th article of the treaty of peace.

‘I beg that upon the receipt of this letter you will cede the districts and places therein specified to the officers who will be sent by the Maharajah to take possession of them; provided that the condition stated in the 8th article is complied with, and particularly provided that Mulwa Dada withdraws his banditti from the country, and crosses the Godavery and proceeds into Candeish. But if Mulwa Dada should still remain with his banditti in that quarter, you are not to deliver up the districts in question till you receive further orders from me.

‘The fort of Ahmednuggur, and the other districts taken possession of, at the time of the capture of that fort by the British troops, are to remain in the possession of the British Government and their Allies, under the treaty of peace.

‘You will give up the districts in the state in which they are on the day you shall receive this letter. You are to have nothing further to do with them, and to give up all claims

upon them for arrears of revenue, &c., unless you should have made advances to the ryots; in which case, you are to recover those advances. 'I have the honor to be, &c.'

'Captain Graham.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone, with the Rajah of Berar.

'SIR, 'Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 7th January, 1804.

'I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 3rd instant, upon the subject of the claim of the Rajah of Berar to the possession of certain districts heretofore belonging to the Nizam, situated on the left bank of the river Wurda, under the 4th article of the treaty of peace.

'It is impossible to frame a treaty of peace in such a manner as to find in it a decision of all questions which can arise between the parties concerned; particularly when the parties have frequently been at war, and have preserved a recollection of a variety of contradictory claims arising out of the events of their wars, which they are ready to bring forward on all occasions.

'But there are certain principles which supply the defect of all instruments of this description, and enable us to decide upon the scope and meaning of the different articles of the treaty, and to apply them to cases not in contemplation when the treaty was made.

'One of these principles is, that the meaning of an article of a treaty shall not be construed in a sense directly the reverse of the principles and basis on which the treaty of peace was negotiated.

'The basis of the negotiation of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar was, that he should give compensation to the Company and their Allies for the injury he had done them by his aggression. It does not follow, that, because he was to give a compensation to the Company and their Allies, the Allied Powers were not to make any cession to him for the sake of peace, or for the general convenience of all parties; but the principle above stated requires that every such cession should be particularly specified in the treaty; and when such cession is not specified, there is strong reason to believe that the intention of the parties, at the time they were contracting the engagement, was, that the cession should not be made.

'The 4th article does not specify that the districts in question are to be ceded to the Rajah of Berar; and to suppose that it conveys an intention to cede those districts,

which it does not express, is to construe it in a sense directly the reverse of the principle and basis of the negotiation for the peace. I, therefore, cannot now admit that construction. To this reasoning I have to add, that although I was misinformed by Rajah Mohiput Ram, and believed when I negotiated the treaty, that the Soubah of the Deccan had no territories beyond the Wurda, I never had an intention to cede any thing by it, excepting the fort of Gawilghur and neighboring districts, of the yearly value of four lacs of rupees; and that, if the demand to cede any territories of the Soubah's had been made, I should have positively rejected it.

‘Besides this general reasoning upon the subject, which in my opinion must be considered conclusive as to the intentions of both the parties interested in the negotiation of this treaty of peace, and the fact above mentioned regarding my own intentions, there are some facts relative to these districts which prove in the clearest manner, that the Rajah's ministers did not imagine that it was intended to cede them.

‘The districts were held previous to the war, and are held at this moment by the Nizam's officers and troops, in the same manner as all the other districts of which the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar collected the revenues jointly. One of the places claimed, is the fort of Amnair, and in each of the districts there is a place of strength, of which it would not be very easy for the Rajah to dispossess the Soubah's officers. But although they certainly could not have taken the fort of Amnair, and in all probability would have found it difficult to get possession of the pergunnahs in the districts, the Rajah's minister has never applied for orders to the Nizam's officers and troops to evacuate them: and I therefore conclude, that he who negotiated the treaty knew well that it had never been intended to give them up.

‘I have also to mention to you, that, in a conversation which I had with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder upon this subject last night, he did not contend that the district had been ceded; but he requested that they might be given up to the Rajah as a mark of friendship and of favor.

‘The districts in question are the pergunnah of Ashtie, the annual value of which is one lac and a half of rupees; the pergunnah of Berroor Ahah, or Belloor Akal, the value of which is twenty thousand rupees; and the pergunnah of Arvee, the value of which is twenty thousand rupees; half of each of which sums belonged to the Nizam, and a half to the Rajah of Berar. The fort of Amnair also is on the left bank of the river, and is the capital of the district of Am-

nair, which is on the right bank. The value of these districts to either party is trifling, but I request you to inform the Rajah's ministers that I consider that the Soubah's claim to his share is just; that I must support him in the enjoyment of his just right; and that I trust they will urge the Rajah to cease all opposition to it. At the same time, I request you to tell them that I have desired Rajah Mohiput Ram not to interfere with the Rajah's rights in the same districts.

'I am much concerned that the Rajah of Berar should have demanded the sole possession of these districts, as it will be necessary to report the demand to his Excellency the Governor General; and his Excellency may, upon receiving this report, entertain doubts of the Rajah's sincerity in making the peace. Explain this apprehension to the ministers: and tell them that, in my opinion, the only mode of removing these doubts from his Excellency's mind, and to induce him to believe that the demand of the districts originated in error, will be for the Rajah to renounce this unreasonable claim without loss of time.

'As a proof of such renunciation, I request you to demand from the Rajah's ministers orders to his officers in those districts, not to interfere with the rights of the Soubah of the Deccan; and to cease all hostilities against, and to withdraw from, the post of Amnair.

'Rajah Mohiput Ram declares that Mollagies Ahier is still in the Amnair pergunnah with two thousand men, that Trimbuck Row is in Roora and Munyloor with two thousand men, and Ambajee, a brahmin, in Corga and Wausim with one thousand. The Rajah's vakeel declares that he has sent them orders to cross the Wurda, and that they have passed that river. But I request you to make inquiries upon this subject, and to procure orders addressed to those chiefs to withdraw without loss of time.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Hon. Mountstuart Elphinstone.*' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR MALCOLM ON HIS MISSION TO THE
DURBAR OF DOWLUT RAO SCINDIAH.

'7th January, 1804.

'I think that there are not any troops of Scindiah's now in Hindustan, and there are certainly none in Guzerat; therefore there will be but little necessity to press him to perform his treaty, as far as it respects those two countries, but his pindarries have lately been spread in the province of

Berar ceded by Ragojee Bhoonslah ; and the Nizam's officers appear determined to do nothing to get rid of this evil, and depend entirely on the British Government. I shall endeavor to check it by a disposition of the troops to cover the country.

‘ It will be necessary to urge Scindiah to send his pindaries off to the northward of the Nerbudda ; and I beg that you will take an early opportunity of conversing seriously with Scindiah's ministers upon this subject. Inform them that, if the peace is to continue, the ryots and inhabitants of the country must enjoy the benefits of it, and be free from military violence, otherwise the governments shall not, and the war must recommence.

‘ Mulwa Punt, or Mulwa Dada, still continues his depredations also on the Nizam's frontier towards Perinda. I beg you to inform Scindiah that I shall not think myself authorized to restore the places detailed in the 8th article of the treaty of peace, till that person and his troops shall have gone to the northward.

‘ In case he should disavow Mulwa Dada, it will be necessary that he should write me a letter to that purport, which I shall send to that person ; and at the same time inform him that, finding him to be little better than a common thief, I propose to hang him, if I can catch him. I shall likewise offer a large reward for his apprehension.

‘ I promised Jeswunt Rao Goorparah that he should be provided for by the British Government ; and I wish you would endeavor to have him included in the list of persons to be provided for by the Company under the 7th article of the treaty. If Scindiah should not consent to do this, or should give him an inadequate provision, I must recommend him to the Governor General.

‘ I think that you ought to see all the persons whom Scindiah shall name as those to receive these pensions or jag-hires, and give them some kind of paper, by way of sunnud, for the sum which he shall fix for them ; explaining to them that the mode in which they shall receive the money will be hereafter made known to them.

‘ By these means they will be taught immediately to look up to the British Government as the source from which they shall receive their subsistence.

‘ The payments to these people will commence from the day Scindiah shall ratify the treaty ; but as in the mean time, till orders from the Governor General shall arrive, they may be distressed for the want of money, you might draw upon the Governor General for one, two, or three lacs of rupees, to

be distributed among them, according to the proportions which Scindiah will fix for them.

‘I expect that Scindiah will be much annoyed when he finds the loss sustained by his consent to the 9th article of the treaty. However, you may remind him and his ministers, that they were repeatedly informed of what was going forward, and that they must attribute the greatest part of the loss to the eight weeks’ delay in the negotiating the treaty of peace.

‘I recommend that you should watch his military movements very closely, and take care that he does not attack some of the Rajahs who have made treaties with us, in the interval between the time when he shall ratify the treaty, and that at which he shall receive the ratification of the Governor General.

‘If you should find Scindiah at all alarmed about the 11th article of the treaty, you will tell him that there is no intention to go into an examination of all that has passed at Poonah for the last seven or eight years.

‘My opinion upon that point is, that it would be best for the British Government, if the Peswah had no territories north of the Godavery, or of the hills north of that river; at all events, none intermixed as those in Malwa are with those of Holkar and Scindiah.

‘It is very probable that many grants that Scindiah has of lands in Malwa were extorted from the Peshwah. But I do not think that circumstance ought to affect their validity. They are regular grants from the Poonah government; and unless we should enter into a detailed inquiry into all that passed for three or four years at Poonah, it will be impossible to dispute them. Those grants, made by Ballojee Koonger after he quitted the Peshwah, stand on quite different grounds, and must be disputed to the last.

‘Upon the subject of the general defensive alliance under the 15th article of the treaty of peace, my opinion is, that Scindiah and his ministers will readily agree to all the stipulations of the treaty, excepting that of placing a corps at Ougein, or any where in Scindiah’s dominions. I acknowledge that, if Scindiah were left in a situation, at the end of the war, to support his own government against Holkar, and if he were equal in abilities to the latter, or had any person in his service capable of conducting the affairs of his government, in such a manner as to afford a reasonable ground for hope that his government would regain such strength, as that it would stand against Holkar’s attacks, I should be very indifferent upon the success of this treaty; as I

am convinced that the attention of both these chiefs will always be occupied by the gratification of their mutual enmity and revenge, and that they will never unite ; and that, whether singly or united, neither will ever dare to attack the British Government or its Allies. But, in the present state of Scindiah's affairs, it does not appear possible that his government can last, without the support of the Company. He must either be destroyed entirely, or his government must fall under the influence of Holkar ; and it is unnecessary to detail the probable consequences of such an event. On this ground only do I think it advisable to connect the Company with Scindiah, in the present situation of affairs.

‘ The principal features in the treaty of defensive alliance are the subsidiary force in the territory of our ally, the engagement of our ally to have no communication with any foreign power, excepting with our knowledge, and to be guided by our advice in his foreign relations ; and the aid to be derived from our ally upon the occasion of a war.

‘ It is my opinion, both from the nature of Scindiah's government, and from what passed in the conferences with the vakeels, that the only point to which Scindiah will have any objection is that fixing the force within his territories.

‘ In considering the necessity of forcing this point as a *sine quâ non*, it is my opinion that all reference to what passed, and what was necessary at Hyderabad at the moment at which the treaty of defensive alliance was formed with the late Nizam, may be dispensed with, and ought to be laid out of the question. At that time there were three or four great parties in the Nizam's state contending for its power, each, excepting the English party, having great military power.

‘ The French party could not have been put down without the presence of the English detachment. The English party could not have been supported against the fears occasioned in the Nizam's mind by the threats of the Pagah party, or of the Marhatta faction, if the English troops had not been at Hyderabad. But it is doubtful whether, hereafter, the presence of the troops will be necessary to preserve our influence even over those.

‘ At all events, the troops are not necessary, and do not produce any benefit at Poonah, and still less would they be necessary at Scindiah's capital.

‘ The enemy, the fear of whom will induce Scindiah to throw himself upon the Company, is the personal enemy of himself, and of every individual about his person. It will not be very difficult for the British Resident to prevent that

enemy from gaining a preponderating influence in his durbar, or, at all events, such as will be likely to be injurious to the British interests.

‘I conceive, therefore, that no political object will be gained by having the troops at Scindiah’s capital.

‘There is a military objection to stationing them at Ougein, resulting from the comparative strength of the detachment with that of Holkar’s army.

‘I certainly think that six battalions of the Company’s troops, without Europeans or cavalry, ought not to be risked in an action with Holkar’s army, excepting in a case of absolute necessity, which ought to be avoided if possible. But as Holkar’s army will be stationed at Indore, it will not be possible to avoid the action, if that chief should think it proper to bring it on suddenly, which, from the ferocious and superstitious nature of his disposition, must be expected.

‘One of the effects which has attended the placing of the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, has been the complete destruction of the military power of the Soubahdar of the Decan. It is not necessary now to canvass the benefits or disadvantages resulting from that effect; like every other political measure, it has both, which are felt in different degrees upon different occasions; but the effect has been produced by the entire reliance of the government upon the exertion of the British troops for the performance of all the services, for which they had before kept up their own military establishments, and by the desire of the Nizam and his ministers to hoard up treasure.

‘The consequence of Scindiah’s discharging all his military establishments, an effect which will certainly be produced by the same cause, will be much more serious than those experienced by the Nizam’s discharging his, however inconvenient. All the persons discharged must go into Holkar’s service, in order to gain a livelihood, and thereby increase his means of annoying the other powers of India, every one of whom will be connected with the Company; and also render more urgent the necessity of using those means, in order to procure support for his numerous followers.

‘This is, in my opinion, a very serious consideration. The consequence of the extension of the Company’s army has been to destroy the military power of their Allies. But those armies, formerly in the service of the Peshwah and of the Nizam, must have gone somewhere; and there can be no doubt but they are at this moment in the service of Scindiah and Holkar, and the Rajah of Berar; and when this alliance

shall be formed with Scindiah, they will have Holkar for their only resource, unless, in forming it, great pains should be taken to oblige Scindiah to preserve his military power.

‘I have also to observe upon this point, that Scindiah’s government is in a state so unsettled, that if the Company’s troops are to be introduced into his country, and we are to be employed in settling it, and he is not to be obliged to keep up his military establishment, and all means adopted to insure that object, the expense to the Company will be much greater than that estimated.

‘I have already shown that the presence of the military force at the seat of Scindiah’s residence will not be necessary to support the British influence in his durbar; and I have stated a military objection to keeping the force at Ougein. I might possibly contend that no political influence can be produced at Scindiah’s durbar from stationing the force in any other part of his country; but I think that, in the present situation of the British power in India, no advantage of that kind can compensate for the loss of his military power and its consequences, which must result from stationing the force in his country at all.

‘I will suppose even the worst that can happen: as it is probable that the alliance will have the effect of supporting Scindiah’s government throughout the ensuing two years, and that it will have time to regain its strength, much will have been gained: and even if the alliance should be then broken, the Company will enjoy a greater advantage, and will have a better prospect of the continuance of peace, than it would have if Scindiah should allow his military establishment to fall.

‘In this state of the case, the question regarding the position of the subsidiary force becomes merely military; and where political considerations affect it, they operate against placing the subsidiary force in Scindiah’s territories.

‘Whatever may be the result of this negotiation with Scindiah, there are two points which must be strengthened; the troops at both of which will materially check both him and Holkar. One of these is Guzerat, respecting reinforcing which province I have measures in contemplation; the other is the southern part of Bundelcund; either of these provinces might be fixed upon, with Scindiah’s Government, as the station of the subsidiary force; and the British Government would derive the greatest advantage in these territories from the adoption of either.

‘In giving my opinion upon this subject, I am fully aware that I have departed from one of the principles adopted by

the Governor General, in framing his instructions upon all these subsidiary allowanees. But the circumstances of the case, and of the moment, are entirely different from those which have hitherto occurred. We are aware of a practical inconvenience in all the subsidiary alliances, and of the danger of its being caused in Scindiah's government; and I think that the Governor General will authorize the deviation recommended from the original plan, when he shall consider the circumstances of this case. However, you are better acquainted with his sentiments upon this and every political subject than I am, and must know best how far the reasoning above detailed would have the effect of inducing him to alter the original plan. If you should think it would not, I beg you to insist upon the reception of the subsidiary force in Scindiah's territories as a *sine quâ non*.

'It is absolutely necessary to insist upon Scindiah's agreeing to all the stipulations by which the allies are bound to have no intercourse with foreign states, excepting with our consent; and to follow our advice in all their relations with such states. The object which he has in view, in this alliance, is to gain support against Holkar; not so much for his own defence, as in his plans of aggression against that chief. We must, therefore, take care that we are not drawn into an offensive war by these engagements.

'It appears that, in consideration of Holkar's engaging to join in the attack on the British Government and their Allies, Scindiah gave over to him the territories of his family, and agreed that Kundee Rao Holkar, the son of Mulhar Rao, should be placed on the musnud, under the protection of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. By this act he relinquished the right of Cashee Rao Holkar, in support of which he had before committed murder, and had carried on the war for years; and he abandoned that chief to his fate. When the treaty of defensive alliance shall be taken into consideration, it will be absolutely necessary to see this treaty with Jeswunt Rao Holkar.

'In respect to its conditions, it is my opinion that the British Government must determine at once to adopt one of two lines: either to acknowledge and support the treaty, and consider it in every respect as containing the register of the rights of the two parties; or to disavow the treaty as being the bond of an offensive alliance against the British Government.

'If the first is adopted, a mode will exist of ascertaining the rights of each party, and the British Government have some document by which its conduct relative to each can be

guided. I have also to observe, that this line of conduct is most consistent with that heretofore followed in respect to Holkar, and with the assurances given him, that as long as he refrained from attacking the British Government and their Allies, the British Government would not interfere with him.

‘In this case, Scindiah’s conquest of Holkar’s territories, and his right to dispose of them as he might think proper, must be admitted.

‘If the second is to be adopted, Holkar must be considered as an usurper. The question regarding the right of his possession may be renewed by Scindiah at any time; and, at all events, it will be difficult to find out a mode of understanding and settling the claims of both parties.

‘Upon the whole, therefore, however extraordinary the proceeding may be, to acknowledge the validity of the stipulations of a treaty of offensive alliance against the British Government, I do not see how it can be avoided, without risking another war immediately, which the alliance with Scindiah is intended to prevent; or without depriving the British Government of the means of deciding upon questions between Scindiah and Holkar.

‘The rights of Scindiah, also, over all the Bajpoots who will remain liable to his extortions, as having omitted to connect themselves with the British Government, must also be ascertained.

‘The next point to be considered is, the amount of the aid to be received from Scindiah, in case the British Government should be involved in a war.

‘In the course of this memorandum, I have already adverted to the tendency which these subsidiary forces have to destroy the military establishments of the native powers; and I have pointed out the bad consequences which must result from the destruction of Scindiah’s military establishment.

‘It is possible that if the subsidiary force is not stationed in his country, and if he cannot command its services upon all occasions for which he will require troops, he may be induced to keep up his military establishments. But whether the situations above proposed for the Company’s troops have that effect or not, it will be necessary that the treaty should provide for his keeping up a respectable force.

‘First. Whatever may be his military establishments of cavalry, regular regimental infantry, and artillery, he ought to be obliged by treaty to keep up the same.

‘Secondly. He ought to be obliged to furnish certain proportions of those troops to serve with the British troops

at his expense, when required ; to allot regular funds for their support, and to pay a certain sum monthly for every man absent from the number settled by treaty that he is to furnish.

‘ Thirdly. That in case the British Government should at any time require that more of his troops than the number which he is obliged to supply should serve in the field with their army, they are to be furnished at certain rates, to be specified in the treaty.

‘ I think, also, that there might be some additional exceptions against employing the British troops in the collection of the revenues, and in the business of mooluck-geery, or levying tribute from polygars or Rajahs, unless in cases in which it should appear to the British Resident that the assistance of the British troops is essentially necessary to enable Scindiah to recover his rights.

‘ In case you should find Scindiah to be inclined to consent to the treaty of defensive alliance, I think it will be very desirable to endeavor to prevail upon him to cede to the Company Powanghur and Dohud, in exchange for lands elsewhere ; and you might point out to him the advantage which he would derive from having the Company’s troops so near to Holkar as they would be at Dohud, as an inducement to him to adopt the measure.

‘ He will possibly offer to allow us to put a garrison in Dohud, or to post our troops there, while he will have a garrison in the fort. But in answer to this offer, you might tell him that we could not venture to post our troops so far forward, unless we had possession of the countries, and had the Rajahs of Ravera, &c., under our government. That if this arrangement were made, we could afford to conciliate these Rajahs, and thus secure our communication with Baroda and the sea coast. But that as long as they remain under him, and he continues to levy the tribute, they will be his enemies, and of course ours also, if we should be his allies ; and that we should experience the greatest difficulties in keeping up the communication through those jungly and mountainous tracts, under those circumstances.

‘ I think it certain that Scindiah is sincere in his desire for peace. Indeed, the state of his affairs with Holkar requires it. But in the course of the negotiation of this treaty, I have observed a fickleness and unsteadiness of principle and of action, which is scarcely consistent with the existence of government. That which guides all the measures of Scindiah’s government, appears to be jealousy of the power of the house of Holkar, a personal enmity against Jeswunt Rao

Holkar, and a desire of revenging injuries received from, and of repeating others done to that chief; but we have already seen Scindiah's government depart from that great and ruling principle of his measures, and make great sacrifices to obtain peace with Holkar, certainly contrary to the sense which Scindiah himself and all his ministers entertained of his true interests: I think, therefore, that it is desirable to watch closely their future negotiations.

'I do not think it probable that they will unite, or that if they did, the British Government would have much to apprehend from their union, excepting that which is always to be apprehended from the weakness and inconsistency of Scindiah's character, and the violent ferocity and superstition of Holkar.

'This union is by no means so probable as the immediate renewal of the war between them; and you will possibly find it very difficult to prevent this war. But this is very desirable for many reasons.

'I have already pointed out that Scindiah's military resources are nearly destroyed, those of Holkar are unimpaired: Scindiah has no abilities himself, and has no person about him capable of managing his affairs; Holkar has the reputation of being an able man, and has certainly been a successful one.

'The consequence of the existence of tranquillity for a year, or two years, will be, that Scindiah's government and his military resources will in some degree recover; and Holkar's will become worse than they are at present, as the certain consequence of tranquillity to an overgrown army, constituted as his is, must be its gradual dissolution. It is also probable, that, if the peace should be preserved for one or two years, the influence of the British Government with both chiefs will be so much increased as to render it possible to prevent the war altogether.

'I therefore most anxiously recommend this point to your attention.

'In my letter to Holkar, I have informed him that you are going to Scindiah's camp, and have desired him to send the answer to you; you will, of course, peruse it, and if you should find any opportunity of opening a communication with Holkar, do so, and exert yourself to the utmost to preserve the peace between him and Scindiah.

'Of course you will do every thing in your power to obtain accurate intelligence of the remaining strength of Scindiah's armies, of his revenues, &c. &c. In my opinion, the best mode of acquiring this information is to keep up a constant personal intercourse with his ministers and those about his

darbar ; to have this intercourse a daily occurrence, and by no means a matter of state or parade ; and by these means it is not possible that we can remain in ignorance of any thing that is going on, as in other places.

• *Major. Malcolm.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th January, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 16th of December, upon the subject of the weakness of the garrison of Surat. I have not received any return of the troops at that station, and I cannot say what their numbers are. Colonel Murray has, I imagine, lately called the European troops into the field, as I observe that the 75th regiment is among those composing his corps.

‘I am decidedly of opinion that Surat is a point of too much consequence ever to be exposed to risk, excepting in a case of very urgent necessity. The plan which I proposed to the Honorable the Governor, in my letter of the 2nd of August, provided effectually for the security of Surat, under every possible contingency ; and I conclude that the departure from that part of it has been occasioned by the extraordinary sickness of the troops.

‘The change of the circumstances of our situation, in consequence of the peace, may render desirable a small alteration in that plan. I purpose immediately to take the subject into consideration, and to lay my sentiments before the Governor. In the mean time, I think that it will be advisable to station the fencible battalion at Surat ; unless Colonel Murray should require its services for any extraordinary emergency, of which I am not aware.

‘I now beg leave to recommend generally to the Government, that the first step taken should be to supply the deficiencies of men in the established corps, and to call upon the officers to discipline their sepoys. I see that in one corps there are no less than 500 supernumeraries, all undisciplined. This corps has had the same number of supernumeraries for the last six months ; and it might have been expected that before this time some of them would have been disciplined. In their present state, they are worse than useless.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘**SIR,** ‘Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th January 1804.

‘I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 18th of December. I do not apprehend that any inconvenience can result from the continuation of the correspondence of Colonel Murray with the Honorable the Governor in Council, through the accustomed channel; and it has the advantage of affording to Government the assistance of Major General Nicolls’s opinion upon the different points which may occur, and I therefore recommend its continuance.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Sec^y of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘**ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**’

To Captain Graham.

‘Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum,
8th January, 1804.

‘**MY DEAR SIR,**

‘I received your letters of the 11th and 13th December, but have been obliged to delay answering them, because the Nizam’s amildars thought proper to drive my tappall peons off the road, and to interrupt my communication with the southward.

‘The Bheel who, you say, proposes to connect himself with the British Government, merely refers you to his carkoon, laments the death of some other Bheel, and says that, if certain others are released, he will have full confidence in your professions. There is nothing in all this.

‘I am sorry for the defeat of the Perinda detachment; but I conclude that, as usual, they had only one hundred, instead of one thousand men.

‘I must consider of the proposal to have the mint at Ahmednuggur. I have concluded treaties of peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar; and a letter will go to you with this, which will show you what is to be given up on the side of Ahmednuggur; which fort will remain in our possession.

‘I shall also give Nimgaum to the Rajah of Berar. I fear, however, that nothing will restore peace to that part of the country, excepting my marching that way with the army, which I am now doing.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*Captain Graham.*’

‘**ARTHUR WELLESLEY.**’

To the Officer commanding at Gawilghur.

'SIR, 'Camp at Rajah Peepulgaum, 8th Jan., 1804.

'I beg that, upon the receipt of this letter, you will deliver up the fort of Gawilghur to the officer of the Rajah of Berar who will give this letter to you. You will take a receipt for the guns, stores, &c., which you will deliver up, as well as the armour, swords, &c., which have been kept by my directions.

'After having done this, you will march with the troops under your command to Ellichpoor, and place yourself under the orders of Lieut. Colonel Lang.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Officer commanding 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'
'at Gawilghur.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Jeypoor, 9th January, 1804.

'I have the honor to enclose orders for the delivery of the forts and districts ceded in Hindustan by the treaty of peace with Dowlut Rao Scindiah. I likewise enclose copies of letters which I have addressed to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and have dispatched through Hindustan.

'Major Malcolm quitted camp on the 7th instant, on his march to the camp of Dowlut Rao Scindiah.

'That chief had gone towards Burhampoor, and some of the sirdars had come from Ougein, escorted by a body of infantry to join him.

'I have recommended certain objects to the attention of Major Malcolm in a paper of which I will transmit a copy as soon as it can be made. 'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Camp at Jeypoor, 9th January, 1804.*

'I have the honor to enclose dispatches which have been sent to me by the Honorable Mr. Elphinstone, from a perusal of which, your Excellency will observe that the Rajah of

* Lieut. General Stuart, Commander-in-Chief, Fort St. George,
to the Governor General.

'MY LORD, 'Choultry Plain, 9th January, 1804.

'I have considered it unnecessary to report to your Excellency the operations of the British army employed against the Marhatta confederates in the Deccan, as they have been regularly communicated direct to your

Berar has claimed the exclusive possession of three districts east of the Wurda, the revenues of which had been collected previously to the war, jointly by him and by the Soubah of

Excellency by the Hon. Major General Wellesley. It is my duty, however, to inform your Excellency of the proceedings of the division of the army serving in the Dooab since the period of time when I left that division to return to the Carnatic.

‘The state of affairs at Hyderabad at the time of the death of the late Nizam, and the intention manifested by the Marhatta confederates of proceeding towards that capital, appeared to render it advisable, that the force under Major General Campbell should occupy a position favorable to a speedy advance upon Hyderabad. That officer, pursuant to the instructions which he received, proceeded to the Kistna in the month of September, and made the necessary preparations for the expeditious passage of that river.

‘The maintenance of order at Hyderabad, and the successes of the British armies to the northward of the Godavery, removed, however, every probability of the services of the division under the command of Major General Campbell being required at that capital. In the month of October intelligence was received from different quarters, of a nature calculated to excite suspicions regarding the dispositions and views of the southern Marhatta jaghiredars. The Rajah of Kolapoor increased his troops, and permitted a relation of Dowlut Rao Scindiah to make large levies in his country. The members of the Putwurdun family, and Madhoo Rao Rastia, also increased their forces to a considerable extent, and the Jalloor jaghiredar made an irruption into the country of Siddajee Rao Nimbilkur, Appah Dessaye, who, with his quota, had accompanied Major General Wellesley, plundered that chieftain’s villages, and attacked his fort of Manowly.

‘Major General Wellesley, on the 24th of October, requested that Major General Campbell should adopt measures for the protection of the country of Appah Dessaye; and the hostile tendency of the conduct manifested by the southern jaghiredars in general rendered it expedient for the latter officer to enter the Marhatta territory for the purpose not only of relieving the fort of Manowly, but of preventing acts of aggression on the part of the other jaghiredars.

‘On approaching the Marhatta frontier, Major General Campbell wrote to the several jaghiredars, and in the letter which he addressed to the Jalloor jaghiredar enjoined that chief to withdraw from the country of Appah Dessaye. Receiving no reply to that letter, Major General Campbell continued his march, and arrived at Manowly, where he was joined by the manager of Appah Dessaye. He proceeded from thence to Jalloor, and being unable to effect an accommodation between the jaghiredar of that place and the manager of Appah Dessaye, he delivered over the fort of Jalloor, which was surrendered to him without opposition, to the latter, on the 24th of December, until the orders of his Highness the Peshwah, relative to its disposal, should be received. The jaghiredar fled to the Rajah of Kolapoor.

‘Major General Campbell, on the 27th of December, received information that a large body of plunderers, amounting to ten thousand horsemen and peons, had crossed the Kistna at the Dharoor ghaut, and were proceed-

the Deccan. I likewise enclose the copy of a letter which I have written to Mr. Elphinstone upon the subject of this claim.

ing towards the Toombuddra and the Company's frontier. This body of plunderers was conducted by a Mussulman, who assumed the character of a faquir,* and the name of the late Dhoondiah Waugh.

'The depredations already committed by these plunderers, their manifest intention of passing the Toombuddra, and the extensive and serious evils which they were calculated to occasion in the countries of the Company and its Allies, rendered it indispensable to attack and disperse them with every possible degree of promptitude, and Major General Campbell commenced his march in pursuit of them on the 28th of December with the cavalry and the flank companies of the infantry of his division. After a forced march of considerable length, Major General Campbell had the good fortune to get up with the plunderers on the morning of the 31st of December; he attacked them immediately, and dispersed them, after killing and wounding upwards of three thousand of their number.

'I had the honor of forwarding to your Excellency a copy of Major General Campbell's report of that affair, which reflects considerable credit on the exertions of that officer, and the troops under his command. No doubts can exist of his early success having relieved the Company's northern provinces, and the Doab, from depredations similar to those which were committed by the late Dhoondiah Waugh.

'I embrace with sincere pleasure this opportunity of offering my cordial congratulations to your Excellency on the important, brilliant, and decisive successes which have attended the operations of the British armies during the present war in every quarter of India. Those events lead me to anticipate with the fullest confidence the speedy termination of the contest in which we are engaged, on terms eminently calculated to extend our resources, and secure the stability of the British power in India.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'The Governor General.'

'J. STUART.'

*The Secretary of the Supreme Government to Major General the
Hon. A. Wellesley.*

'SIR,

'Fort William, 9th January, 1804.

'Your dispatch dated the 17th of December, 1803, enclosing the copy of a treaty of peace concluded by you on that date, on the part of the Honorable Company with the Rajah of Berar, has been received and submitted to the Governor General in Council.

'2. The Governor General in Council has great satisfaction in communicating to you his high approbation of the terms of peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar, which his Excellency in Council considers to be in the highest degree advantageous, honorable, and glorious to the British Government.'

'3. The Governor General in Council discharges a satisfactory part of his duty in expressing to you the high sense which he entertains of the judgment and ability manifested by you on this occasion. The Governor General in Council considers you to have rendered an essential service to the

‘ Besides the conversation alluded to in that letter, I had another yesterday evening with Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder upon this subject, in the course of which, he entirely gave up the claim; and said that he had not a doubt but that the Rajah would also give it up, as soon as Mr. Elphinstone should make him acquainted with my sentiments. I told Ramchunder, however, that till that claim was given up, and till I should receive reports that the Rajah’s troops had been withdrawn from the province of Berar, I should not restore the fort of Gawilghur, or deliver over the districts for the support of its garrison, or of the garrison of Nernulla, and that I had ordered one division of British troops and the Nizam’s army to halt in Berar till further orders. He has again assured me that the Rajah would have no hesitation

interests of the Honorable Company, and to have augmented the reputation of the British name by the conclusion of this advantageous and honorable treaty.

‘ 4. The Governor General in Council has this day ratified the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, and the ratified copy will be immediately dispatched to the resident at Hyderabad, for the purpose of being transmitted to the Rajah of Berar through Mr. Elphinstone, whom you have appointed to act in the capacity of resident at that chieftain’s court.

‘ N. B. EDMONSTONE,

‘ Secretary to the Supreme Government.’

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.’

Marquis Wellesley to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR ARTHUR,

‘ Fort William, 9th January, 1804.’

‘ I have this instant received your letter of the 17th December, announcing the happy event of peace with the Rajah of Berar. Your treaty is wise, honorable, and glorious, and I shall ratify it the instant a copy can be made.

‘ The only article upon which I should wish any alteration, is that respecting the admission of Europeans into the service of the Rajah. It would be more complete to exclude them altogether in peace and war, unless with the consent of the British Government. But this is not an object to be placed in competition with the great advantages of this admirable treaty; the stipulations which will confer advantages on the Nizam are highly politic, and afford a splendid proof of the British faith. Upon the whole I feel the greatest pride in the treaty, and I am satisfied that it will form a brilliant point in the history of this country, and a noble termination of your military glory.

‘ Ever, my dear Arthur, &c.

‘ Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

‘ WELLESLEY.’

‘ I entirely approve your mission of Mr. Elphinstone, and your sending for Webbe. Let me know what situation Elphinstone wishes to fill.’

in renouncing this claim, and he wrote a dispatch to the ministers, which I forwarded last night.

‘I think that the claim has been brought forward only to try whether the British Government was likely to yield any point about which there could be a dispute, and it will be given up immediately. It is scarcely possible to believe that Rajah Mohiput Ram did not know that the Soubah of the Deccan had territories on the left bank of the Wurda, but he told me, upon more than one occasion, that he had none. But supposing him to have had a knowledge of the extent of his master’s territories in that quarter, his conduct in deceiving me upon that subject, is not more extraordinary than his having been the channel by which a present of five lacs of rupees was offered to me, provided I would consent to make peace with the Rajah of Berar, on condition of his ceding to the Company the province of Cuttack.

‘It is true, that when he spoke to me upon this subject, I do not believe that he was aware that I had demanded the province of Berar, as a compensation for the Soubah of the Deccan; but the fact above mentioned will show your Excellency that, in negotiating these treaties of peace, I had to contend not only with the ministers of the enemy, but against the intrigues of the servant of the allies: this will account in some degree for my want of information respecting the extent of the Soubah’s territories and rights beyond the Wurda.

‘There is a Marhatta interest in the government of the Soubah of the Deccan which pervades all branches of the administration. It is to be hoped that the operation of the treaties of peace will destroy this interest, for if it should not, the government must fall.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘Camp, at the bottom of the Badowly ghaut,

‘DEAR COLONEL, 10th January, 1804.

‘The letters which I sent under cover to you on the 8th instant will have apprized you that I have made peace with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, and those which I now send you will show you the principles on which I agreed to those terms.

‘Mr. Elphinstone is with Ragojee Bhoonslah, and appears to be getting on well. The Rajah has claimed the possession of three trifling districts, of which the revenues had been collected by him and the Nizam jointly, which are to the eastward

of the Wurda, under the operation of the 4th article of the treaty of peace. But I have combated that claim by stating that the basis of the treaty was, that the Rajah was to give compensation; and that in a case of doubt of what was the meaning of any article, it must be construed conformably to the basis of the treaty, and that when no cession is specified, no cession was ever intended. The Rajah's vakeel with me does not pretend that this cession was ever intended; and he says that he has no doubt that when the Rajah shall have been made acquainted with my sentiments, he will give up the claim.

'It would certainly have been better if the 4th article of the treaty had been more accurately drawn. But the fact is that Rajah Mohiput Ram deceived me in this instance, as he has in many others; and gave me reason to believe that the Soubah of the Deccan had no territories and no claims to the eastward of the Wurda; although I now believe that he has a claim upon the city of Nagpoor itself.

'Malcolm is gone to Scindiah's camp, where his principal business will be to arrange the treaty of defensive alliance. I think that the only objection to the treaty, in the same manner as it stands with the Soubah and the Peshwah, will be the stations of the troops in Scindiah's territories; and I am of opinion that this is not important, and I have recommended to Malcolm to give it up. The reasons on which I ground this opinion are too long to be detailed in this letter; and I have so much business that I cannot get you a copy of the paper which I have sent to Malcolm on this subject: but they appear to me to have had their weight with him, and to have induced him to alter his opinion.

'Whether Scindiah will agree to the treaty of defensive alliance or not, the first object of our attention must be to strengthen Guzerat; and place our military affairs in that province on a respectable footing. I am sure that I do not know how that is to be done, unless a thorough reform is to be introduced into all the military arrangements of the Bombay government, and possibly into the government itself. But I believe I must go to Bombay on this business.

'I see that the fencible battalion is turned into a regiment, and that it was to be sent into Guzerat. It is probable that this arrangement will be altered as soon as Mr. Duncan shall hear of the peace. But, at all events, whether it is altered or not, it will be necessary to move another battalion into that quarter. This can be done only by marching from Poonah the Bombay battalion stationed there, and I have this measure in contemplation.

‘ But before I carry this into execution, I must get farther to the southward, and see the real state of the country of the Soubah of the Deccan, which I am informed is chaos itself. We must introduce a reform into that government ; we must give it some public force, and establish that force on permanent principles, otherwise the government must fall to pieces. Six British battalions are not equal to keep in subjugation and tranquillity a country 600 miles long by 400 broad. Its disturbances will at some time or other prove fatal to our military operations : they would have distressed us much, if the late war had continued ; and even now that we have made peace, I much doubt whether I shall not be obliged, in consequence of their existence, to draw the troops to the southward to insure their subsistence.

‘ There are some points to which I wish you to turn your attention, and to give me your opinion before I write upon them to the Governor General. The first of these is the fort of Ahmednuggur. Shall we keep the fort, or give it up to the Peshwah ? If we keep it, shall it be in the name of the Peshwah ?

‘ What shall be the station of the subsidiary force ? I observe that the Peshwah has no territories in Candeish, or beyond the hills to the northward of the Godavery. Probably a station on that river would be the best. But as this subsidiary force will have no Europeans, and will be weak, as the Peshwah will most probably be desirous of keeping two battalions near his person, it is my opinion that unless the subsidiary force with the Soubah of the Deccan should be stationed also upon the Godavery, that with the Peshwah ought not to be so far forward : shall it therefore be at Ahmednuggur ? Upon the whole I believe* that this would be the best plan.

‘ What is to be done about settling the Peshwah’s countries ? My opinion is, that until his Highness raises ~~se~~bandy to take and keep possession of his tannahs, and puts his government into some kind of regular train, the British Government ought not to take the trouble of interfering in the business. Any interference, unless he should take these previous steps, will be entirely useless. Either our troops must be scattered up and down the country to garrison mud villages, and the officers to carry on the amildary ; or the mud villages must remain without tannahs, and the amildary in the hands of the thieves who now hold it, unless the Peshwah should put his government into some form. The first will be insecure, and, indeed, impracticable ; and the last will incur disgrace, which we must by all means avoid.

I should, therefore, think it best to withhold all assistance, and to remain neutral, till we shall see what steps the Peshwah will take, or whether it is possible to throw his government into any form; therefore, in order that the troops might not suffer want from the existence of this confusion, and that they might not be involved in it, I shall recommend Ahmednuggur as their station, at least for some time.

'This question respecting the settlement of the Peshwah's countries is much connected with another relating to which I wrote to you about a month ago: viz., his reconciliation with Amrut Rao. I hope to receive a letter from you upon that subject as soon as I shall have re-established my communication.

'I propose to appoint Colonel Wallace to command the subsidiary force, to whom, I understand from Malcolm, you have no objection. He is a brave soldier and an honorable gentleman, but he is little accustomed to transact political business. I shall, therefore, endeavor to place about him those officers who can be useful to him, but of course in doing this I must in some degree consult his own inclinations.

'I propose to appoint Lieut. Hamilton, of the Poonah escort, his interpreter, agreeably to your recommendation, which Malcolm gave me.

'I think of going to Poonah immediately, particularly if Webbe should be on his road, as I should wish to see him there; but I shall be glad to hear from you on all these points.

'Malcolm is, in my opinion, very unwell, and must go to England. I think that Webbe ought to go to Scindiah's durbar.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL, 'Camp, 10th January, 1804.

'Since I wrote to you this morning, Amrut Rao's vakeel has been here, and has told me that 30 sirdars and 500 of the Peshwah's Pagah horse, whom his Highness sent away when he embarked at Mhar, had joined Baba Phurkia. Baba Phurkia has lately dismissed them, (in fact he has been defeated in the Nizam's territories,) and they are now desirous of returning to the Peshwah's service, obtaining a pardon; or if that should not be granted, they are ready to deliver up their horses. They are now in a village in the Nizam's country, ten coss distant; and if the Peshwah

chooses to have them, Captain Graham will be able to find out from Amrut Rao's son where they are. I enclose an account of the names of the sirdars.

'Besides these people, there are a body of 3000 horse in this camp belonging to Amrut Rao, that I am now paying, which the Peshwah might as well take into his service. I wish you would propose this measure to him; but if he does not comply with your proposition, I shall discharge them immediately.

'Amrut Rao has also a very fine battalion of infantry of 700 men: possibly the Peshwah would like to have that also. But I do not know whether Amrut Rao would part with it. You may sound the Peshwah, and I will try Amrut Rao. The whole expense of Amrut Rao's troops is 87,000 rupees per mensem.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Glose.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Malcolm.

'Camp at the bottom of the Badowly ghaut, 10th January, 1804.
'MY DEAR MALCOLM,

'The only business at Ragojee Bhoonslah's durbar is the claim of the districts beyond the Wurda, and the delay of the orders to call in the horse who are still in Berar. If any thing material should occur, I shall let you know; but I cannot promise to send you copies of Elphinstone's dispatches, as I, and those who are obliged to assist me, have already much more to do than we can manage.

'I have told Ragojee's vakeel that I should not give up the fort of Gawilghur, or the country of the value of four lacs of rupees, and that I should leave a division of the British army in Berar, till all these questions should be settled. He declares that the Rajah will not hesitate one moment in complying with my requisition.

'The Nizam's territories are, I believe, in one complete chaos, from the Godavery to Hyderabad. Major Robertson writes me from Dharore that Bheer has been plundered, and the plunderers are spreading wide. This is a serious evil. Unless we can draw supplies from those countries, it will not be possible to keep the army to the northward.

'Some reform must be introduced into the government of the Soubah of the Deccan, or we shall yet be obliged to draw back to our frontier. A country 700 miles in length, and 400 in breadth, cannot be kept in subjection by six battalions.

‘I should be glad to have the translation of the schedule of the treaty with Scindiah. Likewise the paper received from Amrut Rao; on the subject of the division among his friends of the sum of one lac of rupees annually, which Kischen Rao has in his possession.

‘I have not yet got the papers from Scindiah’s vakeel, containing a memorandum of his demands, which were discussed in my last meeting with Eitul Punt.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘Camp above the Badowly ghaut,

SIR, 11th January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th November, on the subject of the trial of private William Clarke, of his Majesty’s 74th regiment. The reason for which I omitted to apply to you in favor of that soldier, at the time the proceedings on his trial were transmitted to be laid before you, was, that Lieut. Colonel Wallace did not recommend him; and when I pressed him to recommend him, he told me that if he had not been tried by a General Court Martial for murder, he must have been tried by a Regimental Court Martial for theft. However, I think it very desirable to avoid punishing with death a man belonging to the 74th regiment; and therefore I propose to offer to the man to commute his punishment to transportation for life to Botany Bay. By this mode the punishment of death will be avoided, and the 74th regiment will get rid of a bad soldier, of which Colonel Wallace is very desirous.

‘My tappall has for the last month been very irregular, owing to the increase of the disturbances in the Nizam’s territories, and I am much afraid that you will not have received many of my letters.

‘I have, however, within these few days, made a fresh effort to re-establish the runners upon the road, which I hope will be successful, particularly as I have passed through the ghauts with my own division, on my return towards the Godavery.

‘I shall therefore now give you an outline of our operations, and of events in this quarter, since the battle at Argaum on the 29th of November, of which I think you must have received the account.

‘I marched immediately after that action with both divisions to Ellichpoor, where I established an hospital for the wounded. On the 7th of December both divisions marched

to take up their ground for the siege of Gawilghur. The subsidiary force having been equipped for that operation at Asseerghur, was destined to attack the northern face, in which it appeared probable we should have the best chance of success; while I should cover the siege with my own division and all the cavalry, and make such attacks to the southward and westward as might appear practicable, and likely to divert the attention of the enemy from Colonel Stevenson's attack.

'The difficulty of dragging the guns through the mountains to the northern point of attack was terrible; but it was overcome by the labor of the troops, and our batteries opened, both to the northward and southward, on the 13th in the morning. On the 15th in the morning a breach was effected in two outer walls of the northern face, and the place was stormed. But then there still remained an inner wall, which had not been touched. This was escaladed, and the place was soon in our possession. Lieut. Colonel Kenny, who commanded the storming party, was wounded; and Lieut. Young of the 7th died of a wound he received. Our loss was not great. No impression was made by my battery on the southern face of the fort; but still I made two attacks with my division, while Colonel Stevenson stormed the northern face, one on the southern and one on the western gateway. The former could have done no good, excepting by distracting the enemy; but the latter got into the fort and co-operated in the attack of the inner wall.

'I have only given you an outline of our proceedings at Gawilghur, as I think it probable that you will have received my dispatches detailing them more particularly.

'On the 17th of December, in the morning, I signed a treaty of peace with the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, of which, and of my dispatch on this subject to the Governor General, I enclose other copies.

'I marched the same day, and till the 19th, to the eastward towards Nagpoor, in order to keep alive the impression under which it was obvious that the treaty had been concluded; but I halted on the 20th, as I had every reason to believe that the Rajah would ratify the treaty, and that if I crossed the Wurda, his government would be entirely destroyed.

'On the 23rd, I received the ratification of the treaty. On the same day, Eitul Punt and Moonshee Kavel Nyn, two of Scindiah's principal ministers, came into camp to settle the peace for their master.

'Although this chief had ratified the suspension of hos-

tilities, he had not performed any one of the conditions of the treaty. He had remained to the westward, instead of going to the eastward of Ellichpoor; and his pindarries had taken advantage of my being occupied in the siege of Gawilghur to spread over and plunder the country. Accordingly, I gave notice to his ministers, that in a few days I should put an end to the suspension of hostilities.

‘I marched on the 24th to the westward and joined Colonel Stevenson to the westward of Ellichpoor on the 26th; and on the 27th, we both marched to Surjee Anjengaum, where I concluded a treaty of peace with Scindiah’s ministers on the 28th, which I signed at one in the morning of the 30th. I received Scindiah’s ratification of it on the 5th of January, and I have now the honor to enclose another copy of it, and of my dispatch of the 30th of December to the Governor General.

‘I have nothing to add to that letter. The power of Scindiah is gone. The Rajah of Berar will never dare to venture into another war with the Company; and if he does, we know that we can destroy him. Holkar alone remains of all these Marhatta chiefs, and he will be formidable only as a freebooter. However, if we can oblige our allies to keep, or rather to restore their military establishments to some degree of efficiency, (and if we cannot effect that object, our system is essentially defective, and must, in the end, fail,) freebooters will never again be formidable.

‘Mr. Elphinstone has gone to the Rajah of Berar’s durbar, where there is a little difference of opinion respecting the meaning of the 4th article of the treaty, whether it was intended to cede some small districts belonging to the Nizam, situated beyond the Wurda. I have no doubt upon the subject; and the Rajah’s vakeel who negotiated the treaty with me agrees in that opinion, and tells me that the Rajah will give up the point. In the mean time, however, till this point is decided, I have kept the fort of Gawilghur, and have left the subsidiary force in Berar.

‘Scindiah is gone to the northward of Burhampoor, and Major Malcolm was to join him on this day. The principal object of his attention will be to arrange the treaty of defensive alliance. I have recommended to him not to insist upon fixing the subsidiary force in Scindiah’s territories. I should prefer to have it either in Guzerat or Buundelcund, for reasons which are too long to be given in this letter. But I shall send you the copy of the paper which I have given to Major Malcolm upon the subject, in which they are detailed. Unless I have convinced Major Malcolm, which I

believe I have done, (if his silence upon the subject is not to be attributed to sickness,) I am afraid I stand single in this opinion. However, I am convinced this is the only point upon which there will be any difficulty in Scindiah's durbar; and I see by the Governor General's instructions to Colonel Close, that he was disposed to give it up, even at Poonah.

'My intention is now gradually to draw off the troops, and to establish the Peshwah's subsidiary force according to the Governor General's orders. I propose to appoint Lieut. Colonel Wallace to command it, of which arrangement I trust you will approve.

'We must keep up all the troops about the Godavery, till every thing shall have been settled, and every body gone to his home; but I cannot exactly decide upon this point, till I shall have received further intelligence from the southward, and shall know the exact extent of the disturbances in the Nizam's territories. They began almost immediately after I had passed through the ghauts to the northward; and, it is said, have spread greatly. But I have no accurate intelligence from the southward of a later date than the 20th of December from Ahmednuggur.

'I propose to reinforce Guzerat as much as I can, as it is very obvious that that is now our weak point, and that it is also the point from which we can most easily annoy the Marhattas. A good force in Guzerat, the Nizam's and the Peshwah's subsidiary forces, the troops in Bundelcund and Scindiah, must keep Holkar in check; or, if he should move, must destroy him. If he should adopt the freebooter plan, the allies must look to the security of their own dominions. Our scattered detachments are not equal to catching thieves in all parts of these extended territories. But I have recommended to the Governor General's attention the state of the military power of the allies, and I trust that he will take measures to have it amended.

'I informed you that I had given leave to Colonel Stevenson to go to Madras. He must go to England, or he will not live. In the mean time, Lieut. Colonel Hallyburton commands the subsidiary force; and I beg leave to recommend him to you to succeed Colonel Stevenson, if that officer should go to England.

'I believe that I have now adverted to all the points on which you may not have before received intelligence. I shall be much obliged to you to communicate to Lord William Bentinck such parts of this letter as you may deem necessary for his information.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 13th January, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the memorandum of the conferences with the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, to the day on which they delivered the ratification of the treaty of peace by that chief.

‘ I have likewise the honor to enclose the copy of a memorandum which I gave to Major ‘Malcolm previous to his departure for Scindiah’s camp. It contains my sentiments upon a variety of points, upon which I had before conversed with Major Malcolm; and I put them in this form both to recall them to his recollection, and that I might have an opportunity of laying them before your Excellency.

‘ I have reason to believe that Major Malcolm arrived in Scindiah’s camp on the 11th instant, but I have not yet heard of his arrival there.

‘ By the last accounts from Mr. Elphinstone, dated the 6th instant, the Rajah of Berar had made another march towards Nagpoor, and the huzoories had attended Mr. Elphinstone, for the purpose of carrying the orders to the different chiefs who still remained with their troops in Berar.

‘ My letter upon the subject of the claim to the districts in Berar east of the Wurda had not been received.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘ Camp on the top of the Badowly ghaut,

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

13th January, 1804.

‘ I received last night numerous and voluminous packets from Bengal, but which contain nothing of any importance.

‘ Nothing has been concluded with any of the Rajahs or other chiefs; and I think it probable, from the complexion of the negotiations, that nothing will be concluded. Every endeavor appears to be made to delay; and the Commander-in-Chief was still halting on the 22nd of November. The Rajah of Calpee, in particular, was hostile; and Edmonstone mentions that matters had not been conducted in a very satisfactory manner in Bundelcund; and I think it probable that the report that I sent to you yesterday of Meer Khan’s march to that quarter, may have been made with an intention to keep up the spirit of opposition to our views in that quarter. The Rajah of Jansi is favorable.

‘ There are two or three sheets of instructions from the Governor General, upon the peace, which I send to you.

From his notes in the margin, I suspect that he will, upon the whole, approve of the peace.

‘But I am much annoyed by the receipt of a letter from Sydenham, written by the Governor General’s order, from which I perceive that some suspicion is entertained respecting the propriety of demanding the contribution at Burham-poor, the report of which had reached the Governor General through a private channel. Great pains are taken in Sydenham’s letter to prove to me that no suspicion is entertained—that the questions upon the subject are asked merely for information; but those very pains prove the existence of the suspicion, and in fact, why is he in such a hurry to ask for information upon a subject upon which information must be given, unless some suspicion is entertained?’

‘I have answered this letter, and have shown, that from the increase of my expenses, by measures not mine; by the total want of funds provided for this army; by my being left to chance; and by the Governor General having employed the frigate sent to Bengal for money; and by not paying my bills at Benares, and not furnishing money to pay them at Bombay, there was every reason to expect the loss of the campaign from the deficiency of funds to carry it on; and that, in fact, I could not have paid the troops in December, if it had not been for this very sum of money, raised by contribution at Burhampoor, and the sales of goods captured at Asseerghur.

‘I have told the Governor General that if he disapproves of the measure, he may order the money to be restored; but I have warned him, that if he does give those orders, Scindiah will certainly put the money into his pocket.

‘In fact, if I had not exerted myself to keep in my hands a command of money, what would have become of the campaign? Where would have been the national honor or character, if the campaign had been lost?

‘They have made the fencible battalion into a regiment at Bombay, upon which subject I send you some papers which you may keep. Nothing new. We have had violent rains.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major Malcolm.*’

‘*ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Shawe.

‘MY DEAR SIR,

‘Camp, 13th January, 1804.

‘I received last night Mr. Sydenham’s letter of the 4th December, which I take the earliest opportunity of answering.

‘When I sent a division of the army to Burhampoor, I

determined to raise a contribution upon that city. My reasons for this determination were: first, I had reason to believe from Colonel Collins's report, that Burhampoor was an open town, which it would not be possible for me to retain; and, therefore, to levy the contribution was a likely mode of distressing the enemy, who, in fact, did give orders upon that city to part of his troops for their pay. Secondly, although I was not in immediate want of money, I had the prospect before me of an approaching want.

'The expenses of this army had been vastly increased, first, by the course of the campaign, and the increased distance of our operations from the sources of supply; secondly, by the increased price of every article of consumption, particularly of grain for the horses of the cavalry; and thirdly, by the necessity of paying the Peshwah's troops, and at times those of the Rajah of Mysore, when their money had not arrived. I had, besides, every reason to hope that Amrut Rao would join; and by arrangement made with the Peshwah, five thousand men were to be raised, three thousand of which were to serve with my army, and to be paid by me.

'The rough estimate of our expenses would then stand thus:

	Rupees.
My own Division	400,000
Colonel Stevenson's	300,000
The Peshwah's	100,000
The Rajah of Mysore's	80,000
Amrut Rao and part of the 5000 troops, about	150,000
	<hr/>
	1,030,000

'To answer these demands no fund had been provided, excepting what I could get at Poonah for bills upon Bombay and Bengal, and what Major Kirkpatrick could get at Hyderabad. In respect to the supply from Poonah, I have to observe, that, besides my expenses, it was to pay those of the troops there, and at Ahmednuggur; and also that not a post came in that I was not informed, either directly by Mr. Duncan or by Major Malcolm, that the government of Bombay could supply me no longer. Mr. Duncan had been obliged to insist that we should draw at thirty days instead of eight days; and then we could get no more money for our drafts; and nearly at the same time we received accounts from Benares, that our drafts upon that place had not been paid.

In the mean time, no money came from Bengal, and the frigate which Mr. Duncan sent round for specie was detained for another service.

‘The supply from Hyderabad was likely to be more plentiful, and has proved to be much so; but still the supply was liable to many accidents, from the number of desperate thieves who infest the roads.

‘Besides all these demands upon me, compared with my means of answering them, the Governor General had desired that any chief, who offered himself from the enemy, should be taken into the service, and particularly Meer Khan, the Patan chief in Holkar’s service. This expense would also have fallen upon me, as the Nizam government have not supplied one farthing; and I have lately been obliged to lend Rajah Mohiput Ram three and a quarter lacs of rupees, to prevent a mutiny among the troops usually in his service. But I do not mention this circumstance as a reason for levying a contribution upon Burhampoor, as I was not aware of it at the time I ordered that measure.

‘I knew that the moment at which I should cease to pay the troops regularly would be the date of the commencement of the disasters of the campaign in this quarter; and, therefore, I conceive that I should have neglected my duty to the Governor General, if I had omitted to take any measure which could avert or procrastinate that evil day.

‘In respect to the amount raised at Burhampoor in this manner, I did not order that any particular sum should be raised. I desired Colonel Stevenson, generally, to raise a contribution, if he should be of opinion that the inhabitants would pay it. The most he first demanded was ten lacs of rupees. Upon finding that sum could not be paid without difficulty, and without resorting to measures which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to two and a half lacs; and the inhabitants who had been charged to collect the money then paid seventy-five thousand of rupees more, which they had levied beyond the reduced sum. This is the fact related to me by Colonel Stevenson, and I have every reason to believe it is correct.

‘You have now the whole story, and the Governor General may form his own judgment upon it. I should have reported it before now, as I am desirous that this and every other part of my conduct should be investigated; only that I did not know the result of Colonel Stevenson’s measures at Burhampoor till after he joined me at the battle of Argaum: and I did not know the exact sum which had been levied until a few days ago, when he was about to leave the army,

and gave me the receipt of the Paymaster. But I had intended, and shall still make a regular report to the Governor General, upon this subject, as I have upon every other, either to him or to General Stuart.

‘The Governor General has trusted me to carry on an extensive service here; and I conceive that my duty to him requires that I should omit nothing which can insure its success. It would have been no excuse to him, or to the world, if I had been obliged to give it up for want of money; and yet I must tell you, that if it had not been for this money levied at Burhampoor, and from the produce of the sales of property captured at Asseerghur, I should not have been able to have paid the troops in December, and I should not be able to pay them now, but for the sales of property captured at Gawilghur. There is to the value of two lacs of rupees of plate captured at Gawilghur, which, unless I get up money from Poonah or Hyderabad, is my only resource for next month.

‘It is impossible to reason on the effect on the national character of levying a contribution, because no facts can be produced by which a judgment can be formed. I know that to levy a contribution is common in India and in Europe; that I should have levied one at Oomrawutty, and another at Nagpoor, if the Rajah of Berar had not made peace; and that it would have been much more disgraceful and disastrous to have lost the campaign from the want of money, than to have insured in this manner the means of gaining it.

‘I believe I am as anxious as any other man that my character should not suffer—I do not mean in the mouths of common reporters and scandal bearers, but in the eyes of a fair judging people. I declare that I think that I have done what is right; but if the Governor General thinks it was wrong, it is easy to return the money to the people of Burhampoor. However, if he does this, he returns the money into Scindiah’s pocket, for he will take it immediately.

‘I have many other important matters to write to you upon; but as nothing can go on smoothly till this matter is explained, I have thought it best to begin with this, and to send off the letter without delay.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Shawe.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘At the same time with Sydenham’s letter of the 4th, I received yours of the 8th, and also his of the 9th, enclosing the commencement of the Governor General’s instructions upon the peace. As far as I can judge from his notes, in the

margin of the sheets transmitted by you, I believe I have made a better peace than he expected. At all events, the Governor General's mind will very soon have been relieved from all anxiety respecting the junction of the interests of Scindiah and Ragojee Bhoonslah, as he must have received my letter on the subject of the suspension of arms with Scindiah.

'I have received Mr. Edmonstone's letters with the accounts of the negotiations with the Rajahs, &c., and I think there is every reason to believe that they have not been concluded by treaties. I hear that Meer Khan is gone towards Bundelcund: if that report be true, he must have done so in communication with Ambajee.'

To Major Shawe.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Camp, 13th January, 1804.

'I enclose a copy of the Governor General's different projects, with remarks. Upon the whole, I hope he will approve of the treaty. The only doubt I have is about Ambajee.

'It has also occurred to me, that he may not approve of the cessions being made to the allies generally. The fact is, that, if I had begun to draw up the treaty by stating the cessions to be made to each of the different powers, the vakeels would have begun intriguing with the Nizam's and the Peshwah's servants in camp, respecting the cessions demanded for them; and I should never have got through the business. I might have entered in the treaty every cession as made to the British Government, but this would have had the same consequences.

'I have received the account of the captured property, which I propose to forward to the Governor General to-morrow. It is not much, I am sorry to say.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major Shawe.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Shawe.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Camp, 14th January, 1804.

'Since I wrote to you yesterday, I have examined more particularly the papers received from Mr. Edmonstone on the subject of the negotiations with the chiefs on the north-west frontier; and I think it is much to be regretted that I did not receive them before I concluded the treaty with Scindiah. It now appears to have been the Governor General's intention to restore the power of the Jauts as a State,

at the expense of Dowlut Rao Scindiah ; I did not know that their State had ever been destroyed. However, I still hope it will be possible to do every thing that the Governor General wishes, under the article of the treaty of peace which relates to these chiefs.

‘ I observe, from the first sheets of the Governor General’s instructions, that he wishes Scindiah may have nothing south of the Taptee. I imagine the reason for such wish is, that the territories in Candeish may afford compensation for the Soubah of the Deccan, as that prince has now a better frontier than the Taptee could afford him ; particularly considering that the greater part of Candeish and of Gungatena, or the countries bordering upon the Godavery near its source, will belong to Holkar. But Scindiah’s possessions in Candeish are not worth above four or five lacs ; and the account which I now send of the Soubah’s gains in Berar will remove all uneasiness upon the subject of compensation for him.

‘ This is an account of the revenues of Berar, which I have received from Rajah Mohiput Ram ; from which it appears that the Soubah will gain sixty lacs annually. His minister will dispute this account, and will say that the country does not produce that revenue. I believe this is true ; but the same argument may be used respecting every country ceded, and there is no way of settling a question of this kind, excepting by reference to the ancient documents, of which this is a copy.

‘ I would send you a translation of this paper, but that I have no person in camp to translate it ; and it will be better done in the office at Fort William than it can be elsewhere.

‘ I believe that Malcolm wrote to you to propose that he should be sent to England, with the Governor General’s dispatches upon the peace. I think this will be an advisable measure. At all events, Malcolm must go to England. His health is entirely gone, and the medical people think that his remaining in this country will be attended with danger. He is at present entirely incapable of doing business ; and he was knocked up by what he had to do in this camp when Elphinstone went away : so that to detain him will be useless. I think that Webbe ought to relieve him at Scindiah’s durbar, and I propose to endeavor to prevail upon Webbe to go there. He is now, I hope, on his road to Poenah.

‘ In respect to Mysore, I recommend that a gentleman from the Bengal Civil Service should be Malcolm’s successor there. The government of that country should be placed

under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor General in Council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan, or the Peshwah. The consequence of the continuance of the existing system will be, that the Rajah's government will be destroyed by corruption; or, if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil; or who has strength of character or talents to defend the government against the second. In my opinion, the only remedy is, to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor General; and this can be done effectually, only by appointing, as Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal Civil Service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor General.

'To fill this office with advantage to the public, will not require very extraordinary talents when this arrangement shall be made. Good character, and decent, respectable manners will be far more important.

'Since writing the above, I have received your letters of the 11th, with the remainder of the Governor General's instructions. I have now better hopes than I had, that the peace will be approved of. It contains all the articles proposed by the Governor General, excepting the independence of the Rajpoots and Jauts, whether they make treaties with us or not; that respecting the taking any Europeans into Scindiah's service; and the renunciation of Scindiah of all claims upon Jansi and Calpee, &c.

'I see clearly the difference between my arrangements for the Rajpoots and Jauts, and that proposed by the Governor General: my public letter gives my reasons for making the arrangement as it stands in the treaty. I have to add to these reasons, that I thought it very improbable that Scindiah would ever consent to declare these people independent of his government, unless compelled thereto by necessity; such as the British Government having made treaties with them. However, it is useless to add any thing upon the subject; the article cannot be altered, and I have only to regret that I did not receive instructions at an earlier period.

'I have already written to Malcolm to insert an article in the treaty of defensive alliance upon the subject of Europeans, as proposed by the Governor General.

'In respect to the renunciation of Jansi, Calpee, Bundelcund, &c., Scindiah's ministers declared that Scindiah had nothing to do with those countries, which belonged to the

Peshwah. This appears in the minutes of the conferences. I was anxious to find out to what countries they had claims, and probed them particularly upon that point.

‘I have sent to the Governor General a copy of my memorandum to Malcolm, on the subject of his negotiations at Scindiah’s durbar; but since the receipt of your letter of the 11th December, I have written to him to desire he will do his utmost to secure the introduction of the subsidiary force into Scindiah’s territories, as I see that is the wish of the Governor General.

‘In answer to the latter part of your letter of the 11th December, upon the subject of the subsidiary alliances, I have to tell you that I am perfectly aware of their benefits. The consequences of them have been, that in this war with the Marhattas, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company’s territories have not been invaded; and the evils of war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and our power. This fact alone, unsupported by any others which could be enumerated as benefits resulting from those alliances, would be sufficient to justify them.

‘But they undoubtedly have a tendency to reduce the strength of the powers with which we are connected; and this is an evil, the growth and inconvenience of which daily increase. The memorandum to Malcolm will show the great evils which will attend Scindiah’s discharging his military establishments; and the present state of the countries of the Nizam and the Peshwah show the consequences of their discharging those formerly in their service.

‘The question is exactly this. Is it necessary for the general tranquillity and security of the British Government that the banditti who infest those countries should be put down? and that the Government of the Peshwah and the Nizam should be established in their territories respectively? If so, it is absolutely necessary that those powers should be obliged to keep up some military force for the purposes of their own government; or if they refuse to keep up their military establishments, and the *onus* is to fall upon the British troops, their numbers must be doubled, or even trebled; for it stands to reason that they are not now sufficiently strong to preserve order in countries of such vast extent.

‘I do not object to the subsidiary alliances, but I do to forming them all upon the Hyderabad model. The circumstances at other durbars are entirely different; and it is obvious that to form the subsidiary alliance with Scindiah upon that model would be attended with risk.

‘ In respect to my saying that the establishments must be increased to the full amount of the subsidiary forces, if established at the durbars of Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar, I meant that the same number of troops would still be necessary to support the authority of Government in their own provinces and immediate dependencies.

‘ In the provinces depending upon Bengal, there is a civil governor, and some strength, besides that of the sword ; but in the territories depending upon the subordinate governments, there is no other power ; and the moment that is weakened, the people rise in rebellion. I think, therefore, that the same number of troops will still be necessary, at least for some time, to support the authority of Government in our own provinces.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ Camp, 10 miles north from Jaffierabad,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL, 15th January, 1804.

‘ I informed you, some time ago, that I was determined to assist the Peshwah, as far as might be possible, in settling his government ; but before I employ the Company’s troops in reducing rebels and taking mud forts, I must see some arrangements made by his Highness’s government to settle his country, and to take possession of the places which the Company’s troops may hand over to him. The Company’s officers cannot be employed as amildars, nor the Company’s troops as sebundies ; and yet, under present arrangements, if they do not take charge of the districts from which they may drive the rebels against the Peshwah’s government, these districts will just fall again into the hands which now hold them, and the Company will have made for themselves a few more enemies.

‘ The first step, therefore, is for the Peshwah to organize his revenue department upon some permanent footing, to raise the sebundies of the country, and then the troops can be employed to advantage in giving him assistance ; otherwise, in my opinion, they will only lose their time, and throw away their trouble.

‘ The Peshwah’s conduct respecting Baba Phurkiah is strange. The vakeel of this person is now in camp, and I shall let him know the result of my negotiation. But the treaty does not bind the British Government to attack persons of this description, and I shall tell Baba Phurkiah that

as long as he does not molest the Peshwah, nobody will interfere with him. His troops have lately been cut up in the Nizam's territories, and his party are entirely dispersed. But if the implacable revenge of the Peshwah is to be allowed to be the rule of our conduct, the war will be eternal.

‘Colonel Murray received my letter of the 1st of December, and did not march into Malwa.

‘——— has been already ordered up to Poenah for trial.

‘You will have observed, by my letter to the Governor General on the peace, that I have been obliged to yield the point to Scindiah respecting Chumargoonda, &c., and the stipulation made to prevent that arrangement from being prejudicial to us.

‘I believe that I must move the army towards the Nuggur district, in order to set matters to rights.

‘I do not think there is any thing in the supposed plans of the French to the northward.

‘I think that you have mistaken my letter upon the subject of Amrut Rao. That chief did not propose that the adherents of Nana Furnavees should be released, as a measure for his gratification, but as one likely to be beneficial to the Peshwah's government. Amrut Rao will give up Poonadur and the other forts, districts, &c., in his possession, whenever I may demand them. But the demand would, in my opinion, be very unjust, till the Peshwah shall have released his private servants, and the families of his servants, and restored their property.

‘But it is my opinion that the Peshwah is endeavoring to deceive us all upon the subject of Amrut Rao. Did you know that he had sent a brother of Munkaiseer to speak to me about him? He came to me in company with Goklah, and questioned me in a very extraordinary manner, as he said, by orders from his Highness. I refused to answer his questions, as he could produce no authority from the Peshwah for asking them. But I told Goklah that, as he was an old acquaintance of mine, for whom I had a respect, and that as he was a servant of the Peshwah, I had no objection to impart to him every thing that had ever passed between Amrut Rao and me. I then told him the whole story, stated the causes for which I had made the whole arrangement, and desired him to tell the Peshwah that if he wished to see the treaty, he might ask you for it, and you could give him a copy of it.

‘They tell me positively that the Peshwah's durbar is guided by Sirjee Rao Ghautky. Appah Dessaye was here

again the night before last, and said that his vakeel at Poonah had seen, in Ghautky's hands, the sunnud from the Peshwah for Manowly. The polygar of Moodgul has written to inform me that Ghautky had ordered him to attack Appah Dessaye. I enclose a copy of that letter.

'I hear also, but of this I am not quite certain, that the Peshwah has given to Ghautky and Ball Kischen Gungurdhur, serinjaumy for 4000 men each; as it is said, for the purpose of attacking Holkar. The only importance that can be attached to this act, is the Peshwah's duplicity in employing Ghautky after he had proposed to us to arrest him. He must not be allowed to attack Holkar's territory; and we must take care that sirdar intrigues in the Peshwah's durbar are not carried on through this same Ghautky, in order to bring on a contest between us and Holkar, for which Scindiah and his ministers are most anxious.

'Upon the subject of the intrigues of Nana Furnavees' partisans, I have to observe, that the Peshwah has one certain mode of getting the better of them all, and that is to allow Dhoondoo Punt to go to Bombay with Nana's family, thus to get possession of the fort of Loghur. This arrangement, and the possession of Poonadur, by doing common justice to Amrut Rao's followers, will make the Peshwah's government so strong and respectable, that there might be hopes of seeing it revive. But it will not answer to break faith with the Loghur man by attacking him, or to take Poonadur from Amrut Rao, without getting the Peshwah to relieve his servants and restore their property.

'Malcolm has arrived in Scindiah's camp. I have not received the account of his reception, but I have a letter of the 13th, which must have been written subsequent to the account he must have sent me of that ceremony. Malcolm was very unwell, I am sorry to say, and could not write himself. Have you heard any thing of Webbe's progress?

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY'

To the Governor General.

'MY LORD,

'Camp, 15th January, 1804.

'My time and attention have been so much taken up by other important objects, that I have been obliged to delay till this moment to address your Excellency upon the subjects of the arrangements made with Amrut Rao, since I apprized you, in my letter of the 13th of November, that he had arrived in my camp.

‘ The objects to be settled with him were, first, the operation of the 4th article of the treaty which I had concluded with him ; secondly, the operation of the 5th article of that treaty ; and, thirdly, his possession of certain districts belonging to the Peshwah.

‘ In respect to the first object, Amrut Rao proposed that the sirdars who accompanied him to camp should have pensions, the total amount of which would have been two lacs of rupees per annum. I brought this demand down to one lac of rupees per annum, which has been distributed in the proportions stated in the enclosed paper.

‘ In respect to the second object, viz., the payment of the troops, I have already informed your Excellency that I proposed to pay these troops as a part of those which your Excellency was bound to pay for the Peshwah, according to the modification of the treaty of Bassein. Their expense, including a body of infantry, which, if the war had continued, would have been useful, is 87,000 rupees per mensem, to commence from the 12th of November, the day on which Amrut Rao came into camp.

‘ I have desired Lieut. Colonel Close to make an offer of the services of those troops to the Peshwah ; and, if his Highness should not accept their services, I propose to discharge them.

‘ The troops have remained under the command of Amrut Rao ; who, since he has been in the camp, has appeared well disposed to conduct himself in a manner satisfactory to me.

‘ In respect to the third object, I have been able to settle nothing definitively. I proposed to Amrut Rao, on his arrival, that he should give me an account of the produce of the districts of which he had possession, belonging to the Peshwah, as it would be necessary to subtract their value from the amount of his pension ; or if he should prefer to receive the full amount of his pension, it would be necessary that he should resign the districts to the Peshwah. In answer to this proposal, Amrut Rao made no objections : he said that the districts were situated upon the Godavery ; that they were on the high road of every army that had marched to Poonah for the last eight years ; that the Peshwah had destroyed them ; that the inhabitants had fled from the country ; and that there was no produce and no revenue.

‘ In respect to giving them up, Amrut Rao said, that having thrown himself upon the Company, he should have no scruple in doing whatever was desired ; and that he

would resign the districts to me whenever I chose to ask for them. He expressed a wish, however, that these districts, and the fort of Poonadur, and certain other forts of which he has possession, might be made the means of procuring from the Peshwah orders to release the persons, and restore the property of the families of his private servants who had been arrested, and which had been seized by his Highness's orders. He at the same time gave me a list of the persons to whom these injuries had been done, which I have transmitted to Lieut. Colonel Close, with a request that he would arrange with the Peshwah's ministers, that the persons might be released, and the property restored, on the ground of Amrut Rao's giving up the forts and districts of which he had possession. I have hitherto received no answer, and there this matter rests for the present.

'Besides this list of his own immediate dependants, to whom injuries have been done by the Peshwah, Amrut Rao gave me another list of the old servants of the Marhatta state, who had been imprisoned by his Highness's orders, and were at that moment confined in different hill forts. Amrut Rao declared that he had nothing to say about these persons, excepting that they were the old official people who had conducted the business for years, under Nana Furnavees; and he recommended that if the British Government were desirous of seeing the Peshwah's state recover, they should procure the release of these servants. I have also recommended this point to Lieut. Colonel Close's attention.

'In fact, my Lord, the Peshwah's government is at present only a name. His Highness has not settled even the country along the Beemah, five miles from Poonah. It is at this moment a dreary waste, overrun by thieves; and his Highness is incapable of conducting his government himself: he gives no confidence or power to any body, and he has no person about him able to conduct the common business of the country.

'I have called Lieut. Colonel Close's attention particularly to this point. Amrut Rao could certainly settle the government; but the Peshwah's aversion to him appears to be so rooted, that I am afraid I shall not be able to persuade his Highness to refrain from acts of open hostility; much less to receive him as a brother, and employ him in a confidential situation under the Government. The only mode, therefore, that appears practicable, is to persuade his Highness to release these old servants of the statè, to have them employed in the management of the revenue,—to keep Amrut

Rao at a distance, and at peace with the Peshwah,—and to increase the power and reputation of the government as much as possible, by giving it possession of Poonadur, and the other hill forts near Poonah.

‘Amrut Rao’s pension, and those given under the 4th article of the treaty, have been paid since the 14th of August, the day on which it was concluded.

‘Besides these pensions, I have promised one of 6000 rupees per annum to Prubbaukur Bellall, Amrut Rao’s vakeel, with whom I concluded the treaty with Amrut Rao ; and to whose influence over his master I attribute his having joined at the time he did. The reputation of the British Government, and the successes of the British armies, afforded him powerful arguments ; but I think there is great reason to believe that, however satisfied Amrut Rao may now be with his situation, he might have joined the banditti who have overrun the defenceless territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, if this person had not possessed his confidence, and exerted his influence to induce him to join the British army.

‘There are three other persons whom I wish to recommend to your Excellency for similar marks of the favor of the British Government. One of these is Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, the vakeel of the Rajah of Berar, who negotiated the peace ; the other is Ball Kischen Letchma, a person who was employed as a vakeel from the family of Pursheram Bhow ; and the third is Surjun Pundit, who has been employed in carrying on the communication between Goklah and me.

‘By the customs of India, I imagine that the first is entitled to a reward, as having negotiated an important treaty of peace ; and it is but justice to this man to say, that he conducted himself throughout the negotiation with the utmost candor. I have also to observe, that rewards of this description have a good effect in the native durbars.

‘In respect to the persons mentioned in the second and third instance, I have only to recall to your Excellency’s recollection the events of the last year, as a ground for my recommendation of them. When I entered the Marhatta territory in the month of March, the Peshwah had been driven from his capital, and his cause was deemed desperate throughout the Marhatta empire. By the influence of these persons, principally, I was enabled to bring their employers forward to Poonah in his cause. Pursheram Bhow’s family, it is true, did not serve throughout the campaign, but Ball Kischen Letchma exerted himself to persuade those chiefs to

accompany me from Poonah; and when he found that he could not succeed he quitted their service.

'Goklah's conduct, however, has been exemplary, and considering that he must have believed that we commenced the campaign under discouraging circumstances, very extraordinary in a Marhatta.

'Upon the whole, I consider these persons deserving the reward of the British Government; and I therefore beg leave to recommend that they should have each a pension of 6000 rupees per annum, to commence from the date of the fall of Ahmednuggur, and that of Jeswunt Rao Ramchunder, from the date of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar.

'The services of the people of the description of those I have above recommended to your Excellency are more useful to the British Government than those of any other description about the native durbars. They, in fact, do all the business, and direct all measures, and one reward from the British Government, for services actually rendered, creates a general desire to merit and obtain a similar advantage by the same line of conduct.

'It is not possible to reward these people excepting by pension. They are so depraved in their habits; their notions of justice and government are so erroneous; and they are so little to be depended upon, excepting to follow their own interests, that they cannot be employed in any manner in the Company's service.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Governor General.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major General Campbell.

'Camp, 10 miles north of Jaffierabad,
15th January, 1804.

'DEAR SIR,

'I have the pleasure of acknowledging the receipt of your letter of the 30th December, and I congratulate you upon the success of your operations. This plundering excursion was quite unexpected, but it has been at once most fortunately and vigorously checked.

'I enclose copies of the treaties of peace which I have made with Scindiah and the Rajah of Berar. Scindiah's cessions amount to above sixty-seven lacs of rupees, and the Rajah of Berar's to about seventy lacs. Both these treaties have been ratified.

'Chintomoney Rao has written to me to say that he was about to join you, and that he hoped you would assist him

against the Rajah of Kolapoor. I wish to warn you against interfering, in any manner, in this dispute. Purnsheram Bhow's family have not behaved very well to us, and they do not deserve the smallest assistance. But the refusal to give them this assistance must be made as little injurious to their feelings as possible.

'Believe me, &c.

'Major General Campbell.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Graham.

'MY DEAR SIR,

'Camp, 15th January, 1804.

'I have received your letters of the 7th and 8th. I am sorry to observe that your peons behave so ill. I believe I must move down towards Ahmednuggur, to settle matters in that quarter.

'I enclose you an order from Scindiah to Mulwa Dada, to cease all hostilities, to withdraw with his troops, and to join him. You will have this letter delivered to him in public, and read to him by a person of your own; and you will write to him a letter, which is also to be read to him publicly, in which you will tell him that I am coming into that quarter with the army; and that if I find him, or any of his adherents, I shall pursue him till I catch him, and will certainly hang him as a freebooter.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Graham.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

'MY DEAR COLONEL,

'Camp, 16th January, 1804.

'I shall be much obliged to you if you will be so kind as to send forward, as soon as possible, all the money that you may have belonging to me.

'I enclose a memorandum from Jeswunt Rao Goorparah; and I shall be obliged to you if you will take care that he does not lose his jaghires, &c. He comes within an article of the treaty.

'Believe me, &c.

'Lieut. Colonel Close.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR,

'Camp at Waroor, 16th January, 1804.

'I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 22nd of December; and I am rejoiced to find that Lieut. Wight's convoy is safe.

‘ The increasing disturbances in all parts of the territory of the Soubah of the Deccan are a most serious inconvenience, and urgently require a most effectual remedy. I am on my march to the southward, and propose to give a check to those on the western frontier ; but the whole of the army, if scattered and employed in the pursuit of the various troops of banditti which infest his Highness’s territories, would not be able to restore peace for years, without the exertion of his Highness’s government.

‘ The evil is to be traced to avarice. The government, or rather the mutasaddes of the government, found that they could depend upon the protection of the British troops, and they discharged their own.

‘ The British troops are employed in an external war ; and the consequence is, that his Highness has no troops to support his government and authority ; and any other support but that of armed men will not answer.

‘ This discharge of their own troops has contributed to these disturbances in two modes : first, the government has no power to support itself ; and this is well known throughout the country : secondly, the people discharged have no means of gaining a subsistence, and they are obliged to plunder to support life.

‘ It appears that there is no doubt whatever of the necessity of introducing a reform into the military establishments of the Soubah of the Deccan ; the only question will be, in what manner this reform ought to be effected, and what ought to be the nature of the reform. Two objects are required : one is to give the government some strength, to enable it to go on, without being obliged to have recourse to British assistance upon every trifling occasion ; the other is, that the military establishments shall be so efficient, as in case of future wars to provide for the defence and tranquillity of the country in some degree, and reduce the government to the necessity of confining the operations in this quarter to defensive objects.

‘ In respect to the plan you propose in your letter of the 22nd of December, I have no scruple in declaring, that if I was to consider the question of forming a military establishment abstractedly, I should recommend that plan. It is, undoubtedly, the best, and will give the Soubah of the Deccan the command of the greatest number of good troops, probably in the shortest space of time, and at the smallest expense.

‘ But upon this occasion there are many questions to be considered, besides that of forming a good military esta-

blishment for the Soubah of the Deccan ; not to overburthen it with regular troops ; and upon this point it must be recollected, that upon all occasions of external war, and upon almost all other important occasions, he will have the assistance of the Company's battalions.

‘ Upon this point I have also to observe, that on a service with the British troops, the irregulars are far more useful than the regulars in the service of the native powers, although some of these are very useful.

‘ Upon the whole, therefore, I think that the best plan would be, that the Soubah of the Deccan should have a moderate establishment of infantry, possibly but little stronger than that which he is required by the treaty of defensive alliance to supply. But this establishment ought to be kept complete, and in the immediate pay of the government ; and not made up, as at present, of sixty or seventy men, or possibly as far as a battalion, in the service of each chief who commands a body of horse. It is obvious that as long as that system shall continue, the government cannot command the service of these people ; they are never paid, as the jaghiredars have not the means of defraying their expenses upon distant expeditions, and are totally unfit for the purposes of external war.

‘ In respect to regular cavalry, it is my opinion that it ought not to be attempted. The formation and discipline of a body of cavalry are very difficult and tedious, and require great experience and patience in the persons who attempt it. After all, it is doubtful whether they will succeed, and whether the body of cavalry thus formed will be worth the expense of maintaining it ; for at the same time that nothing can be more useful in the day of battle than a body of disciplined cavalry, nothing can be more expensive, and nothing more useless than a body of regular cavalry half and insufficiently disciplined ; I should therefore recommend that this may not be attempted.

‘ In respect to cavalry, I should recommend that the Soubah might have in his own immediate service, and paid by the treasury, either silladar or Pagah horse, to the full amount of the number which he is obliged by treaty to furnish, in a joint operation with the British Government. I should prefer silladar horse : first, because the employment of these will give subsistence to a greater number of people ; secondly, because they are more useful, and better troops ; and, thirdly, because they are less dangerous, and, being more divided, less liable to create disturbances by mutinies and sedition.

‘The question respecting the jaghiredars comes next to be considered. There is certainly no mode by which the revenues of the state can be increased, excepting by depriving the jaghiredars of their jaghires. The necessity of increasing the revenues of the state may be doubted, considering the addition to his Highness’s territories and revenues, consequent on the late war; and considering the vast increase which may be given to these revenues by inspecting closely the conduct and the accounts of Ragotim Rao, and the management of all the persons on the frontier employed by that person.

‘From what I have seen, I have no scruple in declaring that I am convinced that, with proper management, the Soubah of the Deccan will gain, by the peace, the whole amount of revenues of Berar on this side of the Wurda; for, as far as I have been able to gain any knowledge of the facts, his share of those revenues has heretofore gone to the Rajah of Berar, been dissipated in the country by the amildars, the creatures of Ragotim Rao, or has gone into Ragotim Rao’s pocket.

‘It may be a question, therefore, as it will not be necessary, whether it will be proper to encourage the resumption of the jaghires.

‘The British Government has been left, by the late war in a most glorious situation. They are the sovereigns of a great part of India, the protectors of the principal powers, and the mediators, by treaty, of the disputes of all.

‘The sovereignty they possess is greater, and their power is settled upon more permanent foundations than any before known in India: all it wants is the popularity which, from the nature of the institutions, and the justice of the proceedings of the government, it is likely to obtain, and which it must obtain, after a short period of tranquillity shall have given the people time and opportunity to feel the happiness and security which they enjoy.

‘But the resumption of these jaghires will bring ruin and distress on many noble families and ancient servants of the Nizam’s government. Some of these may possibly have assisted in the different wars in which the British Government have been engaged, and in the establishment of the present happy state of affairs; and all the odium which the measures must produce will not fail to fall upon the British Government. I think, therefore, that it is advisable to avoid it, if it should be possible, and, at all events, that the British Government should not appear in the execution of the measure.

‘I have taken the liberty of giving you my thoughts more at large than I intended at first, on the subject of the military establishment of the Soubah of the Deccan. I have felt severely the bad consequences of their weakness. I see the cause of it, and that an effectual remedy must be applied immediately. You have my opinion upon the whole subject, which may be of use to you in forming your plans, and for that reason only do I communicate it to you.

‘I shall be obliged to you if you will forward to Dharore, as soon as you can, all the money that you may have which is intended for the use of the army.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Major Kirkpatrick.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

‘Camp at Warroor, ten miles north of Jaffierabad,

SIR,

16th January, 1804.

‘I have received all your letters written between the 7th and 21st.

‘My opinion respecting Surat is, that the first object should be to find a healthy spot for the troops, European soldiers in particular, who must be there; as it will not answer to lose two or three more regiments in that place.

‘The next object is to place the troops as near the town as may be possible, consistently with the first. In respect to the intrenched camp, my idea is, that all that is necessary will be, to throw up such works as will cover the buildings required for the convenience of the troops, and to enable a small body to give them protection while the troops may be absent from them in the field.

‘My former letter will have apprized you of my concern upon the occasion of your letter to Mr. Duncan. I hope you have desired to withdraw it according to my advice; as you may depend upon it that the Governor General will be highly displeased with it. While writing upon this subject, I may as well mention to you, that I should be glad to see a little more conciliation towards the Guickwar chiefs and troops. Upon a late occasion, I observe in the correspondence, that a wish was expressed that your communication with those chiefs should be carried on through a particular officer belonging to your staff, with which you declined to comply.

‘It is true, that the gratification of the wishes of the natives may at times be attended with inconvenience; but unless

they are gratified and conciliated, we can derive no advantage from their assistance.

‘What would you say if they were all to insist upon communicating personally with yourself, as they do with me? Yet, I believe that as much business goes through my hands as through those of any other person; and I am convinced, that if I had refused to gratify this wish, I should have derived no assistance from them.

‘I have seen such places as Dohud appears to be by your description. It is a most convenient situation, and might be very useful to us.

‘Of course, Scindiah will give no protection to Canojee. I will confirm the treaty with the Sounte Rajah, enclosed in your letter of the 19th of December, excepting the third article.

‘You had better draw up a new treaty. The first article, specifying that he shall pay no tribute. The second will answer as it is; the third to be what the fourth now is.

‘It will not answer to engage to defend the territories of any power or chief, unless such power or chief should submit all his foreign concerns to the decision of the British Government; and a savage, such as this Sounte Rajah, would not understand, and would never comply with all the conditions of such an arrangement.

‘I can give you no positive answer upon the subject of the arrears of revenue of the pergunnah of Dohud. Every question respecting property is referrible, and must be referred to the Governor General: my own opinion is, that arrears of revenue can in no manner be considered as that species of property which is given to troops as prize, for reasons too long to be detailed at present.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘Colonel Murray.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. General Stuart.

‘SIR, ‘Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th January, 1804.*

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 31st of December. The fact is, that our expenses in this division

* *The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.*
(Extract.)

‘SIR,

‘Fort William, 17th January, 1804.

‘I have directed the Secretary in the Secret Department to forward to you a copy of my instructions of this date to the Commander-in-Chief, relative to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, together with my instructions to you, with

of the army only, exclusive of Poonah and Ahmednuggur, amount to two lacs of pagodas monthly. In this sum, however, are included one lac of rupees to the Peshwah's sirdars; 67,000 to Amrut Rao and his sirdars, under the treaty with that chief; 87,000 to Amrut Rao's troops, as part payment of the 5000 men, which the Governor General engaged to keep for the Peshwah, under the modification of the treaty of

regard to the course of policy which I wish to be observed towards that Chieftain.

'I have the honor, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'WELLESLEY.'

The Secretary to the Supreme Government to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Fort William, 17th January, 1804.

'By command of his Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, I have the honor to transmit to you for your information, and for the eventual regulation of your conduct, the enclosed copy of the Governor General's instructions to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the subject of an arrangement with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, and to signify to you the Governor General's desire, that if previously to the conclusion of such arrangement by the Commander-in-Chief, your position should eventually be approximated to that of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, in a degree that would render your communication with that Chieftain more practicable and convenient than the Commander-in-Chief, you will enter upon a negotiation with Jeswunt Rao Holkar, on the basis of the Governor General's instructions, confirming the Commander-in-Chief's previous act, and apprizing his Excellency of your intention to proceed with the negotiation, if his Excellency should have commenced it.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'N. B. EDMONSTONE.'

The Governor General to Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.

'SIR,

'Fort William, 17th January, 1804.

'My instructions of the 11th of December will have apprized you of my sentiments with regard to the conditions to be required from Dowlut Rao Scindiah in the conclusion of a treaty of peace with that Chieftain. It does not appear to me to be necessary to make any material alteration of those instructions, or any addition to them.'

'2. The treaty which you have concluded with the Rajah of Berar contains abundant proofs of your accurate attention to the general principles which I am desirous of establishing as the foundation of the treaties of peace with the confederates.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major General the Hon. A. Wellesley.'

'WELLESLEY.'

Bassein ; and 80,000 rupees to the Rajah of Mysore's troops, which I have paid for the last two months.

'None of these sums will eventually fall upon the Company, excepting that to Amrut Rao's troops ; and as I intend to discharge those troops at the end of this month, that expense will entirely cease. The Rajah of Mysore's money will be repaid at the end of this month, when the convoy shall arrive ; and the Peshwah's will be repaid in time, in proportion as the revenues come in from Ahmedabad.'

'I get supplies of money occasionally at Poonah, for drafts on Bombay, which will keep me going, with the lac and 40,000 pagodas which you mention is provided. But it is desirable that I should have as much money as can be spared from other services.

'I am not in want of horses, indeed I believe I have some at Poonah to spare ; upon which subject I shall make a report to you, as soon as I shall receive an accurate return. That is an expense which is at an end.

'I am drawing off slowly to the southward ; and if the banditti, upon the Nizam's frontier near Perinda, do not disperse, I think I shall spend the time between this and the arrival of the Governor General's ratification of the treaties in dispersing them. It will not do to break up the army till that time.

'The subsidiary force is still in Berar, and I shall not draw it off till I shall have given over Gawilghur to the Rajah of Berar.

'I have great hopes that the Governor General will ratify the treaties. In a note which I lately received from him, he authorizes me to make the arrangement which I have made for the subsidiary force with Scindiah, and to restore the territories depending upon Baroach and Ahmednuggur, if Scindiah should agree to the defensive alliance. In this respect my treaty is better than his. But he insists upon the independence of the Rajpoot Rajahs, as a separate arrangement ; and that Scindiah shall have no Europeans without the permission of the British Government.

'I am convinced that I should never have made the peace, if I had pressed the independence of the Rajpoots, in any other manner than as it stands in the treaty. They combated it strongly, and consented to it only when they found that we had treaties with them from which we never should depart.

'In respect to the Europeans, I could have arranged that in any manner I pleased ; and that point shall be settled to the Governor General's satisfaction in the treaty of defensive alli-

ance. But I acknowledge that I think that point may be pushed too far, and that it is not desirable to see the destruction of Scindiah's infantry.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Lieut. General Stuart.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Kirkpatrick.

'SIR,

'Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th January, 1804.

'I have the honor to enclose my answer to the letters which I have received from the Soubah of the Deccan and his ministers, and copies of them for your information.

'Narroo Hurry, one of the vakeels of Dowlut Rao Scindiah, employed in the negotiations of the late peace, is a native of Bheer, and has desired me to apply to the Soubah of the Deccan to give him a village in that district, in enaam. I believe that it is usual to give rewards of this description to persons employed as Narroo Hurry has been, and I am convinced that these rewards have a good effect; I shall, therefore, be obliged to you, if you will apply to the minister for this mark of favor to Narroo Hurry, if you should see no objection to making the application, and if you will forward the sunnud to me in case the application should be complied with.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'Major Kirkpatrick.'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To Major Shawe.

MY DEAR SIR, 'Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th January, 1804.

'I have written the Governor General a letter upon the subject of the property captured by the troops under my command; and I now enclose you a Memorandum upon the same subject, which will explain my wishes.

'I intended to have recommended that the contribution levied at Burhampoor might be given to the troops; but I have since thought it best to say nothing upon the subject.

'Some time will elapse, I am afraid, before I shall be able to send an account of the value of the ordnance and military stores, as the ordnance must be weighed. But I think the best thing the Governor General can do, is to give the troops a sum of money, instead of the value of those articles.

'All I can say is, that there are no troops who are more deserving of his favor; and I declare that I am convinced there is not one officer with the army, who has not been obliged to live at an expense far exceeding his pay, since the troops crossed the Kistna.

‘ I am very anxious to have an early answer to my letter upon this subject. I have checked all interference of the army in this question, and I am desirous that they should experience the advantage of conforming to the wishes of government, and that the officers should be relieved at an early period from the distress, which I know they suffer at present.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Major Shawe.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

MEMORANDUM.

‘ 1. I recommend that the property captured may be divided, by order from the Governor General, according to the plan contained in the annexed paper, (a copy of one received from Bengal,) which plan appears to have been approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

‘ 2. I have not allowed the election of any prize agents; I have appointed five officers, to take charge of the property and dispose of it on account of Government, to whom I should wish the commission to be given. Of course I appointed those officers to take charge, whom the officers of the army would have elected to be agents, if an election had been allowed.

‘ 3. I am desirous that the Governor General should order the distribution of the prize according to this plan, without the intervention of any committee, the assembly of which must be attended with delay, at all events, and inconveniences, as it is probable that before the committee could assemble, the corps who have served in the war will have separated.

‘ 4. It appears to be the Commander-in-Chief’s wish that the corps only which were actually engaged in particular service should enjoy the benefit resulting from it, and I am entirely of the same opinion. Accordingly,—

‘ i. I recommend that those officers and corps, who were present with my division, or the subsidiary force, when the former were at the siege of Ahmednuggur, including a detachment employed at Toka, under Captain Campbell of the 84th regiment, or at the battle of Assye, or with the subsidiary force employed at Asseerghur, or with either at the battle of Argaum or siege of Gawilghur, shall share in all the property captured.

‘ ii. The troops in Captain Baynes’ affair with the enemy at Umber, on the 31st of October, and those engaged at Korget Coraygaum, on the 27th September, under Captain

O'Donnell, to share in all the property captured during the war.

‘(N.B. This arrangement excludes the troops stationed at Poonah and Hyderabad, who have incurred no expense, and had nothing to do with the service; and includes every body who had.)

‘5. In respect to the shares and persons, I recommend the following deviations from the plan approved of by the Commander-in-Chief:—

‘i That Colonel Stevenson, in consideration of their being no Major General with the army, should have 1000 shares instead of 600.)

‘(N. B. When I was in his situation, in the war against Tippoo, I received only 600.)

‘ii. I recommend that the Governor General should order that, in consideration of the favorable reports made of the conduct of the officers on the Staff on all occasions, the Deputy Adjutant, and the Deputy Quarter Master Generals of Mysore, and of the subsidiary force, and the Staff Surgeons attached to each division, may draw Major's prize-money, and that Major Malcolm may have Lieut. Colonel's.

‘(N.B. Sir John Kennaway had Lieut. Colonel's prize-money at Seringapatam)

‘6. I have not included the troops of the allies, because nothing that they have taken has been carried to account. Elephants, camels, and even jewels, to the amount of several lacs of rupees, taken in the battles of Assye and Argaum, and upon other occasions, have been disposed of, and the produce given to them by their own chiefs. In the battle of Argaum they got Vincatjee Bhoonslah's jewels, which, his vakeel declared to me were worth six lacs of rupees.*

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

* *His Excellency General Lake to Major General Ware, President of the Prize Committee.*

‘SIR,

‘In compliance with the wishes of the committee I have the honor to communicate the following, as my sentiments on the most just and equitable appropriation of prize.

‘1. All corps, officers, and soldiers, who were present with the army on the 29th August and 4th September, 1803, are entitled to share in prize taken by the army during the war, with the exceptions hereafter mentioned.

‘2. All corps, officers, and soldiers, who joined the army between the 4th and 11th September are entitled to share in prize taken subsequent to the 11th September.

‘3. Corps, officers, and men, who joined and shall join the army subse-

To the Governor General.

' MY LORD, ' Camp at Jaffierabad, 17th January, 1804..

' I have the honor to enclose the accounts of the property captured during the war, by the troops under my command.

quent to an action, or capture of a place, are not entitled to share in prize which was the immediate consequence of such action or capture.

' 4. Corps, officers, or soldiers, are to be entitled to share in prize made subsequent to their junction, with the exceptions alluded to in the foregoing articles.

' 5. No officer who quits the army on leave of absence is entitled to share in prize made during his absence; unless his absence shall have been occasioned by wounds or ill health.

' 6. Officers transferred from corps with, or which have been with the army, to corps in other situations are not entitled to share in prize taken after their quitting the army.

' These appear to me to be the leading principles upon which the division of prize ought to be adjusted. I shall, however, with much pleasure, take into consideration any suggestions which the committee shall offer.

' I have the honor to be, &c.

' Major General Ware.'

' G. LAKE.'

Proceedings of the Prize Committee, assembled agreeably to the General Order, 19th October, 1803.

' The Committee have resolved, that all officers shall share according to their rank, viz :—

' Major Generals, Colonels, Lieut. Colonels, Majors, Captains, Majors of Brigade, Aides de Camps, Surgeons, Chaplains, and Field Paymasters, Lieutenants, Assistant Surgeons, Cornets, Lieutenant Fire Workers, Ensigns, and Veterinary Surgeons, Quarter Masters of Cavalry, and Conductors of Ordnance.

Europeans.

	Shares
The Committee resolve, that Corporals, Gunners, Drummers, Trumpeters, and Privates, shall receive	1
Serjeants	2
Serjeant Majors	4
Conductors and Quarter Masters of Cavalry	12
Ensigns	50
Lieutenants	70
Captains	120
Majors	240
Lieut. Colonels	360
Colonels	600
Major Generals	1500

' The Commander-in-Chief, one eighth of the whole, after deducting Prize Agent's commission.

‘The articles sold at different times were howdahs, rich cloths, &c., which could not be moved away; and the amount of the sales has been paid into the hands of the Paymasters of this division of the army and of the subsidiary force. The jewels were taken at Asseerghur, and have not been sold; the plate was taken at Gawilghur, and I propose to order that it may be sold immediately; or if there should be no purchasers for it, I shall have it coined, and lodge the money in the hands of the Paymasters.

‘I beg leave to recommend that the money resulting from the sale of this property may be given to the troops. In the course of the campaign I have had frequent opportunities of reporting their good conduct to your Excellency; and I have likewise to report that their patience under fatigue, and the persevering activity with which they performed all the duties required from them, were equal to their bravery when opposed to the enemy in the field; and the consequence of all those good qualities is, that notwithstanding the distance and difficulties attending our communication with the sources of our supplies, the great bodies of the enemy’s horse, and the disaffected and disturbed state of the countries under the government of the Company’s allies, I am enabled to state, that throughout the campaign, we did not lose one convoy, nor a particle of the Company’s property of any description.

‘The troops composing the division under my immediate command were assembled from the most distant parts of the country, and have been in the field during two monsoons, that on the Eastern coast in the winter of 1802; and that on the Western coast in the course of 1803. These circumstances, and the exhausted state of the countries from the Kistna to the Taptee, have been the cause of the loss of equipments of the officers of the army three or four times in one year. Those belonging to the subsidiary force were equally unfortunate, and all must have suffered the greatest

‘Prize Agents to receive five per cent. commission, paying all incidental expenses.

Natives.

‘Naks, 2d Tindals, Troopers, Sepoys, Golandauze, Drummers, Trumpeters, Gun Lascars, Pioneers, Puckallies, and Bheesties, receive two-thirds of a share.

Havildars, 1st Tindals, and Native Doctors, one and one third of a share.

	Shares
•Jemidars of Cavalry and Infantry and Syrarys of Artillery	3
Subidars	5

‘Prize to be drawn for all officers and soldiers who may have been killed in action.’

inconveniences from the great advance of price of all the necessaries of life, in the countries which have been the seat of the war.

‘ Besides this property captured, a contribution, amounting to three lacs and twenty-five thousand rupees was levied upon the city of Burhampoor. I was induced to order Colonel Stevenson to levy this contribution from a desire to deprive the enemy of the resource of money which the city of Burhampoor would afford him, in case it should have proved either convenient or necessary not to occupy that place with the Company’s troops, and from a wish to secure, on the spot, as large supplies of money for the service of the war as circumstances would permit. In obedience to my orders, Colonel Stevenson having made inquiries, and judging from the appearance of riches in the place, first demanded ten lacs of rupees; but having subsequently found that that sum could not be raised without distressing the inhabitants, and either delaying his march towards Gawilghur, after he had completed the equipments of his corps for the siege of that place, or having recourse to measures of severity which I had forbid, he reduced the demand to the amount of the sum which had been collected. This sum has likewise been paid to the Paymaster of the subsidiary force.

‘ I have likewise the honor to enclose accounts of the ordnance and stores captured at Ahmednuggur and Asseerghur. The accounts of stores captured at Gawilghur have not been completed. Your Excellency has already the accounts of the ordnance captured at the battles of Assye and Argaum; but I cannot report the value of the ordnance at present, as an opportunity has not yet offered of ascertaining the weight of each piece.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ Camp at Donegaon,

‘ MY DEAR COLONEL,

18th January, 1804.

‘ I am sorry to be obliged to trouble you again on the subject of Amrut Rao’s servants, in confinement, by the Peshwah, of whom I sent you a list in my letter of the 14th December.

‘ I wish to have a decided answer, whether the Peshwah will or will not release them and their families, in order that I may be guided accordingly in the measures which I shall adopt respecting Amrut Rao.

‘A great part of my time, for which there is plenty of occupation, is now taken up in hearing Amrut Rao’s complaints, (which, I must acknowledge, are just,) and in framing excuses for the Peshwah’s conduct.

‘Amrut Rao has again this day offered me the fort of Poonadur, and every other piece of land that he possesses belonging to the Peshwah, or to which his Highness can have any claim.

‘All I wish to have is an answer, that I may determine what manner of conduct I shall adopt.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Lieut. Colonel Close.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD, ‘Camp at Jalnapoor, 19th January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose a dispatch from Mr. Elphinstone, from which I observe that the Rajah of Berar has given up his claim to the districts beyond the Wurda. I have therefore given orders to the officer commanding at Gawilghur to evacuate that fort; and as soon as I shall receive true accounts of the revenues of the districts near the hills, from Rajah Mohiput Ram, I propose to settle which districts shall be delivered over to the Rajah of Berar. Hitherto I have been unable to settle this point in the manner I wish, viz., agreeably to the treaty, at the same time consistently with the views and interests of the Soubah of the Deccan; because all the accounts I have received from the Soubah’s officers have been framed with a view to induce me to attend only to the latter object, and to lose sight entirely of the former.

‘I have settled for the Rajah of Berar’s servants, that they are to continue to enjoy the advantages which they have hitherto held in Berar. They are very trifling; and to continue to them the enjoyment of them will be attended with good consequences. I shall also endeavor to ascertain the grounds of the complaint of the Rajah against the Soubah’s servants, that they have seized a village of his.

‘I have to inform your Excellency, however, that the servants of the Soubah of the Deccan are not less rapacious than the Marhattas; and that I experience the greatest difficulty in forcing them to be moderate in their exactions in Berar, and to refrain from the plunder of some of its rich inhabitants, only because they have heretofore been the servants of the Rajah of Berar; and what is still more extraordinary, in obliging them to perform the stipulations of the

Treaty of Peace with Scindiah, in evacuating the city of Burhampoor and districts depending thereon.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*’

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘ Camp at Jaulna,

‘ MY DEAR MALCOLM,

19th January, 1804.

‘ I have received your letters of the 15th and 16th, with a number of Persian papers, not one of which I can read nor understand, but I suppose that all is right.

‘ I have written to Captain Johnstone, to request he would speak to Rajah Mohiput Ram about the talook of Paunchorē, and desire him to evacuate it. But I cannot promise that it will be evacuated, unless I send my own troops to drive out those of the Soubah, as his officers appear every day to be more determined to do as they please.

‘ Goorparah spoke to me on the subject of the horses, not horsemen, taken at Peepulgaum. In the first place, peace was then made, and Scindiah had no right to collect hurdry there, or any where else. In the second place, a cessation of hostilities had existed before the peace for six weeks, and he had no right to collect hurdry during that period. In the third place, these horsemen were near our camp, and came there for the purpose of plunder: therefore they were attacked, and their horses taken from them, and they shall not be returned.

‘ This is all Greek to Scindiah; but we must adhere to the rules. When Goorparah mentioned the subject to me, I would not listen to him at all.

‘ I shall write again to the Soubah’s camp, to desire that all prisoners may be released.

‘ There is a great deal of difference between Scindiah restoring horses taken, and our doing so. When we have taken horses, it has been in our own defence; when his pindarries have taken them, it has been as thieves in our camps. The day I came up the ghaut we had no cavalry in camp, and they carried off fifteen camels; and if they had come one hundred yards farther on, they would have carried off more with them.

‘ I desired Barclay to send the man to you who came from the person in Holkar’s camp with a desire to be supplied with money. This person is the same, I believe, whom you sent there in May last.

‘The letter from Scindiah contains a desire that I should attack Mulwa Dada; and I see clearly that unless I go across the Godavery, that banditti will never be driven out of the country. The Nizam’s servants who, at the commencement of the campaign, drove us away from their forts, and refused to allow us to purchase grain in their country, now press me, by dozens of letters in a day, to move to their assistance, otherwise they will be destroyed.

‘Sindkeir positively cannot be given up. It is at this moment a nest of thieves. The situation of this country is shocking; the people are starving in hundreds, and there is no government to afford them the slightest relief!!!

‘You must draw your bills either on the Governor General’s Agent at Benares, or on the Collector there and at Moorsheadabad. Give notice of the draft to the Governor General, and to the person on whom it is drawn.

‘It will not answer to enter the expenses of the Residency with Scindiah in my military accounts.

‘I shall send the memorandum on the subject of Vittojee Patel to Captain Graham; but I suspect that this person is a relation of Mulwa Dada, who has been taken up for misbehaviour. If so, he cannot be released until Mulwa Dada shall have joined Scindiah; or until I shall have him hanged, which I certainly shall do if I can catch him.

‘The Eedlabad man shall be released, if I can effect this release.

‘I have written to Bengal fully upon the subject of your going home with the dispatches, and have recommended the arrangement for Mysore about which we spoke.

‘There is nothing new. The Rajah of Berar has given up that most unjust claim he made of the Soubah’s districts beyond the Wurda, and I have consequently sent him the orders for the evacuation of Gawilghur. He shall have the districts near the fort as soon as I can get some true accounts of their value from Rajah Mohiput Ram.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘Major Malcolm.’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 20th January, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 10th instant, upon the subject of the rice from Bengal and Canara. The difference between these two descriptions of rice is, that the former is boiled partly in the operation of breaking off the husk, the latter is not. The former, therefore, becomes harder, will keep longer, and is consequently more fit for a

magazine than the latter. Both are used by the natives, but those of some of the castes have an objection to that which has been boiled.

‘ Provided the rice which is sent is of a good quality, it is a matter of indifference to me whether it comes from Canara or from Bengal.

‘ I have likewise received your dispatch of the 6th, upon the subject of the pay department in Guzerat; and I am much concerned to observe, from a perusal of the papers, that disputes still exist, upon subjects that appear to me to be of no importance whatever; and supposing them to be important to the public interests, they are not referrible to the military officer.

‘ The principal point of dispute, at present, is a contract which has been given to a sircar, by name Serwaddy, to supply the troops with coin.

‘ I do not observe that any specific inconvenience has been stated, as resulting from the operations of that contract, excepting that coins of a bad description were received at one or two stations.

‘ I must observe that that is an inconvenience to which all troops are liable. Those under my command in this quarter have, for months, been paid in coins not current in this part of the country; but supposing that, or any other inconvenience, to result from the contract, the military officer can have no more to do with it than to report it to Government.

‘ The Government, particularly one situated as that of Bombay, must decide as to the propriety of continuing the contract, notwithstanding its inconveniences, even supposing them to be greater than they are.

‘ It is well known that the necessary expenses of the Government of Bombay are much larger than their means of defraying them; and particularly in the last year, from the aid afforded to this army, they exceed the ordinary means. It is possible also that the expenses in Guzerat exceed the means of the Government in that quarter.

‘ The military commanding officer in Guzerat, although he may be a proper person to report the inconvenience felt by the army, resulting from any particular mode of finding money for its payment, cannot be the proper person to decide upon the benefits or evils resulting generally to the public interests from its adoption. He cannot tell what has passed heretofore, and whether Government is in debt or otherwise to the contractor; he does not know whether the resources of Guzerat are equal to the payment of this army; (indeed in this instance it appears that he does not know the amount

of the expenses of his army;) and supposing that those resources are equal to his expenses, he cannot be aware to what other exigencies of the public service it might be convenient to the Government to apply them.

‘This reasoning scarcely requires to be applied; but I have to observe that in the late scarcity of specie at Bombay, in consequence of the demands of this army, among other causes, it might have been convenient to the Governor in Council to have brought the resources of Guzerat in coin to Bombay, and to have paid Serwaddy’s bills by bills upon Benares or Calcutta, or any other part of India. The military commanding officer in Guzerat, who could have no knowledge of the facts which occasioned this necessity, could not be a proper person to deliver an opinion upon the subject at all. Therefore it is not the commanding officer’s business to give an opinion upon this subject. He is to report inconveniences, if they should exist; it will rest with Government to balance them with others, and to decide upon the remedy to be applied.

‘I have written thus much upon this subject, because I observe that the Honorable the Governor in Council has contrary to his own judgment, abolished Serwaddy’s contract, only because it has been disapproved of by Colonel Murray.

‘The principle on which he has adopted this measure is that of obedience to the Governor General’s orders of the 23rd of November, a copy of which has been transmitted to me.

‘As I think it important to the public interests, which are certainly likely to suffer upon this occasion, as well as upon others,—upon which I have observed that the Governor in Council has adopted measures contrary to his own judgment,—I hope it will not be deemed presumptuous in me to declare that I do not conceive that his Excellency the Governor General ever intended, by his orders of the 23rd of November, that the Honorable the Governor in Council should, for a moment, suspend his salutary superintendence and control over all the military operations to the northward; much less that he should so far abdicate the duties peculiarly belonging to his office, as to alter a financial arrangement, only because it was disapproved of by one military officer under his orders.

‘I shall only advert to one or two objections made by Colonel Murray to the mode of payment adopted by Prendergast.

‘One of them is, that the troops are not paid till the 10th or 12th of the month. I believe, if the facts were ascer-

tained regarding the troops in all parts of India, it would be found that by far the majority were not paid till a later period in the month. Those in this army are paid when it is convenient; the payments to some are made early in the month, to others at a later period, according, as it may prove convenient, to the length of the marches, or the importance of the other operations carrying on. There are posts, hospitals, &c., belonging to this army, as well as to that in Guzerat; but I am sorry to say that however desirable that these (the hospital in particular) should be paid at an early period, I have not been able to effect that object, particularly for want of a Serwaddy, to give bills upon sircars at the different stations at which my posts, hospitals, and detachments are situated.

‘I have also to observe that although it is desirable that, under the system adopted for the payment of the army, and for finding funds for that purpose, the convenience of individuals should be accommodated, a system which does not accommodate individuals ought not to be departed from only for that reason. It appears that Serwaddy considers it a breach of his contract for the Paymaster to take up money from individual officers, and to grant bills upon Surat, which, as I understand the contract, it certainly is. It appears also that Government have been so kind as to provide means for the officers to remit their money to the coast; and if they do not choose to adopt these means, they can get bills from Serwaddy’s agents.

‘In my opinion Government do a great deal, if they have funds in camp to pay the troops regularly; and no individual ought to complain, if it should not suit the public interests to provide as he wishes for his private accommodation. In a very late instance, under the government of Fort St. George, the provincial Paymasters were positively forbidden to grant bills upon the Presidency. As there is no internal commerce in that part of the peninsula, the inconvenience felt by individuals was much greater than it could be in Guzerat, even if Government had not provided means of remittance for the officers of the army.

‘*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

*To the Officer commanding the British troops advancing from
Cuttack into the territories of the Rajah of Berar.*

‘SIR, .

‘Camp, 20th January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to inform you, that I have concluded a treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar on the 17th Decem-

ber, and received his ratification of it on the 22nd; and I have reason to believe that the copy of the treaty which I sent to the Governor General arrived at Calcutta on the 6th instant.

‘Under these circumstances, unless you should have received intelligence that his Excellency the Governor General has not ratified the treaty, and unless his Excellency should have ordered you to continue hostilities against the Rajah of Berar, I request you to stop them, and to halt until you shall have received further orders from his Excellency.

‘I also request that you will take measures that no injury may be done to Gadwar, Jeypoor, Ooreen, and Sumbulpoor; or any other places in the territories of the Rajah of Berar, and that you will not give an asylum to the zemindars of the country, with whom treaties may not have been concluded previous to the receipt of this letter.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*To the Officer commanding, &c.*’ ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘MY LORD.

‘Camp, 21st January, 1804.

‘I have the honor to enclose a dispatch of the 8th instant, which I have received from Mr. Elphinstone. Your Excellency will have been apprised by a subsequent dispatch of the 19th, that the Rajah of Berar had relinquished the claims which he had made to the territories of the Soubah of the Deccan, east of the Wurda.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

‘*The Governor General.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 21st January, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 12th instant, upon the subject of the claim of the medical gentlemen serving in Guzerat to an additional allowance.

‘This subject is one entirely referrible to the Bombay regulations, upon which I must beg leave to decline giving any opinion, excepting that, of all the liberal establishments of the Honorable Company, that of the medical department is the most so.

‘The custom on the Madras establishment is for a soldier to pay the surgeon $3\frac{1}{2}$ fanams per diem, when he is in hospital, either general or regimental, for his diet. The

Honorable Company incur no expense whatever on account of hospitals for European troops, excepting European medicines, and the allowance which they give for attendance, country medicines, &c., to the surgeons of European regiments.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

The Governor General.

‘ MY LORD,

‘ Camp, 21st January, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose the copy of a dispatch which I have addressed this day to the Governor of Bombay, from the perusal of which your Excellency will observe that, in obedience to your orders, through your Military Secretary, I have made arrangements for sending from Guzerat a regiment of European infantry to Fort William. The other arrangements proposed in that dispatch, if approved of by Mr. Duncan, will leave at Bombay two European regiments.

‘ As soon as I shall receive Mr. Duncan’s answer to this dispatch, in case he should approve of the arrangements recommended, I propose to ask his permission to resign the command of the troops in Guzerat ; as I am of opinion that the reference to me upon every question that arises occasions considerable delay and inconvenience ; and as peace is now concluded, no adequate benefit can be expected from my interference in Guzerat concerns.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *To the Governor General.*’ ‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

To Marquis Wellesley.

‘ MY DEAR MORNINGTON,

‘ Camp, 21st January, 1804.

‘ I have only this day received your letter of the 23rd of December, which had been transmitted by the Soubah’s dawk to Ellichpoor, and I am delighted to find that you are pleased with our battle of Argaum.

‘ I do not know whether I detailed the causes of the departure from the armistice, in that instance, in any of my public or private letters ; but they appear fully on the minutes of the conferences. The fact was, that Scindiah complied with none of the conditions of the armistice, which he had not ratified at that time, and I attacked him, as I gave notice to his vakeels that I should on the preceding day. They thought he was at too great a distance from me, and the intention of both Scindiah and Vincatjee Bhoonslah, in drawing up their

army and apparently offering battle, was to impose upon the troops, and induce them to believe that we wanted confidence in our own strength. They would have drawn off at night, and we should have been obliged to fight a more desperate battle, in a position more favorable to the enemy, under the guns of Gawilghur.

‘You will see, by one of the dispatches which I have written to you this day, that I have arranged to send a regiment of European infantry to Fort William, and that I have provided an efficient disposable corps for Guzerat, and an European garrison for Bombay.

‘I have written to Colonel Close to have his opinion upon some points relative to the subsidiary force with the Peshwah, and as soon as I receive his answer, I shall issue orders for the establishment of it. I propose to appoint Colonel Wallace to command it till your order shall be received. He is a brave soldier, in whom the troops have confidence. I shall leave the remains of the 7th with the subsidiary force for some time till we see how affairs settle at Scindiah’s durbar.

‘I am much annoyed by the lumbago, a disorder to which, I believe, all persons in camp are liable; and if I do not go into a house soon, I am afraid I shall walk like old Pomeroy for the remainder of my life. I do not propose, however, to break up till I shall receive the ratification of the treaty of peace; although I shall have all the preparatory arrangements made, such as subsidiary force established, &c. &c.

‘I am now going across the Godavery, to try if I cannot surprise and cut up the banditti upon the Nizam’s frontier. At all events, I shall disperse them.

‘Since the receipt of your letter of the 25th of November, Mr. Duncan has in a manner abdicated his government. I have written to him a public and a private letter, with a view to raise his spirits a little; and yesterday I wrote him a dispatch on the subject of Colonel Murray’s interference in one of his financial arrangements in Guzerat, in consequence of which, Mr. Duncan acted contrary to his own judgment; in which I told him that it was my opinion, that you never intended that he should cease his superintendence over the military affairs in Guzerat, or that he should abdicate the duties of his office. I mention this subject, because I think it will require a little explanation, but I only hope that the explanation will be of a healing nature.

‘I have allowed Colonel Stevenson to go to Madras for his health. He must go to England soon, or he will not live. Colonel Hallyburton now commands the Nizam’s subsidiary

force, in Colonel Stevenson's absence, and I recommend him as his successor, if Colonel Stevenson should go to England. He has been long at Hyderabad, and has served well during the campaign.

'I have generally written to Major Shawe for two reasons : first, because it was probable I should get an answer from him ; secondly, it was probable that this answer would contain intelligence of matters in Bengal, which it was desirable that I should have.

'Ever yours, most affectionately,

'*Marquis Wellesley.*'

'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

'Malcolm writes from Scindiah's camp, that at the first meeting Scindiah received him with great gravity, which he had intended to preserve throughout the visit. It rained violently ; and an officer of the escort, Mr. Pepper, an Irishman, (a nephew of old Bective's, by the bye,) sat under a flat part of the tent which received a great part of the rain that fell. At length it burst through the tent upon the head of Mr. Pepper, who was concealed by the torrent that fell, and was discovered after some time by an "*Oh Jasus !*" and an hideous yell. Scindiah laughed violently, as did all the others present ; and the gravity and dignity of the durbar degenerated into a Malcolm riot—after which they all parted upon the best terms.'

To the Governor of Bombay.

'HONORABLE SIR,

'Camp, 21st January, 1804.

'1. I received, some time ago, a letter from the Military Secretary of the Governor General, expressing the desire of his Excellency, that if I should think it possible to spare their services from this side of India, I should send a regiment of European infantry to Calcutta. I have now the honor to enclose a copy of that letter.

'2. At the time I received that letter, I did not deem it consistent with the public safety to send a regiment to Fort William, but the peace with the confederated Marhattas has made a great alteration in the situation of affairs in this quarter ; at the same time, the increase lately made to the Bombay army has added to your means. It will be proper now therefore, to send a regiment of European Infantry to Fort William, and I request you to give orders that tonnage be prepared for them, that they may embark when it is

prepared, and that you will apply to Admiral Rainier to give them a convoy.

‘3. When writing upon this subject, it is proper that I should address you on the future military arrangements in Guzerat. It is my opinion, that the proportion of European troops in that quarter is much larger than is necessary; the consequence is, that your expenses there are much increased, and the European troops stationed there are wanted, either for the security of Bombay, or for the service of other parts of India. In the course of a few days, I hope that I shall either have destroyed or dispersed the banditti who have been so long hanging upon the frontiers of the Soubah of the Deccan; and that I shall be able to take a position with this division of the army as near to Poonah as possible, consistently with the necessity of providing for its forage and easy subsistence. At that period I propose to send from Poonah the battalion of Bombay Native Infantry, at present stationed there, and I beg leave to recommend that it may be ordered to march into Guzerat through the Konkan.

‘4. When this battalion shall arrive in Guzerat, the troops there will have been reinforced by two battalions of native infantry; and one regiment of Europeans will have been drawn from thence, according to the request made in the first part of this letter, should you think proper to comply with it.

‘5. I am of opinion that you might then reduce still further the European force in Guzerat, by drawing away the detachments of the 84th, 88th, and 61st regiments, leaving in that quarter only two complete regiments of European infantry. If you should determine to send the 75th regiment to Fort William, I recommend that the detachments of the 88th and 61st regiments should go with it, as the 75th is not strong.

‘6. When the arrangements shall be made, I beg leave to recommend the following modification of the plan detailed in my letter of the 2nd of August.—First, I recommend that the European infantry should be withdrawn from the garrisons of Songhur, Parneira, Baroach, and Baroda; that one of the regiments of European infantry should be in the cantonments in front of Surat, and the other in camp or cantonments in front of Baroda.

‘7. According to the plan detailed in my letter of the 7th of August, which I imagine has been nearly carried into execution, there remained for service in the field, after providing for the garrison, two regiments of European infantry, and four battalions of native infantry, which were to have

been divided into two corps, one north of the Nerbudda, the other south of the Taptee. The success of the operations in the war, and the terms of the peace have made a great alteration in the situation of our affairs.

‘8. There is but little danger of an invasion south of the Taptee, but still it is necessary to provide effectually for the security of Surat. I should therefore recommend that besides the five hundred native infantry allotted in the letter of the 22nd August, and the regiment of European infantry in the cantonments, as above recommended, a battalion of native infantry may also be stationed either in, or in the neighborhood of that city. There will then remain a disposable corps for the service north of the Nerbudda, consisting of one regiment of European, and five battalions of native infantry; which, in case of war, or the existence of any urgent necessity, might be reinforced by the other regiments of European infantry from Surat.

‘9. I recommend that a healthy and convenient place in front of Baroda may be fixed upon for the cantonment of this corps; and that its proportion of field ordnance and stores may be either with it, or in the nearest garrison.

‘10. By this arrangement, by keeping the corps complete in numbers and in discipline, you will have a large disposable force in the most important point of the Company’s territories, whether considered with reference to the defence of their territories, and those of their allies, or to the attack of the only freebooter that remains.

‘11. Shortly after I shall send the Bombay native infantry from Poonah, I hope to be able also to send to Bombay the detachment of the 84th, stationed at Poonah, and the 78th regiment, which forms part of this army. These troops, together with the detachments of the 84th, 88th, and 61st from Guzerat, will render the garrison of Bombay as strong in European troops possibly as you may wish.

‘12. Thus, by these arrangements, which I recommend for your consideration and adoption, if you should approve of them, you will reinforce the Bengal army, in conformity to the wishes of his Excellency the Governor General; you will provide, for the service in Guzerat, a body of troops, whose services will not be so expensive as those at present stationed there; at the same time that the army in Guzerat will be composed of a due proportion of European and native infantry, you will provide a sufficient European garrison for Bombay.

‘I have the honor to be, &c.

The Governor of Bombay. ‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Colonel Murray.

' SIR,

' Camp, 21st January, 1804.

' I have received your public and private letters of the 27th December. Colonel Anderson acted exactly as he ought, and I only hope that very few of the Arabs may have escaped.

' I am sorry to observe, from the perusal of a voluminous correspondence which you have had with the Paymaster, and with the government of Bombay, on the subject of the Paymaster, that your disagreement with that public officer still continues.

' I notice this subject to you, because I have been obliged to enter into details upon it in my correspondence with the Government of Bombay. I dare say that you have seen my letter, if you should not, I apprise you that I think you ought not to have interfered respecting the contract with Serwaddy. That is a financial question, referrible entirely to the civil government, upon which we cannot form an opinion. Mr. Duncan alone can decide whether the inconveniences of the contract balance the conveniences which have been derived from it, and you ought to have done no more than report the inconveniences resulting from it.

' As I think the question is not for our consideration at all, and that, by interfering in it, we have taken upon ourselves an unnecessary responsibility to find funds for the payment of the army in Guzerat, in which, if the war had continued, we should undoubtedly have failed, I do not think it necessary to enter into any consideration of your reasoning upon the contract, although I am of opinion that you are mistaken in parts of it.

' In respect to the inconveniences experienced, that the troops do not get their pay until the 10th or 12th of the month, when I consider that by far the majority of the troops in India (particularly in Bengal) do not receive their pay till between the 20th and 30th of the month, I cannot conceive that your troops have much reason to complain; and in respect to the want of bills from the Paymaster by the officers, I have to observe, that the receipt of money from officers is a breach of Serwaddy's contract, by no means necessary, even for private convenience, as it appears that there was a mode of remitting money to the Coast provided by Government, and the officers could have got bills from Serwaddy's agent in camp. But private convenience must, in my opinion, be always a secondary consideration; and, therefore, even if there had been no mode of remittance to the Coast for

officers, those bills ought not to have been drawn by the Paymaster.

‘ Upon this subject I have to observe, that very recently the Government of Fort St. George ordered that the Paymasters might not draw bills upon the Presidency; but they did not provide means of remittance to the Coast for the officers of the army; although there is no internal commerce in that part of the peninsula, there was no such means excepting the transmission of cash.

‘ I mention these subjects to you, because I think it very desirable as well for yourself as for the public service, that you should draw well with the Government and its servants. For my part, I shall shortly resign my charge in this part of India, and, excepting as far as my wishes may go, I shall be indifferent to what passes. But I shall ever be sorry to hear that you misapply your talents by entering into these questions and disputes, and that you have thereby tired the government, and put it under a necessity not to employ you.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Colonel Murray.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Major Kirkpatrick.

‘ *SIR,*

‘ *Camp, 21st January, 1804.*

‘ I enclose a dispatch for his Excellency the Governor General.

‘ I have this instant received your dispatch of the 4th instant, and I have the pleasure to inform you that Lieutenant Ferrier is now with his convoy, and Captain Baynes’s detachment, at Umber, about seven miles from this camp.

‘ I hope to cross the Godavery on the day after to-morrow; and I intend to endeavor to cut up, if not, I shall disperse, the banditti on his Highness’s western frontier.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *Major Kirkpatrick.*’

‘ *ARTHUR WELLESLEY.*’

To Lieut. Colonel Close.

‘ *MY DEAR COLONEL,* ‘ *Camp at Paunchore 22nd, Jan. 1804.*

‘ I have received your letter of the 18th instant, and I am much concerned to find that you are indisposed. I trust that this letter will find you recovered in health.

‘ You will have observed by my letter to Mr. Duncan, which I sent you yesterday, that I am on my march on an expedition against a banditti on the frontier of the Soubah of the Deccan.

‘ I intend to cross the Godavery, if possible, to-morrow. As soon as I shall have either destroyed or dispersed this banditti, I shall place the troops in a situation in which they can get forage, and I shall go towards Poonah.

‘ I think that they will disperse as soon as they hear that I have crossed the Godavery.

‘ In respect to Amrut Rao, my fixed intention is, that he shall reside at Surat. There he shall receive the amount of his pension, which, with the provision for his adherents, is eight lacs of rupees annually.

‘ I have got from him orders to his killadar at Poonadur, and to his servants in different districts, to withdraw from them ; but I do not propose to make any use of those orders till the Peshwah consents to release those of Amrut Rao’s servants, and the families of his servants, whom he has confined, and restore their houses and property which he has seized. Amrut Rao’s property in Poonadur also, and the killadar and his family must be allowed to join Amrut Rao in security ; and a sum of fifty thousand rupees must be given to pay the arrears of the garrison of the fort. Indeed this sum of fifty thousand rupees was required some time ago, and I think it probable that those arrears now amount to more than that sum.

‘ Under this arrangement the Peshwah is required to do no more than an act of common humanity, and to spend fifty thousand rupees. If he does not choose to adopt this line of conduct, his government must take its chance. It is my opinion that the British Government cannot interfere with Amrut Rao, to obtain possession of the fort of Poonadur, till the Peshwah decides to release Amrut Rao’s servants, and to restore their property. I request you to procure a positive answer upon this subject one way or the other, as soon as you shall be sufficiently recovered.

‘ Upon the subject of your letter of the 7th instant, I have to observe, that it is impossible to propose any thing to Amrut Rao that is inconsistent with the treaty made with him, which has been approved of by the Governor General. I rather think you wrote that letter under the notion that, in my letter of the 14th December, I wished that the old servants of the state, the adherents of Nana Furnavees, should be released from their confinement, as a *sine quâ non*. Amrut Rao recommended that measure to me, and I recommended it to your consideration, as the most probable mode of settling the country. I insisted only upon a release of Amrut Rao’s servants, and the families of his servants, (of whom I sent you, I am sorry to say, a very long list,) and the restoration of their houses in Poonah and their property.

‘ I do not wish to go into a consideration of the question respecting the revival of Nana’s party in the state, but we are all agreed, that till the Peshwah is reconciled to Amrut Rao, his government cannot be settled ; and I repeat that he cannot be reconciled to Amrut Rao, if he continues his cruel usage of his servants.

‘ Goklah was with me last night, and made a proposition, the meaning of which I cannot comprehend. He said that Munkaiseer’s brother had received letters from Poonah, stating that the Peshwah was willing to be reconciled to his brother, provided the measures to bring about the reconciliation should be consistent with his dignity. Upon inquiring what the measures were, Goklah said that I must send a message by Munkaiseer’s brother to the Peshwah, on the subject, and a person to you ; I do not understand all this manœuvring, and I shall therefore beg to communicate with his Highness in the ordinary official channel. I have received another letter and message from Baba Phurkia ; he throws himself upon the mercy of the Company, and asks only for a place in which his life will be in safety.

‘ The war will be eternal if nobody is ever to be forgiven ; and I certainly think that the British Government cannot intend to make the British troops the instruments of the Peshwah’s revenge. You must decide what is to be done with this person. I have ordered him to quit the Nizam’s territories, and not to come near this army. The answer of the vakeel is natural. It is, “ Where is a man to go, who is not to be allowed to remain in the territories of the Company or of the Company’s allies ? ” When the empire of the Company is so great, little dirty passions must not be suffered to guide its measures.

‘ I have the pleasure to inform you that I have settled the question with the Rajah of Berar, and have given him the fort of Gawilghur.

‘ Believe me, &c.

‘ *Lieut. Colonel Close.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To the Governor General.

‘ MY LORD, ‘ Camp at Paunchore, 22nd January, 1804.

‘ I have the honor to enclose a dispatch for your Excellency from Mr. Elphinstone. The accounts which I have received from Berar agree that all the troops have been withdrawn from thence.

‘ I have the honor to be, &c.

‘ *The Governor General.*

‘ ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

To Major Malcolm.

‘Camp, 4 miles north of the Godavery,
‘MY DEAR MALCOLM, 23rd January, 1804.

‘I return Mr. Pasley’s letter, and I assure you that I condole with you for the loss which you have sustained. My letter of the 14th, I believe required no answer; at all events, none to induce you to give yourself any trouble at such a time.

‘I believe I told you in my last letter that every thing was settled at Ragojee’s durbar, respecting the countries beyond the Wurda; nothing remains now but the country of the value of four lacs annually.

‘Ragojee is dismissing his troops, and is apparently inclined to preserve the peace. The dismissal of the troops would not be a proof of that inclination; as in fact it may, and possibly will, be the cause of the Berar country being plundered. But the dismissal is attended by mutinies and military outrages, in which both the Rajah and his minister have been exposed to personal risk; and I think that they would not incur this risk if they were not in earnest.

‘Elphinstone gets on capitally; his dispatches are really excellent, and Ramchunder tells me that the Rajah and his ministers are much pleased with him.

‘I expect Strachey in a day or two. He was to leave Ahmednuggur yesterday, and I shall not detain him for one moment.

‘Colonel Close has been very ill, and confined to his bed with fever. We stand where we were at Poonah; nothing done about Amrut Rao.

‘This chief has given me orders for the surrender of all his territories, the fort of Poonadur, &c. &c.

‘Upon my arrival at Jalnapoor I received a deputation from the town of Bheer, stating that if I did not move quickly to their assistance, the town would be destroyed by the rebels. Consequently I moved on, and have formed a plan for surrounding the banditti, and attacking them from several quarters at the same time. I shall cross the Godavery to-morrow, with a view to carry this plan into execution; and I hope either to destroy or disperse these villains in three or four days. They are in an unfavorable position for the execution of the plan, being at the top of a ghaut; but I have some hopes that I shall succeed.

‘Webbe had not left Hurryhur on the 11th, but was prepared to leave it.

‘Nothing new from Hyderabad, excepting that the Soubah has threatened to murder the minister. The latter has asked for and received the protection of an additional guard of British troops.

‘*Major Malcolm.*’

‘Believe me, &c.

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

· *To Major Malcolm.*

‘Camp, 7 miles south of the Godavery,

‘MY DEAR MALCOLM, 24th January, 1804.

‘I have just received your letter of the 19th: that of the 18th has not yet reached me; and I therefore can say nothing upon the draft of the treaty which you say it contains.

‘I am glad to see that Mr. Duncan bears his letter from Bengal so well. I have publicly disapproved of Murray’s conduct respecting Serwaddy, and also respecting his treatment of the Guickwar sirdars; and have recommended to the Governor General, in a private letter, to dismiss him from his situation. I had recommended the same to Mr. Duncan, but I fancy he will not attend to my recommendation.

‘I write again this day to Rajah Mohiput Ram respecting the release of the zemindar of Eedlabad.

‘I am delighted with Scindiah’s treatment of the pindaries. I only fear that the measure will throw more power into the hands of Holkar. But probably this may be a very usual mode of settling accounts of arrears with troops.

‘I apprized you yesterday of my intentions respecting the freebooters in this quarter.

‘Colonel Close is obliged to quit Poonah, and go to the coast for the recovery of his health. He had fever for eight days without intermission. Mr. Frissell is in charge of the Residency.

‘Believe me, &c.

‘*Major Malcolm.*’

‘ARTHUR WELLESLEY.’

‘P.S.—The lands held by Ambajee belonged principally to the Peshwah: 13 lacs of rupees only, I believe, to Scindiah.

‘I shall look over the treaty, and return it to-morrow.

‘I have received your letter of the 18th, which, by the bye, had been opened.

· *To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.*

‘SIR,

‘Camp, 24th January, 1804.

‘I have had the honor of receiving your letter of the 18th instant.

‘There are at present in the depôts at Poonah and Ahmednuggur, about 20,000 bags of rice; besides about 5000 with

the army, and nearly as much with Colonel Stevenson's division. Under these circumstances, and the alteration of the general situation of affairs, in consequence of the peace, I rather think that it will not be necessary to send a larger quantity of rice to Poonah than is at that place at present.

'At all events, supposing that it should be necessary to send it up at a later period than in the month of April, the inconvenience and expense will not be equal to what might be suffered by the want, at Bombay, of a supply for other quarters; and to the loss which might be sustained by having in hand at Poonah so large a quantity of rice, for which there would be no consumption.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Sec. of Gov. Bombay.*' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

To the Secretary of Government, Bombay.

'Sir,

'Camp, 24th January, 1804.

'I have had the honor of receiving your dispatch of the 16th instant, upon the subject of Mr. De Souza's house. Upon a former occasion, I took the liberty of recommending that Lieut. Colonel ——— might be removed from the command of Baroach, which I now beg leave to repeat.

'In respect to Mr. De Souza's house, it is impossible for me to determine, without further inquiry, whether it does, or does not, belong to him. The only mode for determining that, will be for the Honorable the Governor in Council to give orders that the civil authority on the spot may make the necessary inquiries.

'I have recommended that Lieut. Colonel ——— may be removed from his situation, because he seized the house, which was an improper act of authority, whether the house did, or did not, belong to Mr. De Souza.

'I have the honor to be, &c.

'*The Sec. of Gov., Bombay.*' 'ARTHUR WELLESLEY.'

END OF VOLUME II.

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